Geoff GALLAS v. The SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA; The First Judicial District of Pennsylvania; Democratic City Committee; The Philadelphia Chapter of the Teamsters Union Teamsters Local 115; Does 1-100; Robert N.C. Nix, Jr., Honorable, in his official capacity as Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; John P. Flaherty, Jr., Honorable, in his official capacity as Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; Stephen A. Zappala, Honorable, individually and in his official capacity as Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; Ralph J. Cappy, Honorable, individually and in his official capacity as Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; Ronald D. Castille, Honorable, in his official capacity as Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; Russell M. Nigro, Honorable, individually and in his official capacity as Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; Sandra Schultz Newman, Honorable, in her official capacity as Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; Nancy Sobolevitch, individually and in her official capacity as Court Administrator of Pennsylvania; Alex Bonavitacola, Honorable, individually and in his official capacity as President Judge, Court of Common Pleas; Esther Sylvester, Honorable, individually and in her official capacity as Judge, Court of Common Pleas Family Division; Vincent Fumo, Honorable, individually and in his official capacity as Pennsylvania State Senator; Joseph DiPrimio, individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Court Administrator Family Division, Domestic Relations Branch; Robert Brady, individually and in his official capacity as Chairman, Democratic City Committee; John Morris, individually and in his official capacity as Secretary-Treasurer of Teamsters Local Union No. 115
No. 98-2138
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Argued March 20, 2000 Filed May 5, 2000
211 F.3d 760
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
In Cope, plaintiff was injured in an accident on Beach Drive which passes through Washington, D.C.‘s Rock Creek Park. Plaintiff sustained injuries when a car crashed into his after losing traction on a curve in the rain. The National Park Service, which owns and operates Beach Drive, asserted a discretionary function exception defense saying that its decision not to place a “slippery when wet” warning sign before the curve was a discretionary policy decision. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the District Court‘s dismissal based on the discretionary function exception, holding the decision of whether to post the sign was not rooted in policy considerations. See Cope, 45 F.3d at 451-52.
The Cope Court stated that it was unconvinced by the National Park Service‘s aesthetics argument given that “twenty-three traffic control, warning, and informational signs already exist on the half-mile stretch bracketing the curve on which the accident occurred—a stretch of road that carries 20,000 vehicles daily.” Id. at 452 (internal quotations omitted). Recognizing that other aesthetics-based failure to warn cases had reached the opposite result, the D.C. Circuit stated that those decisions were “easily distinguishable [because] ... the decisions were based on a reasonable desire to protect the experience of the park visitor.” Id. We believe the essential holding in Cope to be that a decision (or non-decision) must be reasonably related to a policy consideration to fall under the discretionary function exception.9
V.
For the reasons stated, we hold the discretionary function exception does not apply to the National Park Service‘s decisions concerning the Hospital Street lot. We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Glenn J. Brown, Quakertown, PA, Peter G. Friesen (argued), San Diego, CA, for Appellant.
Alan J. Davis (argued), Burt M. Rublin, Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee Honorable Russell M. Nigro.
James E. Beasley (argued), David A. Yanoff, Beasley, Casey & Erbstein, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellees The First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, Honorable Alex Bonavitacola, Honorable Esther Sylvester, and Joseph DiPrimio.
Richard A. Sprague (argued), Geoffrey R. Johnson, Sprague & Sprague, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee Vincent J. Fumo.
Gabriel L.I. Bevilacqua, Stephen M. Donweber, Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellees Robert Brady and the Democratic City Committee.
Before: MANSMANN, GREENBERG, and ALARCON,* Circuit Judges
OPINION OF THE COURT
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes on before this court on appeal from various orders of the district court dismissing appellant Geoff Gallas’ claims arising under
A. Factual Background
On December 19, 1990, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reacting to budgetary and administrative problems in the Philadelphia courts which comprise the First Judicial District (“FJD“), issued an order assuming control over the FJD. J.A. at 304, 412. See In re Blake, 527 Pa. 456, 593 A.2d 1267, 1268 (Pa. 1991). Pursuant to the order, the court assigned, respectively, Justice Ralph Cappy the task of “overseeing the reformation of the Administrative Structure of the Courts of the First Judicial District,” and Justice Nicholas Papadakos the task of “overseeing the Budgetary Structure” of those courts. J.A. at 304. The Supreme Court, however, intended that its oversight of the FJD would be temporary, with control eventually returned to local judges and officials. J.A. at 413.
