Chow v. State

of this type inquiry response would reviewable adequately upon the conclusion of trial and of final entry judgment.7 Because all four of the elements must be met appeal may proceed before an under collateral order doctrine, we conclude that discovery provision order, Circuit Court’s entered on 15 September is not reviewable this time.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED; CASE REMANDED THAT TO COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS THE APPEAL. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR ST. MARY’S COUNTY.

903A.2d 388 Lin Todd CHOW Maryland. STATE of 99, Sept. Term, No. 2005. Appeals Maryland.

Court of July 2006. Special Appeals, Similar to the Court of expresses this Court no opinion about whether the during discovery information obtained from deposition a Board ultimately member's during would be admissible trial. (David Michael brief), Wein Simpson, Greenbelt, MD, M. on for Petititoner.

Gregory D’Alesandro, (J. Assistant Attorney General Jo- Curran, Jr., seph Attorney brief), General of Maryland, on Baltimore, MD for Respondent.

Argued BELL, C.J., before RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, GREENE, BATTAGLIA and JJ.

CATHELL, J. This case concerns whether the gratuitous temporary ex change or loan of a regulated firearm1 between two adult (1957, Maryland 27, 1. Repl.Vol., 441(r) Code Supp.), 2002 § Art. "Regulated defines Firearm”: individuals, and obtain a permitted were otherwise own who of a in illegal transfer firearm viola handgun, constitutes an (1957, 1996 Art. Repl.Vol., Supp.), Code Maryland tion 442.2 issue us the contextual particular § before “transfer,” 442(d), § it is “A meaning as used word sell, may who is not a firearms dealer person regulated ” (Em transfer, rent, any firearm.... purchase regulated or added). Thus, temporary must whether a we decide phasis constitutes exchange regulated or loan firearm gratuitous 442(d). addition, will discuss a “transfer” under we (1957, Art. Repl.Vol., Supp.), Maryland Code 449,3 which a violation penalty establishes mens rea for such violation. 442(d), to proper determine “Regulated firearm.—'Regulated means: firearm’ section; (1) Any handgun as in this or defined (2) Any weapon defined in this section.” assault (1957, Repl.Vol., Supp.), §§ Maryland Art. 441 et Code seq. composes "Regulated subheading. Firearms" Section pertinent part: states "(d) dealer.—(1) A who by Sale other than firearms sell, rent, transfer, may not not a firearms dealer days elapsed purchase any regulated until after 7 have firearm shall application purchase have from the time an or transfer shall been transferee, purchaser triplicate, and prospective executed original by regulated copy is firearms dealer to the forwarded Secretary." Chapter Acts effective October Pursuant subheading "Regulated repealed re-enacted as Firearms” (2003), Safety seq. Maryland §§ 5-101 et of the Public Article. Code (without currently change) §as 5- Section 442 is codified substantial Safety All in this took 124 of the Public Article. events issue case 2003, therefore, shall, indicated, we place April unless otherwise time, Maryland in Code refer to the version of the statute (1957, effect at 27, seq. Supp.), §§ 441 Repl.Vol., 2002 Art. et (1957, Maryland Repl.Vol., Supp.), § Art. 3. Code pertinent part: states sale, rental, "(f) etc.—Except Knowing participants in as otherwise section, knowingly provided any partici- dealer this or who sale, rental, transfer, purchase, possession, pates illegal or subheading receipt regulated this firearm in violation of shall upon guilty of be fined not more a misdemeanor and conviction shall $10,000 years, imprisoned for not than 5 or both. Each than more separate violation be considered a offense." shall 31, 2003, Chow, On Lin July petitioner, Todd a District of Metropolitan Columbia Police Department officer and non- firearms, dealer charged illegally transferring § firearm pursuant 25, 2003, 442. On November a bench trial was held in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s 1, 2003, December County. On the court ruling, issued its finding petitioner guilty. The court petitioner sentenced (60) sixty days, suspended the sentence imposed a two ($200) hundred dollar fine. A timely appeal was made to the Court of Special Appeals and on June after hearing arguments, the court filed its decision affirming the decision of State, Circuit Court. Chow v. 163 Md.App. (2005). Petitioner then timely filed a Motion for Recon- sideration, which was denied on October 2005. On October 19, 2005, petitioner timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. granted We certiorari on December State, (2005). Chow 888 A.2d 341

Petitioner presented three questions in his Petition for Writ of Certiorari4 which rephrase we to consolidate and clarify issues: (without currently

Section 449 is change) codified substantial as 5- Safety 143 of the Public Article. questions, phrased Certiorari, 4. Petitioner's in his Petition for Writ of were as follows: ‘temporary "1. Whether a transfer’ or loan of a firearm constitutes a when; (1) ‘transfer’ under Art. 27 ‘transfer’ is not defined anywhere (2) subheading, dictionary definition of transfer (title possessory includes transfer, legal both a transfer and ownership) (3) greater years legislature than 60 has consis- tently apply used the term ‘transfer’ firearm transac- tions, consistently while prohibiting also even the unrecorded ‘loan’ gun of a machine since 1933 and legislative history there is no otherwise to indicate that 'transfers’ include loans? Assuming arguendo “2. ‘temporary transfer’ can in certain law, circumstances be construed as a ‘transfer’ under the do those period circumstances include a short lending gun time of between firearms, two adult eligible individuals who are both to own (as period case) if the time of the loan in this day”? was for about a "3. Was there sufficient evidence for a rational fact finder to convict when; knowingly the Petitioner violating Art. 27 any crime, State never introduced evidence of an element of the or loan temporary gratuitous exchange I. the Whether individuals, firearm between adult regulated two and obtain a permitted who were otherwise to own firearm, an “transfer” of regulated illegal constitutes (1957, Maryland in a firearm violation of Code § Art. as Repl.Vol., 2002 “transfer” Supp.), (d)(1), in “A not a person utilized subsection who is rent, sell, transfer, may regulated firearms dealer ?” firearm ... purchase any regulated (Emphasis added). (1957, Repl.Vol., Maryland

II. Whether Code 449(f), states, “any Art. dealer or Supp.), which in the ... knowingly participates illegal who transfer ... of a firearm in of this violation ...,” a general spe- establishes intent or subheading added). cific intent mens rea? (Emphasis the first we hold that response question plain history “Regulated Firearms” language legislative “transfer,” that as subheading indicates the word used 442(d), context ownership apply is used in an and does not the case sub judice—that to the situation extant or loan adults gratuitous exchange between two temporary to own and obtain permitted who are otherwise we need not reach the second Although question firearms. first regards question, because of our we disposition 449(f) mens rea required by will be- requisite discuss the may of the likelihood that the issue come before cause follow, hold again. Court For the reasons that we 449(f), §in in the “knowingly” particular word circumstance here, scheme at issue indicates applicable statutory mens intent rea—which find the not to specific petitioner we possessed. have namely paperwork whether the transferee filed the State by Special Appeals

police, and the Court of facts noted any 'temporary an unin- themselves demonstrate transfer’ was immediately tentional accident that the Petitioner intended to recti- fy?”

I. Facts adopt, part, facts as stated the Court We in its Special Appeals opinion below: friend, Nguyen, Man was the State’s main

“[Petitioner’s] that, at trial. testified his car Nguyen driving witness while 1, 2003, on April stopped by George’s he was the Prince County Department Police for a broken At that taillight. time, vehicle, the police Nguyen’s searched and discovered a (not Glock semi-automatic pistol weapon that subject of this appeal). pistol properly registered The was name, in Nguyen’s permit carry but he did not have a to it. The it in police investiga- confiscated connection with their tion of a recent of one of Nguyen’s murder friends. following day,

“The Nguyen [petitioner]. Ngu- contacted yen explained [petitioner] to that this gun guns and other his home had been confiscated he police, and was buy ‘anxious’ to another He gun. [petitioner] told that he to purchase gun needed for protection, by which he meant ‘[s]o, security,’ ‘[h]ome [petitioner] gun.’ offered me his “The men arranged two to meet later that day for lunch Bowie, at a restaurant Maryland. Sometime this during meeting, [petitioner] gave millimeter, a nine Nguyen semi- automatic handgun that he had owned since 1996.

“Nguyen told [petitioner] that he to wanted test fire the weapon before it. purchasing pair got into Nguyen’s vehicle and headed a firing range in Upper Marlboro. route, En Nguyen received business call on his cellular telephone, requiring that he abort the trip firing to the range. Nguyen [petitioner] drove back to the restaurant [petitioner’s] where car parked was and dropped him off. weapon remained in Nguyen’s [Petitioner’s] car. No money exchanged was Nguyen [petitioner]. between and thereafter, “Soon Nguyen contacted [petitioner] by tele- phone. Nguyen T testified: was interested in buying it and him, and,

I know, called you I him give told I’d it back to said, him cool, but he just that’s it in the keep house and he’ll pick up.’ Nguyen further testified that he anticipat- appellant be ‘as soon as ed the would returned weapon ”

possible.’ He Donnie Judd testified as a State’s “Detective witness. that, on he other members reported April County Nguyen George’s Department stopped Prince Police having arrest him for carried the illegally on a warrant days three In the his car earlier. gun was found car, Nguyen’s police [peti discovered ensuing search car’s center Detec handgun in the console. loaded tioner’s] NCIC[5] tive ran an check determined Judd test gun not been stolen. The was handgun reported had operable. fired and determined station, arrested taken to the “Nguyen police four-page paragraph he statement. The first gave where he had [petition- addressed how obtained statement admit- portion and that statement was handgun, er’s] testimony. It from trial Nguyen’s ted into evidence. varied Ngyuen wrote: [years]. for 2-3 I detain [petitioner] [sic]

