LYNN TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1037, AFT, AFL-CIO, vs. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
Essex. September 11, 1989. - January 22, 1990.
406 Mass. 515
Present: LIACOS, C.J., WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH, O‘CONNOR, & GREANEY, JJ.
Employment, Discrimination. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Anti-Discrimination Law, Employee, Sex, Maternity leave, Prima facie case, Burden of proof. Statute, Construction.
The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination correctly determined that the exemption embodied in
Complainants before a commissioner of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination established a prima facie case that a certain union seniority system unlawfully discriminated against them, where they demonstrated that they were denied seniority credit as the result of being unlawfully forced to resign their employment on account of pregnancy. [526-527] GREANEY, J., concurring.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 28, 1985.
The case was heard by John T. Ronan, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court granted a request for direct appellate review.
Deborah L. McCutcheon for the plaintiff.
Jean A. Musiker for Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.
The union challenges the judge‘s decision, claiming that the original complaint filed with the commission was barred by the six-month filing limitation of
We agree with the judge‘s decision that the commission‘s findings of fact are supported by the evidence and that its determination that the situation presented a continuing violation was not erroneous as matter of law. We affirm. We summarize the facts as found by the hearing commissioner.1
Angelli applied for, and was granted, a maternity leave for the 1962-1963 school year. Her first child was born on December 31, 1962, and her second child was born in August, 1964. Under the rules of the school committee, Angelli could not return to work at the beginning of the 1964-1965 school year in September. Because Angelli had not returned from her maternity leave within two years, the school committee treated her as having resigned her position, effective September, 1964. Angelli took a part-time teaching position in the Lynn school system in April, 1976, returning to full-time teaching duties in September, 1977.
During the summer of 1970, Carol Griffin learned that she was pregnant and would deliver in early 1971. Griffin had been employed as a teacher in the Lynn public schools since September, 1968. Because Griffin was not a tenured teacher, she was not entitled to maternity leave and was forced to
The plaintiff union was certified in November, 1966, as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for all classroom teachers in Lynn. A collective bargaining agreement between the school committee and the union governed the terms and conditions of employment for Angelli and Griffin, both of whom were union members.2 At all times material to this case, the collective bargaining agreement provided that seniority of employees would be computed according to the number of ”consecutive years of experience in the Lynn School Department” (emphasis added). Because the maternity policy had forced Angelli and Griffin to leave their jobs, their total years of employment within the Lynn school system were not consecutive. Thus, the seniority system embodied in the collective bargaining agreement did not credit either Angelli or Griffin for those years of employment preceding pregnancy and subsequent resignation.
In June, 1980, Griffin began to inquire about obtaining seniority credit for her preresignation employment. Her efforts at that time were unsuccessful. In November, 1980, the Massachusetts electorate voted to implement Proposition 2 1/2. St. 1980, c. 580. Anticipating a layoff of teaching personnel due to Proposition 2 1/2, the union requested that the school committee delineate each teacher‘s seniority.
On March 4, 1981, both Angelli and Griffin (complainants) filed a “charge of discrimination” with the commission against the school committee for its failure to credit the complainants for their service prior to the forced resignations. It was not until March 18, 1981, when the school committee distributed the seniority list which the union had requested,
In August, 1982, the school committee voted to grant Griffin and Angelli seniority credit for their preresignation service. The union, however, grieved the committee‘s decision as a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. An arbitrator upheld the grievance, and, as a result, both teachers were sent a termination notice. Griffin and Angelli filed amended complaints in November, 1982, naming the union as well as the school committee as respondents.
On February 21, 1985, the hearing commissioner issued her decision finding that the union had discriminated against the complainants on the basis of their sex in violation of
In the present case, the commission decided that the union‘s failure to credit the complainants for their preresignation seniority was a continuing violation, thereby releasing the complainants from the six-month filing limitation of
The commission found a continuing violation of
The union claims that the application of a facially neutral seniority system cannot be considered a discriminatory act for the purposes of the continuing violation rule, even though it gives present effect to a past act of discrimination. The union points to the decision in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), in support of its contention.7 We find its arguments unpersuasive.