In the summer of 1991, a committee chaired by Justices James McDermott and Stephen Zappala of the Supreme Court conducted a search to select an Executive Administrator who would have the responsibility of “overseeing the administration of all ministerial functions” in the FJD‘s courts. J.A. at 415. This search resulted in Gallas’ hiring for this position effective December 1, 1991. J.A. at 80, 415. According to Gallas’ amended complaint, during the selection process Justices Zappala and Cappy and Nancy Sobolevitch, the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania, conveyed the importance of “instituting a ‘merit system’ whereby employment and other issues in the FJD would be strictly governed by proper personnel processes, qualifications and performance“; these in-dividuals further indicated to Gallas that “use of political patronage to fill positions in all three Philadelphia courts [Court of Common Pleas, Municipal Court, and Traffic Court] making up the FJD had been a serious problem in Philadelphia.” J.A. at 85.
Gallas’ complaint indicates that he “expressed concern and reticence about taking the job ... [because] Philadelphia and its courts were vulnerable to improper political influence ... [and] many persons, both inside and outside the FJD, previously derived improper benefit from that influence.” J.A. at 85-86. This concern led Gallas to worry about job security, J.A. at 86, and prompted him to negotiate an oral “severance arrangement” which would entitle him to certain benefits if he should leave or be discharged. Supp.App. at 1206-11, 1214, 1708-17.
Gallas served as Executive Administrator for approximately four and one-half years. According to Gallas’ complaint, during the course of his service various individuals pressured him to acquiesce in patronage appointments in the FJD. Gallas claims that in 1992 Justices Zappala and Cappy instructed him to accommodate job appointments favored by two public figures, Pennsylvania State Senator Vincent Fumo and Robert Brady,1 the chairman of the Democratic City Committee. Gallas alleges that Zappala and Cappy specifically warned him that his failure to honor Fumo‘s requests could result in the loss of his job. J.A. at 87-88. Gallas further alleges that Fumo and Brady and their respective associates contacted him on multiple occasions concerning requests that certain individuals be hired or promoted. J.A. at 87-88. According to Gallas, he resisted demands for such appointments, and in March 1993, Fumo and Brady told him that his failure to honor their requests would lead them to “turn the dogs” on him. J.A. at 88. As the
Gallas’ service as Executive Administrator came to an end pursuant to a March 26, 1996 order of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (the “March 26 order“) which provided for an “administrative reorganization of the First Judicial District.” According to affidavits from justices of the Supreme Court, the court issued this order because the progress that had been achieved during the Supreme Court‘s oversight justified returning the FJD to local control.2 J.A. at 412, 425, 427. The March 26 order eliminated the position of Executive Administrator and created an Administrative Governing Board for the FJD to be comprised of the three president judges and the three administrative judges of the district, along with the Administrator of the Pennsylvania Courts. The order directed the Administrative Governing Board to select a Court Administrator and Budget Administrator for the FJD, with the persons in these two positions being responsible for many of the duties the Executive Administrator had performed. The order named Gallas as Budget Administrator effective April 1, 1996, “[s]ince it is anticipated that it may take a short time ... for the Administrative Governing Board to organize itself.”3 J.A. at 308-12.
Meanwhile, there were problems in Gallas’ marriage, and on September 22, 1995, his wife filed a Petition for Protection from Abuse (“PFA“) alleging that he had physically abused her. J.A. at 92. Gallas claims that court personnel improperly released this PFA to the public on three separate occasions. According to Gallas’ complaint, unknown court personnel released the contents of the PFA to the Democratic City Committee “within two hours” of its filing. J.A. at 93. Then, on September 26, 1995, the PFA was released to the Philadelphia Daily News by order of Esther Sylvester, the Administrative Judge of the Family Division of the Court of Common Pleas. J.A. at 93. According to the complaint, the newspaper secured this order through a request made by one of its reporters to Joseph DiPrimio, the Deputy Court Administrator of the Family Court Division.4 J.A. at 92-93. Finally, on or before March 23, 1996, unknown individuals again publicly released the PFA, along with the file from Gallas’ divorce proceeding. J.A. at 98.
