Hernandez Caballero v. Hernandez CaballeroHernandez Caballero v. Hernandez Caballero
On brief: Flecha Law, Ltd., and Joshua G. Homer, for appellant. Argued: Joshua G. Homer.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch
DORRIAN, J.
{1} Plaintiff-appellant, Orlin Waldina Hernandez Caballero, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, that dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{2} On January 25, 2022, Caballero filed a “complaint for custody,” in which she requested the juvenile court award her legal custody of Jose Carlos Lopez Hernandez. In the complaint, Caballero alleged that Hernandez‘s parents were not married when he was born. Caballero also stated that Hernandez‘s father, Carlos Enrique Lopez Maldonado, abandoned him upon birth and Hernandez‘s mother, Brenda Yosari Hernandez Caballero, died on October 14, 2006. Hernandez lived with his maternal grandmother and an aunt in
{3} Caballero requested service by publication on Maldonado. Public notice of the complaint and custody hearing, scheduled for April 6, 2022, was completed on February 8, 2022.
{4} Immediately prior to the April 6, 2022 hearing, Caballero filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint clarified that Caballero was Hernandez‘s maternal aunt, and that Hernandez was born on May 31, 2004.
{5} At the April 6, 2022 hearing, the magistrate refused to proceed because Caballero had not served all necessary parties with the complaint. The magistrate explained that because Caballero had not established Maldonado‘s paternity of Hernandez under Honduran law, Caballero also needed to serve Hernandez‘s unknown father. The magistrate, however, agreed to issue a temporary order granting Caballero legal custody of Hernandez.1 The magistrate also granted Caballero a continuance, resetting the custody hearing for June 8, 2022.
{6} With Hernandez‘s 18th birthday quickly approaching on May 31, 2022, Caballero‘s attorney asked to bring the June 8, 2022 hearing forward. The magistrate complied with this request, advancing the hearing date to April 20, 2022. But, on April 20, 2022, Caballero had not yet accomplished service of the unknown father, so the magistrate again refused to proceed. The magistrate continued the hearing, resetting it for July 18, 2022.
{7} On June 22, 2022, the magistrate entered a decision and entry dismissing the complaint for: (1) failure to prosecute because Caballero failed to appear for a hearing on June 8, 2022, and (2) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Hernandez turned 18 years old on May 31, 2022. The juvenile court adopted the magistrate‘s decision and entry.
{8} Caballero appeals and assigns the following four assignments of error for our review:
I. THE COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT IT NO LONGER HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT DUE TO THE CHILD HAVING OBTAINED THE AGE OF 18; WHERE A CHILD IS ADJUDICATED NEGLECTED, WHICH INCLUDES ABANDONED CHILDREN, A CUSTODY DETERMINATION MAY BE CONTINUED AFTER THE CHILD TURNS 18 IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE CHILD GRADUATES FROM HIGH SCHOOL.
II. MS. HERNANDEZ CABALLERO NEVER FAILED TO PROSECUTE HER COMPLAINT; NO HEARING WAS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 8, 2022. THEREFORE MS. HERNANDEZ DID NOT FAIL TO APPEAR IN COURT.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT IT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT DUE TO UNKNOWN THIRD PARTY “JOHN DOE” NOT HAVING BEEN SERVED; THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED THAT PATERNITY HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, THEREFORE THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION AS ALL PARTIES TO THE CUSTODY PROCEEDING HAD BEEN SERVED.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORS ARE REVERSIBLE ERROR AS THEY PREJUDICED MS. HERNANDEZ CABALLERO BY COMPLETING DEPRIVING HER OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN THE RELIEF THAT SHE SOUGHT.
III. Analysis
{9} By her first assignment of error, Caballero argues the juvenile court erred in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter once Hernandez turned 18 years old. We disagree.
{10} In dismissing the complaint, the juvenile court adopted the magistrate‘s decision. Caballero did not object to the magistrate‘s decision. Pursuant to
{11} In civil cases, courts apply the doctrine of plain error “with the utmost caution.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 (1997). Courts will find that plain error has occurred “only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error * * * seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” Id. at syllabus.
{12} Subject-matter jurisdiction is the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case. State v. Hudson, 169 Ohio St.3d 216, 2022-Ohio-1435, ¶ 22; Ostanek v. Ostanek, 166 Ohio St.3d 1, 2021-Ohio-2319, ¶ 21. In determining a court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction, the focus is on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy. Hudson at ¶ 22; Ostanek at ¶ 21. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a condition precedent to a court‘s power to render judgment in a case, and “in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, a court lacks the authority to do anything but announce its lack of jurisdiction and dismiss.” Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 21.
{13}
{15} This appeal centers on two provisions granting juvenile courts jurisdiction to act. The first,
{16} In this appeal, Caballero argues that her complaint invoked the juvenile court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction under
{17} Caballero‘s argument fails for multiple reasons. First, Caballero‘s complaint appears to invoke the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction under
{18} Generally, when filing a complaint in the juvenile court, a party must: (1) “[s]tate in ordinary and concise language the essential facts that bring the proceeding within the jurisdiction of the court,” (2) list “the name and address of the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child or state that the name or address is unknown,” and (3) make the complaint under oath.
{19} In In re Hunt, 46 Ohio St.2d 378 (1976), the Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether a dependency complaint satisfied the requirements of
{20} In the case at bar, Caballero entitled her complaint, “complaint for custody,” and entitled her amended complaint, “amended complaint for custody.” In both documents, she alleged that Hernandez was “not a ward of any other court of this or any other state,” and therefore, she “pray[ed] that [the juvenile court would] make her the legal custodian” of Hernandez. (Compl. at ¶ 14; Am. Compl. at ¶ 15.) Perhaps most tellingly, Caballero averred that she brought her complaint and amended complaint pursuant to
{21} However, on appeal, Caballero contends that she actually brought her complaint pursuant to
{22} We are skeptical of Caballero‘s argument. While Caballero‘s complaint may include facts that could support a neglect complaint, she did not allege—as required in
{24} As a general rule, the juvenile court “shall retain jurisdiction over any child for whom the court issues an order of disposition” pursuant to
{25} Initially, with the filing of an abuse, neglect, or dependency complaint, the juvenile court acts within its exclusive original jurisdiction.
{26} Here, Caballero relies on the jurisdiction provided under
{27} Caballero also argues that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to continue the temporary order granting her legal custody of Hernandez past Hernandez‘s 18th birthday. The juvenile court granted Caballero the temporary order pursuant to
{28} Finally, Caballero emphasizes that before a person is granted legal custody of a child in an order of disposition under
{29} In sum, due to the lack of a dispositional order issued pursuant to
{30} Our conclusion that the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction renders moot Caballero‘s second, third, and fourth assignments of error. Accordingly, we do not address those assignments of error.
IV. Conclusion
{31} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule the first assignment of error, and render the second, third, and fourth assignments of error moot. We affirm the judgment
Judgment affirmed.
BOGGS and LELAND, JJ., concur.