Felicia LOCKETT v. BLUE OCEAN BRISTOL, LLC.
No. 29, Sept. Term, 2015.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Feb. 22, 2016.
132 A.3d 257
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Burke, 67 Md.App. 147, 151-52, 506 A.2d 683 (1986).
The Court‘s decision to uphold this deviation from the usual principle of public access can be justified by the peculiar circumstances of this case. In particular, at the hearing in the Circuit Court in which DHMH had the burden of justifying an extension of the temporary denial of access, the requester did not contest DHMH‘s petition by cross-examining DHMH‘s affiant concerning the conclusions he had reached or by offering its own evidence.
Moreover, the denial of access is very limited in content and time. Only one or two names and email addresses—and only to the extent that an email address discloses those names—have been redacted from the records. While the court order that allows DHMH to continue to withhold the information from this requester does not have an end date, it is by its nature peculiar to this time and circumstance. The justification may dissipate with time and with new facts. It is not a precedent that necessarily forecloses forever the disclosure of such information. Cf. Cranford, 300 Md. at 789, 481 A.2d 221.
Finally, the Court‘s oрinion is premised on the understanding—consistent with the law relating to occupational licenses noted above—that the accreditation and disciplinary records of the doctors who work in these facilities is available under the PIA. Majority op. at 394-95, 132 A.3d
Tassity Johnson (Anna Jagelewski, Murnaghan Appellate Advocacy Fellow, Public Justice Center of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.
Diane C. Bristow (Neuberger, Quinn, Gielen, Rubin & Gibber, P.A., Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.
Argued before: BARBERA, C.J., BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, MCDONALD, GLENN T. HARRELL, JR. (Retired, Specially Assigned), ALAN M. WILNER (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
McDONALD, J.
State law protects a residential tenant from retaliation by a landlord for certain specified activities, including participation in a tenants association. Proof of an act of retaliation may be a defense to eviction and may entitle the tenant to an award of damages, attorneys’ fees, and court costs. But, even if a tenant proves an act of retaliation, the tenant is eligible for relief only if the tenant is “current on the rent.” This case concerns what is meant by “rent“—a term left undefined in the statute—and how a сourt should handle a request for an award of attorneys’ fees.
Petitioner Felicia Lockett is a tenant in an apartment building known as Bristol House in Baltimore City. She has participated in the tenants association at Bristol House and advocated vigorously on behalf of the tenants there. This apparently resulted in a contentious relationship with the landlord, Respondent Blue Ocean Bristol, LLC (“Blue Ocean“).
In 2014, Blue Ocean decided not to renew Ms. Lockett‘s lease and, when she did not vacate the apartment, Blue Ocean filed a tenant holding over action. Ms. Lockett defended on the basis that the non-renewal and tenant holding over action were in retaliation for her advocacy on behalf of the tenants association.
The Circuit Court ultimately ruled in Ms. Lockett‘s favor on the question of retaliation. However, it awarded her damages for only one of two alleged acts of retaliation on the ground that she failed to prove that she was “current on the rent” at thе time of the second alleged act and therefore was not eligible for relief as to that act. Although she had fully paid the fixed monthly amount specified as the “rent” in one part of her lease, she had an
With respect to Ms. Lockett‘s request for attorneys’ fees,1 the trial court declined to allow Ms. Lockett to provide evidence on that issue following the trial and denied the award simply by noting that an award of attorneys’ fees is “discretionary.” While it is true that the decision whether to award fees and the amount of any such fees is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court, we hold that the court must follow the procedure set forth in Maryland Rule 2-703 and give some explanation of its reasons for how it chose to exercise its discretion.
