BRANDIE CUNNINGHAM, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus THOMAS CASTLOO, Defendant—Appellant.
No. 20-40082
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
December 18, 2020
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:19-CV-18
Before JOLLY, SOUTHWICK, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
This interlocutory appeal presents the question whether Sheriff Thomas Castloo enjoys qualified immunity from Brandie Cunningham‘s
I
As laid out above, Sheriff Castloo appeals a summary judgment denying him qualified immunity from this lawsuit. In our review, then, we take Cunningham‘s version of the facts as true. See Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 347-48 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Brandie Cunningham joined the Wood County Sheriff‘s Office as a deputy in April 2016. Before that, she worked at the Hopkins County Jail. And before that, she worked as a mental health specialist in the military. Her military duties included reviewing discharge forms, known as DD214s.1
During Cunningham‘s stint at the Hopkins County Jail, one of her superiors had asked her to review the DD214 of a jailer named David McGee. Cunningham concluded, based on her military experience, that the DD214 was “altered.”
Like Cunningham, McGee moved from Hopkins County to Wood County. By January 2017, he had become a supervisor at the Wood County Jail. His friend, Thomas Castloo, had taken office as Wood County Sheriff on January 1. The events that led to this litigation occurred over a one-week period, beginning on Wednesday, January 18.
On Wednesday the 18th, Cunningham approached Tony Crouse, a Wood County criminal investigator, and asked how she could “go about filing a federal crime.” She believed that she had an obligation to report that, in her opinion, McGee‘s DD214 had been altered. Crouse told Cunningham to bring her concerns to Sheriff Castloo.
On Thursday the 19th, Cunningham and Crouse met with Sheriff Castloo. Cunningham told Sheriff Castloo that she suspected that McGee had altered his DD214. She did not think she was violating her chain of command by bringing her concerns to Crouse and Sheriff Castloo. She spoke to Crouse first because she knew him from Hopkins County. And she spoke to Sheriff Castloo next because Crouse “instructed” her to do so and because she thought that Sheriff Castloo was McGee‘s supervisor. After the meeting, Cunningham told her chain of command what she had reported. She also told at least one person outside her chain of command—Deputy Justin Bowring.
On Friday the 20th, Cunningham met with Sheriff Castloo and Chief Deputy Bobby Sanders. Sheriff Castloo called Cunningham a “liar” and said that “the only reason” she “was doing this to McGee was because [she] hated him.” Sheriff Castloo asked her “numerous times” how many people she had told about her suspicion that McGee had altered his DD214. She gave Sheriff Castloo the names of everyone she told within her chain of command. Because Sheriff Castloo was yelling at her, however, she says that she forgot that she had told Deputy Bowring. Neither Sheriff Castloo nor Chief Deputy Sanders told Cunningham that she was under investigation for lying and violating the chain of command.
Later that day, Cunningham remembered that she had told Deputy Bowring of
That night, Cunningham received a call from Lieutenant William Burge. Lieutenant Burge told her to report to Sheriff Castloo‘s office on Monday morning. She asked Lieutenant Burge if she “was going to be able to speak with” Sheriff Castloo. Lieutenant Burge responded that she “was not allowed to speak with the [S]heriff that day,” but she could speak to him on Monday morning.
On the morning of Monday the 23rd, Cunningham met with Chief Deputy Sanders, Lieutenant Burge, and Captain Holland. Thereupon, she was fired for “improper use of chain of command and lying.” She was not told how she had lied or how her “use” of the chain of command was “improper.” She “ask[ed] to speak with the [S]heriff at that time,” but “they would not allow [her] to talk to him.” She did not receive a written notice describing the charges against her, nor was she “allowed” to respond to the oral charges made against her. When she tried to speak, Chief Deputy Sanders cut her off, saying, “I don‘t need to hear anything further from you . . . .”2
The next day, Sheriff Castloo signed Cunningham‘s F-5. The F-5 is filed with the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement and indicates the nature of an officer‘s discharge: honorable, dishonorable, or general. Sheriff Castloo designated the discharge as “dishonorable,” which is the “only option” when the employee is “found guilty of either lying or lack of clarity.” Since Cunningham was dishonorably discharged, she has not found further work.
