Ho PAK and Lisa Leone Pak, v. Minh-Vu HOANG.
No. 14, Sept. Term, 2003.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Nov. 18, 2003.
835 A.2d 1185
Section 11-106, consequently, remains the applicable provi- sion, and must be applied, whenever a probationary employee has disciplinary action taken against him or her that is short of termination. Contrary to the protestations of the petitioner to the contrary, albeit in a broader context, there is logic and symmetry in such a dichotomy.9
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
Fredric J. Einhorn of Rockville, for respondents.
Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE,* RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.
CATHELL, Judge.
This case arises out of a landlord and tenant dispute. In December of 1999, Minh-Vu Hoang, respondent, filed a com- plaint in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Montgomery County, against Ho and Lisa Pak, petitioners, seeking $25,000.00 in damages for a breach of lease. Petitioners were tenants in a townhouse owned by respondent.1
Petitioners prayed a jury trial and the case was transferred
to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Petitioners
then filed counterclaims alleging that respondent had breach-
ed the lease and had not returned their security deposit in
violation of the Maryland Security Deposit Act,
Petitioners then filed post-judgment discovery motions in an effort to aid in their recovery of the judgment against respon- dent, to which there was no response. Petitioners then filed a Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents in Aid of Execution. In an order dated May 23, 2001, the Circuit Court granted the motion. Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Civil Contempt and for the Entry of Appropriate Relief on July 23, 2001, in response to respondent‘s failure to comply with the Circuit Court‘s May 23rd order. Following a September 20, 2001 hearing, the Circuit Court entered another order directing respondent to fully and completely respond to the interrogato- ries and request for documents. A compliance review hearing was set for October 29, 2001. After respondent failed to appear at the October 29th hearing, the Circuit Court issued a writ of body attachment for respondent‘s arrest. Respondent was arrested and released on her own recognizance.
On December 6, 2001, there was a hearing in the Circuit Court on petitioners’ Petition for Civil Contempt. The court found respondent in civil contempt and sanctioned respondent with 30 days of incarceration subject to a purge provision, i.e., respondent could purge the contempt with her complete com- pliance with the court‘s order regarding petitioners’ Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories and Request for Produc- tion of Documents in Aid of Execution. The Court set a compliance hearing for January 14, 2002. On December 6, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion for Supplemental Award of Attorney‘s Fees from respondent.
Respondent paid the original judgment and all interest then
due on January 11, 2002, one business day before the compli-
ance hearing was to take place, by delivering a check to
petitioners’ counsel. At the January 14th hearing, the court
noted that the supplemental attorney‘s fees motion was out-
standing and set a final hearing on that motion for February
Petitioners appealed that decision to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion issued on January 21, 2003, affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court, and, on May 7, 2003, we granted the petition. Pak v. Hoang, 374 Md. 358, 822 A.2d 1224 (2003). Petitioners present four questions for our review:
“I. Whether the Circuit Court has the authority to award supplemental attorney‘s fees pursuant to the Maryland Rules where a judgment debtor has willfully violated court orders and has been found in contempt.
II. Whether the Circuit Court has the power to award sup- plemental attorney‘s fees pursuant to a court‘s inherent powers as recognized in Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md.App. 179, 728 A.2d 727 (1999).
III. Whether the Circuit Court has the authority to award supplemental attorney‘s fees incident to its contempt pow- ers.
IV. Whether the Circuit Court has the authority to award supplemental attorney‘s fees pursuant to the Maryland Se- curity Deposit Act,
Maryland Code Real Estate, § 8-203 , and to enforce a judgment entered pursuant to that Act.”3
We answer petitioners’ fourth question in the affirmative and
I. The Trial Court‘s Decision
On February 15, 2002, at the hearing on petitioners’ Motion for Supplemental Award of Attorney‘s Fees, the trial court stated:
“I think that [respondent‘s] conduct is reprehensible. I think that she really has done whatever she could to throw roadblocks in the way of the other side. I think that she has defied the orders of this court. She has done a lot of things that I take a very dim view of, and I think that she ought not get away with those things.