B. Procedural History
Gallas commenced this action on September 23, 1996, asserting claims for monetary relief against various defendants based on his termination and the releases of the documents from his domestic proceedings. In Counts I-III of his amended complaint, Gallas raised claims under
The district court dismissed or granted the defendants summary judgment on each of Gallas’ claims in response to various motions by the defendants. See Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., No. CIV. A. 96-6450, 1998 WL 599249 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 1998); Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., No. CIV. A. 96-6450, 1998 WL 352584 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1998); Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., No. CIV. A. 96-6450, 1998 WL 22081 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 1998); Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., No. CIV. A. 96-6450, 1997 WL 256972 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1997). We will summarize only those rulings of the district court which are at issue on this appeal.6
On May 16, 1997, the district court entered a memorandum and order which dismissed, on the basis of absolute judicial immunity, Gallas’ claims against Judge Sylvester and DiPrimio arising from Judge Sylvester‘s order releasing the PFA. See Gallas, 1997 WL 256972, at *11-12. In the same memorandum and order, the district court dismissed Gallas’ procedural due process claim to the extent that he based it on the alleged deprivation of a liberty interest; in this regard, the court found that Gallas failed to allege that he was stigmatized in connection with his termination as Executive Administrator. See id. at *19. On January 22, 1998, the district court entered an order and memorandum granting summary judgment against Gallas on the procedural due process claim to the extent that he based it on the alleged deprivation of a property interest; in this connection, the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Gallas was anything other than an at-will employee. See Gallas, 1998 WL 22081, at *4-6. Then, on June 15, 1998, the district court entered an order and memorandum holding that Justices Zappala, Cappy, and Russell Nigro, along with Sobolevitch, were entitled to absolute legislative immunity with respect to Gallas’ First Amendment claim arising from his termination as Executive Administrator. See Gallas, 1998 WL 352584, at *3-10. Gallas claims that these rulings were erroneous.
Gallas also has appealed certain discovery rulings by the district court. On September 9, 1998, the district court entered a memorandum and order quashing certain
II. JURISDICTION
The district court had jurisdiction over Gallas’
III. DISCUSSION
A. Judicial Immunity
The first issue on appeal is whether Judge Sylvester and DiPrimio are entitled to absolute judicial immunity with regard to Judge Sylvester‘s order releasing the PFA to the Philadelphia Daily News. Following a motion to dismiss, the district court held that Judge Sylvester‘s order, as described in the amended complaint, constituted a judicial act for purposes of absolute immunity. See Gallas, 1997 WL 256972, at *11-12. Our review of the district court‘s order is plenary. See Children‘s Seashore House v. Waldman, 197 F.3d 654, 658 (3d Cir. 1999).
The Supreme Court long has recognized that judges are immune from suit under
[T]he nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have.... [T]his is the principal characteristic that adjudication has in common with legislation and with criminal prosecution, which are the two other areas in which absolute immunity has most generously been provided. If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or control, and it would manifestly detract from independent and impartial adjudication.
Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226-27, 108 S. Ct. at 544 (citations omitted).
We must engage in a two-part inquiry to determine whether judicial immunity is applicable. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge‘s judicial capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S. Ct. at 288. “Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 12, 112 S. Ct. at 288. With respect to the first inquiry, “the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to Nevertheless, based on the issues presented and argued in Gallas’ brief, we understand that he challenges only the rulings of the district court which we have described.
With respect to the second inquiry, we must distinguish between acts in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” which do not enjoy the protection of absolute immunity, and acts that are merely in “excess of jurisdiction,” which do enjoy that protection:
A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend.
Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 n. 6, 98 S. Ct. at 1104 n. 6 (citation omitted).