The union argues that the seniority system does not treat the complainants any differently than “any other employee, male or female, who returned to teaching after several years absence, whether the initial separation was voluntary or involuntary.” But the union has failed to consider the more telling issue whether the seniority system discerns between “initial separations” which are legal and those which are illegal. We are not concerned with the seniority system‘s responsiveness to the desires of those teachers who leave their jobs voluntarily; rather, we are concerned with the seniority system‘s responsiveness to the rights of those teachers who are forced to leave. A seniority system which is so “facially neutral” that it ignores prior discriminatory acts against its members, to the detriment of those members, presents a ready vehicle for application of the continuing violation rule.
In Rock v. Massachusetts Comm‘n Against Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 207 (1981), we described the purpose of the continuing violation rule as “[permitting the commission] to remedy ongoing discriminatory policies.” In the present case, that purpose is met by the commission‘s application of the continuing violation rule. The union‘s refusal to credit the complainants’ preresignation seniority springs directly
The commission has been charged with the task of combating discrimination in the Commonwealth and, pursuant to its statutory powers, has developed the continuing violation rule to assist in carrying out its legislative mandate. To limit the continuing violation rule to the interpretation proposed by the union would be to strip the rule of its vitality, while allowing the dead hand of past discrimination to reach out to revisit illegal discrimination upon its past victims again and anew. To this we cannot agree.
2. The seniority system and application of
The union presented this same argument to both the commissioner and the commission, and in each instance it was rejected. As we review the validity of the commission‘s decision, we keep in mind that “[a]n agency‘s interpretation of a statute, under which it is vested with broad authority to effectuate the purposes thereof, is entitled to great weight.” Polednak v. Rent Control Board of Cambridge, 397 Mass. 854, 858 (1986). Therefore, the commission‘s determination that the statutory exemption did not apply in the present situation is not to be disregarded lightly.
The commissioner noted that § 4 (17) (a) was inserted in
This court has recognized that, “[w]hile the title to an act cannot control the provisions of the statute, the title may be used for the purpose of ascertaining its proper limitations.” Commonwealth v. Graham, 388 Mass. 115, 120 (1983). American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 388 Mass. 468, 474 (1983). Similarly, we have held that, in interpreting a statute this court may consider “the cause of [the statute‘s] enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished.” O‘Brien v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 393 Mass. 482, 488 (1984), quoting Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm‘n, 367 Mass. 360, 364 (1975).
The title and provisions of c. 266 make clear the intent of the Legislature to focus exclusively on the problem of age discrimination in the workplace. General Laws c. 151B addresses issues of discrimination on the basis of race, color, religious creed, national origin, age, sex, or ancestry. However, c. 266 refers explicitly only to age discrimination in its
We agree with the commissioner that, by its addition of paragraph (17) (a) to
A prima facie case of employment discrimination can be based on a theory of disparate impact or disparate treatment.10 School Comm. of Braintree v. Massachusetts Comm‘n Against Discrimination, 377 Mass. 424, 428 (1979). The complainants chose to present the matter to the hearing commissioner as one of disparate treatment. A prima facie case of disparate treatment requires that the challenging party make a showing that he or she was discriminated against in employment on the basis of illegal considerations. Id. In addition, the challenging party must prove discriminatory intent or motive. Smith College v. Massachusetts Comm‘n Against Discrimination, 376 Mass. 221, 227 (1978).
Based on our review of the entire record, we discern no error of law in the commission‘s decision; we conclude that the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court affirming the decision of the commission contains no error.
Judgment affirmed.
GREANEY, J. (concurring). I join in the result but think the more proper inquiry might be whether the aspect of the seniority system under consideration is “bona fide.” The exception contained in
LYNCH, J. (dissenting, with whom O‘Connor, J., joins). I cannot agree that the seniority system exception contained in
General Laws c. 151B contains a comprehensive legislative scheme prohibiting unlawful discrimination. Section 4 (2) makes it unlawful for a labor organization to discriminate against any of its members “because of race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, age, ancestry . . . or handicap.” The seniority system exception contained in paragraph (17) of that section states, in pertinent part, that
“[n]otwithstanding any provisions of this chapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for any . . . labor organization . . . to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system” (emphasis supplied).