“My problem, however, is that this was a judgment which was entered against her. She did everything she could to avoid complying with the discovery to aid in the enforce- ment of that judgment, but ultimately she did pay the amount of that judgment.
...
“The contempt finding ... was a contempt finding with regard to the discovery that was intended to help enforce the judgment.
“It seems to me that once the amount of that judgment is paid, that the thrust of that--the contempt finding disap- pears.
“So, as much as, in fairness, I would like to go ahead and impose a sanction for that contempt ... I don‘t think it would be enforceable. ...
“... I wish there were a greater sanction than that that could be imposed on her. I don‘t feel that I can.
“There is also a request that has been made for supple- mental attorney‘s fees under the security deposit statute, and my reading of that statute is that the attorney‘s fees that were awarded at the time are really the only attorney‘s fees you can get.
“... I don‘t read the statute to say that you can go back and award supplemental attorney‘s fees later when you have difficulty enforcing the judgment that was entered the first time.
“So, I‘m not going to award supplemental attorney‘s fees, and I am not going to impose any part of the 30 days [jail sentence] which I believe Judge Rupp had imposed.
“I regret that I am not going to do either one of those things, because I think in fairness [respondent] probably deserves them, but I work within the statutes and the rules I have to work with and that is where I come out.” [Alterations added.]
II. Discussion
The determinative issue on review in this case is whether
courts have the authority to award attorney‘s fees pursuant to
the Maryland Security Deposit Act (the Act), specifically
under
When we interpret statutes, this Court has annunci- ated that the ” ‘paramount goal ... is to identify and effectu- ate the legislative intent underlying the statute at issue.’ ” Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814 A.2d 557, 566 (2003) (quoting Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000)). We may ascertain the legislative intent of a statute by analyzing its plain language and by considering its context within the statutory scheme as a whole. Moore, 372 Md. at 677, 814 A.2d at 566; see also In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711, 782 A.2d 332, 346 (2001). Where ” ‘the words of a statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning,’ we ‘will give effect to the statute as it is written.’ ” Moore, 372 Md. at 677, 814 A.2d at 566 (quoting Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994)). In discerning the legislative intent where the statutory language is ambiguous, however, we look beyond the statute‘s plain language. Moore, 372 Md. at 677, 814 A.2d at 566; see also In re Mark M., 365 Md. at 711, 782 A.2d at 346. If a statute‘s language is found to be ambiguous, then it is appropriate to analyze the legislative history and other relevant factors, such as “a bill‘s title and function paragraphs, amendments ... and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal,” which may reveal the intent or general purpose of the statute. Moore, 372 Md. at 677, 814 A.2d at 566 (quoting In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 58, 763 A.2d 136, 140 (2000)(internal citation omitted)). The Court must be careful, however, to avoid a “[c]onstruction of a statute which is unreasonable, illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with common sense.” Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417, 722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999) (alteration added) (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992)); see also Moore, 372 Md. at 677-78, 814 A.2d at 566.
B. Section 8-203(e)(4)
The specific statutory provision at issue in the case sub
judice is
“(e) Return of deposit to tenant; interest. ...
...
(4) If the landlord, without a reasonable basis, fails to return any part of the security deposit, plus accrued inter- est, within 45 days after the termination of the tenancy, the tenant has an action of up to threefold of the withheld amount, plus reasonable attorney‘s fees.”
The parties do not dispute that trial courts may require a
landlord to pay the tenant‘s attorney‘s fees incurred prior to
and at trial; they agree that the statute is clear and unambig-
uous as to that point. The plain language of
While this Court has never addressed the alleged
remedial nature of
“Generally, remedial statutes are those which provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries. They also include statutes intended for the correction of defects, mistakes and omissions in the civil institutions and the administration of the state. The definition of a remedial statute has also been stated as a statute that relates to
practice, procedure, or remedies and does not affect sub- stantive or vested rights. ” ‘Every statute that makes any change in the existing body of law, excluding only those enactments which merely restate or codify prior law, can be said to “remedy” some flaw in the prior law or some social evil.’ [Footnotes omitted.]
