Case Information
*2 CARROLL SIMMON; LYNDA RENDELL, Circuit Judge. NAVRATIL (N.J. (Newark) D.C. No. 95-cv-06159)
At the end of Gary Marshall
Alston’s 17-year sentence in a New Jersey Gary Marshall Alston, prison, he was involuntarily committed to Appellant Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital. Wh ile there, Alston sued various Greystone employees in a pro se § 1983
Appeal from the United States complaint, raising several challenges with District Court respect to his prison sentence and his for the District of New Jersey psychiatric commitment. Before the (D.C. Civil Nos. 95-cv-06158 merits of Alston’s claims could be tested,
and 95-cv-06159) the District Court granted a motion to District Judge: Honorable dismiss for failure to state a claim under
William H. Walls Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court concluded that Alston’s pleading did not meet the factual specificity requirement for Argued January 15, 2004 civil rights complaints and dismissed his
complaint. Because we hold that the Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL and District Court subjected Als ton’s
ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. complaint to a heightened pleading standard no longer applicable in such civil (Filed: April 5, 2004) rights cases, we will reverse.
*3 I. Greystone and requested the appointment of counsel to help advance his case. Challenging his transfer to
Greystone, Alston filed two pro se The District Court referred the complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on matter to a Magistrate Judge, who granted December 4, 1995. In those complaints, Alston’s application for counsel on March which were later consolidated, Alston 19, 1996. The threshold requirement for sought over $63 million in damages from the appointment of counsel to indigent four Greystone employees, who he plaintiffs is the arguable legal and factual contended had violated his rights. The merit of a complaint. See Tabron v. employees included William Parker, Jack Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993). The Singer, and Lynda Navratil (collectively, Magistrate Judge recognized two claims in “Defendants”). [1] The complaints, the Alston’s complaint: 1) a claim that his 17- pertinent text of which we set forth in the year term in prison caused him such harm margin, are not models of clarity. [2] Yet, that his sentence constituted cruel and their thrust is clear enough: Alston unusual punishment; and 2) that his questioned the basis of his transfer to involuntary commitment, as Alston put it
“without victim without evidence,” violated due process. With respect to the Although Alston also named “Carroll latter claim, the Magistrate Judge cited Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), in Simmon” as a defendant, the parties have which the Supreme Court articulated the been unable to identify such an individual.
minimum procedural protections that must With the exception of misspellings, we be afforded to a prisoner who is set out Alston’s allegations verbatim. In transferred to a psychiatric institution. o n e c o m p l a i n t , A l s t o n s t a t e d : Such procedures include fair notice and a “Defendant(s) slanderous allege that I was hearing at which evidence may be a threat(s) that got me six (6) month(s) presented. This Vitek claim is at the heart more in jail without victim without of Alston’s complaint. The Magistrate evidence when than know I have no other Judge recognized the legal sufficiency of right to petitioner the covered which I am these claims, but noted at the same time exercising.” In the other complaint, the paucity of factual development. Alston stated: “Plaintiff did seventeen (17) Nevertheless, after considering other years in hard labor and maximum security factors, including his doubt that Alston jail after serving this cruel and unusual could adequately present his case without punishment(s) I am denied release as the assistance, he ordered counsel to be judiciary promised at the completion of my appointed.
jail term I was transfer to another jail for Four years later, in August of 2000, an year now for allege medical reason(s) the District Court finally appointed that never had existed until I got in this jail.”
counsel for Alston. [3] By that time, Alston that it was “well settled” that civil rights had been released from Greystone and his complaints must be pled with factual whereabouts were unknown. Eventually, specificity. Concluding that Alston’s his counsel successfully located him and complaint was unsubstantiated and did not entered into a representation agreement on specifically set forth how each defendant November 7, 2000. One month later, on infringed Alston’s rights, the District December 6, 2000, Alston’s counsel filed Court found that Alston had not met the a status update with the District Court. pleading requirements necessary to pursue Counsel informed the District Court that it a § 1983 action. The District Court further was attempting to locate, and serve held that Alston had sufficient notice of Alston’s pro se complaint on, the this pleading defect, referring to the Defendants. A similar status update was Magistrate Judge’s admonition in 1996 f i l e d o n F e b r u a r y 2 1 , 2 0 0 1 . that the allegations lacked factual support. [4] Notwithstanding these updates, on March Accordingly, the District Court entered an 20, 2001, the District Court dismissed the order granting the Defendants’ 12(b)(6) case for lack of prosecution. motion and dismissing the complaint. The order did not specify whether the dismissal Subsequently, Alston’s counsel was with or without prejudice, but successfully served the complaint on three pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), we treat out of the four named defendants and the dismissal as an “adjudication upon the petitioned the District Court to reconsider merits.” Subsequently, the District Court its dismissal. On January 29, 2002, the rejected Alston’s motion for reargument District Court reinstated the case upon and reconsideration. Alston appeals both Alston’s motion and vacated its earlier the orders dismissing his complaint and dismissal order. The Defendants denying reconsideration. responded by filing a 12(b)(6) motion, invoking various defenses, such as defects
in the pleading, witness immunity,
qualified immunity, and sovereign
immunity. and on that basis, granted the motion to
Alston’s complaint was fatally defective, 79, 80 (3d Cir. 1985), the Court observed dismiss. Citing Darr v. Wolfe, 767 F.2d The District Court determined that The District Court initially misspoke after its appointment to rectify the when it stated that counsel had seven years pleadings, since counsel had only been appointed in 2000. The Court corrected
this error in its response to Alston’s motion for reconsideration, noting that There is nothing in the record before us Alston’s counsel nevertheless had more that explains this unfortunate delay in the than enough notice and time to amend the appointment of counsel. defective complaint.