I know was [sic] my guns. [d]ay, all Next I on 4-1-03 and PGPD took I him if hold on his called asked could [petitioner] I back a two gun get my guns until can week then gun[.] because I felt uncomfortable without We had lunch met at att 4pm Olive Garden Bowie [sic] 9mm, bag give he me his out of and after that [sic] Passengers the front [sic] seat[.] Szimanski, of the Police Licens- “Sergeant State William Division, Section, back- Firearms ing Registration performs regulated firearms in persons checks on ground purchasing pur- firearms Maryland concerning and deals with records [petition- that the records related to chases. He testified handgun that [petitioner] bought reflect handgun er’s] to him formally and it transferred in November was acronym the National Crime Information 5. "The ‘NCIC’ stands for FBI, system Managed by provides informa- Center. this nationwide Chow, federal, agencies.” justice and local criminal tion to state Md.App. A.2d n. 3. at 498 n. at 1152 month, on that the 27th of after of the completion weapon registration process. subsequent records show no handgun, application transfer of the and no for a transfer of [petitioner] from gun Nguyen. Rivera, “Sergeant Guillermo Internal Office of Affairs of the District of Police Metropolitan Colombia Department, also testified. He stated that appellant had not weapon filed a stolen report between November and November case,

“At the close of the State’s made a [petitioner] judgment motion for of acquittal. argued that [Petitioner] 442(d) conduct, not cover does his which simply temporary exchange handgun. alternative, In the [petitioner] argued that he not ‘knowingly’ did violate the statute, 449(1), required by because the State did not prove transferee, that he knew the Nguyen, had not filed 442(d). the application required by § “The countered leaving State [petitioner’s] gun with Nguyen it, was a ‘transfer’ and therefore was 442(d). covered by The State further argued [peti- tioner] was aware requirements transferring a handgun, he because had fulfilled those requirements him- self when he purchased gun 1996. The finally State argued ‘plain that the meaning’ transfer does neces- sarily title, the conveyance include encompasses mere loan. hearing issues,

“After from on counsel both the [Circuit George’s Court for Prince County] denied the motion. [Pe- evidence, then rested titioner] without on putting any and the court issued its ruling.”

Chow, Md.App. (some A.2d 1151-52 omitted). footnotes

The Circuit Court stated: 442(d) having

“The Court the reviewed statute [§ ] now the is on burden the to prove beyond State a reason- doubt, able the Court finds upon testimony based the in fact transfer in this that there was a

State’s witnesses case. facts that it upon

“The also finds that based the Court a transfer. temporary was the testimony assessment the

“It is the Court’s loan, has although that it was in he witness State’s fact testified that it opposite things; he totally testified to two hand, other and on the anticipated purchase, fact an was testimony testimony least—yeah, or at there was there was So, it in fact loan. have two inconsistent we was the statements State’s witness. to the

“And the Court or states Court— the State asks under either that there was theory, to the Court that argues case. The court that there illegal agrees an transfer in this an illegal was transfer. counsel], your argument I understand

“And [petitioner’s transfer, it and I’ll leave to the respect temporary is not a to tell me that transfer temporary courts higher law, cir- I believe under the transfer under facts a temporary this it is in cumstances case fact transfer. intended a transference legislature “And whether clear, statute, finds but this this Court it’s part be a from with that.” higher I’ll for direction court wait [Emphasis added.] and sen- judge petitioner guilty trial then found court sixty days—with suspended— sentence

tenced him to so, ($200). In trial doing fine dollars and a of two hundred I’m why giving you disposi- “And the reason judge stated: it temporary transfer, illegal, I that it was tion is believe was but, it regulated firearm] the transferee did with [the what control, he stated on your clearly not within house, in the and he chose put told him you record [Emphasis not to.” added]. an timely appeal Special

Petitioner noted Court filed Special Appeals The Court of On June Appeals. The court affirmed the decision of Circuit opinion. its in reference to the Specifically, interpretation Court. “transfer,” word the court stated: plainly meaning hold included within

“[W]e firearm, 442(d), regulated lending § ‘transfer’ of a firearm. The construction of the term is confirmed plain by general regulated an examination of the purpose firearms that the [subheading], rule remedial of a statute are to be There- portions liberally construed. fore, 442(d) a person by lending violates firearm to another person being compli- without there first ance the application process seven-day waiting forth in period set that section.”

Chow, (footnote Md.App. at 1158 A.2d omitted). court, however, The failed to address the entire issue of what would constitute a transfer: need not “We transfer, decide in this case other support what facts would 442(d). purposes It is therefore unnecessary i.e., address the scenario postulated by [petitioner], a mere momentary exchange regulated firearm between the possessor person.” lawful and another Id. at 510 n. addition,

A.2d at 1158 n. 7. to the mens rea respect 449(f), §of requirement the court held “that ‘knowingly par- 442(d) in a ticipates’ violation means participation with knowledge of the facts that make out a violation of that State, then, subsection” and that only prove “[t]he need the defendant participated a transfer of a firearm (as with the that a firearm knowledge to some other opposed item) (as being intentionally was opposed accidentally) transferred.” Id. at (citing A.2d at 1160 Dawkins v. State, (1988)). 313 Md.

II. Standard of Review judice case sub tried in the circuit court without a jury, thus our standard of by Maryland review dictated Rule 8-131(c). State, We stated in recently Gray (2005): 879 A.2d 1064 8-131(c)

“According Maryland Rule ‘when an action has been tried jury, appellate without court will review It will set and the evidence. case on both the law unless court on the evidence of the trial judgment

aside erroneous, opportuni- to give regard due and will clearly of the credibility witnesses.’ judge to of the trial court ty legal apply standard does clearly The erroneous 65, 72, GEICO, 854 A.2d 382 Md. Nesbit v. conclusions. an (2004). order “involves the trial court’s 879, ‘When 883 statutory Maryland application interpretation the lower law, must determine whether our Court case a de novo correct under legally are conclusions court’s ” Nesbit, 72, at 883 854 A.2d 382 Md. of review.’ standard Gunter, A.2d Md. v. (quoting Walter (2002)).” Therefore, we A.2d at 1068. 388 Md. at Gray, interpreta- to the presented as legal questions shall review 442(d) rea element of the mens §in tion of “transfer” 449(f) de novo. §

III. Discussion Meaning of “Transfer” The A. 442(d). §of

in the Context 442(d) subheading Firearms Regulated Section an by firearms regulated or “transfer” sale governs As firearms dealer. stated regulated not a that is individual states, in pertinent part: the statute supra, dealer.—(1) A “(d) regulated other than by Sale firearms sell, may not firearms dealer regulated not a who is until after firearm rent, any regulated or transfer, purchase an application from the time elapsed days shall have by pro- executed have been or transfer shall purchase transferee, origi- and the triplicate, or purchaser spective to the firearms dealer aby regulated copy nal forwarded Secretary.” added). 442(d)(1) (emphasis using intent of legislative that the contends

Petitioner 442(d), perma- to mean a “transfer,” §in as found term firearm, possession of title or exchange nent or gift in a rather than a mere loan bequeathment, tempo- State, such rary exchange opposition, firearm. 442(d) argues all prohibits exchanges firearms, sale, rental, or permanent, temporary whether loan, and no matter gift, exchange tempo- otherwise how rary. 442(d)

In order to of “transfer” in meaning divine we of statutory interpretation, look the canons re which we Resources, cently expressed Department Kushell v. Natural (2005): 870 A.2d 186 Md. 38 “The interpretation cardinal rule of statutory ascertain Legislature. and effectuate the intent of the Collins See State, (2004). Statutory begins plain statute, construction with the language of and ordinary, popular understanding English lan- guage interpretation of its dictates Deville v. terminology. State, 217, 223, 484, (2004). 383 Md. 858 A.2d 487

“In the construing plain language, may court neither ‘[a] add nor language delete so as to reflect an intent not plain evidenced in the and unambiguous language the statute; may nor the construe statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or application.’ extend its State, 378, 387, Price 1221, (2003); v. 378 Md. 835 A.2d 1226 Dutcher, County 399, 416-417, v. Council 365 Md. 780 A.2d 1137, (2001). Statutory 1147 text ‘should be read so that no word, clause, or phrase sentence superfluous rendered ” Collins, nugatory.’ 691, 383 Md. at 861 A.2d at 732 (quoting Butler, 683, 696, 1180, ames v. 378 Md. 838 A.2d 1187 J (2003)). The plain language provision is interpreted Rather, in isolation. we the analyze scheme as statutory whole and attempt provisions harmonize dealing with the subject Deville, same so that each may given effect. 383 223, 487; Md. at 858 A.2d at Navarro-Monzo v. Washing Adventist, 204, 195, (2004). ton 406, 380 Md. 844 411 A.2d “If statutory language is unambiguous when construed according ordinary to its and everyday meaning, then we give Collins, effect to the statute as it is written. 383 Md. 688-89, at 861 A.2d at 730. If there is no ambiguity other inherently or reference to relevant

language, either circumstances, as to intent legislative the inquiry laws various, ends; resort to the and some- we do not need to inconsistent, construction, ‘the external rules of times what it said and said presumed to have meant Legislature Marie, Corp. Md. it meant.’ Arundel v. what Azarian, v. Md. (quoting A.2d Witte (2002)).” A.2d Kushell, 870 A.2d 193-94. Further- 385 Md. State, more, as we stated Price (2003): cases, statutory ambiguity, “In some text reveals ambiguity then the of this is to resolve that job Court intent, all the resources and legislative using light However, our statutory disposal. tools of construction at interpretation, may look other sources for judges before statute, i.e., an ambiguity first there must exist within interpretations or more reasonable alternative two free from statutory language is such statute. Where beyond courts will neither look words of ambiguity, to or legislative to determine intent nor add statute itself Only from the statute. faced with delete words when consider both the literal or usual ambiguity will courts their meaning meaning light the words as well as our objectives enactment. As purposes noted, authority read ‘We cannot assume predecessors Legislature apparently deliberately into the Act what be resorted to only left out. Judicial construction should Therefore, an ambiguity strongly pre- exists.’ when to statutory ferred norm of is effectuate interpretation statutory text.” plain language (citations omitted); Price, at 835 A.2d at 1226 Goff (2005); State, 327, 342, 875 A.2d 141 Pete v. Md. (2004). State, 47, 57-58, 862 A.2d Md. 442(d). Language Plain

First, it to look at necessary plain language 442(d) any ambiguity in the determine whether there as it is context of the statute. The “transfer” used term Chow, term itself is not defined within the subheading. See (“Neither Md.App. at 881 A.2d at 1154 442 nor any other section subheading within defines word ‘trans- ”). Therefore, fer.’ look to ordinary we and popular understanding of the “transfer” to determine its mean- word Kushell, ing. supra.