3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland‘s Statutory Construction, supra, § 60.02, at 152; see also 2 id. § 41.09, at 399 (‘The statutes which fall into this category [of remedial statutes] are ones that describe methods for enforcing, processing, administering, or determining rights, liabilities or status.‘).
“The appellate courts of this state have also defined remedial legislation. For instance, in [State of Maryland Comm‘n on Human Relations v. Amecom Div. of Litton Sys., Inc., 278 Md. 120, 125, 360 A.2d 1, 5 (1976) ], we said that ‘[a]n act is remedial in nature when it provides only for a new method of enforcement of a preexisting right.’ (Cit- ing [Kelch v. Keehn, 183 Md. 140, 145, 36 A.2d 544, 545 (1944)]; Ireland v. Shipley, 165 Md. 90, 98, 166 A. 593 (1933)). ‘Under Maryland law, statutes are remedial in nature if they are designed to correct existing law, to redress existing grievances and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good.’ Weathersby v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat‘l Management Co., 86 Md.App. 533, 550, 587 A.2d 569, 577 (1991) (citing State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 208, 328 A.2d 737, 745 (1974)), rev‘d on other grounds, 326 Md. 663, 607 A.2d 8 (1992).” [Alterations added.]
See also Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 556-57, 766 A.2d
98, 110 (2001)(determining the retroactivity of the remedial
rule, Maryland Rule 15-207(e) and quoting to Langston). We
recognized the remedial nature of another section of the
Residential Lease Subtitle of the Real Property Article in
Neal v. Fisher, 312 Md. 685, 541 A.2d 1314 (1988), where we
interpreted
“In short, we have before us remedial legislation. When the legislature enacts a statute designed, as the Act is, to provide remedies not available at common law, it is not desirable that construction should be mindlessly guided by a slogan, such as ‘statutes in derogation of the common law must be narrowly construed.’ Statutes of this nature ‘are remedial and designed to close a gap in the preexisting law....’ A court should not permit ‘a narrow or grudging process of construction to exemplify and perpetuate the very evils to be remedied....’ ”
Neal, 312 Md. at 693-94, 541 A.2d at 1318 (citations omitted).
We also have discussed the remedial nature of several other Maryland statutes. See, inter alia, Livering v. Richardson‘s Restaurant, 374 Md. 566, 574, 823 A.2d 687, 691 (2003)(Mary- land Workers’ Compensation Act); Friolo v. Frankel, 373 Md. 501, 517-18, 819 A.2d 354, 364 (2003)(Wage and Hour Law); Caffrey v. Dep‘t of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 306, 805 A.2d 268, 288 (2002)(Maryland Public Information Act); Smith v. Borello, 370 Md. 227, 235, 804 A.2d 1151, 1155 (2002)(survival and wrongful death statutes); Kat- senelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. 122, 134, 775 A.2d 1249, 1256 (2001)(domestic abuse statute); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 252, 674 A.2d 951, 955 (1996)(domestic abuse statute). We have said that once we have determined that a statute is remedial in nature that it “must be liberally construed ... in order to effectuate the [statute‘s] broad remedial purpose.” Caffrey, 370 Md. at 306, 805 A.2d at 288 (quoting A.S. Abell Publg. Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 32, 464 A.2d 1068, 1071 (1983))(alteration added).
...
The right of a tenant to sue a landlord for the return of a
security deposit first appeared in its current form in
This inclusion of a treble damage clause recognizes the
difficulties often encountered by tenants seeking the return of
security deposits from landlords. Litigation arising under
As we hold that
Ҥ 3-507.1. Action to recover unpaid wages.