I
Background
A. Landlord—Tenant Litigation
Maryland law provides a variety of remedies for the many possible disputes that may arise between a landlord and a tenant who are parties to a residential lease. Most such disputes are refereed by the District Court, but on occasion, as here, the case may be adjudicated in a circuit court. We begin with a brief review of the particular remedies pursued by the landlord and the tenant in this case, as they appear in the Real Property Article of the Maryland Code. Similar or superseding remedies are sometimes provided by local laws, such as those of Baltimore City. See Parkington Apts., Inc. v. Cordish, 296 Md. 143, 460 A.2d 52 (1983). While there are a few differences between the provisions of the Real Property Article and the Baltimore City provisions, none of those differences matter to our resolution of this case. In their arguments, the parties have focused on the provisions of the Real Property Article—and so shall we.
1. Landlord Remedies
Summary ejectment and tenant holding over actions are remedies available to landlords in the context of both commercial and residential leases.
Summary ejectment
When a tenant does not pay rent that is owed, a landlord may bring an action for summary ejectment under Maryland Code,
Tenant holding over action
When a lease expires or is terminated, but the tenant does not vacate the leased premises, the landlord may bring an action for damages against the tenant under
If the landlоrd assents to the tenant remaining in the property, the statute creates a periodic tenancy. Unless otherwise provided in the lease and initialed by the tenant, “when a landlord consents to a holdover tenant remaining on the premises, the holdover tenant becomes a periodic week-to-week tenant if the tenant was a week-to-week tenant before the tenant‘s holding over, and a periodic month-to-month tenant in all other cases.”
2. Residential Tenant Remedies
Among the statutory remedies available specifically to residential tenants are rent escrow and anti-retaliation claims.
Rent escrow
There is “an obligation upon landlords to repair and eliminate conditions and defects which constitute, or if not promptly corrected will constitute, a fire hazard or a serious and substantial threat to the life, health or safety of occupants.”
Claim under anti-retaliation statute
The law prohibits a landlord from taking certain adverse actions against a tenant for reasons that the law deems improper.
In particular, a landlord may not do the following for improper reasons:
- Bring or threaten to bring an action for possession against a tenant;
-
Arbitrarily increase the rent or decrease the services to which a tenant has been entitled; or - Terminate a periodic tenancy.
- Because the tenant or the tenant‘s agent has provided written or actual notice of a good faith complaint about an alleged violation of the lease, violation of law, or condition on the leased premises that is a substantial threat to the health or safety of occupants to:
- The landlord; or
- Any public agency against the landlord;
- Because the tenant or the tenant‘s agent has:
- Filed a lawsuit against the landlord; or
- Testified or participated in a lawsuit involving the landlord; or
- Because the tenant has participated in any tenants’ organization.
If the court finds that a landlord committed a retaliatory action, the court may award the tenant damages against the landlord in an amount not to exceed the equivalent of three months’ rent, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and court costs.
B. Facts
The pertinent facts are undisputed. Ms. Lockett has been a tenant in an apartment building in Baltimore City known as Bristol House since 2010. She originally entered into the lease with the entity that managed the property in 2010—an annual lease that renews automatically at the end of every July. In December 2012, Blue Ocean took over ownership and management of Bristol House from the prior owner and manager—and stepped into the shoes of the landlord under Ms. Lockett‘s lease.
The lease specifies an annual “rent” in a fixed amount payable in “equal monthly installments” due on the first day of each month. Paragraph 44 of the lease providеs the mechanism for the annual renewal of the lease, for its termination upon 60 days’ notice, or for an alteration in its terms, such as setting a “higher rent.” The lease identifies the monthly rent as $795, but it is undisputed that it had increased to $837 as a result of annual renewals by the time Blue Ocean became landlord.