There are a number of sources from can obtain which we definitions of the “transfer” to consult a proper word and it is or dictionary ordinary popular dictionaries for a term’s meaning. Dep’t Mary State Assessments and Taxation v. Comm’n, land-National Capital Planning Park and 2, 14, (1997) (“[I]n 702 A.2d deciding what term’s is, do, and natural ordinary meaning and often may, we State, consult the dictionary.”); Hackley v. 161 Md.App. (2005). The Special Appeals Court of looked different two sources for definitions:

“The first definition of the verb ‘transfer’ The Random House Dictionary of the English Language convey is ‘to or etc., place, remove from one person, another[.]’ Random House Dictionary English Language, Una- (2nd 1987) (‘Random House’). bridged 2009 ed. A similar first definition of the verb ‘transfer’ is found Black’s Law ‘To Dictionary: convey place remove from one or one another; person to pass or hand over from one to another, esp. to change possession over the or control of.’ (8th 2004) (‘Black’s’). Black’s Dictionary Law ed. These definitions are broad and both include a loan of the property issue. sure,

“To be other subsequently listed defini- dictionary tions of the verb ‘transfer’ are more in keeping construction given [petitioner]. Random House includes third definition of the verb: ‘Law. to make possession over the or control of: to a title to land.’ transfer House, lists, Random supra, at 2009. And Black’s as its definition, second Black’s, ‘To sell or give.’ supra, at 1536. Similarly, Random House defines the noun form word as, alia, ‘Law, ‘transfer’ sale, inter a conveyance, by gift, otherwise of real or personal property, to another.’ Ran- House, defined, at And ‘conveyance’ 2009. supra,

dom alia, one ‘Law. a. the transfer of from property inter 445, to Id. at 866 A.2d 906.” another.’ Chow, Utilizing at at 1154. A.2d Md.App. in appears and the context which “transfer” these definitions 442(d), Appeals §in of decided “decline Special the Court ‘transfer,’ in to ascribe [petitioner’s] invitation verb 442(d), of a suggestive only exchange a definition permanent Chow, 503, 881 A.2d at possession.” Md.App. of title or at We, however, disagree Special Ap- Court of 1154. in this determination instance. peals’ from there different sources supra, As stated are which points out may be obtained.6 Petitioner definitions word a number of definitions from dictionaries which were available Library prior to the initial 1941 Maryland in the State Law Regulated of to the Fire predecessor enactment statute All of “transfer” as arms the definitions define subheading.7 Marshall, Harrell, writing Judge Harvey for in v. the Court 243, (2005), expressed some the Court has 884 A.2d 1171 concerns dictionary singularly relying on about recent editions establish meaning statutory of in a words scheme: rely "Although frequently appellate on dictio courts consult statutory nary analysis language, often without definitions in their of consulted, dictionary explanation why particular ques dictionary given particular as to edition of a is utilized in a tion which puzzling inquiry. presents a more seems that situation Sometimes determinative, on edition on a random chance is based whatever composition library of of of shelf within reach the author the time attempting opinion. Because we are to ascertain the intent of time, Legislature choosing language point at a to a certain in resort otherwise, dictionary, logically legal include consultation should (in editions) were editions addition current dictionaries that those pertinent legislative enactments. See Rossville extant at the time of 305, Comptroller Md.App. Vending Corp. Treasury, 316- Mach. (1993) (stating logical, at 629 A.2d 1289-90 seems ‘[i]t dictionary way, popular that a time in which [the least in linear attempting would statute was be an informative resource enacted] .')(cid:127)” at a to arrive determination... (emphasis Harvey, 260-61 n. 1181 n. 389 Md. at added). initially pursuant to the 7. The statute was enacted Laws Maryland, Chapter and codified in the "Crimes and Punishments” exchange of title time of permanent possession.8 From the 1941, through its initial its to the enactment evolution present always the statute has a form of the day, contained persuasive term It is the use of the term “transfer.” throughout “transfer” has remained consistent the evolution of the in of all statute—always the context a transfer of of the transferee, rights of the transferor to the either permanently Thus, or for an of if a period gun extended time is “rented.” the meaning and context of the term have been altered over the of the years, though course other definitions even may changed. have

The Special Appeals Court of found that an interpretation suggestive “transfer” as only permanent exchange of title title, "Pistols,” (1939, Maryland Supp.), under the subtitle in Code 1943 states, §§ pertinent part: Art. 531A-531G. It by “A kept true record shall be made dealer in each a book for the purpose, prescribed by Secretary the form of which shall be the State, sold, pistols disposed of all or revolvers or otherwise transferred retail, of at or wholesale which record the said shall contain date of sale, caliber, make, the model and of the manufacturer’s number weapon, to which shall be the added name and of the address purchaser....” IB, Chapter of the 1941. Acts of The reference "whole- sale or retail” indicates a business transaction. as, Adjudged 8. Words and Phrases defines transfer "The term transfer convey pass means to or right over the of one to another” and by thing person, "[t]he act which the owner of a delivers it to another passing right with the intent of the had in it he to the latter.” Charles Winfield, Adjudged (1882). H. Words and Phrases Dictionary by Bouvier’s Law defines transfer as act which the "ft]he thing person, owner of a delivers it to passing another with the intent rights he Dictionary which has it to the latter.” Bouvier’s Law (1914). transfer, Collegiate Dictionary pertinent part, The Law defines as: by thing "1. The which act the owner of a delivers it another person, passing rights with the intent of he had in it to latter. Any by anything conveys act which the owner of delivers or it to pass rights another intent to with the his therein.... 4. To remove. 5. location, change place, To of.” relation (citations omitted). Collegiate Dictionary The Law Cyclopedic Dictionary The Law defines transfer as which "[t]he act thing person, the owner of a delivers it to another with the intent of passing rights which he Cyclopedic has in it to latter.” The Law (3rd ed.1940). Dictionary ‘[ojrdinary rule that run afoul possession “would inter English language understanding of dictates popular ” Chow, 163 Md. terminology legislation.’ within pretation Deville, at 1154 App. (citing A.2d 484). court, however, no provides support from other than what can inferred its this conclusion dictionary provided, supra, definitions it discussion of the two both the and the State’s supported petitioner’s arguably which of the definitions in light “transfer” arguments. Analyzing 442(d), time of enactment of we legislative effect at the run of “transfer” to afoul petitioner’s interpretation do not find understanding English ordinary popular language. and often do. And multiple meanings can have

Words particular may satisfy of a word each meanings the numerous In understanding the that word. ordinary popular specific meaning particular in a interpret order to word’s in context the word is used. As statute we look the which of a is not plain language provision “The supra, we stated Rather, analyze statutory in isolation. we the interpreted to harmonize attempt provisions scheme as a whole and subject may given that each dealing same so Deville, 487; A.2d at Navarro- effect. Adventist, Md. Washington A.2d Monzo v. (2004).” Kushell, A.2d at 193. Md. Regulated Context of “Transfer” Subheading. Firearms specifi- Firearms Regulated subheading While the does “transfer,” term use term several cally define the does 441 provides times its sections. Section throughout various 441(f) particular, for In subheading. the definitions “ any person engaged ‘Dealer’ means who is states that: renting, firearms at Selling, transferring business of: added). Transfer, as used in (Emphasis or retail.” wholesale section, for this concerns transfers consideration obviously terms). (t) (“wholesale” are and “retail” business Section “ regu- of a ‘Rent’ means the temporary states that: transfer lated firearm consideration the firearm where is taken for added). from the firearm property.” (Emphasis owner’s Fi- “ 441(w) nally, states that: purchase’ any ‘Straw means sale regulated of a firearm where the individual uses another (the person straw purchaser) to complete application purchase firearm, a regulated take possession initial of that firearm, and subsequently that firearm to the individ- transfer added). ual.” (Emphasis This section also obviously concerns transfers consideration. In all of the above instances (except where “Rent” is specifically defined and delineated as consideration) temporary transfer for the word “transfer” is used the sense of permanent exchange of title or posses- sion of the regulated firearm for A consideration. dealer is a engaged permanently business of exchanging title or possession of 441(f), a firearm. In the context of transfer logically permanent means a exchange. the case purchase, straw there is a sale of firearm to the strawperson, then who (permanently exchanging transfers of) possession the firearm to another individual. The use of 441(w) in § transfer also contemplates permanent exchange of possession for consideration.

