Animal Legal Defense Fund v. California Exposition and State FairsAnimal Legal Defense Fund v. California Exposition and State Fairs
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Richman
RICHMAN, J.—Plaintiffs brought a
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT LAW
California‘s Animal Cruelty Law
Under California‘s animal cruelty laws, it is a crime to cause harm to an animal through an affirmative act or an act of neglect or to confine an animal in an enclosed space without an adequate exercise area. (
Proposition 2
In 2008, California voters passed the Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act,
Finally, Proposition 2 contains a savings clause: “The provisions of this chapter are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other laws protecting animal welfare, including the California Penal Code. This chapter shall not be construed to limit any state law or regulations protecting the welfare of animals . . . .” (
Code of Civil Procedure Section 526a
Section 526a creates a taxpayer private right of action to restrain the illegal or wasteful expenditure of public funds. It provides in pertinent part: “An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a county, town, city or city and county of the state, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a citizen resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax therein.” Although the statutory language authorizes a taxpayer action only as to local governmental units and their officers, courts have extended section 526a‘s reach tо state agencies. (Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 472, 482 [117 Cal.Rptr.3d 169].)
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs’ Complaint
On July 18, 2013, plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting a section 526a action against defendants, premised on the theory that defendants waste taxpayer money and staff time by obtaining, transporting, and exhibiting pregnant pigs in violation of
The University of California at Davis School of Veterinary Medicine (School) is a professional school of the University of California, which is governed by defendant Regents of the University of California (Regents).
Every year, Cal Expo enters into a cooperative arrangement with the School to set up and manage the livestock nursery exhibit at the State Fair where pregnant pigs and other animals are put on display for three weeks to give birth and nurse. Cal Expo provides the land, tent, support infrastructure, and financial compensation, while the School provides the animals, equipment, and staff.
Shortly before the State Fair begins, the School obtains and transports pregnant pigs to be displayed in the livestock nursery exhibit. The pigs have approximately two weeks remaining in their pregnancy when they are transported. Transporting pigs during the last two weeks of their pregnancy causes suffering due to stress and physical discomfort, potentially resulting in an aborted pregnancy.
Once at the fair, the School places the pregnant pigs in farrowing crates. As plaintiffs describe them: “[F]arrowing crаtes are small metal stalls approximately five feet long and three feet wide. These are also the approximate dimensions of the pigs themselves. On both sides immediately adjacent to the mother‘s area are two enclosed areas for the piglets to live once they are born. Metal bars separate the mother‘s section from the piglets’ but provide an opening so the piglets can nurse. [¶] . . . The farrowing crates are so small that the mother pigs cannot turn around or walk. The pigs remain confined to the farrowing crates for the three-week duration of the State Fair . . . .” The restriction оf movement once at the State Fair deprives the pigs of the opportunity to engage in any exercise, which causes suffering due to physical discomfort, boredom, and stress.
The farrowing crates have metal-grate flooring and lack bedding material, which causes additional suffering. The lack of bedding material causes physical and thermal discomfort for the pigs and frustrates their maternal instinct to build a nest, causing stress and emotional depression that manifests outwardly as restlessness and bar-chewing.
The crated pigs are displayed as close as four feet to attendees of the State Fair. The pigs havе a strong instinct to isolate themselves days before and
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants from transporting pregnant pigs to the State Fair for non-medical purposes during the final 15 days of their pregnancies, confining them to farrowing crates and other similar areas with metal floors and insufficient bedding material, and keeping them in close proximity to State Fair attendees during the days leading up to and following birth. Plaintiffs also sought a declaration that such conduct is illegal.
The Regents’ Demurrer
On September 30, 2013, the Regents demurred to the complaint, with Cal Expo subsequently filing a joinder. The Regents asserted three independent reasons the complaint failed to state a cause of action. First, the conduct of which plaintiffs complained was not illegal because Proposition 2 would not proscribe defendants’ conduct once in effect. Second, there is no private right of action to enforce the animal cruelty provisions of the Penal Code, as held in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Mendes (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 136 [72 Cal.Rptr.3d 553] (Mendes). Third, section 526a taxpayer actions do not lie where the challenged conduct involves an exercise of discretion by another branch of government, such as a prosecutor‘s decision to charge a particular act as a crime.
Plaintiffs filed opposition, responding to each of the Regents’ arguments. They contended Proposition 2 was irrelevant to their claims, because not only was it not yet operative, but it also did not apply to the conduct of which they complained—conduct, plaintiffs.argued, that constituted animal cruelty under
After the Regents filed a reply, the trial court issued a tentative ruling rejecting all three grounds asserted by the Regents and overruling the demurrer. The Regents contested the tentative ruling, and the matter came on for hearing on November 18, 2013. After a lengthy hearing, the court took the matter under submission.