Although the lease identifies a specific figure payable monthly as “rent” and provides a mechanism for setting a “higher rent,” paragraph 33 of the lease—which has a tag line “Definition of Rent“—states that “All payments from [Ms. Lockett] to [the landlord] required under the terms of this lease, including, but not limited to, Court costs, shall be deemed rent.” Other paragraphs of the lease identify various charges and circumstances under which a tenant may be liable to the landlord for those charges—e.g., late fees, administrative fees, indemnification of the landlord for certain types of liability, repair expenses, parking fees, among others—but
Several pages at the end of the document entitled “Addendum to Rental Agreement (Utilities)” concern an amendment of paragraph 17 of the lease which is entitled “Utilities.” Pertinent to this case, the utilities addendum provides for the landlord to pay for the monthly gas charge for the entire building, describes how the charge is to be allocated among the residents, and obligates the tenant to reimburse the landlord for the tenant‘s pro rata share on a monthly basis. The utilities addendum characterizes this reimbursement by the tenant as “additional rent.”
The Tenant Association
The tenants at Bristol House formed the Bristol House Tenant Association to address concerns of the residents of the property‘s 74 residential units. Since January 2012, Ms. Lockett has served as the liaison for the Tenant Association, representing it in communications and meetings with building management. During that time, the Tenant Association has been working to resolve complaints about alleged erroneous charges involving the master-meter utility billing system used in the building. This process included, among other things, communication with the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General in early 2013. The complaints were not fully resolved at the time this litigation began.
After a contentious meeting with the Tenant Association in early 2014 concerning the gas charge allocation, Blue Ocean decided in February 2014 not to renew Ms. Lockett‘s lease. However, Blue Ocean did not inform her of its decision at the time. Conflicts regarding metering continued for the next several months and were never completely resolved.
Eventually, Ms. Lockett found a notice dated May 28, 2014, posted on her door stating that her lease would not be renewed and that she was to vacate the premises by July 31, 2014. While the parties have articulated different definitions of “rent,” it is undisputed that, as of the time she received the notice, Ms. Lockett was current on her rent, regardless of the definition.4
Litigation in the District Court
Despite the notice, Ms. Lockett did not vacate the premises. Instead, she remained in the property and withheld her June 2014 rent payment, which was due on June 1. On June 17, 2014, Blue Ocean filed a summary ejectment action in the District Court in Baltimore City against Ms. Lockett for failure to pay rent. On July 1, 2014, Ms. Lockett filed a rent escrow action in the District Court. The District Court consolidated these actions.
The District Court held an initial hearing on July 15, 2014.5 Ms. Lockett advised the court that Catholic Charities would
pay her June 2014 rent and sought to pay her July and August rent into the court registry. After hearing from Ms. Lockett and Blue Ocean, the District Court ordered that she pay rent in the amount of $837 per month into the court registry for July and August 2014. On July 28, 2014, Catholic Charities paid the June rent. On August 14, 2014, the District Court decided the case in favor of Blue Ocean. As a result, the two months of rent that had been deposited in the court registry, totaling
The day after the District Court ruled in favor of Blue Ocean in the summary ejectment action and that action was resolved by disbursement of the rent escrow, Blue Ocean filed another action against Ms. Lockett in the District Court—this time, a tenant holding over action under
Ms. Lockett responded by alleging, both as a defense to the complaint and as a counterclaim, that Blue Ocean‘s non-renewal of her lease on May 28 and its filing of the tenant holding over action on August 15 were retaliatory actions for her participation in the Tenant Association. In her response, she also asserted that her monthly rent was $837, as opposed to $795, as alleged by Blue Ocean. She sought money damages in a total amount of $5,022—that is, three times the amount of her monthly rent of $837 for each of two acts of retaliation—plus costs and attorneys’ fees, pursuant to
On October 8, 2014, the District Court decided in Blue Ocean‘s favor in the tenant holding over action and awarded possession of the apartment to Blue Ocean. The District Court declined to consider Ms. Lockett‘s counterclaim on the ground she had failed to perfect its filing by paying a $28 filing fee.
