Landrith v. RobertsLandrith v. Roberts
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that DRC‘s motion to lift the stay or, in the alternative, to order the Republic of Honduras to provide security [Dkt. No. 72] is GRANTED in part and DENIED as moot in part; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that DRC‘S motion to lift the stay in this case is GRANTED; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Court‘s March 28, 2011 Order imposing a stay of this case in its entirety [Dkt. No. 67] is VACATED; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that DRC‘s alternative request that the Court order the Republic of Honduras to provide security is DENIED as moot; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that DRC‘s request for oral argument is DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that, in its motion papers, DRC states that it believes “the Court might benefit from supplemental briefing on the narrow question of whether the Award against FHIS can be enforced against the Republic.” Stay Reply at 14 n.35. And in its supplemental briefing, DRC requests that, “when the stay is lifted, the Court permit the parties to submit supplemental briefing on DRC‘s entitlement to and the amount of prejudgment interest that should be included in any Court order confirming the Award.” DRC Supp. Reply at 10. The Court finds that supplemental briefing on the two issues raised by DRC would be helpful. Therefore, by June 22, 2012, the parties shall meet and confer and shall file a joint report with the Court setting forth a proposed briefing schedule on these two supplemental briefing topics.
SO ORDERED.
Bret D. Landrith, Topeka, KS, pro se.
Samuel K. Lipari, Independence, MO, pro se.
Claire M. Whitaker, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge
Plaintiffs Bret D. Landrith and Samuel K. Lipari, proceeding pro se, bring this action for injunctive and declaratory relief against the Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court (“Chief Justice“) in his capacity as administrator of the Judicial Conference of the United States (“Judicial Conference“). Plaintiffs believe that their constitutional rights have been violated in a multitude of ways, and that these violations are ultimately attributable to, and redressable by, the Chief Justice and the Judicial Conference. Plaintiffs have additionally filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against defendant and his counsel, and two motions requesting an ECF password. The Chief Justice filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under
Because the Court finds that plaintiffs lack standing as to Counts I and II of the first amended complaint and that Count
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff Landrith is a disbarred former attorney and plaintiff Lipari, a “medical supply business owner,” is his former client.1 See Am. Compl. [Dkt. #11] ¶¶ 4, 7, 49. Plaintiffs are frequent litigants in state and federal court, see, e.g., Attach. 1 to Def.‘s Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. #9-1] at 6-7 (detailing numerous lawsuits brought by Landrith), and contend they have been mistreated and “repeatedly vilified” by federal judges, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33-36. In this lawsuit, they claim that the Chief Justice, in his capacity as the administrator of the Judicial Conference, violated their rights under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.2 Id. at 2, 40, 48, 51. They seek prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to redress their asserted injuries, id. at 43, 50, 52, which fall into four general categories.
First, plaintiffs assert that they have been injured by federal judges in retribution for bringing multiple lawsuits challenging the alleged monopolization of the medical supply industry. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. They claim that federal judges have adopted a “widespread practice” of dis-missing their antitrust and RICO claims under
Second, plaintiffs assert that Landrith has been a victim of retaliation by state and federal officials for his representation of racial minority clients in civil rights actions. Id. ¶¶ 44-45. According to the amended complaint, Landrith‘s disbarment by the Kansas Supreme Court—and reciprocal disbarment by federal courts in Kansas and Missouri—was in retribution for bringing these suits. Id. ¶¶ 4, 45. Plaintiffs also assert that Landrith‘s name has been placed in “state and national law enforcement databases,” including a secret “Do Not Work List” allegedly maintained by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security pursuant to the “USA PATRIOT Act II.” Id. ¶¶ 50-51. As a result, plaintiffs claim that Landrith has lost numerous job opportunities and is “ineligible for even
Third, plaintiffs contend they have been injured by the misconduct of state and federal officials, including the Chief Justice and his counsel in this case. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 69, 85-86, 100. They allege widespread judicial tolerance of “misrepresentations” of fact and law by state and federal prosecutors. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 65-69 (claiming that unnamed judges applied a heightened standard for
Fourth, plaintiffs assert that they are the targets of surveillance and interference by the FBI and DOJ, and that these intrusions have increased in retaliation for filing this lawsuit.3 Id. ¶¶ 31, 114-20. They claim that the “scurrilous attacks by federal judges” have led the FBI and DOJ to investigate them as “dangers to large corporations or national security.” Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiffs also contend that since they brought this lawsuit, the government has interfered with their cell phone service, email accounts, and website. Id. ¶¶ 31, 81-82, 114-15, 117-18; see also id. ¶ 120 (alleging the existence of a “secret part or unpublished part of USA PATRIOT Act” that “address[es] citizens posting information about the courts on the Internet” and presumably authorizes the claimed disruptions). They insist that these technological difficulties were a “direct response to” this lawsuit. Id. ¶ 124.
