Lavar v. Accel Schools OhioLavar v. Accel Schools Ohio
Lavar Martin, pro se.
Ford Law PLLC and Darren W. Ford, for appellant.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Accel Schools Ohio (“Accel“) appeals the decision of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss pursuant to
{¶ 2} In June 2024, Lavar Martin (“Martin“), acting pro se, filed a complaint in the Court of Claims alleging that Accel had failed to respond to public-records requests he submitted in May and June 2024 in violation of
{¶ 3} The Court of Claims subsequently assigned a special master to the case pursuant to
{¶ 5} The special master overruled Accel‘s objections, noting that
{¶ 6} On November 1, 2024, Accel filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to
{¶ 7} In November 2024, the special master filed his report and recommendation. He denied Accel‘s motion to dismiss under
{¶ 8} Accel filed objections to the report and recommendations, which in pertinent part, argued that the Court of Claims should exercise its power under
{¶ 9} In December 2024, the Court of Claims overruled Accel‘s objections and adopted the special master‘s report and recommendations. Martin v. Accel Schools Ohio, 2024-Ohio-6143, ¶ 29 (Ct. of Cl.). The court found that Accel‘s request for dismissal under
{¶ 10} The Court of Claims found that it did have subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the language of
{¶ 11} Based on a review of Accel‘s School management agreement with the two community schools it managed in Cuyahoga County, the Court of Claims found that the documents were public records subject to the Public Records Act and that Accel was required to produce them under both a quasi-agency theory and the functional equivalency test.
{¶ 12} Accel appeals raising the following assigned errors for our review.
Assignment of Error No. 1
The Court of Claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction over [Martin‘s] claim because claims against private entities under
R.C. 149.43 are not within the Court‘s expanded jurisdiction over public records complaints governed byR.C. 2743.03(A)(3)(b) .
Assignment of Error No. 2
The Court of Claims erred in finding that [Accel] is the “functional equivalent of the two community schools for which it provides management services.
Assignment of Error No. 3
The Court of Claims erred in finding that [Accel] is a “quasi-agent” of the two community schools it manages with respect to [Accel‘s] personnel records sought by the public records request.
Law and Analysis
{¶ 13} We begin with the first assignment of error because it is dispositive of this appeal. Accel argues that the trial court erred when it failed to grant its motion to dismiss under
Standard of Review
{¶ 14} A party may move for dismissal under
{¶ 15} An appellate court reviews a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to
The Court of Claims’ Jurisdiction
{¶ 16} The Court of Claims was created by statute. State ex rel. Dewine v. Court of Claims of Ohio, 2011-Ohio-5283, ¶ 19. As such, “the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is limited by statute and specifically confined to the powers conferred by the legislature.” Id. at ¶ 21. The Court of Claims’ jurisdiction is defined, in part, in
the court of claims is a court of record and has exclusive, original jurisdiction of all civil actions against the state permitted by the waiver of immunity contained in section 2743.02 of the Revised Code and exclusive jurisdiction of the causes of action of all parties in civil actions that are removed to the court of claims.
{¶ 17} Additionally, “[t]he only defendant in original actions in the court of claims is the state.”
{¶ 18} In 2016, the General Assembly enacted
[a] person allegedly aggrieved by a denial of access to public records in violation of
R.C. 149.43(B) may now file either a mandamus complaint pursuant toR.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b) or a public-records-access complaint in the Court of Claims pursuant toR.C. 2743.75 . The person cannot pursue both remedies.
Id. at ¶ 12.
{¶ 19} That same year the General Assembly enacted
In addition to its exclusive, original jurisdiction as conferred by divisions (A)(1) and (2) of this section, the court of claims has exclusive, original jurisdiction as follows:
(b) Under section 2743.75 of the Revised Code to hear complaints alleging a denial of access to public records in violation of division (B) of section 149.43 of the Revised Code, regardless of whether the public office or person responsible for public records is an office or employee of the state or of a political subdivision.
{¶ 20} In its ruling, the Court of Claims maintained that
{¶ 21} When deciding the meaning of a statute, a court does not ask “what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.” State ex rel. Dudley v. Yost, 2024-Ohio-5166, ¶ 14, citing Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. “When the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly has said.” Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., 2003-Ohio-1099, ¶ 12, citing Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549 (2000). In doing so, courts have to give effect to all parts of the statutory scheme and may not add words or delete words from the statutory
{¶ 22} In its review of the statute, the Court of Claims focused solely on the grant of original, exclusive jurisdiction over denial of access to public records, but ignored the final phrase, “regardless of whether the public office or person responsible for public records is an office or employee of the state or of a political subdivision.” “Regardless” means “without regard for,” and “regardless of” means “in spite of” or “without taking into account.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Kyles, 2024-Ohio-5038, ¶ 13. The plain language of the statute expands the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to include denial of access to public-records cases, in spite of, or without taking into account, whether the public office or the person responsible for public records is an office or employee of the state or a political subdivision.
{¶ 23} Because the court did not previously have jurisdiction over political subdivisions, the language is an expansion of the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction, but a limited expansion. Statutorily created courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction only if it is expressly granted the authority to do so by statute. See Caballero v. Caballero, 2023-Ohio-1006, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.); Dewine, 2011-Ohio-5283, at ¶ 20 (comparing the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to other statutory courts and noting that if the power is not conferred by statute, it does not exist); State ex rel. Cordray v. Court of Claims of Ohio, 2010-Ohio-4437, ¶ 30, (“[W]hen courts construe authority a legislative body has granted, ‘the intention of that grant of power, as well as the extent of the grant, must be clear and if there is doubt, that
{¶ 24}
{¶ 25} Martin argues that the central issue in this case is whether a private management company like Accel is subject to the Public Records Act and argues that Accel is merely trying to evade accountability under the act. We want to make clear that this ruling does not address whether a private entity is subject to the Public Records Act. It is well settled that a private agency may be subject to the Public Records Act under the functional equivalency test or the quasi-agency theory. See State ex rel. Bell v. Brooks, 2011-Ohio-4897, ¶ 19; S/O ex rel. Am. Ctr. for Economic Equality v. Jackson, 2015-Ohio-4981, ¶ 15. The primary question in this case is whether the Court of Claims has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case, and we must answer that question in the negative.
{¶ 26} Judgment reversed.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Court of Claims to carry this judgment into execution.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR
(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.)