De Novo Appeal in Circuit Court
Ms. Lockett filed an appeal for a de novo trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. She also re-filed her counterclaim in the Circuit Court. She continued to seek damages in a total amount of $5,022 for the two alleged retaliatory acts, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs, both as part of her affirmative defense as well as her counterclaim.6
On January 22, 2015, the Circuit Court held a bench trial. While most of the testimony at trial focused on the terms of the lease, the controversies with the Tenant Association, the notice of non-renewal, and the Blue Ocean‘s motive for that decision, Blue Ocean introduced evidence suggesting that Ms. Lockett was not current on her obligations to the landlord at the time of the alleged acts of retaliation. In particular, a representative of Blue Ocean introduced a ledger showing charges to, and payments by, Ms. Lockett for “rent” and other expenses, and testified that the last time prior to the trial that there was a net balance of zero or a credit in Ms. Lockett‘s account was October 2013. On cross-examination, the Blue Ocean representative acknowledged that its ledger did not account for the timing of payments into the court registry in the rent escrow action.
Similarly, while Ms. Lockett‘s testimony dealt primarily with the alleged acts of retaliation, she also addressed briefly her payments to the landlord. She testified that a pending balance of $90.63 in the ledger as of May 29, 2014 (the date she
of retaliation) related to a disputed gas charge that was resolved in her favor shortly thereafter. She also testified about the payment of her June rent by Catholic Charities and her payment of the July and August rent into the District Court registry.
In the end, Blue Ocean did not dispute that Ms. Lockett was current on her payment of the fixed monthly installment of rent as of the filing of the tenant holding over action. However, its counsel argued that the ledger demonstrated that she owed money “counted as rent” (although not designated as such on the ledger) to Blue Ocean as of that date. The ledger itself shows a balance of approximately $244 apparently attributable to items listed as a filing fee, late fees, and gas charges. Ms. Lockett‘s counsel disputed that she owed some or all of those amounts and argued that, in any event, she had timely paid the fixed monthly amount actually designated as “rent” on the ledger.
After considering the testimony and documentary exhibits, the Circuit Court ruled in favor of Ms. Lockett in the tenant holding over action, finding that Blue Ocean‘s May 28, 2014 notice that it was not renewing her lease was “clearly an act of retaliation.” The court further determined that Ms. Lockett was current on her rent at the time she received the non-renewal notice, thus satisfying the condition for relief in the anti-retaliation statute as to the first alleged act of retaliation. With respect to the second alleged act of retaliation—the filing of the tenant holding over action in the District Court—the Circuit Court found the evidence to be “muddled” as to her liability for rent and stated that it could not find that Ms. Lockett was current on her rent as of the date of filing of that action (August 15, 2014). Accordingly, the Circuit Court ruled in Blue Ocean‘s favor on that claim.
In awarding treble damages under the anti-retaliation statute for the first claim of retaliation, the Circuit Court found “that [$]837 is the monthly rental fee” and awarded Ms. Lockett damages in the amount of $2,511. The court noted that it had “received no evidence with respect to attorneys’ fees” during the trial. Ms. Lockett‘s counsel asked for the opportunity to submit an affidavit supporting the request for attorneys’ fees, but the court denied the request in the following fashion: “[T]hat request is denied. The statute indicates that it‘s permissive. The Court may enter judgment and thе Court may award attorneys’ fees. So that request is denied.” Finally, the court directed Blue Ocean to pay court costs.
Ms. Lockett filed a timely petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court, which we granted. We summarize the two issues raised by that petition as follows:
- Do the disputed charges (the filing fee, late fees, and gas charges) matter? In other words, what is “rent” for purposes of the condition in the anti-retaliation statute (
RP § 8-208.1 ) that a residential tenant be “current on the rent” in order to invoke the remedies provided by that statute? - What procedure should a circuit court follow and what, if any, explanation must a circuit court give when it decides whether or not to award attorneys’ fees to a tenant who has proven a retaliation claim in a de novo appeal?