“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.‘” Id. at 356-57, 98 S. Ct. at 1105 (citation omitted); see also Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S. Ct. at 544 (an act “does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive“); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200, 200, 106 S. Ct. 496, 500, 88 L. Ed. 2d 507 (1985) (“Nor can this exemption of the judges from civil liability be affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are performed.“) (citation omitted). Immunity will not be forfeited because a judge has committed “grave procedural errors,” Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S. Ct. at 1106, or because a judge has conducted a proceeding in an “informal and ex parte” manner. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S. Ct. at 544. Further, immunity will not be lost merely because the judge‘s action is “unfair” or controversial. See Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 199-200, 106 S. Ct. at 500 (immunity applies “however injurious in its consequences [the judge‘s action] may have proved to the plaintiff“) (citation omitted); Stump, 435 U.S. at 363-64, 98 S. Ct. at 1108 (“Disagreement with the action taken by the judge ... does not justify depriving that judge of his immunity.... The fact that the issue before the judge is a controversial one is all the more reason that he should be able to act without fear of suit.“). In sum, our analysis must focus on the general nature of the challenged action, without inquiry into such “specifics” as the judge‘s motive or the correctness of his or her decision. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13, 112 S. Ct. at 288 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is the ‘nature’ and ‘function’ of the act, not the ‘act itself.’ In other words, we look to the particular act‘s relation to a general function normally performed by a judge ....“) (citation omitted).
According to Gallas’ complaint, Judge Sylvester ordered the release of the PFA “for no judicial purpose and for the sole purpose of injuring the reputation of [Gallas] ... without notice to [Gallas], and without a hearing designed to consider just cause for the release of it.” J.A. at 93-94. The complaint further alleges that Judge Sylvester “was motivated by a nonjudicial intent to undermine [Gallas‘] moral authority as Executive Administrator, and to assist political opponents of [Gallas] in terminating his employment.” J.A. at 97. Gallas argues that Judge Sylvester‘s order
Gallas’ arguments notwithstanding, we hold that Judge Sylvester is entitled to the protection of judicial immunity. Her order, as described in the amended complaint, undeniably was a judicial act. Contrary to Gallas’ argument that “clerks and not judges are typically the custodians of the public record,” Appellant‘s Br. at 27, the issuance of an order releasing a court record to the public is certainly a “function normally performed by a judge,” and the newspaper reporter “dealt with the judge in [her] judicial capacity” when he approached Judge Sylvester (through DiPrimio) seeking an order releasing the PFA. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S. Ct. at 1107. Indeed, Gallas’ complaint states that Judge Sylvester‘s actions were taken “under the color of state law and as agent of the ... [Court of Common Pleas]” and that Judge Sylvester “used the color of her authority under state law” to order the release of the PFA. See J.A. at 83, 97. These allegations recognize that Judge Sylvester was acting in her judicial capacity. See id. at 360, 98 S. Ct. at 1106 (“[W]e cannot characterize the approval of the petition as a nonjudicial act. [Plaintiffs] themselves stated in their pleadings before the District Court that Judge Stump was ‘clothed with the authority of the state’ at the time that he approved the petition and that ‘he was acting as a county circuit court judge.‘“).
The fact that Judge Sylvester issued the order ex parte, without notice to Gallas or an opportunity for him to be heard, does not mean that her act was not judicial. In Stump, the Supreme Court held that a judge was absolutely immune with respect to his approval of a mother‘s ex parte petition for an order permitting the sterilization of her mentally challenged daughter. Id. at 355-64, 98 S. Ct. at 1104-09. The Court squarely rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the approval of the petition was not a judicial act because it was “not given a docket number, was not placed on file with the clerk‘s office, and was approved in an ex parte proceeding without notice to the minor, without a hearing, and without the appointment of a guardian ad litem.” Id. at 360-63, 98 S. Ct. at 1106-08. In the Court‘s view, “[b]ecause Judge Stump performed the type of act normally performed only by judges and because he did so in his capacity as a Circuit Court Judge, we find no merit to [plaintiffs‘] argument that the informality with which he proceeded rendered his action nonjudicial and deprived him of his absolute immunity.” Id. at 362-63, 98 S. Ct. at 1108.8
Further, the allegations of the complaint do not indicate that Judge Sylvester acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. We
We recognize that Gallas contends that only the judge who actually presided over his domestic proceedings had the power to order a release of the PFA. But Gallas has not pointed to any rule or other authority indicating that Judge Sylvester did not have the authority to issue a release or-der.10 Moreover, even if he did point to a rule that indicated that another judge should have entertained the application for release of the PFA, we would not hold that Judge Sylvester acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction in issuing the order.