According to the amended complaint, all of these injuries are attributable to, and redressable by, the Chief Justice in his capacity as the administrator of the Judicial Conference. Plaintiffs assert that federal judges and government attorneys are “employees” of the Chief Justice and compare the Chief Justice to a “Walmart [sic] store manager” who “permit[s] ... employees ... to shoplift, embezzle, and injure its customers.” Id. ¶¶ 72-73, 125. Plaintiffs also contend that Attorney General Eric Holder is the Chief Justice‘s “agent” because he “report[s] to the ... Chief Justice ... by statute.”4 Id. ¶¶ 123-24. Therefore, they claim, the
II. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on November 26, 2012, Compl. [Dkt. #1], and defendant moved to dismiss on March 11, 2013, Def.‘s Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. #9]. In response to defendant‘s motion, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on April 1, 2013. Am. Compl. [Dkt. #11]. The Court denied defendant‘s initial motion to dismiss as moot on April 5, 2013, Order [Dkt. #12], and defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint on April 22, 2013, Def.‘s Renewed & Supplemental Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. #14]. On May 23, 2013, plaintiffs filed both a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, Mot. for Leave to Amend Compl. Under Rule 15 [Dkt. #17] (“Mot. to Amend“), and a motion for sanctions against defendant and his counsel, Pls.’ Rule 11 Mot. for Sanctions [Dkt. #18] (“Pls.’ Mot. for Sanctions“). In addition, on March 1, 2013, plaintiffs filed a motion requesting access to the electronic filing system pursuant to LCvR 5.4. Pls.’ Mot. for CM/ECF Password [Dkt. #5]. Plaintiffs renewed that motion on May 23, 2013. Pls.’ 2d Mot. for Leave to File Electronically via CM/ECF and to Receive Passwords [Dkt. # 17–1].5
ANALYSIS
I. The Court Will Grant Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss
A. Standard of Review
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under either
1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Under
2. Failure to State a Claim
“To survive a [
B. Plaintiffs Lack Standing as to Counts I and II
To assert constitutional standing, a plaintiff must allege (1) a concrete and particularized injury, (2) that is “fairly traceable” to the defendant, and (3) that a favorable ruling by the court is capable of redressing. Id. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. If any one of these elements is missing, this Court may not entertain a plaintiff‘s claim. Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Here, plaintiffs have failed to establish the causa-
1. Counts I and II
In Count I, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief from alleged infringements of their “First Amendment and Due Process rights under the Constitution.” Am. Compl. at 40. The complained-of constitutional deprivations include the past cancellation of Landrith‘s federal food stamp benefits, a determination by “[t]he State of Kansas Shawnee District Court” that Landrith “is still in danger of being jailed for child support payments from a divorce decree in the absence of personal jurisdiction,” Lipari‘s ongoing business-related difficulties, and the enforcement of the “Code of Silence” against them both. Id. at 45-47. Plaintiffs contend that the Chief Justice, as the administrator of the Judicial Conference, is responsible for these injuries because he: negligently allows federal judges to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under
Count II alleges substantially the same injuries as Count I, although plaintiffs additionally suggest that Lipari is being denied his right to counsel.7 See id. at 48-50. Plaintiffs seek generalized declaratory relief, asking this Court to declare: (1) “[T]hat vilifying parties for bringing actions under [the Civil Rights Acts, the Sherman Antitrust Act, and RICO] before any discovery has been permitted violates [plaintiffs‘] rights“; and (2) that the Constitution requires an evidentiary hearing in federal court before that court may reciprocally disbar an attorney. Id. at 50.
2. Plaintiffs Have Not Established Causation
To demonstrate the causation element of standing, plaintiffs must allege an “injury that is ‘fairly traceable to the defendant‘s allegedly unlawful conduct.‘” Grocery Mfrs. Ass‘n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2012), quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). Causation is “substantially more difficult to establish” when a plaintiff‘s alleged injury is directly caused by a third party who is not before the court. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (“When ... a plaintiff‘s asserted injury arises from the government‘s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed.“). A defendant need not be the “but-for” cause of a plaintiff‘s injuries at the hands of a third party. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007) (stating that causation may be established when defendant caused an “incremental” part of plaintiff‘s alleged injury); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that causation may be established when a defendant‘s actions are “a substantial factor motivating the third parties’ actions“). But it must be “substantially probable that the challenged acts of the defendant, not of some absent third party,” have led to a plaintiff‘s injury. Bentsen, 94 F.3d at 663 (citations omitted); see also Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 176 (same).
