29 F.4th 246
5th Cir.2022Background
- Barbara Lollar purchased a 365‑acre tract subject to a promissory note (the "Note"); Lucky sued Lollar in state court and obtained a judgment authorizing seizure and a sheriff’s sale of the Note to satisfy that judgment.
- State law required two party appraisers and, if their valuations diverged, a third appraiser whose valuation sets the minimum bid. Lollar’s appraiser valued the Note at ~$1.48M; Lucky’s at ~$173K, triggering a third appraisal.
- The sheriff’s office (deputy and supervisors) did not know a suitable third appraiser and accepted a recommendation from Lucky’s counsel to appoint Patrick Lacour; Lacour issued a ~$157K valuation without reviewing the Note.
- An entity controlled by Lucky’s family bought the Note at the sheriff’s sale for $105K (near the minimum bid); Lollar sued Lucky and Sheriff Julian Whittington in federal court alleging deprivation of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and parallel state‑law and state constitutional claims.
- The district court denied the Sheriff qualified immunity on the § 1983 and related claims; the Sheriff appealed interlocutorily. The Fifth Circuit reviews legal consequences of undisputed facts and views facts in favor of the non‑movant.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity on Lollar's individual‑capacity § 1983 due‑process claim | Lollar: sheriff (through office) deprived her of notice/hearing at the sale; office conduct caused violation | Whittington: no evidence the Sheriff was personally involved; § 1983 does not impose vicarious liability, so he is entitled to immunity | Reversed denial of qualified immunity — Sheriff entitled to qualified immunity because Lollar produced no evidence of his personal involvement |
| Whether state constitutional due‑process claim survives given federal immunity principles | Lollar: state claim parallels federal due‑process claim and should proceed | Whittington: federal qualified immunity analysis applies and bars relief against him in his individual capacity | Reversed denial as to state constitutional claim — same reasoning as § 1983 claim; immunity applies |
| Whether Sheriff’s plea of Louisiana state discretionary immunity was timely | Lollar: discretionary immunity not properly raised or proven | Whittington: entitled to state discretionary immunity under Louisiana law | Affirmed denial on procedural grounds — Sheriff raised discretionary immunity only in a reply brief; district court permissibly declined to consider it; merits not decided |
Key Cases Cited
- Hogan v. Cunningham, 722 F.3d 725 (5th Cir. 2013) (interlocutory review limits for qualified immunity)
- Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2004) (scope of issues permissible on interlocutory review)
- Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1988) (§ 1983 does not impose vicarious liability)
- Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 1999) (personal involvement / causal connection standard)
- Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2010) (burden shifting at summary judgment when qualified immunity raised)
- Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying federal qualified immunity principles to parallel state constitutional claims)
- Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2006) (courts may decline issues first raised in reply briefs)