The court reads this exception out of the statute by discerning a legislative purpose from the title to the Act adopting
The starting point of my analysis is the language of the statute itself, “the principal source of insight into legislative purpose.” Simon v. State Examiners of Electricians, 395 Mass. 238, 242 (1985), quoting Commonwealth v. Lightfoot, 391 Mass. 718, 720 (1984). It is, of course, axiomatic that in interpreting a statute we give meaning to each of its provisions. See Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453 (1987); Casa Loma, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm‘n, 377 Mass. 231, 234 (1979). It seems to me that not only does the court fail to apply the plain meaning of the statute, but eliminates the word “chapter” from its interpretation, in effect giving the word no meaning at all. Chapter 151B prohibits unlawful discrimination. The same section of c. 151B (§ 4), that regulates the conduct of labor organizations in this regard, provides an exception for bona fide seniority systems from any of the provisions of the chapter. In other words, seniority systems are exempt from the comprehensive legislative scheme prohibiting unlawful discrimination. There is no ambiguity. Even if one were to suggest that the word “chapter” should be read as meaning section, the result does not change. That reading would mean the seniority systems are exempt from the antidiscrimination laws that apply to labor organizations. The court is able to discern a legislative purpose contrary to the statute‘s plain meaning by ascribing talismanic powers to the title to the act adopting the exception. Not only does this ascribe an unheard of significance to the Act‘s title, but it is neither compelled by logic nor consistent with the realities of the legislative process. The court pays lip service to the traditional rule of statutory construction, but ignores its application. The traditional rule is that a title to an Act cannot control the plain provisions of a statute although it may be a guide to resolving an ambiguity in the legislation. Breault v. Ford Motor Co., 364 Mass. 352, 353-354 n.2 (1973). Here the court looks to the title to find the ambiguity. Thus the title controls the statutory language. Such a construction stands the rule on its head.
Furthermore, there is no inconsistency between the Act‘s title and the broad reading of the exception required by its plain meaning. If the court is correct in concluding that the “intent of the Legislature [was] to focus exclusively on the problem of age discrimination in the workplace,” ante at 524, then insulating a bona fide seniority clause from attack based upon all forms of discrimination is consistent with this purpose. This is so because by definition seniority clauses protect the oldest workers in terms of service. This almost always equates with chronological age, and thus the application of seniority clauses according to their terms, protects older workers and reduces the opportunities for discrimination against a worker because of age. For the same reason limiting the exception to age discrimination is to so narrow its application as to make it practically meaningless. Since, as I have pointed out, the natural tendency of the seniority clause is to protect older workers, there is no need that such clauses be insulated from attack based on age discrimination.
In addition, the court‘s interpretation of the statute is contrary to the one Federal courts have given the parallel provision of Title VII, the Federal law proscribing employment discrimination. Section 703(h) of Title VII,
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different terms, conditions or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”
The United States Supreme Court has construed § 703(h) to “make clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title VII,” International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 352 (1977), and to “defin[e] what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice in instances in which the post-Act operation of a seniority system is challenged as perpetuating the effects” of pre-Title VII discrimination. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 761 (1976). The Title VII bona fide seniority system exemption has since been frequently invoked in diverse contexts, including actions charging discrimination on the basis of race (see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, supra, Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., supra; sex (see United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 [1977]; Lorance v. A T & T Technologies, 109 S. Ct. 2261 [1989]) and national origin (see Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 [1980]). Since there is no essential difference between the wording of the bona fide seniority system provisions of the Federal statute and
Finally, by exalting the Act‘s title as it does, the court ignores the reality of the legislative process. The legislative history of c. 266 demonstrates that it is an amalgam of fourteen separate bills forged by the Committee on Commerce and
The error of this interpretation, it seems to me, is compounded when one takes into account the Massachusetts Legislature‘s practices in relation to titles to Acts. Titles are altered throughout the legislative process, often by nonlegislators, frequently even after adoption.
Because I would apply the seniority clause exception, I would not reach the other issues discussed by the court.
Notes
The dissent also states that our interpretation of § 4 (17) will render the seniority system exemption “practically meaningless.” This conclusion rests upon the rather dubious assumption that seniority systems, by their very nature, protect older workers and therefore do not need protection from age discrimination claims. The dissent fails to recognize the realities of the modern workplace, in which it is quite common for workers to enter new jobs in the latter stages of their lives. See Carey, Occupational Tenure in 1987, Monthly Labor Review 4 (Oct. 1988) (10.5% of workers aged fifty to fifty-four have tenure of less than six to nine years). These older workers will receive less protection from a seniority system than is anticipated by the dissent, and will owe less allegiance to the system. The Legislature recognized that length of seniority does not necessarily equate with chronological age, and that older workers will not always receive better treatment under a seniority system. Section 4 (17) is a reflection of that recognition, and is designed to protect seniority systems from the appearance of age discrimination inherent in a situation where a younger worker receives benefits at the expense of an older worker.
