Leider v. Lewis, 218 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127

Plaintiff Aaron Leider (taxpayer) sued City of Los Angeles and the LA Zoo director seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under Code Civ. Proc. § 526a, alleging zoo employees violated Penal Code provisions prohibiting elephant abuse.
An earlier unpublished Court of Appeal decision (Culp) reversed summary judgment, finding Penal Code § 596.5 supplied an enforceable legal standard and the claims were justiciable; the trial court relied on that ruling.
The City later argued Civil Code § 3369 bars equitable relief to enforce penal laws; the trial court overruled that demurrer and, after a bench trial, entered injunctions and declarations restricting bullhooks, electric shock, and ordering exercise/maintenance of elephant enclosures.
The Court of Appeal affirmed in a divided decision, holding (1) law of the case barred the City’s § 3369 defense and (2) the 1977 amendment adding “as otherwise provided by law” allowed equitable relief against illegal public expenditures tied to penal violations.
The California Supreme Court granted review to decide whether law of the case precluded the City’s § 3369 defense and whether the § 3369 exception permits taxpayer injunctions against penal-law–related public expenditures; the Court reversed the Court of Appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prior Court of Appeal decision (Culp) established law of the case barring City from raising Civil Code § 3369 defense on remand	Culp implicitly decided injunctive relief tied to Penal Code violations was available, so City cannot now invoke § 3369	§ 3369 was not litigated or decided in Culp; raising § 3369 now is a new, permissible argument	Law of the case does not apply; Culp did not implicitly decide § 3369 issues (Horman controls)
Whether the “as otherwise provided by law” exception in Civil Code § 3369 permits equitable relief in a § 526a taxpayer action to restrain expenditures furthering Penal Code violations	The 1977 amendment and related statutes authorize equitable relief for illegal public expenditures tied to penal-law violations	Longstanding rule (Lim, Landowitz, Schur) bars equity to enforce penal laws absent explicit legislative authorization; the 1977 change did not intend to overturn that rule	§ 3369’s 1977 exception does not authorize a § 526a taxpayer injunction to enforce Penal Code provisions; express statutory authorization is required

Nathan H. Schur, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 47 Cal.2d 11 (1956) (taxpayer action cannot enjoin penal-law violations absent explicit legislative authorization)
People v. Lim, 18 Cal.2d 872 (1941) (equity should not broadly enjoin criminal conduct absent legislative declaration because it circumvents criminal procedures and protections)
International Etc. Workers v. Landowitz, 20 Cal.2d 418 (1942) (equity will not restrain violation of a penal ordinance unless statute clearly authorizes injunctive relief)
Perrin v. Mountain View Mausoleum Assn., 206 Cal. 669 (1929) (Civil Code § 3369 reflects the principle that equity generally does not intervene in criminal matters)
Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn., 7 Cal.3d 94 (1972) (recognized standard for justiciability in public-rights contexts cited in related analyses)
Estate of Horman, 5 Cal.3d 62 (1971) (law-of-the-case does not apply to issues not presented or essential to prior appellate decision)
Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia, 103 Cal.App.4th 298 (2002) (illustrates when law of the case can bar re-litigating an issue that was necessarily decided on prior appeal)