Linda S. ANDREWS, Appellant v. Kathryn M. HENS-GRECO, individually and in her official capacity as a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Division.
No. 15-1504.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
January 22, 2016.
Moleski‘s scheme, however, was not so feeble that it could not possibly have harmed anyone. Even if the demands in his documents were ultimately baseless, by obscuring them in obtuse legalese he could have confused the busy employees of financial institutions and the government who had to review them. The government presented substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could (and apparently did) conclude that Moleski‘s misrepresentations had the tendency or ability to influence decisionmakers at the target organizations to disburse funds, clear debts, recognize debts as repaid, or take other action. The jury had the opportunity to examine Moleski‘s documents, which were long, complex, and official-looking. A documents expert testified that Moleski‘s instruments bore marks of legitimacy and required careful examination to understand their worthlessness. Finally, the jury heard from the documents’ recipients, who likewise testified that they had to expend time and energy in determining the documents’ validity and what course of action to take with them. Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could rationally determine that the documents could deceive their recipients. There was thus sufficient evidence of materiality to find Moleski guilty of the mail fraud charges he has appealed.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.
mining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.” 527 U.S. at 22 n. 5, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (quoting
Before: JORDAN, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.
OPINION*
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
Pro se appellant Linda Andrews appeals the District Court‘s judgment dismissing her complaint against Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas Judge Kathryn Hens-Greco. For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court‘s judgment.
I. Background1
Andrews had been appointed by judges of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas Family Division (the “Family Court“) to serve as an educational and medical guardian for dependent children in various cases. Prior to 2011, a guardian received remuneration from Allegheny County for her services by submitting a Petition for Payment of Fees (“Petition“) 2 to the judge who had appointed her as a guardian. A Petition consists of, inter alia, a list of services with corresponding fees and a proposed court order directing the Controller of Allegheny County to issue a warrant for the fee total. After reviewing a submitted Petition, the appointing judge would sign the Petition and Allegheny County would remit payment to the guardian.
Upon becoming the Presiding Administrative Judge of the Family Court, Judge Hens-Greco required all guardians to submit outstanding Petitions to her by August 30, 2011. Andrews was informed of this new requirement in a letter dated May 18, 2011. Andrews submitted all relevant Petitions to Judge Hens-Greco by the deadline.
Subsequently, Andrews was told by a Family Court administrator that five of her Petitions required corrections and had not been processed. Andrews corrected the errors in the five Petitions and resubmitted them in accordance with the Family Court administrator‘s instructions. On April 3, 2012, Andrews received a letter from Judge Hens-Greco informing her that the Petitions would not be paid because they were submitted well beyond the August 30, 2011 deadline.
Andrews filed a pro se complaint against Judge Hens-Greco in the present action on April 7, 2014. Andrews alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection and Due Process clauses and of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA“). She sought the return of her “[P]etition property” or “compensation for its destruction.” J.A. 27. In addition, Andrews alleged that she had outstanding Petitions that she had not yet submitted because Judge Hens-Greco‘s April 3, 2012 letter had “put a chilling effect” on her “right to be paid for her services.” J.A. 26. Accordingly, Andrews sought a “declaratory judgment” to estab
On May 19, 2014, Judge Hens-Greco filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge who issued a Report and Recommendation (“R & R“) on December 22, 2014 agreeing with Judge Hens-Greco‘s arguments and recommending dismissal of the complaint. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice because amendment would be futile. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge‘s R & R and, on January 27, 2015, dismissed Andrews‘s complaint with prejudice.3 This appeal followed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to
III. Analysis
Andrews‘s pro se complaint is unclear as to the specific type of relief she seeks. As such, we will liberally construe the complaint to bring claims against Judge Hens-Greco for money damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). We address each type of relief in turn.
A. Money Damages
Under the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, a judge is generally immune from suit in his or her individual capacity for money damages. See Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000). The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is “founded upon the premise that a judge, in performing his or her judicial duties, should be free to act upon his or her convictions” without the threat of suit. Id. The immunity is only lost where the judge‘s actions that gave rise to suit were: (1) nonjudicial in nature; or (2) were “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)). Neither exception to judicial immunity applies in this case.
Judge Hens-Greco‘s decision to deny
Andrews argues that Judge Hens-Greco acted in the absence of all jurisdiction because, in denying Andrews‘s Petitions herself, Judge Hens-Greco departed from the Family Court‘s prior practice of having appointing judges review Petitions. Yet Andrews has “not pointed to any rule or other authority indicating that [Judge Hens-Greco] did not have the authority” to deny Andrews‘s Petitions. Gallas, 211 F.3d at 771. Even if Andrews did point us to such a rule, the Family Court clearly had jurisdiction over Andrews‘s Petitions and thus Judge Hens-Greco, as a judge of the Family Court, did not act in the absence of all jurisdiction in denying the Petitions. See Gallas, 211 F.3d at 771 (“[A] judge does not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction when the judge enters an order at least colorably within the jurisdiction of her court.“).
We therefore hold that Judge Hens-Greco is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from Andrews‘s individual capacity claim for money damages.
Nor may Andrews bring a claim for money damages against Judge Hens-Greco in her official capacity. Because Judge Hens-Greco serves on the Family Court, the real party in interest to Andrews‘s official capacity claim is the Family Court itself. See Jones v. Lilly, 37 F.3d 964, 966 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he real party in interest in an official capacity suit is not the individual but rather the entity of which the officer is an agent.“). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to the Pennsylvania state courts because they are entities of the state of Pennsylvania. See Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 238-41 (3d Cir. 2005). Thus, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to bar an official capacity claim for money damages against Judge Hens-Greco.
B. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
Neither absolute judicial immunity nor the Eleventh Amendment bar claims seeking prospective injunctive or declaratory relief against a state official. See Larsen v. Senate of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 1998); Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm‘n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998). However, Andrews‘s complaint focuses primarily on Petitions that she has already submitted for payment and that have already been denied.
To the extent that Andrews seeks relief with respect to outstanding and future Petitions, in order to satisfy Article III‘s standing requirement, Andrews must “establish a real and immediate threat” that she would again be subject to the allegedly unconstitutional denial of her Petitions. Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 400 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983)). Andrews alleges that Judge Hens-Greco‘s April 3, 2012 letter informing her of the denial of her past Petitions has deterred her from submitting other outstanding Petitions. However, the April 3 letter refers only to past Petitions and there is no indication---from the letter or otherwise-that any outstanding or future Petitions Andrews may submit will be denied if she complies with the Family Court‘s procedures. Therefore, Andrews has not established Article III standing to pursue a claim for injunctive or declaratory relief against Judge Hens-Greco.5
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court dismissing Andrews‘s complaint.6
GREENAWAY, JR.
CIRCUIT JUDGE
Notes
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.