Mason v. MasonMason v. Mason
JAMIE L. ANDERSON, Attorney for Appellee
OPINION
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant James C. Mason1 appeals from a final judgment and decree of divorce entered by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Michell and Clyde Mason were married in 1999. Michell filed a complaint for divorce in November 2022. In May 2023, Clyde filed a
{¶ 3} Clyde deposed Steven Pennington in July 2023. According to Pennington, he and his wife had purchased the subject property at a foreclosure sale with the intent to permit their daughter, Michell, to reside in the home until she “got back on her feet.” At the time of the purchase, Michell and Clyde were separated and living apart. Pennington testified that he and his wife expected Michell to eventually purchase the home, but they intended to resell the property if Michell did not buy it from them. Pennington testified that he had made substantial improvements to the home. At some point, Michell and Clyde reconciled, and Clyde moved into the home. Pennington
{¶ 4} Thereafter, the Penningtons filed a
{¶ 5} Clyde appeals.
II. Civ.R. 12(B)(1)
{¶ 6}
{¶ 7} Appellate courts conduct a de novo review of
III. Trial Court‘s Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Claim Against the Penningtons
{¶ 8} The first and second assignments of error asserted by Clyde state as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT IT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE AN EQUITABLE MARITAL PROPERTY CLAIM CONCERNING REAL ESTATE THAT WAS TITLED IN THE NAME OF APPELLEE‘S PARENTS.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT APPELLEE‘S PARENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN JOINED AS DEFENDANTS IN THE PARTIES’ DIVORCE CASE PURSUANT TO CIV. 75(B)(1).
{¶ 9} Clyde contends the trial court erred when it dismissed his claim against the Penningtons and that it also incorrectly determined that joinder was improper.
{¶ 10} “Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case[.]” Ostanek v. Ostanek, 2021-Ohio-2319, ¶ 21, quoting Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 2020-Ohio-5220, ¶ 14. “[T]he focus is on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.” Id., citing Corder, quoting State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 23. “The General Assembly has granted the common pleas courts, and where applicable, their domestic-relations divisions, subject matter jurisdiction over divorce actions,
{¶ 11} “Marital property” is defined in relevant part as “all interest that either or both of the spouses currently has in any real or personal property . . . that was acquired by either or both of the spouses during the marriage[.]”
{¶ 12} Clyde contends that he has an equitable interest in the Penningtons’ residential property by virtue of having “made considerable improvements to the property” which “substantially increased” the value of the property and by virtue of making “payments towards the taxes, insurance, and utilities for the property.” Clyde cites
{¶ 13} The cases Clyde cites are distinguishable from the facts herein. For example, in Alimonos, the evidence established that a house titled solely in the name of the husband‘s parents was originally purchased with marital money as well as monies provided by the parents. Thus, the house was considered a marital asset. In another case, insurance policies held by a third-party trust were considered marital property because the policies had been purchased with marital monies. Kim v. Kim, 2020-Ohio-22 (9th Dist.). In Neeley v. Neeley, 1998 WL 639288 (2d Dist. Aug. 28, 1998), the husband gave his brother marital monies to purchase a car; the brother bought a car solely with the monies provided by husband, but only brother‘s name was placed on the title. Id. at *4. During the divorce proceedings, husband admitted that he and his brother were joint owners of the car. The court classified the car as a marital asset. Id.
{¶ 14} We need not discuss every case cited by Clyde as they, like Alimonos and Kim, all have one factual similarity: the assets at issue were originally purchased either wholly or partially with marital monies. Here, the record established that the real estate was purchased solely by the Penningtons; the Masons did not expend any marital monies or other assets toward the purchase.
{¶ 15} We do note Clyde has cited one case in which marital monies expended on improvements to a house owned by a third-party were classified as an equitable interest
{¶ 16} The facts in Steward are not entirely clear. However, it is clear that the court concluded the monies expended by the parties constituted mortgage payments toward the purchase of the home, thereby entitling wife to reimbursement for a portion of those payments. Here, there was no evidence to support a finding that the monies expended on the Pennington property constituted mortgage payments or even rent. Instead, the record demonstrates that the improvements made by the Masons were not approved or requested by the Penningtons.
{¶ 17} We conclude that the domestic relations court in this case properly permitted joinder of the Penningtons when Clyde first requested it. However, after considering the pleadings and the evidence submitted by Clyde, the trial court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Clyde‘s claim against the Penningtons. This was not error.
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} The domestic relations court‘s subject matter jurisdiction is limited to the division and distribution of marital property. Under the facts of this case, the Rohrer Boulevard real estate was not a marital asset. As such, the domestic relations court correctly concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Clyde‘s claim against the Penningtons. This result could have been different if the record supported a conclusion that 1) marital funds had been used to acquire the property or 2) there had been some agreement between Michell and her parents that, by virtue of the expenditure of marital funds, she would receive an ownership interest in the real estate.
{¶ 20} The domestic relations court did not err in finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Clyde‘s claims against the Pennington property. Thus, the court did not err in dismissing the action against them.
{¶ 21} Accordingly, both assignments of error are overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 22} The judgment of the domestic relations court is affirmed.
LEWIS, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.