II
Discussion
A. Standard of Review
We accept the trial court‘s fact findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
B. Whether Ms. Lockett was “Current on the Rent”
In the complaint initiating this action Blue Ocean alleged that “[t]he rental for the premises is $795.00 per month“—the fixed monthly payment originally required by the lease. It is undisputed that, although $795 was the monthly rent provided by the lease when Ms. Lockett entered into it with the original landlord in 2010, that figure had risen as a result of annual renewals to $837 by the time of trial. Blue Ocean has conceded that Ms. Lockett had paid that amount as of August 15, 2014, but argues that she was delinquent in paying other fees and charges—such as the gas charges for three months, the late fee for one month, and a court filing fee owed to the landlord—which were “deemed rent” or “additional rent” under the lease.7 (Ms. Lockett disputed the extent to which she actually owed those charges). Blue Ocean reasons that all of those charges should be considered part of the “rent” that she allegedly owed to Blue Ocean as of August 15, 2014, and that she was therefore not current on her rent as of the date of the second alleged act of retaliation. In concluding that the evidence was “muddled” on whether Ms. Lockett was “current on the rent” as of August 15, 2014, the Circuit Court apparently accepted Blue Ocean‘s argument that the disputed charges were part of “rent” for purposes of
The question before this Court is whether these charges are “rent” for purposes of
1. Motion to Dismiss and Preservation of the Issue
Blue Ocean moved to dismiss Ms. Lockett‘s appeal pursuant to
The short answer is that these grounds are not a basis for dismissing an appeal. The longer answer—if Blue Ocean‘s motion is considered an argument about preservation of the legal issue for appellate review—is that the issue was adequately preserved.
First, failing to meet the requirements of
Raised below
The definition of “rent” does plainly appear to have been raised in the trial court. Testimony and documentary evidence was introduced in the Circuit Court, including the lease, related documents, and ledger sheet that concerned Ms. Lockett‘s obligation to pay rent and other charges and her history of payment. Both sides presented argument to the Circuit Court as to what that court should consider in resolving
whether Ms. Lockett was current on her rent. For example, in closing, counsel for Ms. Lockett told the Circuit Court:
[The] District Court, both in the failure to pay rent action in June and in the rent escrow case[,] had made a determination [of] what the rent owing would be and Ms. Lockett paid those amounts as the Court specified her to pay. Blue Ocean can‘t come now and say that there are other amounts that they did not speсify as rent and allege now that she was not current on the rent at that time.
(emphasis added). Similarly, in closing rebuttal, counsel for Blue Ocean said:
You‘ve heard testimony from Ms. Lockett that she believed she didn‘t owe different monies on [May 28 and August 15], but, in fact, a careful review of the record and the ledger shows that she did, in fact, owe monies. Those monies could be included or were counted as rent. And as such she wasn‘t current on rent on the days of alleged retaliation.
(emphasis added). Thus, counsel for both sides disputed the definition of rent in the Circuit Court and whether she was “current on the rent” at the time the tenant holding over action was filed.