In fact, we recently dealt with and rejected a similar claim in Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000). In Figueroa we held that a New Jersey municipal court judge had absolute judicial immunity for her act in holding a party in contempt and jailing him without granting a stay as required by court rule even though in hearing the case she acted contrary to a Supreme Court of New Jersey directive that required her to transfer the case to another judge. Thus, we hold that a judge does not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction when the judge enters an order at least colorably within the jurisdiction of her court even though a court rule or other procedural constraint required another judge to act in the matter. We also note, though our result is not dependent on the point, that Judge Sylvester was the administrative judge of the Family Court Division and thus it might be expected that she would entertain the application for the release of the PFA in the sensitive situation in which the FJD‘s Executive Administrator was a party.11
J.A. at 129 (emphasis added).
We recognize that the complaint contains little information regarding the precise circumstances leading to Judge Sylvester issuing the order. We do not know, for example, whether the order was oral or written, whether legal argument was presented to Judge Sylvester prior to the issuance of the order, or whether legal counsel for the newspaper participated to any extent. We will assume that Judge Sylvester issued the order orally, with no their release should apply to the administrative judge or his judicial designee. See J.A. at 129. Judge Sylvester was the administrative judge.
Our conclusion that Judge Sylvester is entitled to absolute judicial immunity in turn demands that DiPrimio be accorded absolute “quasi-judicial” immunity. As mentioned, according to the complaint, the Philadelphia Daily News obtained the release order from Judge Sylvester by means of its reporter‘s request to DiPrimio. J.A. at 92-93. In the circumstances, we have no trouble concluding that he should be absolutely immune for simply acting as an intermediary between the newspaper and the judge. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225, 108 S. Ct. at 543 (indicating that the protections of judicial immunity extend to officials “who perform quasi-judicial functions“); Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[Defen-dant], while acting as Clerk of the United States District Court ... in many of his actions performed quasi-judicial functions.... Even if ... [defendant] deceived [plaintiff] regarding the status of the [supersedeas] bond and improperly of the judicial institution or the decision-making process.” Id. at 261. Gallas seeks to draw an analogy between Judge Sylvester‘s order releasing the PFA to the media and the comments to the media made by the judge in Barrett. This analogy must fail. While a judge may “step[] out of her judicial role” when she chooses to talk to the media about a litigant appearing before her, see id., a judge certainly does not step out of her judicial role when she entertains a petition for an order releasing a court record.
In sum, the district court did not err in dismissing Gallas’ claims against Judge Sylvester and DiPrimio with respect to Judge Sylvester‘s order releasing the PFA.
B. Legislative Immunity
The next issue we address is whether Justices Zappala, Cappy, and Nigro, as well as Sobolevitch, are entitled to absolute legislative immunity with regard to Gallas’ claims arising from his termination as Executive Administrator. The district court granted summary judgment with respect to Gallas’ First Amendment claim on the ground that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court‘s March 26 order reorganizing the FJD constituted a legislative act to which absolute immunity should attach. See Gallas, 1998 WL 352584, at *3-10. Our standard of review is plenary. See Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 867 (3d Cir. 1999).
Legislators enjoy absolute immunity from liability for their legislative acts. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 46, 118 S. Ct. 966, 969, 140 L. Ed. 2d 79 (1998); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732, 100 S. Ct. 1967, 1974, 64 L. Ed. 2d 641 (1980); Larsen v. Senate of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1145, 119 S. Ct. 1041, 143 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1999). In determining whether an official is entitled to legislative immunity, we must focus on the nature of the official‘s action rather than the official‘s motives or the title of his or her office. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S. Ct. at 973 (“Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.“); Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224, 108 S. Ct. at 542 (“Running through our cases ... is a ‘functional’ approach to immunity questions.... Under that approach, we examine the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions.“); Larsen, 152 F.3d at 253 (“Legislative immunity must be applied pragmatically, and not by labels.“).