II. We have plenary review of the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for Alston’s principal contention on failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. appeal is that he should have been Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d permitted to have discovery so as to 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). In considering this comply with the fact-pleading standard appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we imposed by the District Court. This Court accept all allegations as true and attribute has long recognized the importance of all reasonable inferences in favor of discovery in the successful prosecution of Alston. Thus, we will affirm the District civil rights complaints. See Colburn v. Court’s dismissal only if it appears that Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666 Alston could prove no set of facts that (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]n civil rights cases would entitle him to relief. Id. at 65. We ‘much of the evidence can be developed review the District Court’s denial of only through discovery’ of materials held reconsideration for abuse of discretion. by defendant officials.” (quoting Frazier v. Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 785 F.2d v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1986)). We acknowledge 1999). Alston’s need for discovery to present his case, which we discuss more fully below.
But, the lack of discovery was not the real B. barrier blocking Alston’s path to relief.
Rather, it was the stringent pleading The District Court tested Alston’s standard presupposed by the parties and complaint against a pleading requirement the District Court. Our discussion for civil rights cases based on our opinion therefore begins by examining the District in Darr v. Wolfe. The District Court Court’s requirement of factual specificity, observed that it was “well settled” that which is in conflict with Fed. R. Civ. P. Third Circuit law requires civil rights 8(a)’s simplified notice pleading standard. plaintiffs to plead with particularity. We We will then consider Alston’s contention disagree.
that the District Court should have Alston’s § 1983 complaint should presented an opportunity to amend the have been considered not under a complaint before dismissing it with prejudice. Lastly, we will comment on the
right to discovery in actions such as this. In seeking to affirm the District Court’s order, the Defendants argue that pro se plaintiffs like Alston are not exempt from A. the strictures of heightened pleading. Jurisdiction was proper in the trial Brief for Appellee at 9 (citing Ressler v. court based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Our Scheipe, 505 F. Supp. 155, 156 (E.D. Pa. review is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 1981)). *6 heightened pleading requirement, but 67; Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 650 under the more liberal standards of notice (3d Cir. 1981); Rotolo v. Borough of pleading. Although once enforced in Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. several circuits, including ours, a fact- 1976), none of which have been expressly pleading requirement for civil rights overruled, these pronouncements preceded complaints has been rejected by the and cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Supreme Court in no uncertain terms. Court’s holdings in Leatherman and Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Swierkiewicz. Insofar as our decisions, Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 such as Darr, run counter to the principle U.S. 163, 168 (1993). In Leatherman, the of notice pleading in § 1983 actions, they Court instructed that Rule 9’s standard for are not controlling. Fundamentally, a averments of fraud and mistake should not heightened pleading requirement for civil be imported to the notice pleading rights complaints no longer retains vitality standard of Rule 8, which requires only “a under the Federal Rules. short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” holding in Leatherman and stated that Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002), the Court reaffirmed its applies to all civil actions, with limited “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard recognized exceptions.” Our Court of Appeals has requirement for § 1983 actions. See Ray abrogation of a heightened pleading 2002) (“[T]he Court [has] explained that courts should narrowly interpret statutory v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297 (3d Cir. nothing more is required of § 1983 cases language to avoid heightened pleadings 141, 149 (3d Cir. 1998) (observing that standards.”); Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d Rule 8). than the notice pleading requirement of Id. the Supre me C ourt’ s More recently, in discovery mechanisms under the Federal parties may avail themselves of the civil resolve or clarify the disputed issues, the granted. If more facts are necessary to 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only need not plead facts. To withstand a make out a claim upon which relief can be sufficient factual support. But a plaintiff The Defendants likewise argue on appeal that Alston’s complaint lacked dispose of unmeritorious claims.”). define disputed facts and issues and to Rules. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (“This simplified notice pleading standard is particularly acute for civil rights plaintiffs, who often face informational relies on liberal discovery rules . . . to testing a complaint for factual sufficiency The need for discovery before disadvantages. See Colburn, 838 F.2d at While our ruling in Darr, 767 F.2d 667. Plaintiffs may be unaware of the at 80, is one of several decisions in which identities and roles of relevant actors and, this Court imposed a higher bar for § 1983 owing to the ir inc a rc eration or pleadings, see, e.g., Frazier, 785 F.2d at institutionalization, unable to conduct a