Cunningham sued Wood County and Sheriff Castloo—in his individual and official capacities—in federal court under
After discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied Cunningham‘s motion in full and granted Wood County and Sheriff Castloo‘s motion in part, dismissing all but the procedural-due-process claims against Sheriff Castloo and Wood County. Although Sheriff Castloo raised a qualified-immunity defense to that claim, the district court held that Cunningham had “successfully rebutted” it. The district court said that factual disputes, when resolved in Cunningham‘s favor, established a procedural-due-process violation and satisfied qualified-immunity‘s constitutional-violation prong. Qualified immunity‘s clearly established prong was met, the district court reasoned, because Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), and Bledsoe v. City of Horn Lake, 449 F.3d 650 (5th Cir. 2006), had “placed beyond debate” Cunningham‘s “liberty interest in the opportunity to clear her name of stigmatizing charges.”
Sheriff Castloo timely filed this interlocutory appeal.3
We begin with our jurisdiction and the standard of review. Sheriff Castloo challenges the denial of qualified immunity on summary judgment. That denial is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine to the extent that it turned on an issue of law. Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 261 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc). We lack jurisdiction to review the genuineness of the factual disputes the district court identified, but we have jurisdiction to review their materiality. Id. That means “our review is limited to determining whether the factual disputes that the district court identified are material to the application of qualified immunity.” Samples v. Vadzemnieks, 900 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis omitted) (citing Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001)). We review legal conclusions, materiality determinations, and the scope of clearly established law de novo. Amador v. Vasquez, 961 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).
In determining materiality, we take Cunningham‘s version of the facts as true and view those facts through the lens of qualified immunity. See Samples, 900 F.3d at 660. If Sheriff Castloo would still be entitled to qualified immunity under this view of the facts, then any disputed facts are not material, the district court‘s denial of summary judgment was improper, and we must reverse. See Lytle v. Bexar Cnty., 560 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2009).
These precepts are clear, though perhaps less so to Cunningham. She contends that we lack jurisdiction because the district court said that it found genuine disputes of material fact. Not so. The mere fact that the district court said that, in its view, material factual disputes preclude summary judgment does not deprive us of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722, 729 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Although the district court explicitly stated that material fact issues remain . . . this in itself does not preclude appellate review.“). We may of course decide whether the factual disputes the district court said were material are in fact material. See Melton, 875 F.3d at 261.
Assured of our jurisdiction, we turn to the merits.
III
Sheriff Castloo contends the district court erred in denying him qualified immunity on summary judgment. We begin with the doctrine of qualified immunity. We next lay out the underlying substantive law that dictates whether Sheriff Castloo is entitled to the defense. We last apply the substantive law and doctrine to the facts of this case.
A
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability in their individual capacity so long as their conduct “‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.‘” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). It “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.‘” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
Our qualified-immunity inquiry is two-pronged. Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2020). First, we ask
The “clearly established” prong is difficult to satisfy. See Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019). A right is “clearly established” only if it “is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11. We must define the right “with specificity.” City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S.Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (per curiam) (citation and quotation marks omitted). A case “directly on point” is not required, but “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). In other words, “there must be adequate authority at a sufficiently high level of specificity to put a reasonable official on notice that his conduct is definitively unlawful.” Vincent v. City of Sulphur, 805 F.3d 543, 547 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). This rule is a “demanding standard,” Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (citation omitted), and the Supreme Court “repeatedly” has told us “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. Ultimately, “[t]he dispositive question is whether the violative nature of the particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (citation omitted). We undertake that inquiry “in [the] light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id. (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)).
When an official raises qualified immunity on summary judgment, as Sheriff Castloo did here, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the defense does not apply. See Bryant v. Gillem, 965 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2020). To meet that burden, the plaintiff must present evidence, viewed in her favor, satisfying both qualified-immunity prongs by showing that the defendant (1) violated a constitutional right (2) that was clearly established at the time of the defendant‘s conduct. See id. We turn now to examine whether Cunningham has made such a showing.
B
The
C
Thus, against this background of qualified immunity and the substantive law of the
The cited cases, however, do not reflect clearly established law under the facts presented in this case. Neither Constantineau nor Bledsoe “clearly prohibit[ed] the [Sheriff‘s] conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” Wesby, 138 S.Ct. at 590.