Section entitled “Sale or transfer of fire arms,” utilizes instances, “transfer” in several including sub section Subsection (d), (b)(8)(i) subject states that provision in the case sub judice. “[a]n application ^[9] to purchase a regulated firearm shall be completed by the transfer recipient and forwarded to the Secretary within 5 days ” receipt of the regulated firearm.... Reference to appli the (MSP 77R-1) cation form itself is reflective of “transfer” having “permanent exchange” connotation.

The form is entitled: “MARYLAND STATE AP- POLICE PLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT A TO PURCHASE REGU- LATED FIREARM.” The first section provides instructions, begin: which “The (purchaser) or voluntary regis- transferee trant complete must Part 1 of application prior this application The form of is not contained in the statute. 9.

completing Part added for The rest of emphasis]. 2.” [Italics and, following composes application Part page block, yes with or no questions instruction fifteen are listed N/A) (and in by applicant, circles to be sometime filled ques- initial for each along space applicant with a for signature At bottom of the there is a page tion’s answer. “Signature Transferee/Voluntary The box is labeled box. [Emphasis Two lines Registrant and added]. Transferor.” (1) labeled provided signatures: are “Transferee/Volun- [Emphasis tary Registrant” “Dealer/Transferor.” added]. 2. Locat- page composes Part application second boxes, respectively page four check top

ed at the are “Gift,” Sale,” Sale,” “Secondary and “Volun- labeled: “Dealer Below that is an instruction box which tary Registration.” states: voluntary

“The must (purchaser) registrant transferee Part 1 this Part complete application prior completing (sellers) visually dealers or must 2. Licensed transferors document inspect provided an official transferee verify completed that the has either certified transferee ... or an official document safety training firearms course a current enforce- that indicates that the law transferee ” for emphasis.] ment officer.... added [Italics box, into is broken six page the instruction Following A of an and B. Each composed sections section two 1. individual section is entitled follows: “TRANSFEREE (PURCHASER INFORMA- REGISTRANT VOLUNTARY *(* TION,” 2a. “DEALER INFORMATION For Licensed * (,SELLER) *),” 2b. Only Dealer Sales “TRANSFEROR (For Gifts, Sales, Secondary Voluntary INFORMATION “ (THIS Only),” FOR MARY- Registration SECTION ONLY),” LAND 4. “GUN INFORMA- STATE POLICE USE (Must signature Be Completed By Transferor),” TION “Sign Voluntary Registration” Application blocks 5. upon “Sign Transfer of Firearm.” added for upon [Italics and 6. emphasis].

It application, by evident that referenced 442(b)(3)(i), or § transfer firearms purchase regulated such only designed permanent “transfers” of firearms.10 fact, available, at the only options top of indicated Sale,” application, second for “Dealer page are “Gift,” Sale,” Registration.” “Secondary “Voluntary With exception “Voluntary Registration,” option of each evinces of permanent a title or exchange possession between two “Voluntary Registration” individuals. of an indi indicative firearm, of already possession regulated any vidual a not of type exchange. 442(d)(2)

Section states: “As an to completing alternative a secondary regulated sale of firearm a through regulated a dealer, firearms seller prospective or transferor and the transferee prospective purchaser may complete the transac- through designated tion law enforcement agency.” This 442(d), an provides § section alternative to the pertinent judice. in the section case sub The use “transfer” in 442(d)(2) to a distinctly permanent exchange. refers This is section, through introductory language evident “As an alternative completing secondary sale “ 442(d)(2) added). (in . ... (emphasis conjunc- Transferor seller) (in conjunction tion with and transferee with purchaser) in this context a secondary is concerned with sale completing (permanent exchange) through firearm a desig- agency nated law enforcement rather through regulat- than firearms ed dealer.

Section “Regulated license,” entitled firearm dealer’s (a), states subsection person shall in the engage “[n]o business of selling, renting, transferring firearms he lawfully possesses unless and conspicuously displays at his business, place any other required by addition license law, a regulated firearms dealer’s license issued Secre- Dictionary It 10. should also be noted Black’s Law defines “transfer- property conveyed” as “[o]ne ee” to whom a interest is and "transfer- conveys property.” or” is defined as who “Lo]ne an interest Id. at added). 441(f), similar Again, use tary.” (Emphasis in person engaging “transfer” in the context of a ex- permanent a connotation of provides firearms business of title or consideration. change possession generally in in term “transfer” is used The context which the as a subheading’s statutory Firearms scheme whole Regulated 442(d). Kushell, §in be harmonized its use must with Navarro-Monzo, at 193 380 Md. (citing Md. at 411; Deville, 383 Md. at 858 A.2d at 844 A.2d at at 487). 442(d) states, pertinent part: Section dealer.—(1)

“(d) than A by regulated Sale other firearms sell, may not a firearms dealer person who is rent, until any regulated or firearm after transfer, purchase the time elapsed application shall have from an days pro- or transfer shall have been executed purchase transferee, or and the purchaser triplicate, origi- spective by regulated firearms dealer copy nal is forwarded added.) Secretary.” (Emphasis Appeals found “the context which Special Court does not narrow definition appears comport ‘transfer’ exchange possession] [petitioner] of title or permanent [that Chow, Md.App. have us the word.” give would this, expounded stating: court upon A.2d at 1154. The 442(d) exchange: forms of refers three firearm “Section ‘rent,’ ‘transfer.’ ‘Rent’ is defined in purchase],’ ‘sell and [or (t) firearm ‘temporary § 441 as the transfer firearm is taken from the for consideration where the and are not property.’ ‘purchase’ firearm owner’s ‘Sell’ they carry in the but we assume their subheading, defined ordinary meaning, contemplate perma and popular nent transfer for consideration.

“ ‘Transfer,’ then, contemplate something must different ‘rent’; otherwise, ‘sell’ those be sur- from or terms would word, that no ‘read statutes so plusage. We strive clause, superflu- is rendered phrase surplusage, sentence ” ous, nugatory Pagano, .’ See State v. meaningless, 129, 134, Md. 669 A.2d 1339 (quoting Montgomery Buckman, County (1994)). 636 A.2d 448 Chow, Md.App. A.2d at 1154-55. agree We with the Court of Special Appeals that “sell” “purchase” contemplate a permanent exchange for consideration.11 We “rent,” have discussed the use of which is specifically defined 441(t). however, disagree, We with the Court of Special Appeals’ analysis that “transfer” must be construed with a broad meaning to being avoid considered surplusage. To the contrary, it is when “transfer” is considered in its broad meaning that surplusage language created. if “transfer” includes everything “sell,” then the words “rent” “pur chase” are surplus words. The Court of Special Appeals’ apparent presumption

that a “gift” only is the form that “permanent a exchange of Chow, title or possession” can assume. See 163 Md.App. at (“[W]e 881 A.2d at 1155 cannot term, ascribe to the as it 442(d), in § is used a meaning narrow essentially restricted ...”). ‘gift’. The Court of Special Appeals argues that “trans fer” cannot mean simply “gift.” The court stated: itself, §

“Elsewhere in the General Assembly ‘gift’ used (with conditions) to exclude certain those forms of exchange from the prohibitions against purchases. straw See 442(b)(2), (providing that prohibitions ‘[t]he of this purchase] [straw subsection do not apply a pur- a chasing regulated firearm as a gift,’ long so as there is compliance the application with requirement). Had the General Assembly intended to limit its meaning of the verb “sale,” Dictionary 11. word, Black’s Law defines the noun form of the as: added). "Sell,” property "The of price.” or title for (emphasis a Id. at 1364 transfer sale, the verb form of (proper- is defined: "To transfer ty) by added). (emphasis sale.” Id. at 1391 "Purchase” is defined: "The act or an buying” instance of and "Purchaser” is defined: "One consideration; property money who obtains for or other valuable a buyer." Id. at 1270. as, Dictionary 12. Black’s Law defines voluntary "Gift” "[t]he transfer (emphasis property to compensation.” another without Id. at 709 added). 442(d) a that the gift, expect ‘transfer’ in we making used that Legislature would have word.” We, Chow, 503-04, 881 A.2d at Md.App. howev- “Transfer,” er, reasoning. this as defined at disagree with 442(d) read in harmony time of enactment of with Regulated subheading, has the the rest Firearms transfer, of a rather than a meaning permanent gratuitous “ will not statute temporary transfer. And we ‘construe that limit or extend its interpretations forced or subtle ” Kushell, A.2d 385 Md. at at 193 application.’ Price, 1226); A.2d County 378 Md. at (quoting Dutcher, 399, 416-417, 1137, 1147 Council (2001). perma- of “a meaning “Transfer” can be ascribed and not be rendered exchange possession” nent title or meaningless, nugatory. surplusage, superfluous, 442(d) §in has litany Each term in the laid out its own The term “sell” a ex meaning. contemplates permanent from seller or transferor of a change consideration a for term buyer. Conversely, “pur firearm to a exchange consideration contemplates permanent chase” for firearm from seller. buyer to a or transferee 441(t), “Rent,” in § and defined contem discussed above transfer consideration. None these plates temporary words, “sell,” to include purchase,” or “rent” can defined That type transfer of a permanent gratuitous firearm. the word “transfer” and exchange is covered permanent statute, i.e., purpose permanent gratuitous that is its Regulated the rest transfer. Read context with of “transfer,” 442(d), §in subheading, the term as used Firearms “sell,” distinguishable “purchase” from the words “rent” and of title or any permanent exchange in that means other if consideration.13 of a firearm even it is without possession that the other permanent exchange This covers situations of suggests Special Appeals has "a broader 13. The Court of that "transfer” to) (even permanent meaning that includes if not limited both the exchange (gift), property of the without and the of title consideration (loan).” exchange temporary possession without of consideration Chow, 504, Md.App. at 881 A.2d at 1155. address, i.e., terms fail to in the gift bequeath- case of a “transfer,” Therefore, 442(d), ment. as is not used surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, nugatory. It is the Court of Special Appeals’ interpretation that makes the other language of the litany surplusage. relevant day