(a) In general. - Notwithstanding any remedy available under
§ 3-507 of this subtitle, if an employer fails to pay an employee in accordance with§ 3-502 or§ 3-505 of this subtitle, after 2 weeks have elapsed from the date on which the employer is required to have paid the wages, the employee may bring an action against the employer to recover the unpaid wages.(b) Award and costs. If, in an action under subsection (a) of this section, a court finds that an employer withheld the wage of an employee in violation of this subtitle and not as a result of a bona fide dispute, the court may award the employee an amount not exceeding 3 times the wage, and reasonable counsel fees and other costs.” [Emphasis add- ed.]
This Court, in Admiral Mortgage, held that
“Attorneys’ fees and costs are another matter. For one thing, they may continue to accrue after the verdict is rendered, if post-trial motions or appeals are filed, so the jury cannot determine them definitively. Attorneys’ fees, moreover, when allowed, have traditionally been set by the judge, who is usually in a far better position than a jury to determine what is reasonable.”
Federal fee-shifting cases provide additional support for the
imposition of post-judgment attorney‘s fees in cases similar to
the case sub judice. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 558-60, 106
S.Ct. 3088, 3094-96, 92 L.Ed.2d 439, 451-53 (1986); Garrity v.
Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 738 (1st Cir.1984)(listing other United
States Circuit Court decisions that have allowed the award of
post-judgment monitoring fees under
“Although it is true that the proceedings involved in Phases II and IX were not ‘judicial’ in the sense that they did not occur in a courtroom or involve ‘traditional’ legal work such as examination of witnesses or selection of jurors for trial, the work done by counsel in these two phases was as necessary to the attainment of adequate relief for their client as was all of their earlier work in the courtroom which secured Delaware Valley‘s initial success in obtaining the consent decree.... Instead, Delaware Valley filed suit to force the Commonwealth to comply with its obligations under the Clean Air Act to develop and implement an emissions inspection and maintenance program covering 10 counties surrounding two major metropolitan areas. To this end, the consent decree provided detailed instructions as to how the program was to be developed and the specific dates by which these tasks were to be accomplished.
“Protection of the full scope of relief afforded by the consent decree was thus crucial to safeguard the interests asserted by Delaware Valley; and enforcement of the de- cree, whether in the courtroom before a judge, or in front of a regulatory agency with power to modify the substance of the program ordered by the court, involved the type of work which is properly compensable as a cost of litigation under § 304....
...
“Given the common purpose of both § 304(d) and § 1988 to promote citizen enforcement of important federal policies, we find no reason not to interpret both provisions governing attorney‘s fees in the same manner. We hold, therefore, that the fact that the work done by counsel did not occur in the context of traditional judicial litigation does not preclude an award of reasonable attorney‘s fees under § 304(d) for the work done during these portions of the present action.”
Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 558-60, 106 S.Ct. at 3094-96, 92 L.Ed.2d at 452-53 (citations omitted). Although it involved administrative enforcement, Delaware Valley‘s rationale is particularly pertinent to this case. The federal statutes dis-
Cases from other states additionally support our interpreta-
tion of
“authorizes the award of treble the amount of a security deposit and reasonable attorney‘s fees when a landlord willfully fails to return the deposit within thirty days of termination of the leasehold. This statute, salutary in na- ture, is designed to assist tenants in vindicating their legal rights and to equalize the disparity in power which exists between landlord and tenant in conflicts over such relatively small sums. To deny attorney‘s fees to tenants who are forced to prosecute an appeal would undercut the objectives of these provisions. Landlords, by the simple expedient of an appeal, could effectively discourage tenants from obtain- ing legal redress. We, therefore, hold that tenants who are
successful on appeal are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney‘s fees.”
Id. at 396, 566 P.2d at 1076.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis.2d 352, 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983), held that the actual recovery of damages is the benchmark of success for a tenant in a landlord-tenant dispute pursuant to the Wisconsin‘s secu- rity deposit act. The provision in dispute in Shands, which is similar to the one in the case sub judice, stated:
” ‘Any person suffering pecuniary loss because of a violation by any other person of any order issued under this section may sue for damages therefore in any court of competent jurisdiction and shall recover twice the amount of such pecuniary loss, together with costs, including a reasonable attorney‘s fee.’ ”
Id. at 355 n. 2, 340 N.W.2d at 507-08 n. 2 (quoting
...