In accordance with this functional approach, the Supreme Court has recognized that judges sometimes perform legislative actions. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S. Ct. at 544 (noting a distinction “between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform“). (emphasis added). Thus, in Consumers Union the Supreme Court afforded legislative immunity to the Virginia Supreme Court and its chief justice in connection with the promulgation of the state bar code. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731-34, 100 S. Ct. at 1974-76 (“[T]he Virginia Court is exercising the State‘s entire legislative power with respect to regulating the Bar, and its members are the State‘s legislators for the purpose of issuing the Bar Code.“). Similarly, we have indicated that non-legislators performing legislative functions may claim legislative immunity. See Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that a mayor and a borough attorney were entitled to legislative immu-
Accordingly, the question here is whether the justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court performed a legislative function when they issued the March 26 order reorganizing the FJD. We have employed a two-part test to determine whether an act is legislative:
First, the act must be “substantively” legislative, i.e., legislative in character. Legislative acts are those which involve policy-making decision [sic] of a general scope or, to put it another way, legislation involves linedrawing. Where the decision affects a small number or a single individual, the legislative power is not implicated, and the act takes on the nature of administration.14 In addition, the act must be “procedurally” legislative, that is, passed by means of established legislative procedures. This principle requires that constitutionally accepted procedures of enacting the legislation must be followed in order to assure that the act is a legitimate, reasoned decision representing the will of the people which the governing body has been chosen to serve.
Ryan v. Burlington County, 889 F.2d 1286, 1290-91 (3d Cir. 1989).
It is clear that the issuance of the March 26 order was a “substantively” legislative act. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued this order (as well as its prior orders relating to the reformation of the FJD) pursuant to a direct grant of rulemaking authority from the state constitution. Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Supreme Court “shall exercise general supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts,”
Further, the March 26 order involved a “policy-making decision of a general scope,” rather than a decision “affect[ing] a small number or a single individual.” See Ryan, 889 F.2d at 1291.
The Supreme Court recently recognized that the elimination of a public employment position—as opposed to the firing of a single individual—constitutes a “legislative” act. In Bogan, the plaintiff filed a
This leaves us with the question whether, stripped of all considerations of intent and motive, [defendants‘] actions were legislative. We have little trouble concluding that they were. Most evi-
dently, [the city council member‘s] acts of voting for an ordinance were, in form, quintessentially legislative. [The mayor‘s] introduction of a budget and signing into law an ordinance also were formally legislative, even though he was an executive official.... [Plaintiff], however, asks us to look beyond [defendants‘] formal actions to consider whether the ordinance was legislative in substance. We need not determine whether the formally legislative character of [defendants‘] actions is alone sufficient to entitle [defendants] to legislative immunity, because here the ordinance, in substance, bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation. The ordinance reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision implicating the budgetary priorities of the city and the services the city provides to its constituents. Moreover, it involved the termination of a position, which, unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee, may have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office. And the city council, in eliminating [plaintiff‘s] position, certainly governed in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act. Thus, [defendants‘] activities were undoubtedly legislative.
Id. at 55-56, 118 S. Ct. at 973 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).17 In light of Bogan, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court‘s “discretionary, policymaking decision” to eliminate the position of Executive Administrator should be classified as a legislative act.18
Turning to the second prong of the Ryan test, the undisputed evidence indi- cates that the March 26 order was “procedurally” legislative. The record includes an affidavit from Justice Cappy describing the process by which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercises its constitutional authority to oversee the lower courts:
The Supreme Court exercises this constitutional authority by following certain established procedures: proposals are circulated among the Justices; the Justices engage in deliberation regarding the proposals; after deliberation, the Justices vote; and, in the event a proposal is adopted, the Court issues an appropriate order. ...