The Circuit Court found, as to whether Ms. Lockett was current on her rent on August 15, 2014, that it was “fairly muddled and it was unclear to the Court and I cannot find that on [August 15] that—that Ms. Lockett was up to date on her rent.” Because there was no dispute that Ms. Lockett had paid fixed monthly installments of $837 as of August 15, the court‘s reluctance to find that she was current on the rent necessarily includes a legal holding that her “rent” for purposes of
To raise an issue, a party need not discuss it at length. See Brock v. State, 203 Md.App. 245, 270, 37 A.3d 1030 (2012) (party preserved the question of the admissibility of a statement for impeachment purposes by mentioning impeachment in a single sentence of an argument mostly devoted to admissibility for substantive use). When, as here, both parties discussed the
Raised in the petition and preserved for review
Raising the issue below is not all that is ordinarily required. In addition,
As to the first prong, the petition for certiorari in this case stated the following question, “Did the trial court еrr in relying on the landlord‘s claim of certain non-rent charges due and owing to conclude that the tenant was not current on her rent and thus not eligible for relief on her claim for retaliatory eviction in violation of
The second prong requires that the issue be preserved for review, but
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is denied and this issue is properly before this Court under
2. Merits
The term “rent” is not defined in the anti-retaliation statute. Nor is the term defined elsewhere in Title 8 of the Real Property Article. It seems safe to say that it is a dollаr amount to be derived in some way from the lease or other agreement that allows the tenant to occupy the property. Blue Ocean argued to the Circuit Court—and to us—that it is simply a matter of applying the provisions of Ms. Lockett‘s lease that characterize various types of tenant obligations as “rent.” But while the Legislature undoubtedly contemplated that a court would refer to the lease to identify “rent” for purposes of determining whether a tenant is “current on the rent” for purposes of
Commercial v. Residential Leases
Blue Ocean relies on two prior cases that construed the meaning of “rent” in commercial leases. In the context of a summary ejectment case involving a commercial lease, the Court held that “charges which may be definitely ascertained, paid by the tenant, going to [the tenant‘s] use, possession, and enjoyment of rentаl commercial premises, are rent if such was the intention of the parties.” University Plaza Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Garcia, 279 Md. 61, 67, 367 A.2d 957 (1977); see also Shum v. Gaudreau, 317 Md. 49, 62, 562 A.2d 707 (1989) (“at least under some circumstances the parties’ intention could determine what was rent“). In those cases, however, the Court explicitly limited its holding to commercial leases which are more likely to be the product of an arms-length negotiation. The Court reasoned that “there is little likelihood of successful overreaching on the part of the landlord and of coerced adhesion on the part of the tenant” and
In this case we are not only dealing with a residential lease, but are construing a statute—
Ms. Lockett‘s Lease
An examination of Ms. Lockett‘s lease reveals that it does not speak with one voice. The second paragraph of the lease recites that the landlord is leasing the premises to Ms. Lockett for an annual “rent” payable in equal monthly amounts. While Blue Ocean has referred to this figure as “base rent” in its brief to us, the lease itself does not use that phrase and refers to the fixed amount simply as “rent.” Paragraph 44 of the lease seems to have this version of “rent” in mind in specifying the procedure for establishing a “higher rent.” On the other hand, paragraph 34 of the lease, entitled “Definition of Rent,” states that “all payments” that the tenant owes to the landlord are “deemed rent.” A careful reading of the lease reveals that there are many potential payments that may be owed by the tenant to the landlord under a variety of circumstances—returned check charges (paragraph 4), late fees (paragraph 5), administrative and attorneys’ fees (paragraph 6), indemnification of landlord liability (paragraph 11), and repairs (paragraph 13), to mention a few. An addendum to the lеase refers to certain utility charges as “additional rent.” It thus appears a more accurate characterization of the lease to say that it provides for “rent” in a fixed monthly amount and for “deemed rent” and “additional rent” that may or may not exist in any particular month and that can vary wildly in amount, depending on what other payments the tenant may owe the landlord.
Blue Ocean‘s internal records, which track payments under the lease, appear to use the term “rent” to mean the fixed monthly charge.9 The ledger relating to Ms. Lockett‘s apartment uses the term “rent” for the fixed monthly payment and uses different terms for other amounts owed or paid by Ms. Lockett, many or all of which would fall into the categories of “deemed rent” and “additional rent.”
Ordinary meaning
Having concluded that determining the “rent” for purposes of
“Rent” ordinarily means the periodic sum paid for the use or occupancy of property. This is the typical dictionary definition. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.), available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rent (https://perma.cc/A42T-ULW7) (defining “rent” as a “usually fixed periodical return made by a tenant or occupant of property to the owner for the possession and use thereof“). It also matches the general legal definition. See Black‘s Law Dictionary (10th ed.2014) (defining “rent” as “[c]onsideration paid, usu[ually] periodically, for thе use or occupancy of property (esp[ecially] real property).“).