“A tenant action brought under sec. 100.20(5) ... is not successful until he or she has actually recovered damages and attorney fees. The trial court‘s decision may have to be defended, or an adverse decision protested, in an appellate forum. The same purposes and policy interests we identi- fied for the original action attach to the appeals process. To permit the recovery of attorney fees for successful appellate work is simply to recognize that an attorney‘s effort at that stage is as essential to the tenant‘s success as is an attorney‘s work at the trial court level. Furthermore, we recognize that, if attorney fees were not recoverable on appeal, landlords could defeat the statutory purposes by the simple expedient of an appeal, which will be prohibitively expensive for many tenants; similarly, tenants would have little incentive to pursue a meritorious claim on appeal where they had not prevailed at the trial court level. In short, to deny attorney fees to tenants who need to pursue appellate review to enforce their rights would undercut the salutary objectives of the statute.
“In light of these important interests, we find no reason to interpret sec. 100.20(5), Stats., as limiting the award of attorney fees to the original trial court litigation. Accord- ingly, we hold that a tenant who has suffered pecuniary loss because of a violation of Wis. Adm.Code Ch. Ag 134 shall recover reasonable attorney fees for appellate review under- taken to attack or defend a trial court‘s decision in the suit.”
Id. at 359, 340 N.W.2d at 509 (emphasis added). See also Schaefer v. Murphey, 131 Ariz. 295, 299, 640 P.2d 857, 861 (1982)(awarding, in a landlord-tenant dispute, attorney‘s fees for an appeal as well as for trial work pursuant to a state statute allowing for the recovery of attorney‘s fees to the successful party); see generally L‘Esperance v. Benware, 830 A.2d 675, 679 (Vt.2003)(although not the issue on appeal, the trial court included “post-judgment attorney‘s fees” for work performed on post-trial motions in a landlord-tenant dispute under Vermont‘s Consumer Fraud Act).
As in Shands, supra, denial of attorney‘s fees in the case at
bar would diminish the remedial nature of
Respondent argues that a holding by this Court that
“(e)(4) If the landlord, without a reasonable basis, fails to return any part of the security deposit, plus accrued inter- est, within 45 days after the termination of the tenancy, or if a landlord fails to pay a judgment entered pursuant to this subsection, or if a landlord fails to respond to post-judg- ment discovery propounded by a tenant having a judgment entered pursuant to this subsection, the tenant has an action of up to threefold of the withheld amount, plus reasonable attorney‘s fees.”
Respondent‘s contention is misplaced. Our interpretation
does not add language to the statute; it is merely an interpre-
tation of “reasonable attorney‘s fees” in light of
III. Conclusion
In conclusion, we hold that although
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED AND THE IS CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO VACATE THE ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUN- TY DENYING A SUPPLEMENTAL AWARD OF ATTOR- NEY‘S FEES AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CON- SISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.
RAKER, J., dissents.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and of the Circuit Court for Mont- gomery County, denying counsel fees in this case for noncom- pliance with a post-judgment discovery order. Respondent‘s abhorrent conduct was not a violation of the Security Deposit Act. Petitioner recovered counsel fees that were permissible under the Security Deposit Act. There is no other provision for the recovery of fees under that Act. The general rule regarding counsel fees applies--that a party may not recover attorney fees and expenses of litigation in his or her claim against the other party defendant unless it arises from specific statutory provisions or the contract of the parties. See Bausch & Lomb v. Utica Mutual, 355 Md. 566, 590, 735 A.2d 1081, 1094 (1999).
The majority holds that petitioner is entitled to counsel fees because, as a remedial statute, it must be construed liberally, and that liberal construction includes recovery of counsel fees to enforce the judgment. I disagree. The majority has expanded significantly the concept of fee-shifting, with no indication of where it will end.
RAKER, J.