While modern definitions of may, “transfer” some instances, attribute to the meaning, they word broader also a more provide narrow definition. That of narrow definition “permanent of title or exchange possession” is more in harmo- ny statutory with the scheme Regulated of the Firearms Thus, subheading, as a whole. we attribute that narrow 442(d) 449(f). meaning §§ “transfer” as it is used 3. Even Can Be Said to Be Ambiguous, the if “Transfer”

Application Statutory Construction and a Review of Legislative Intent that its Meaning in the Context Reflect 442(d) is One Permanent Exchange Title or Possession. “transfer,” 442(d)

While we find that in §§ as used 449(f), is unambiguous and refers to a permanent gratuitous exchange of title or possession, it is useful for confirmatory reasons to look to the purpose Regulated Firearms subheading by intended the General Assembly.14 Prior to enacting predecessor statute to the Regulated Firearms subheading, the General Assembly enacted Uni- State, 175, Stanley (2005): 14. As stated in 390 Md. 887 A.2d 1078 “We are legislative aware that this Court history has reviewed the pronounced statute which unambiguous. we have clear and circumstances, those confirmatory process, is a [Design see 718, 730, v.]Lagos, Kitchen & Baths 388 Md. 882 A.2d [(2005)]; Glass, 401, 411, (2005); State v. 386 Md. 872 A.2d Mayor City Chase, 121, 128, Council Baltimore v. 360 Md. (2000) (when A.2d language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, legislative history ‘the resort confirmatory is a process; it is not plain meaning undertaken contradict the statute'); State, Coleman v. (‘a may general court not as a legislative rule surmise a intention contrary plain language to the exceptions of a statute or insert legislature'), made contradictory not a one.” Stanley, 390 Md. 887 A.2d at Act Act. The Machine Gun was

form Machine Gun Uniform Assembly initially pursuant the General by enacted Laws, Maryland Chap. Md. and is now codified the The (2002), § 4-403 of Law Article. Uni- Code Criminal Act, term in discussing utilizes the “loan” form Machine Gun states, of machine Section 4-403 registration guns. the part: pertinent

“(a) A manufacturer of registration.—(1) Manufacturer gun machine keep register a machine shall each gun by or handled the manufacturer. manufactured (2) The shall contain: register loan, (ii) manufacture, sale, delivery, and gift, the date of manufacturer; from the receipt gun of the machine and (iii) name, address, occupation person loaned, sold, delivered, or gun given whom machine was received, the machine was and the gun or from whom gun the machine was purpose acquired.” for which added). language pertinent The (Emphasis original has over the largely unchanged years: remained section register shall of all machine “Every keep manufacturer him. shall register manufactured or handled This guns number, manufacture, and serial show model date sale, loan, delivery receipt, gun, or machine gift, every name, address, whom occupation person loaned, delivered, sold, given the machine or or gun was received; purpose from whom it was which acquired by gun to whom machine was delivered, sold, loaned, given from whom received.” (1931, Supp.), (emphasis Art. add- Md.Code 350G ed). Assembly involving

The General did not enact regulation firearms, 1941.15 respect handguns, until Appeals Special provides partial review 15. The Court of Regulated subheading: legislative history of the Firearms in its Legislature previously had utilized the term “loan” of machine in regulation guns, arguably dangerous more strument than the As regulated handguns.16 Had General to restrict of firearms in terms of sembly exchange wanted “loaning” specifically respect would have done so to regulated origins, "We have traced the firearms statute back 1o its Assembly and have found that the General never used the words statute, consistently 'loan' or 'lend' in the used the word 'trans- Assembly regulated pistols fer.' The General first sale of 1941, providing: by ‘A revolvers true record shall be made each sold, pistols dealer ... of all or revolvers otherwise transferred Laws, (em- disposed at retailf.]’ of wholesale or 1941 Md. ch. 622 added); (1939, 27, 531B, phasis Supp.), §§ Md.Code 1943 Article 531C. 1957, 27, 442, language § “In that was re-codified at Article 27, (1957), change. § without substantive See Md.Code Article 442. Laws, generally ('legalizing' See ch. 23 the 1957 edition of Code). Maryland 1966, re-enacted, repealed, § "In 442 was with substantial amendments, change requirements to the structure and of the sec- Laws, tion. 1966 Md. ch. 502. It was then that the section first Compare § resembled the of 442 in version effect in 2003. Md.Code (1957, (1957, Repl.Vol.), § 1967 Article with Md.Code 1996 Vol, 27, Repl. Supp.), Assembly § 2002 Article 442. The General ‘(b) Application purchase continued to use the term 'transfer': to any pistol dealer shall sell or or revolver until transfer.—No after seven transfer days elapsed application shall have from the time an to purchase prospective or transfer have shall been executed (1957, purchaser Repl.Vol.), or transferee....’ Md.Code Article 27, added). § (emphasis discuss, infra, language "As we contained in the subsection at 442(d)—was 1996, § part issue in this case— not added until as Laws, Maryland Gun Violence Act.1996 Md. chs. The 562. 442(d), Assembly just § General doing used 'transfer' as it had been through in reference to firearms transactions dealers. See (1957, Repl.Vol., Supp.), § Md.Code Article 442. Despite portions amendments to other 442 between 1996 and (d) unchanged." section has remained Chow, Md.App. at 505-06 n. A.2d 1156 n. 5. It provides should be noted that the Uniform Machine Gun Act person acquires gun register gun "[a] who a machine shall the machine (i) Secretary acquir with the of the State Police: within 24 hours after (2002), 4-403(c)(1)(i) ing gun the machine ...." Md.Code added). (emphasis Criminal Law Article Should we construe "trans 442(d) meaning fer” in requests, with the broad we State would (in making be the Uniform Machine Gun Act less onerous terms of instances) registration Regulated in some than the Firearms subhead ing. here, and, is from those apparent situations such as extant statute, so.17 the machine knew how do gun conclusion, Special Appeals opposite 17. The came to the Court stating: [petitioner's] mean accept proposed construction would "To freely by an that all firearms could be lent owner to another regulation, person complying machine without with the strictures but Chow, guns Md.App. 881 A.2d at 1156. cannot.” Appeals' analysis disingenuous petitioner's pro- Special Court of (on temporary posed All firearms can be lent construction. basis) by legally permitted possess another that is an owner to regulations subject complying strictures set firearms with the dealing subheading. Regulated Firearms Where statute out rights possess present, property, in the context here of citizens prohibited normally specifically presumed it can states what specifically prohibited—is permitted. Maryland follows the what is not recently expressio est alterius. As we stated doctrine of unius exclusio Blanton, Comptroller Treasury in (2006): v. 390 Md. 890 A.2d 279 of (or long accepted expressio "... of inclu- Maryland has the doctrine sio) alterius, expression thing or the of one is unius est exclusio ed.2004). (8th Dictionary another. Black's Law exclusion of 366, 385, (2001) Ayd, v. 780 A.2d Baltimore Harbor Md. statutory long applied principal con- (holding have of '[w]e struction, Biggus “expressio unius est exclusio alterius Accord Co., 188, 214, (1992) Ford Motor Credit statutory (stating, keeping the familiar maxim of ‘[t]his expres- “expressio alterius "—the construction that unius est exclusio long thing Maryland has sion of is the exclusion of another. one rule’).” recognized this basic Blanton, Md. at 890 A.2d at 285. Regulated re- subheading enumerates Section 445 of the Firearms (d): possession regulated firearm in subsection strictions on "(d) possession—In general.—A may person on Restrictions possess person: a firearm if the (1) of: Has been convicted violence; (i) A crime of State; (ii) felony Any classified in this violation (iii) State that Any violation classified as a misdemeanor in this years; statutory penalty of than 2 carries a more (iv) law where the Any violation classified as a common offense years. person imprisonment of of more than 2 received term (2) Is: (i) justice; fugitive from A drunkard; (ii) A habitual (iii) dangerous any or a habitual user of controlled Addicted to substances; (iv) 10—101(f)(2) Suffering from a mental disorder as defined in history Article has a of violent behavior of Health-General self, against person or than 30 another or has been confined for more (d) Subsection of 442 was added in pursuant to the (“Act”). Maryland Gun Violence Act of 1996 It is instructive to look at some of the documentation surrounding the Act. In 1996, then-Governor Parris N. Glendening proposed two “Ad- bills, ministration” cross-filed as Senate Bill 215 and House Bill The Act was “a comprehensive proposal aimed reducing the epidemic gun violence” in Maryland. Briefing Statement Before the Senate Judicial Proceeding Committee (1996) and the (statement House Judiciary Committee Kirkland, Bonnie A. Officer, Chief Legislative Leg- Governor’s islative Office Mitchell, and Colonel B. David Superintendent, Police), Department Statement”). State 2at (“Briefing As the Court of Special Appeals points out: Briefing