Alston’s complaint should have pre-trial investigation to fill in the gaps. not bar entry into a federal court. The But by itself, this lack of knowledge does liberal discovery principles of notice pleading and the confined prisoner cannot adduce all the meritorious claims to proceed even if a necessary facts at the outset. For instance, our cases permit the naming of fictitious defendants as stand-ins until the identities § 1915(d) can help litigants like Alston v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 155 (3d Cir. 1998). As the Magistrate Judge here recognized, can be learned through discovery. Hindes surmount these obstacles to pleading. But counsel appointed under 28 U.S.C. rules allow for Cir. 2003). Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d vagueness, sufficiently “plain.” Both the complaint was “short” and, despite some particular should be construed liberally. keeping in mind that pro se complaints in statement” requirement of Rule 8(a). do substantial justice,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f), been subject only to the “short and plain Courts are to construe complaints so “as to liberally, set forth cognizable legal claims. found that the complaint, construed District Court and the Magistrate Judge Likewise, the Defendants never argued that the complaint ran afoul of the short and plain statement requirement. paragraphs To the in all, Alston’s pro se Comprising only two legal help alone is insufficient; in such
cases, access to discovery may well be identification of responsible defendants or critical. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 the lack thereof, district courts should F.2d 637, 642 (9 th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he strongly consider granting it. Because plaintiff should be given an opportunity Alston’s complaint was dismissed before through discovery to identify the unknown an opportunity for discovery, any defendants, unless it is clear that discovery expectation of factual sufficiency was would not uncover the identities, or that premature. It is a first principle of federal the complaint would be dismissed on other civil procedure that litigants “are entitled grounds.”); see also Billman v. Indiana to discovery before being put to their Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 789-90 (7 th proof.” Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (“ The peculiar 519 (7 th Cir. 1998). perversity of imposing heightened
pleading standards in prisoner cases . . . is It is likely, however, that the that it is far more difficult for a prisoner to Defendants’ pleading defect argument was write a detailed complaint than for a free a reaction to the fact that portions of person to do so, and again this is not Alston’s complaint made little sense. But because the prisoner does not know the in that case, the parties and the District law but because he is not able to Court still had several procedural tools at investigate before filing suit .”). If their disposal. The Defendants, or the discovery is sought by a plaintiff, as it was District Court on its own initiative, may here, and if it would aid in the have sought a more definite statement to *8 contrary, their 12(b)(6) motion was replete discovery. Cf. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d with defenses that responded to claims 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that a they discerned in Alston’s complaint. complaint should set forth “who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, Although Alston’s complaint with enough detail to guide discovery.”). arguably complies with Rule 8(a), we Thus, we have no doubt that the complaint recognize that it lacks clarity and will will require amendment. We are equally likely require amendment. Indeed, his certain that Alston may have made some c o m p l a i n t h a s y i e l d e d v a r i e d progress in that regard had he been interpretations. The Magistrate Judge afforded the opportunity. The denial of recognized two claims, one involving the that opportunity to amend will be taken up cruel and unusual punishment clause and next. the other a deprivation of due process. The Defendants, in their 12(b)(6) motion,
focused instead on Alston’s allegations of C. “slander,” i.e., that he was committed to Greystone as a result of false testimony. In While the District Court’s error in addition to these claims, Alston’s response granting Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion by to the 12(b)(6) motion included claims imposing a fact-pleading requirement on concerning the double jeopardy and ex Alston’s complaint mandates that we post facto clauses of the constitution. remand the case to the District Court for Given these varying interpretations of further proceedings, Alston argues that what is at issue, we concede that Alston’s irrespective of the appropriate pleading complaint may have lacked enough detail standard, he should have been given an to have served its function as a guide to opportunity to amend his complaint before
dismissal. Indeed, Alston’s counsel stated at oral argument that Alston intends to resolve any ambiguity or vagueness. Fed. amend both the allegations and the parties R. Civ. P. 12(e). Matters in the complaint named in the complaint. In particular, it that were deemed imm aterial o r appears that Alston will seek to strike all impertinent could have been stricken. Fed. but the claim that his involuntary R. Civ. P. 12(f). Alternatively, the District commitment violated due process and seek Court could have dismissed the complaint to add New Jersey state officials in their without prejudice permitting Alston to official capacity. We therefore discuss the amend the complaint to make it plain. By issue of amendment as guidance for the contrast, dismissals with prejudice may be District Court’s consideration on remand. appropriate where a party refuses to file an
amended complaint or if the repleading We have held that even when a does not remedy the Rule 8 violation. See plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, if a In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) 696, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1996). *9 dismissal, a District Court must permit a principles apply equally to pro se plaintiffs curative amendment, unless an amendment and those represented by experienced would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. counsel. 213 F.3d at 116 (citing District Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Shane v. Fauver, 213 (3d Cir. 1986)). Dismissal without leave F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)). In Shane, to amend is justified only on the grounds we held that this aspect should be of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or considered and noted in dismissing a claim futility. Id. at 115 (citing In re Burlington for failure to state a claim: Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)).