On December 9, 2013, the trial court entered an order reversing course from its tentative ruling: it agreed with the Regents on all three asserted
The court also agreed that plaintiffs lacked a private right of action to enforce the Penal Code provisions, describing as “illogical and without merit” their attempt to do “as taxpayers . . . what they may not do as bystander citizens . . . .” It noted that section 526a “cannot . . . be read as a carte blanche for taxpayers who declare themselves to be concerned about a potential violation of the Penal Code to do what concerned citizens cannot do under Mendes. . . .
Finally, the court found that the complaint was an “improper[] attempt” by plaintiffs “to pursue principally ‘political’ issues and issues involving the exercise of the discretion of either the legislative or executive branches of government.”
After the court entered judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiffs filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
The Standard of Review
The standard of review governing an appeal from a demurrer sustained without leave to amend is well established. As we summarized in Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at page 480: “‘Because this case comes to us on a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action, we accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. ‘“We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading
Plaintiffs Cannot Assert a Section 526a Taxpayer Claim Predicated on a Violation of Penal Code Section 597 or 597t
On appeal, plaintiffs make the same arguments they made in opposition to the Regents’ demurrer. We address only one, plaintiffs’ claim that, contrary to the trial court‘s conclusion, they can in fact assert a section 526a taxpayer action to enjoin waste arising out of defendants’ alleged violation of the animal cruelty laws. Like the trial court, we reject plaintiffs’ contention, concluding that they cannot circumvent the prohibition recognized in Mendes by couching their claim as a section 526a taxpayer action.
In Mendes, ALDF and two consumers brought an action against two individuals who were in the business of raising calves placed with them by dairies. Plaintiffs alleged that at any one time defendants housed apрroximately 12,000 calves confined to isolation crates for up to 60 days at a time. According to plaintiffs’ allegations, the crates were barely bigger than the calves themselves, preventing them from turning around or lying down in a natural position. (Mendes, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 140.)
Plaintiffs’ complaint asserted two causes of action. The first, asserted only by ALDF, alleged that defendants’ confinement of calves violated
The court went on to describe in detail the statutory scheme to which it was referring, detail we quote at length as it is relevant to whether plaintiffs can assert their taxpayer action here. Thus:
“Since 1905, California has authorized the formation of corporations for the prevention of cruelty to animals. (See Civ. Code, former § 607, repealed by Stats. 1947, ch. 1038, § 100001, p. 2439; see also Stats. 1947, ch. 1038, § 10404, p. 2423, enacting
“Only section 10400 corporations may apply for appointment of humane officеrs, whose duty ‘shall be the enforcement of the laws for the prevention of cruelty to animals.’ (
“Not only do the Corporations Code and the Penal Code provide for extensive regulation and empowerment of section 10400 corporations and humane officers, the Penal Code expressly provides a remedy for those not so regulated when they believe, inter alia, animal cruelty ‘is being, or is about to be’ committed in ‘any particular building or place.’ (
In light of this statutory scheme, the Mendes court concluded that recognitiоn of a private right of action under
As can be seen, Mendes held that the Legislature did not intend to establish an implied private right of action for a
As our Supreme Court long ago recognized, “The primary purpose of [section 526a], originally enacted in 1909, is to ‘enable a large body of the citizenry to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go unсhallenged in the courts because of the standing requirement.’ [Citation.]” (Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 267–268 [96 Cal.Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242]; see Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 481.) Here, as laid out in Mendes, there exists a comprehensive statutory scheme that provides multiple avenues for the enforcement of California‘s animal cruelty laws. Humane societies are vested with “quasi-governmental powers” to aid local authorities in the enforcement of anticruelty laws, and any individual can make a complaint under oath to a magistrate authorized to
In light of these many means of enforcing the animal cruelty laws, the very purpose of a section 526a action is not furthered by plaintiffs’ lawsuit here, since it cannot be said that defendants’ conduct—if indeed violative of the animal cruelty laws—would go unchallenged in the absence of a taxpayer action (notwithstanding plaintiffs’ claim that they “are the only persons who can challenge this unlawful government conduct because Cal Expo and the School‘s victims are pigs who do not have standing to sue“). It is worth nоting, “‘California has one of the nation‘s toughest anticruelty laws, and enforcement of the law appears to be more rigorous than in many other states.‘” (Humane Society of the United States v. State Bd. of Equalization (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 349, 359 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 277] (Humane Society), quoting Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Temple Univ. Press 1995) p. 119.)