Constantineau is far afield. 400 U.S. at 434. That case involved a constitutional challenge to a state law allowing the public posting, without notice or a hearing, of notices forbidding the sale of alcohol to particular individuals. Id. at 434-35. Besides articulating general principles of procedural due process, that case has no application to this one. Id.; see, e.g., Vincent, 805 F.3d at 547 (explaining that “abstract or general statements of legal principle untethered to analogous or near-analogous facts are not sufficient to establish a right ‘clearly’ in a given context“).
Bledsoe is also unhelpful to Cunningham‘s case. 449 F.3d at 651. In Bledsoe, we affirmed a summary judgment dismissing a procedural-due-process claim premised on the alleged denial of a request for a name-clearing hearing, holding that the plaintiff never requested such a hearing. Id. at 655. We found no procedural-due-process violation. Id. So Bledsoe—even if it were factually similar (and it is not)4—is
The district court‘s reliance on broad pronouncements from Constantineau and Bledsoe evinces a methodological error: It defined clearly established law too generally for any controlling relevance in this case. Courts must “frame the constitutional question with specificity and granularity.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874-75. The district court did not do that. Instead, the district court appears to have asked whether, generally, the procedural-due-process right to a name-clearing hearing was clearly established. That wording is the wrong way to frame the question, as the Supreme Court repeatedly has told us. See, e.g., Emmons, 139 S.Ct. at 503-04 (reversing Ninth Circuit for framing clearly established law too generally); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1154-55 (2018) (per curiam) (same); Wesby, 138 S.Ct. at 593 (same, D.C. Circuit); White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548, 552-53 (2017) (per curiam) (same, Tenth Circuit); Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 18-19 (same, this court); Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 20 (2014) (per curiam) (same, Third Circuit); Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 670 (2012) (same, Tenth Circuit); al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743-44 (same, Ninth Circuit).
“The dispositive question,” we emphasize, is whether “the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12. The answer here is no.
To further explain that compact response, we begin by describing the particular conduct for which Cunningham seeks to hold Sheriff Castloo liable. See Wesby, 138 S.Ct. at 590. Sheriff Castloo‘s subordinates—Chief Deputy Sanders, Lieutenant Burge, and Captain Holland—met with Cunningham and fired her for “improper use of chain of command and lying,” without further explanation. In response, Cunningham asked “to speak with the Sheriff,” but Sheriff Castloo‘s subordinates did not “allow” her to do so. Sheriff Castloo was not present at the meeting, and there is no evidence that he instructed his subordinates to deny Cunningham‘s request “to speak with” him.
Having first described Sheriff Castloo‘s particular conduct, as reflected by the summary-judgment record and viewed in Cunningham‘s favor, we now ask whether the “violative nature,” vis-à-vis the Constitution, was clearly established. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12.
We conclude that it was not.5 Specifically, the law was not clearly established that Cunningham‘s request “to speak with”
Cunningham‘s request “to speak with” Sheriff Castloo would not have provided Cunningham a “public forum” of any sort; it would have resulted only in a private audience with Sheriff Castloo. See Bledsoe, 449 F.3d at 654. That fact alone distinguishes this case from Rosenstein, in which case “[t]he appeals procedure would [have] provide[d] the officer ‘with a public forum to clear his name before the governing body that discharged him.‘” Id. (quoting Rosenstein, 876 F.2d at 396).
All told, Cunningham has failed to cite “adequate authority at a sufficiently high level of specificity” to put Sheriff Castloo “on notice that his conduct is definitively unlawful.” Vincent, 805 F.3d at 547 (citing Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). She therefore failed to satisfy her burden of defeating Sheriff Castloo‘s claim of qualified immunity. Sheriff Castloo is entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court erred in denying that defense.
IV
We sum up. In this opinion, we have fully accepted Cunningham‘s version of the summary-judgment record as true. We have held that, even under this view of the record, Sheriff Castloo is entitled to qualified immunity. The law was not clearly established that Sheriff Castloo‘s particular conduct violated Cunningham‘s procedural-due-process right to a name-clearing hearing. Because the alleged violative nature of Sheriff Castloo‘s conduct was not clearly established as unconstitutional, we REVERSE the district court‘s denial of qualified immunity and REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.