“The explains: Statement ‘To help accomplish this goal, the Maryland Gun Violence Act focuses on reducing the availability of handguns and assault weapons, which are defined firearms, bill as regulated prohibited persons by diminishing the proliferation of illegal sales and Id.; transfers firearms.’ see also Valentine v. Target, On Inc., Md. (Raker, J., A.2d 947 concurring) (recognizing the regulated firearms provi- days facility consecutive to a as defined in 10-101 of the Health- Article, General person possesses unless the physician's certifica- person tion that the capable possessing firearm others; danger without undue to the or to (v) respondent against A parte whom a current protec- non ex civil tive order has been entered under Family 4-506 of the Law Article. years age Is less than 30 of possession at the time of and has adjudicated delinquent by

been juvenile a committing: court for (i) violence; A crime of (ii) Any State; felony violation classified as a in this (iii) Any violation classified as a misdemeanor in this State that statutory penalty carries a years." of more than 2 addition, 445(e) supra, § as discussed person states that “a who is years age may under possess of regulated a firearm” unless that minor meets exceptions certain "temporary for a transfer" of the firearm—i.e., regulated permission with legal the guardian of a supervision under the legally permitted of an adult possess regulat- to ed firearm or if the participating minor is in marksmanship training supervision while under the qualified instructor. prohibitions None of these would include a in the status of the present transferee in the case. statutory designed are of an ‘elaborate scheme [ ] sions part which, of like the regulate handguns[,]’ the transfer Act passed Control and Streets Crime Safe Omnibus and, if ‘controlling] the of Congress purpose has violence’).” eliminating] gun possible, Chow, As in the at 881 A.2d at 1157. used Md.App. the proliferation its was to reduce Briefing purpose Statement The of illegal Special of sales and Court illegal transfers. Briefing analysis, stating: to the Statement’s refers Appeals 442(d) has of purpose ‘disrupting] particular “Section of by reducing gun trafficking patterns supply established 442(d) as to the market.’ To read illegal firearms regulated regulated loan of a firearm would undermine exempting the Chow, legislative the laudable of scheme.” purpose (citation omitted). The Md.App. however, Statement, way to the Briefing imposi- no alludes upon exchange loan temporary tion of restrictions not legally two adults that are firearms between regulated prohibited such firearms. possessing from quote which the is taken in the particular

The section from placed is more read in its Briefing properly Statement when The reads: paragraph entire context. Bill

Key Bill 215 and House features Senate Requires go through II. sales between individuals initial scrutiny purchases gun same from dealer: waiting background seven-day period. check (Article 442E). The required application/reg- 27 Sec. secondary coupled prohibi- sales istration disrupt transactions will multiple purchase tion of gun trafficking patterns by reducing established illegal firearms market.” supply Statement, [emphasis purpose at 5 Briefing added]. sales, sales, regulate secondary scheme is to legislative transactions of multiple permanent purchase to prohibit in the disrupt gun trafficking firearms order market, illegal not temporary exchanges or loans of regulated firearms between adults legally permitted possess regulated firearms. fact,

In the Briefing Statement enumerates what the Act proposes regulate: other “Among things, the Act proposes to limit the -purchase of regulated firearms to one in a thirty- day period; treat secondary sales of firearms like sales dealers; prohibit purchases; straw and require license to purchase a regulated Statement, firearm.” Briefing at 2 [emphasis addition, the Briefing added]. Statement’s Con- clusion states:

“Maryland throughout residents the state favor stricter handgun citizens, regulation. These and those testifying support of this Legislation, represent a broad array people throughout the Supporters State. include members medical, business religious community. Support- ers also include the increasing number of victims whose violence, lives have been by gun shattered as their well family and friends. Even many those traditionally thought opposed to any gun measures, control such as gun enthusiasts, owners and support this legislation. They understand that this Act no imposes restrictions on the use purposes such as hunting sport of firearms for lawful shooting, and imposes reasonable regulations aimed at reducing gun epidemic violence by reducing the avail- ability guns to minors and criminals.” Statement, Briefing at 6 [emphasis This is exactly added]. 442(d) what the Act and do if “transfer” is construed narrowly to mean “a permanent exchange of title or posses we, however, sion.” If adopt the broad meaning that the State requests and the Court of Special Appeals adopted, then the 442(d) Act would be interpreted to impose additional restrictions upon the use of firearms for purposes.18 lawful 18. Under interpretation, any the State's temporary exchange or loan of 442(d). firearm would constitute a violation of For exam- ple, properly if an individual owned two firearms and wanted to take permitted a friend who also was own shooting firearms to the that not of the intent this was legislative suggests

Our review Furthermore, a at the the look Legislature. intent (both original to Bill the and revised Fiscal Note House versions) Note, in scope the of the bill. The Fiscal suggests states, law, only current state “Under discussing expenditures, a subject is to involving gun a a licensed dealer transaction the Police. This bill approval by and State waiting period Fis- that to sales between individuals.” requirement extends Note, 2 [emphasis cal added]. 442(d) § intent legislative involving the we

Upon review of statute, “transfer,” in the properly find context that exchange possession” a of title or “permanent defined as without consideration. the of meaning to of contextual

Pursuant our determination 442(d), § apply in hold that “transfer” does not “transfer” we loan of firearm exchange regulated to the a temporary individuals, passing without consideration between two adult obtain, them, own, to permitted are between who otherwise to regard use firearm. due possess, regulated give We the in the sub finding judice the Court’s fact case Circuit nature, in as in a loan. question temporary exchange the upon The it found “that based Court stated that Circuit temporary [Emphasis added]. facts that it was a transfer.” addition, “It Court’s assessment [Circuit] [was] of that was in a loan testimony witness it State’s fact ____“ it judge The trial stated: “I’ll leave [Emphasis added]. not tell that a temporary to courts to me transfer higher target practice, hand range in order to take some should they during target practice, one to use their friend of the firearms 442(d). spouse properly registered If a would have violated has protection permits other gun kept that is in the house for hand spouse protect burglar/assailant, from a under the to use to herself interpretation, spouses—they a crime is committed both State’s repeated in type of scenario can be become misdemeanants. This may lawfully be used. in which firearms numerous situations require people application, fill out It an would unreasonable which, temporary supra, encompass even as doesn’t such discussed exchanges, days being able to triplicate, and then wait before firearm, i.e., days engage wait in the lawful use seven burglar in one’s own house. confront a transfer under the law. I believe under facts circumstances this case it is in a temporary fact transfer.” [Emphasis added].

As discussed supra, temporary gratuitous19 exchange regulated firearm persons legally between permitted pos sess firearms is not the type “transfer” contemplated by the 442(d). framers of Petitioner provisions did violate the 442(d). Regulated Firearms subheading, particular § 449(f). Requisite Required by § B. Mens Rea (1957, Maryland Code Repl.Vol., 2002 Supp.), Art. 27, 449(f) states:

“(f) sale, rental, Knowing participants etc.—Except section, provided otherwise this any dealer or person who knowingly sale, rental, participates illegal transfer, purchase, possession, or receipt of a firearm in violation of this subheading shall be guilty of a misdemeanor upon and shall $10,000 conviction not fined more than or imprisoned for not more than 5 or years both. Each violation shall be considered a separate offense.” (Empha- added.) sis that, argues State pursuant 449(f), §to a violation of 442(d) requires only general intent to knowingly and

intentionally transfer firearm. The petitioner argues 449(f) that the term §in “knowingly” establishes a mens rea equivalent to specific intent. crime is

Every generally composed of two aspects; the act) actus reus (guilty and the mens rea (culpable mental state) accompanying State, a forbidden act. Harris v. 353 Md. 596, 600, 180, (1999); 728 State, A.2d 182-83 Garnett v. 332 571, 577-78, 797, (1993). Md. 632 A.2d 800 “The requirement that an accused have acted with a culpable mental state is an axiom of Garnett, criminal jurisprudence.”20 578, 332 Md. at made, monetary charge If a then it would be a rental of a handgun expressly regulated by and that is the statute. Jackson, writing States, 20. Justice Supreme for the Court of the United stated: 464 Maryland recognize A.2d continues the distinc

632 at 800. Harris, 353 and intent crimes. general specific tion between State, 46, 65, 183; 307 512 602, A.2d at v. Md. Md. 728 Shell (1986). 358, A.2d 366-67 Harris, specific stating:

We discussed intent the intent intent has been defined as “Specific simply act, the ‘additional deliberate to do an immediate but very specific or purpose design accomplishing conscious Shell, 63, Md. at A.2d at remote result.’ 307 512 more 305, State, 277, A.2d Md.App. v. 398 (quoting Smith C., 80, 84, 426, (1979)); see also In re Taka Md. State, (1993); v. 330 Md. A.2d 368-69 Ford Gover, (1993); v. State (1973). Shell, quoted approval we with A.2d writing specific by Judge Moylan, intent explanation State, 41 Special Appeals Smith the Court 305-06, 398 442-43: A.2d at Md.App.

A intent is not the intent to do specific simply requirement act but embraces immediate design remote purpose mind be conscious a more doing of the immediate which shall eventuate from only general act. assault intent Though implies murder, rob, blow, rape, assault intent strike purpose formed conscious requires fully maim doing further shall flow from the consequences those act. and a requires of immediate To break enter only injury when "The that an can amount a crime contention It by provincial intention is no or transient notion. is as inflicted systems of law in freedom persistent mature as belief universal and ability duty consequent will and a and of the normal of human good evil. individual to choose between and only compound concept, generally from constituted "Crime as a hand, evil-doing evil-meaning mind with an concurrence of an congenial early deep and took root to an intense individualism American soil.” 243-44, States, 246, 250-52, 342 U.S. S.Ct. Morissette v. United Garnett, (footnotes omitted); L.Ed. 332 Md. at A.2d at 800. general burglary requires mere intent but to commit intent after the specific committing felony additional entry taking requires has been made. A trespassory (or general mere intent but larceny robbery) requires specific purpose depriv- animus or deliberate furandi ing the of the stolen This is permanently goods. owner even why voluntary may negate specific intoxication intent though negate general will not a mere intent. The larger ‘specific class intent’ includes such other mem 1) 2) murder, bers as intent assault with assault with 3) 4) rob, intent to assault intent rape, assault with 6) maim, 5) 7) 8) intent to burglary, larceny, robbery the specifie-intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm variety murder.[21] Each of these requires simply general intent to particular, do the immediate act with no mind, clear or undifferentiated but the end additional deliberate and conscious purpose design accomplish ing very more specific and remote result. added).