ALDF attempts to distance itself from Mendes, arguing that because section 526a empowers taxpayers to sue governmental entities to stop unlawful activity that violates a legal standard found elsewhere, it provides its own independent right of action, even where, as here, the predicate statute does not. In other words, ALDF seeks to enjoin defendants from illegally using public resоurces, as opposed to seeking to enforce the animal cruelty laws. But section 526a does not create an absolute right of action in taxpayers to assert any claim for governmental waste. To the contrary, courts have recognized numerous situations in which a section 526a claim will not lie. (See, e.g., Daar v. Alvord (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 480, 487 [161 Cal.Rptr. 658] [“[E]ven assuming the illegality of the [tax] collection process,
Our conclusion finds support in the dearth of authority recognizing a section 526a taxpayer action predicated on an alleged criminal violation. Plaintiffs cite only one case, Mendoza v. County of Tulare (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 403 [180 Cal.Rptr. 347] (Mendoza), in which, as they would have it, the Penal Code “supplied [the] standard” for a taxpayer action. Mendoza is unavailing.
Among the numerous issues before the Court of Appeal was whether the taxpayer had standing to assert a section 526a claim. (Mendoza, supra, 128 Cal.App.3d at p. 415.) In its cursory analysis of the issue, the court held that the taxpayer did in fact have standing to bring his taxpayer suit because “the existence of directly affected individuals who might also have standing to sue does not preclude a taxpayer‘s suit” and “directly aggrieved parties and taxpayers have concurrent standing to bring suit to enjoin government action.” (Id. at p. 415.) From this, we can surmise that the only basis on which the defendants challenged the taxpayer‘s standing was whether the taxpayer could maintain his section 526a action when other plaintiffs who were directly impacted by the jail conditions were asserting similar claims. The opinion does not suggest that the court considered whether the taxpayer could maintain a section 526a action basеd on an alleged failure to comply with a Penal Code provision, as is the case here.
Perhaps more significant is the nature of the Penal Code sections at issue in Mendoza. The plaintiffs alleged a failure to maintain a licensed physician in the jail in violation of
Plaintiffs also cite our opinion in Humane Society, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 349, 360–364, for the proposition that “courts have presumed that Section 526a may be used to enjoin violations of the Animal Cruelty Law.” Nothing in Humane Society suggests, however, that we made any such a presumption.
We affirmed, agreeing with the defendants that the complaint failed to allege a cause of action, for multiple reasons. (Humane Society, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 360.) First, we noted that the allegedly improper conduct—subjecting hens to needless suffering—involved conduct not by public officials but rather by certain poultry and egg producers, and a section 526a claim cannot be asserted where the challenged governmental conduct is legal. (152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 361–362.) We rejected the Humane Society‘s attempt “to transform the [state Board of Equalization] into some sort of a police agency with regard to chicken coops.” (Id. at p. 362.) We also expressed concern that a decision in the Humane Society‘s favor could open the door to an “inevitable endless stream of potential litigation” directed at purchasers of equipment used to house cattle, sheep, pigs, or “‘fur-bearing animals in captivity.‘” (Id. at p. 363.) And we cited a “final reason for affirmance: [plaintiffs‘] pleas for governmental action to relieve the alleged mistreatment of chickens should be directed to the Legislature, not the judiciary.” (Ibid.)
From this, plaintiffs infer a presumption “that Section 526a may be used to enjoin violations of the Animal Cruelty Law,” a presumption apparently derived from the fact that we did not hold otherwise. But nothing in Humane Society can be construed as supporting this presumption. Nothing suggests that the parties raised this issue—or that it was in any way before us.
Nathan H. Schur, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (1956) 47 Cal.2d 11 [300 P.2d 831] (Schur) is instructive, where our Supreme Court rejected an
In Schur, the Supreme Court also observed that “[t]he local officials are vested with the power” of determining whether licenses should be issued for the games and that “[h]ere there was a public hearing on the precise issue, whether the games for which licenses were sought violated the Penal Code, and due notice was given to all concerned which would include a taxpayer.” And so, a taxpayer action was not an available remedy. (Schur, supra, 47 Cal.2d at pp. 17–18.)
In sum, Schur stands for the proposition that where the Legislature has provided an administrative remedy, a taxpayer action cannot be used in lieu of that remedy. Here, the remedy provided by the Legislature is not administrative, but it is a carefully crafted legislative mechanism for enforcing the Penal Code section plaintiffs claim defendants violated. Given this detailed legislative scheme, we believe the Legislature intended the enfоrcement mechanisms it established—and the entities in whom it entrusted such enforcement—to be the exclusive mechanisms for, and entities charged with, such enforcement. Put otherwise, the more general remedy of a taxpayer action was not intended to be used in their stead.
Because standing is a procedural requirement plaintiffs cannot satisfy, we need not address their remaining claims.
The judgments are affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.
Kline, P. J., and Stewart, J., concurred.