Other instances of “rent” in the Real Property Article
In construing statutes, we consider the plain language “within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs. . . .” Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276. “We presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute‘s object and scope.” Id. In particular, other uses of the term “rent” are relevant, because “[w]hen a word susceptible of more than one meaning is repeated in the same statute or sections of a statute, it is presumed that it is used in the same sense.” Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 673, 659 A.2d 1347 (1995).
Context suggests that “rent” in
Other provisions of Title 8 use the term “rent” in a way that appears to exclude the variable charges at issue in this case. For example,
Legislative purpose
“A court‘s primary goal in interpreting statutory language is to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by the statutory provision under scrutiny.” Lockshin, 412 Md. at 274. We sеek to “construe the statute in a way that will advance [the statute‘s] purpose, not frustrate it.” Neal v. Fisher, 312 Md. 685, 693, 541 A.2d 1314 (1988).
One possible statutory purpose is to “provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries.” Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 408, 754 A.2d 389 (2000) (quoting 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland‘s Statutory Construction, § 60.02, at 152 (5th ed.1993)). When a statute provides remedies not available at common law, the statute is remedial. Neal, 312 Md. at 693 (construing rent escrow statute). “[O]nce we have determined that a statute is remedial in nature . . . it must be liberally construed in order to effectuate [its] broad remedial purpose.” Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 326, 835 A.2d 1185 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (construing statute providing remedies for tenant when landlord wrongfully withholds security deposit). For similar reasons, “exemptions from remedial legislation must be narrowly construed.” State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Billhimer, 314 Md. 46, 64, 548 A.2d 819 (1988).
Hence,
Conclusion
The anti-retaliation statute, which applies only to residential tenancies, does not include a definition of “rent.” The ordinary meaning of “rent,” the statutory context, and the remedial purpose of the statute all lead to the conclusion that the term “rent” in
Accordingly, the gas charges, late fees, and court filing fee that Ms. Lockett allegedly owed to Blue Ocean on the date (August 15, 2014) that Blue Ocean filed its tenant holding over action are not relevant to the question whether she was “current on the rent.” There is no dispute that Ms. Lockett was current in paying the fixed monthly amount designated in the lease as of that date. Thus, Ms. Lockett was not ineligible for relief as to the second alleged act of retaliation on the ground that she failed to satisfy the statutory condition of being “current on the rent.”
C. Attorneys’ Fees
When a court “finds in favor of the tenant becаuse the landlord engaged in a retaliatory action, the court may enter judgment against the landlord for damages not to exceed the equivalent of 3 months’ rent, reasonable attorney[s‘] fees, and court costs.”
1. Whether a court must explain its denial of an award of attorneys’ fees
When a party makes a claim for attorneys’ fees allowed by law, a circuit court must explain its reasons for declining to make an award.
Blue Ocean resists this analysis, suggesting that
2. Whether Ms. Lockett waived her right to rеquest attorneys’ fees
Blue Ocean argues that Ms. Lockett waived her right to an award of attorneys’ fees. Blue Ocean notes that Ms. Lockett did not present evidence regarding attorneys’ fees during the trial and contends that
For the same reason outlined above, we look to
In this case, Ms. Lockett‘s pleadings requested attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, the parties and the Circuit Court were on notice that attorneys’ fees were at issue in this case; and, indeed, it was the trial judge who raised the question during his announcement of his decision. However, the Circuit Court did not hold a scheduling conference or “order otherwise” as to the presentation of evidence on her claim for attorneys’ fees. As a result, counsel for Ms. Lockett was understandably confused whether to submit evidence regarding attorneys’ fees during the trial on the merits or after the court announced its decision. In light of this confusion, Ms. Lockett did not waive her claim for attorneys’ fees when her counsel waited to offer evidence on that subject until after the Circuit Court held that she had prevailed on the underlying claim.
Finally, even if
III
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that “rent” for purposes of
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.