Plaintiffs have not shown that it is “substantially probable” that the Chief Justice caused any of the injuries they allege in Counts I or II, all of which are attributed to third-party officials. Therefore, their injuries are not “fairly traceable” to the Chief Justice, and plaintiffs have failed to establish the causation element of standing.
Plaintiffs claim that the Chief Justice has allowed federal judges to vilify them and to wrongfully dismiss their claims, Am. Compl. at 41, 48-49, on the theory that these judges are his “employees,” id. ¶ 125. But
The Chief Justice and Judicial Conference also do not usually receive ethics complaints, nor do they oversee federal bar admission policies. The chief judge and judicial counsel of a given circuit, not the Judicial Conference, are charged with enforcing judicial ethics. See
Thus, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate more than a speculative relationship—if any—between the Chief Justice and their claimed injuries. It is therefore not “substantially probable” that the Chief Justice caused any of these injuries for purposes of standing. Plaintiffs have therefore failed to establish the causation element of standing.
3. Plaintiffs Have Not Established Redressability
Plaintiffs have also failed to establish the redressability element of constitutional standing for Counts I and II. To satisfy this element, plaintiffs must demonstrate that it is “‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.‘” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). Moreover, there is a “further impediment to redressability”
Even if this Court had the power to command the Chief Justice and Judicial Conference to allow public posting of judicial ethics complaints on the internet, as plaintiffs request in Count I, Am. Compl. at 43, that injunction would hardly address the myriad injuries plaintiffs describe in their fifty-four page amended complaint. Likewise, even if this Court issued the generalized declarations of law that plaintiffs request in Count II, id. at 48, the impact would be speculative at best; just as the Chief Justice cannot control the actions of independent and life tenured judges, neither can this Court. Plaintiffs have therefore not met the redressability requirement because it is “entirely conjectural” whether any of the remedies they seek would meaningfully address the injuries they assert. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Plaintiffs have thus failed to establish the jurisdictional prerequisite of constitutional standing, and Counts I and II must be dismissed.
C. Count III is Moot
The “case or controversy” requirement of
According to Count III of the amended complaint, the Chief Justice and his counsel have committed “Abuse of Process designed to deprive the plaintiffs of Due Process.” Am. Compl. at 51. Plaintiffs claim that the Chief Justice, through the DOJ, has “further vilif[ied]” them and has acted in “extrajudicial prior restraint” of their First Amendment rights by interfering with a website intended to help expose the “Novation cartel” and its monopoly. Id. They also allege that the Chief Justice‘s arguments in his motion to dismiss are “based on misrepresentations of material facts and controlling case law” designed to “provide camouflage for the trial court to rule contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court.” Id. at 52.
For relief, plaintiffs ask this Court to strike the Chief Justice‘s motion to dismiss, to direct him to answer their amended complaint, and to enjoin the Chief Justice from making any further misrepresentations. But as this Court will dismiss Counts I and II of the amended complaint, the relief plaintiffs seek in Count III will “neither presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future.” Clarke, 915 F.2d at 701. Indeed, without Counts I and II, the underlying controversy is gone, and there is nothing further that this Court might direct the Chief Justice to do. Therefore, Count III of the amended complaint is moot.
II. The Court Will Deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint
A. Standard of Review
Parties have the right to amend their pleadings once as a matter of
B. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Amendments to the Complaint are Futile
Here, plaintiffs have amended their complaint once before, see Am. Compl. at 1, and seek permission to amend it again, Mot. to Amend at 1. Their proposed second amended complaint is identical to their amended complaint except that it includes two new counts and would add Attorney General Eric Holder as a defendant. Id. ¶ 6; (Proposed) 2d Am. Compl. Under Rule 15(a)(1)(B) [Dkt. # 17–3] (“Prop. 2d Am. Compl.“) at 54-64. The Chief Justice opposes plaintiffs’ motion on the basis that the proposed amendments are frivolous and futile. Def.‘s Opp. to Pls.’ 2d Mot. for Leave to Further Amend Compl. [Dkt. # 21] at 1. The Court agrees with the Chief Justice.