307 Md. at (emphasis at 366 Traynor, writing Chief Justice for the Supreme Court California, explained specific difference between intent and general intent crimes:

When the definition crime consists of only act, description of a particular without reference to intent to do a further act or consequence, achieve a future we ask whether defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is a general deemed criminal intent. WThenthe definition refers to defendant’s intent to do some further act or achieve some additional conse- quence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent. murder, "Although the common law crimes of assault with intent to rob, maim, statute, rape burglary changed have been see Art. 28-35B, §§ analysis §§ 12-12A-7 and Art. remains un- Harris, changed. ..." 353 Md. at 604 n. 728 A.2d at 183 n. 2.

466 Hood, 618, 370, 444, 1 82 462 P.2d Cal.Rptr. Cal.3d

People (1969).” 378

Harris, at 728 A.2d at 183-84. that, “it is Special plain of found that Appeals The Court phrase participates the context of the in the viola- ‘knowingly 442(d), that tion’ means it must be ‘knowingly’ simply of of the that knowledge the defendant had facts shown that Chow, 163 at Md.App. constitute offense.” LaFave, 1159; Wayne see R. Criminal Law Substantive ed.2003) 5.2(b) (2d (for proposition meaning that such used in context generally “knowingly” attributed to this when statutes). in criminal conclusion, first of that the court looked support Code, Maryland elsewhere in the “knowingly”

definitions in the Criminal Law Article: specifically moreover, that meaning ‘knowingly,’ comports with “This given the same term in the Article elsewhere Criminal Law See, (2002), § 11- Maryland e.g., of the Md.Code Code. (‘CL’) 201(c) ‘knowing- (defining Criminal Law Article ly* meaning character ‘having knowledge as 7-102(b) matter’); knowing CL (defining content statute, in the theft acts stating person ‘[a] conduct alia, cir- inter ‘with to conduct or a knowingly[,]’ respect crime, by cumstance described statute defines of the conduct or that when is aware exists____)’”. circumstance

Chow, then Md.App. at 1159. court A.2d Bryan Court Supreme referred to two cases: v. United States, 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 524 U.S. 118 S.Ct. Bailey, States v. U.S. S.Ct. United (1980), heavily Supreme on the Court’s relying

L.Ed.2d Bryan. reasoning

As by Special Appeals, opinion discussed the Court its below, Bryan: task of presented construing

“the Court was with the what ‘willfully,’ the term in the section that sets forth meant Firearms violating certain penalty provisions 186-89[, 1942-44, Protection Id. at 118 Owners’ Act. S.Ct. at 197], 141 L.Ed.2d at See U.S.C. generally 924(a)(1)(D). act, § incidentally, part That enacted ‘to protect law-abiding respect acquisi- citizens with tion, or of for possession, use firearms purposes.’ lawful 187[, 1943, Bryan, 524 U.S. at at S.Ct. at L.Ed.2d act, By certain of Congress provisions 197]. amended Crime Omnibus Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to requirement ‘add a scienter as a to the imposition condition for penalties § most of unlawful acts defined in 922.’ 187-88[, 1943, Id. at at S.Ct. 141 L.Ed.2d at 197]. alia, enacted, 924(a)(1), Congress inter time which at the provided: subsection,

Except provided as in this otherwise sub- (b), (c), (f) section, 929, section or of this or in section whoever—

(A) knowingly any makes false statement or represen- tation respect with to the required information this to be in the chapter kept records a person licensed under this chapter or or applying any license or exemption relief from disability under the provisions this chapter;

(B) (a)(4), knowingly (f), (k), (r), (v), violates subsection (w) 922; or of section

(C) knowingly imports or into brings States United any or possession any thereof or firearm ammunition 922(1); violation section or

(D) willfully any violates other provision chap- of this ter, title, fined

shall be under this not than imprisoned more years, five both.

Bryan, 187, 6[, 524 U.S. at 188-89 n. 118 S.Ct. at 1942-44 n. 6, 924(a)(1)) 141 L.Ed.2d at (quoting 18 U.S.C. 197] added).” (emphasis

Chow, 511-12, 163 Md.App. at 881 A.2d at 1159-60. Court “in Bryan held that order to establish a ‘willful’ statute, violation of ‘the Government must prove that the 468¡ that his conduct was unlaw knowledge defendant acted ” 1945, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 118 S.Ct. at

ful.’ U.S. States, 510 U.S. S.Ct. (quoting United Ratzlaf v. (1994)). argued “willful Bryan 126 L.Ed.2d “knowingly,” terms construed contrast ly” when 924(a)(1), particu a more required used are within U.S.C. showing that he acted with knowl showing simply larized than Id. at 118 S.Ct. 1939 that his conduct was unlawful. edge 1945, 141 184, 118 L.Ed.2d 197. 524 U.S. S.Ct. argument unpersuasive because

The Court found this ‘knowingly’ context “the term does in that particular culpable reference to state mind necessarily any have ob correctly of the law. As Justice Jackson knowledge served, of a knowing violation knowledge requisite ‘the knowledge knowledge from distinguished statute factual ” 1945, 192, at 118 at 141 Bryan, 524 U.S. S.Ct. law.’ Lines, (footnote omitted) (quoting Boyce Motor L.Ed.2d 197 States, 337, 345, 329, 333, 96 v. 342 72 S.Ct. Inc. United U.S. (1952) (Jackson, J., see v. dissenting)); Staples also L.Ed. 367 States, 602, 1793, 1795, 600, 114 128 511 U.S. S.Ct. United (1994) (holding that a that the defendant’s charge L.Ed.2d 608 re an was unlawful unregistered machinegun possession weapon possessed “that knew the he had the proof he quired statutory definition brought characteristics that within 394, 408, Bailey, 444 machinegun”); United States U.S. 624, 634, (holding 62 L.Ed.2d 575 that 100 S.Ct. violation of proving knowing fulfills its burden of prosecution escapee “if it that an escape statute demonstrates knew in physical his confinement leaving his actions would result “Thus, Court, however, concluded: permission”). without result,[22] unless the text the statute dictates different States, 419, 2084, "Liparota v. 471 U.S. 105 S.Ct. 85 L.Ed.2d United (1985), case. We there concluded that both the term 434 was such a 2024(c) 'knowing' 'knowingly' in 7 and the term in U.S.C. 2024(b)(1) knowledge literally of the law as well as referred to 428-430, id., S.Ct. 2089- knowledge the relevant facts. See at 105 at 15, 15, n. 141 Bryan, 524 n. 118 S.Ct. at 1946 2091.” U.S. 193 L.Ed.2d 197. term ‘knowingly’ merely requires proof knowledge 193, facts that constitute the offense.” Bryan, U.S. at added). 1946, S.Ct. at 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (emphasis States, In Liparota 419, 420, v. United U.S. S.Ct. (1985), 85 L.Ed.2d 434 the Court reviewed governing “statute food stamp providefd] fraud [which] uses, transfers, alters, ‘whoever knowingly acquires, or pos- coupons sesses or authorization any cards in manner not authorized regulations’ subject [the to a statute] added). fine and imprisonment.” (Emphasis The statute here states “knowingly participates in the ... illegal sale viola- 449(f). tion of this subheading ....“§ Liparota Court addressed whether a violation of the required statute that the defendant knew he acting a manner not authorized by 420-21, 419, the statute. Id. at U.S. S.Ct.

85 L.Ed.2d 434. The Court found: indication of “[a]bsent contrary purpose the language or legislative history statute, we believe that requires [the a showing statute] the defendant knew his conduct to be unauthorized by statute or regulations.” Id. at 471 U.S. 105 S.Ct. at (footnote omitted). L.Ed.2d 434 that,

We hold similarly to Liparota, the text of the statute the case sub judice, dictates a different result from Bryan. that of Section in its entirety, states: “ § 449. Penalties.

(a) Penalties generally.—Any person who of any violates 445(c) provisions § of of this subheading guilty is of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not more $1,000 or imprisoned for not more 1 year than or both.

(b) False or material misstatement on ap- information plication.—Any person who knowingly gives any false in- formation or makes any material misstatement in an appli- cation to purchase regulated a firearm or an for application a regulated firearms dealer’s license shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than 3 years, or both.