[W]e suggest that district judges expressly state, On remand, the District Court where appropriate, that the should offer Alston leave to amend plaintiff has leave to amend pursuant to the above procedures for within a specified period of 12(b)(6) dismissals, unless a curative time, and that application amendment would be inequitable, futile, or for dismissal of the action untimely. Neither the District Court nor may be made if a timely the Defendants made or advocated such a a m e n d m e n t i s n o t finding, or even argued that there was bad forthcoming within that faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility. time. If the plaintiff does not Amendments to pleadings are desire to amend, he may file governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules an appropriate notice with of Civil Procedure. In particular, Rule the district court asserting 15(a) provides that a party can amend the his intent to stand on the complaint to add or substitute parties, as complaint, at which time an Alston is apparently intending to do. Rule order to dismiss the action 15(c), however, sets forth requirements would be appropriate. that determine whether an amendment
adding an entirely new defendant will Id. at 116 (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976)). As we noted in Shane, these relate back to the original date of the filing of the complaint for purposes of the of factual specificity, he should be given a *10 governing statute of limitations. Alston argues that he should have been 15 aims to relieve the harsh result of the strict application of 2003). The issue then becomes whether limitations. Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. or substitute defendants will relate back to the proposed pleading amendment to add complaint. [9] Rule 15(c)(3) requires that for an amendment adding a new party to relate back, the proposed new defendants must the date of the filing of the original the institution of the action within the have had actual or constructive notice of brought in by amendment must have received notice of the institution of the (explaining that “[t]he parties to be Garvin, 354 F.3d at 220 days. See service of the complaint by Rule 4(m) of of the action, the period provided for action within 120 days following the filing period set forth by Rule 4(m), i.e., 120 The relation back provision of Rule Garvin v. C ity o f the statute of the extent that in a civil rights action the in not ordering it. [11] initial discovery would be advisable. We have noted precisely who the relevant actors were, and disadvantaged by not having access to their precise roles, perhaps access to some Court finds imposed. We note, first, that, as discussed “specificity” standard the District Court given the opportunity to engage in some discovery in order to live up to the above, no such standard exists. Second, to plaintiffs in such situations. See Colburn, do not provide for discovery in aid of pleading, as such, nonetheless it would be 838 F.2d at 667. While the Federal Rules standard of notice pleading, and the But, again, we note that it is not essential beneficial in difficult cases such as this. District Court did not abuse its discretion at the pleading stage in order to satisfy the the difficulty faced by that plaintiff may be the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). The District Court dismissed these determinations in the first instance. [10] The District Court should make all Alston’s complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend. We conclude that the District Court erred in applying a III. heightened pleading standard, and that, in light of the procedures for 12(b)(6) As we indicated at the outset, dismissal, the District Court should offer Alston an opportunity to amend his [9] Neither party discussed the issue in its complaint absent inequity, futility, or untimeliness. Therefore, we will vacate brief, but were requested by the Court in advance to be prepared to discuss it at oral
argument. Rule 26(d) provides that discovery is Given the nature of our disposition, we not to commence until a discovery need not address Alston’s contention that conference has occurred pursuant to Rule the District Court erred by denying his 26(f), which the District Court here did not motion for reconsideration. schedule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d), (f). *11 the order dismissing the complaint and will
remand for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
[8] In the very case cited by the District reasonable opportunity to cure the defect, Court to justify a heightened pleading if he can, by amendment of the complaint requirement, Judge Maris went on to note and that denial of an application for leave that “this court has consistently held that to amend under these circumstances is an when an individual has filed a complaint abuse of discretion.” Darr, 767 F.2d at 81. under § 1983 which is dismissable for lack