[With respect to the March 26 order,] the Justices of the Court deliberated on the merits of various alternatives to the Court‘s continued oversight of the FJD. Following these deliberations, the Justices voted to reorganize the administration of the FJD and implement the Court‘s policy decision to return control to the FJD judges and officials. Pursuant to its deliberations and vote, on March 26, 1996, the Supreme Court issued an order reorganizing the FJD....
J.A. at 412, 418. Thus, as the evidence demonstrates, the Supreme Court determined in its discretion that the time had come to return the FJD to local control; the Justices then debated alternatives, voted, and issued a directive reorganizing the FJD. This procedure was no different from that which a legislature would follow in like circumstances.19
In sum, the issuance of the March 26 order was both substantively and procedurally legislative, and accordingly the dis-
C. Discovery Issues
Gallas raises two challenges to the district court‘s management of discovery. First, Gallas challenges the district court‘s September 9, 1998 order quashing certain deposition subpoenas which he issued on or about March 27, 1998. Gallas sought these depositions in part for the purpose of obtaining the identities of the Doe defendants designated in his complaint. The district court precluded Gallas from conducting depositions for this purpose because it concluded that, even if Gallas identified the Doe defendants, it simply was too late for their service in accordance with
On this appeal, Gallas argues that he should have been permitted to conduct depositions for the purpose of identifying the Doe defendants who released his PFA and divorce file. He argues that the district court erred with respect to Rule 4(m), but he presents no argument regarding timeliness or relation-back. Gallas’
Second, Gallas contends that the district court erred in refusing to grant him additional time to conduct discovery with respect to his interference with employment claim. On November 10, 1998, more than two years after Gallas commenced this action and more than six months after the discovery deadline passed, the district court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Fumo, Brady, and the Democratic City Committee on the ground that Gallas had
Our standard of review with regard to the district court‘s management of discovery is abuse of discretion. See Massachusetts Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass‘n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1032 (3d Cir. 1997). “[W]e will not upset a district court‘s conduct of discovery procedures absent a demonstration that the court‘s action made it impossible to obtain crucial evidence, and implicit in such a showing is proof that more diligent discovery was impossible.” In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). The record indicates that Gallas had sufficient time to conduct discovery during the 25 months between the filing of his complaint and the entry of summary judgment on the interference with employment claim, despite the fact that relatively brief stays of discovery occupied some of that time. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. See Massachusetts Sch. of Law, 107 F.3d at 1034 (“[T]he district court, by allowing fairly extensive discovery and then closing discovery and entertaining the summary judgment motion, did not abuse its discretion.“).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the district court challenged by Gallas on this appeal will be affirmed.
GREENBERG
CIRCUIT JUDGE
Notes
Please take note that Family Court records, including ... Protection from Abuse records ... are impounded and are not subject to inspection except by a party to the action or counsel of record for the party whose records are to be inspected unless otherwise provided by statute or rule. These records may not be removed for copying or any other purpose except by special order of the court.
If any of these records are required as evidence in a civil, criminal, administrative or disciplinary proceeding, a verified petition setting forth the reasons why the record is needed must be filed with the Administrative Judge of the Family Court Division or his judicial designee. An appropriate order must accompany the petition.
In Consumers Union, it was argued that legislative immunity should not extend to the Virginia Supreme Court in connection with its promulgation of the state bar code because “many executive and agency officials wield authority to make rules in a wide variety of circumstances.” See id. at 734, 100 S. Ct. at 1975. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that “in this case the Virginia [Supreme] Court claims inherent power to regulate the Bar, and ... [it] is exercising the State‘s entire legislative power with respect to regulating the Bar, and its members are the State‘s legislators for the purpose of issuing the Bar Code.” Id. at 734, 100 S. Ct. at 1975-76. Like the Virginia Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court here exercised “inherent power” to regulate the lower courts and “its members are the State‘s legislators for the purpose of” regulating those courts. Accordingly, legislative immunity is appropriate.
Aside from Zappala, Cappy, Nigro, and Sobolevitch, Gallas asserted the First Amendment and due process claims in Count IV against several other defendants. The district court dismissed these claims against these other defendants on grounds which Gallas does not challenge here. See Gallas, 1997 WL 256972, at *6-22.