(c) person 80-day purchase period.—Any Violation of of the of 442A of this sub- any provisions who violates upon a shall convic- heading guilty is of misdemeanor and $5,000 not imprisoned fined more than or for tion be not 3 years than or both. more

(d) in straw or Knowing purchase participants traffick- in knowing is a person participant or dealer who ing.—Any to a prohibited a of a firearm purchase regulated straw minor, into transports or to a or firearms person of a illegal trafficking for of sale or purpose this State and guilty shall be of a misdemeanor regulated firearm $25,000 fined more impris- be not than or upon conviction than or Each years, oned for more both. violation separate be considered a offense. shall (e) certain Illegal previous possession of firearm of a previously who convicted person convictions.—A 441(e) or as in of this article crime of violence defined §§ 5- through §§ of 5-602 5-609 or convicted a violation Article, and who through 5-614 Criminal Law 445(d)(1)(i) of a as illegal possession firearm defined (ii) article, felony upon and guilty this no for not less than imprisoned years, shall be conviction not be part person may of which be may suspended be parole. Each violation shall considered eligible offense. separate sale, rental,

(f) etc.—Except Knowing participants section, any in this or provided dealer who otherwise transfer, sale, rental, illegal in the knowingly[23]participates firearm purchase, possession, receipt guilty subheading violation this shall misdemeanor $10,000 than shall be fined not more upon conviction years, than 5 or both. Each for not more imprisoned offense.” separate (Empha violation shall be considered added.) sis "knowingly” in this is identical to The use word subsection meaning Liparota. attached to the word in the context of (c) (e) (a), not of specify any type §

Subsections and of 449 do enumerating penalties mens rea in of violations 445(c), 445(d)(1)(i) (ii). contrast, § § § 442A and sub (d) (f) (b), § sections of the terms specifically include “knowing.” of not itself “knowingly” handguns The sale rental, etc., It manner illegal. may is the of the sale or that make it The illegal. phrase used here “knowingly participates in the ...” illegal sale that the actor must know contemplates “illegal that he or she is an find this to committing sale.” We be a mens specific indicative of rea of intent for requirement 449(f). § violations of above, §

As upon distinguishable commented 449 is further from the types statute addressed in There are Bryan. two 449; §in contrasting provisions specific subsections with no rea, mens mentioned and those subsections “knowingly” with language. included in the that subsections include “know- ingly,” 449(f), § in particular provide greater mens rea requirement than the subsections that not mens do mention rea. Supreme may While the Court Bryan have concluded that, instances, in some “the term ‘knowingly’does not neces- sarily have reference any culpable to a state of mind or to law,” 449(f) knowledge § our interpretation comports more the Supreme finding Court’s in Liparota. Though the Bryan Liparota, Court decision is more recent than circumstances, an specifically provided for such exception specifically overruling Liparota’s holding. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193 n. 118 S.Ct. at 1946 n. 141 L.Ed.2d 197 that (stating “unless text of the statute different dictates a footnoting Therefore, result” and an Liparota example). as 442(d) we find that a violation imposition penalty 449(f) requires under that specific one have a intent and rental, requires sale, a defendant that the “knows” trans- fer, purchase, possession, firearm of receipt which they participant are in is a manner is illegal and not a legal sale.

Even if it case that mens rea element of were 449(f), indicated could be “knowingly,” construed ambiguous, to the pursuant lenity, rule the statute must be in favor of the defendant. Melton v.

normally construed State, 471, (2004), 842 A.2d 743 we stated: ..., lenity

“In what the rule of this discussing requires has stated that: Court statute, highly

‘an is and must be penalty penal enhanced only subject that the strictly construed so defendant is the statute. When doubt punishment contemplated by statute, imposed by regarding punishment exists lenity rule of instructs that court a ... criminal so as to increase the interpret not statute that on an individual an penalty places when such more guess can be based on no than a as to interpretation ” intended.’ legislature] what [the State, 712, 339, 347, v. Md. 734 A.2d Melgar 355 716-17 State, (1999) 740, 744, Md. A.2d (quoting White v. 318 569 (citations (1990)) omitted). 1271, also 1273 See Webster State, (stating 359 754 Md. A.2d “ statute, in in a criminal accordance ‘ambiguity penal that to be the rule of is construed lenity, ordinarily against with defendant’); State, and in favor of the McGrath v. the State (1999).” 20,Md. Melton, A in A.2d Md. violation 449(f) §of a misdemeanor and conviction can guilty upon $10,000 up years, or to 5 or both. up imprisoned be fined respect in to the mens rea any ambiguity If there is element statute, rule lenity, in accordance with the the statute in favor against must be construed State and defendant. Conclusion

IV. temporary gratuitous exchange We find individuals, two adult handgun loan of a regulated between permitted who are otherwise own obtain an “transfer” of a firearm handgun, illegal does constitute (1957, Maryland Repl.Vol., in Code violation (d). 27, § Art. in subsection Supp.), particular, plain 442(d), in harmony § language when construed rest of the subheading, only reveals that “transfer” can refer to a of title permanent exchange possession and does not include gratuitous temporary exchanges Legislative or loans. history supports further our interpretation. We also conclude 449(f) that the inclusion of the term “knowingly” creates a specific intent mens rea for violations of that subsection. Thus, 449(f), order violation of a person must activity know are they engaging illegal. This ruling place does not any undue burden on the “Rath State. er, rea, as in other any criminal prosecution requiring mens may prove by reference [State] to facts and circumstances surrounding the case that [the knew that his defendant] conduct was unauthorized or illegal.” Liparota, 471 U.S. (footnote 2092-98, omitted). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IN REVERSED. COSTS AND THIS COURT IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.

Dissenting WILNER, J., BATTAGLIA, which Raker and JJ., join. I respect,

With dissent from the result reached the by Court because, case, on the facts of this I believe that there was a transfer gun of the from to in Nguyen Chow clear violation of (PS). what is now 5-124 of the Public Safety Article I would therefore affirm the judgment of the of Special Court Appeals.

The Court defines the word “transfer” as requiring per- a manent exchange of title possession firearm, or but that would render the term essentially meaningless, and we do not statutes, read especially kind, regulatory statutes this to render deliberately terms by used the Legislature meaning- less. The goes Court an through analysis of dictionary defini- in tions an effort to determine what “transfer” means. Such definitions are often helpful, because in words used a statute are ordinarily given their plain the meaning, but ultimate issue the define the word but what lexicographers not how the intended to achieve.

Legislature part to question The was added the law provision Act of Maryland the called the Gun Violence Legislature what designed place to addi- law comprehensive which was to the firearms. Prior trafficking tional limits on dealer, law, as person engaged who then defined was firearms, was not or “selling” “repairing” in the business until seven to “sell or transfer” firearm permitted “purchase from time an to or application had days elapsed “purchaser filed weapon prospective transfer” Secretary of State Police. See former or transferee” with the (1987 Md.Code, Repl.Vol. Supp.). §§ and 1995 art. was, remains, give purpose waiting period and an opportunity investigation an make Secretary eligible transferee is prospective determine whether 442; former current PS possess weapon. See own the former law terms of Although spoke §§ 5-122. until the selling transferring firearm the dealer not (and the current law terms waiting period expires, speaks the firearm selling, renting, transferring the dealer obviously has were in- until that both laws period expired), until that preclude any delivery actual firearm tended 5-123(b), (c), (d), requiring §PS time. See current sale, rental, or within 90 to the transfer “complete” dealer disapproved was not and days application after notice the completed of the transaction within notify Secretary the firearm; of the also former days “delivery” seven after a way, prohibited in a dealer 442(j). sensible law Read firearm to another delivering regulated person, pursu- from a (and a currently rental agreement to a or transfer ant sale well), expiration waiting period. until the of the agreement licensed period to transactions with limiting waiting dealers, an and enormous the former contained obvious law transactions, in Totally secondary were loophole. unregulated dealer, in a to be any happened other than who person, which firearm could it to someone a transfer possession else, eligible possess a not including person legally own to close that weapon. clearly The 1996 law was intended (current 5-123) the 1996 only Not did law PS loophole. to the preclude renting prior expiration dealers from firearms but, more in waiting significantly, what now period Transactions,”it “Secondary applied captioned PS sales, waiting same to dealers to seven-day period applicable rentals, not dealers. That persons and transfers who are extension of the effort to certainly major important a in these trafficking weapons. control fairly The terms and “rent” a clear and restric- “sell” have obviously The term “transfer” a broader meaning. tive rental; otherwise, term, beyond a sale or meaning something no for the Assembly there would have been reason General accept seems to place leave it the statute. Court gift, permanent gift. that “transfer” would include a at least question Keeping The real is whether it includes a loan. that the prohibition against transferring mind a firearm until waiting period to both expiration applies dealers non-dealers, I cannot imagine Legislature, that the its effort to close a intended to one than the loophole, open larger even closed, one it by allowing both dealers and non-dealers to lend regulated firearms to persons complying without seven-day but waiting period, precisely that is what the Court seems to be Does the mean saying. really Court to hold that non-dealer, loan, a dealer and a through the fiction of a can lawfully possession deliver and control of a regulated firearm so, regard to a without to the waiting period? If law, Court will have absolutely eviscerated the at least with respect secondary transfers, and to what what end—for purpose?

I would hold that “transfer” includes loan—at least one possession which and control of the firearm is relinquished more than a anything momentary period. Like all statutory language, I given meaning. word should a reasonable agree with the Court that the Legislature did intend “transfer” to prohibit allowing word firearm owner from lessee, prospective purchaser, transferee test fire the rent, or other- purchase, deciding before whether weapon it, than it any more or control possession acquire wise cus- allowing prospective from prevent owner would pres- in the weapon examine the owner’s to hold and tomer allowing from another an owner prohibit Nor ence. would weapon to shoot the firing range, at a competent person, do kinds of circumstances Those of the owner. presence that kind of give weapon; a transfer of not constitute wholly unreasonable to the term would meaning expansive possibly could beyond term what extend the well and would been intended. have original If the occurred this case.

But that is not what firing implemented—test had been objective parties interested truly if range Nguyen at a to see weapon no violation of the statute. have been it—there would buying his exclusive gun to retain Nguyen allowed When Chow time, however, indefinite and control for some possession one. transfer—an unlawful there was a BATTAGLIA have authorized Judge RAKER and Judge join in this dissent. they me to state

Case Details

Case Name: Chow v. State

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland

Date Published: Jul 27, 2006

Citation: 903 A.2d 388

Docket Number: 99, September Term, 2005

Court Abbreviation: Md.