In proposed Count IV, plaintiffs would allege that the Chief Justice has “knowingly participated in using government attorneys and law enforcement personnel” to discriminatorily prosecute plaintiffs, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Prop. 2d Am. Compl. at 54-55. They also wish to contend that the Chief Justice “has employed federal judges and Department of Justice attorneys breaking the model rules of ethical conduct,” while simultaneously depriving Landrith “of his right to ... present evidence that he was wrongfully disbarred.” Id. at 55. Plaintiffs also wish to defend Lipari‘s right to pursue his hospital supplies antitrust litigation “free of the intimidation and coercion of [the Chief Justice‘s] agents and employees working to keep that market unlawfully monopolized by the Novation cartel.” Id. at 55. They again allege that Lipari has been denied the right to obtain counsel. Id. Plaintiffs ask this Court for declaratory relief stating that Landrith has a constitutional right “to clear his name in federal courts,” and that Lipari has constitutional rights to enforce contracts, to obtain legal counsel, and “to vindicate the federal antitrust laws and his own right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment” free of “open and naked threats” by federal judges. Id. at 56.
Proposed Count IV, however, “merely restates” the allegations of the amended complaint “in different terms,” albeit with more vigor, and is therefore futile. See Rumber, 598 F.Supp.2d at 102. Essentially, plaintiffs seek leave from this
Proposed Count V is also futile. Here, plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief in recompense for a host of new allegations of corruption and misconduct by proposed new defendant Attorney General Eric Holder, as well as the DOJ and other federal officials. Prop. 2d Am. Compl. at 56–64. Plaintiffs assert violations of their
clearly established constitutional right to be free from warrantless surveillance, pen register captures and wire taps, and free from bad faith warrant based surveillance to cover and attempt to launder earlier warrantless electronic surveillance and wire taps in furtherance of malicious investigations and malicious prosecutions of the plaintiffs for the purpose of depriving them of their property rights without trial or other court proceedings.
Id. at 56-57. They describe the DOJ as “an infiltrated enterprise captured by organized crime.” Id. at 57. Quoting extensively from their own pleadings in three separate state and federal cases, plaintiffs allege that:
- Attorney General Holder “has had repeated notice of the violations of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs by DOJ employees and by [the FBI],” id. at 57-58;
- Former Attorney General John Ashcroft has benefitted personally from the “Novation cartel,” id. at 58-59;
- The DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility has been “capture[d]” by certain corrupt officials, id. at 59;
- The “Novation cartel” caused certain individuals to be “installed as U.S. Attorney for the purpose of obstructing the plaintiffs’ antitrust investigation and court proceedings,” id.;
- Other DOJ officials have conspired to prevent plaintiffs from disrupting the monopoly of the medical supply industry, id. at 59-61;
- A U.S. Senator caused the nomination of a U.S. Attorney who was married to a Missouri state judge “key to the Novation cartel,” and the U.S. Attorney “spent the day after her swearing in ... going over the plaintiffs’ civil case files online,” id. at 61;
- A different U.S. Attorney obstructed justice with respect to Lipari‘s litigation against the “Novation cartel,” id.;
- Attorney General Holder has permitted continued surveillance of plaintiffs since 2002 without bringing criminal charges “for the sole purpose of obstructing justice through extrinsic fraud” as to plaintiffs’ legal claims, id. at 62;
- Attorney General Holder has, through “extrinsic fraud,” deprived “the Government‘s right” to have officials of various federal agencies “transact their official business honestly and impartially, free from corruption, fraud, improper and undue influence, dishonesty, unlawful impairment and obstruction,” id. at 63; and
Attorney General Holder has violated plaintiffs’ rights not to be subjected to warrantless wiretapping, to “censorship of Google,” to “biased tribunals resulting from ex parte communications by of [sic] the DOJ and its FBI agents,” and to unconstitutional enforcement of statutes, id. at 63-64.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief from all of these alleged injuries. Specifically, plaintiffs ask this Court: (1) to declare “that the investigations and extrajudicial seizures of [plaintiffs‘] property by the DOJ were malicious and violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights“; (2) to enjoin Attorney General Holder “and his agents” from surveillance and obstruction of justice as to plaintiffs; and (3) to enjoin Attorney General Holder “and his agents” from “maintaining any databases that report negative information about the plaintiffs for their private civil litigation in vindication of federal antitrust and civil rights statutes.” Id. at 64.
The Court does not have the power to hear plaintiffs’ claims. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree. It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673 (citations omitted). Subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking where a complaint “is patently insubstantial, presenting no federal question suitable for decision.” Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A claim is “patently insubstantial” when it is “flimsier than doubtful or questionable ... essentially fictitious.” Best, 39 F.3d at 330 (internal quotations omitted); see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (“[F]ederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial, [or] obviously frivolous.“) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.д., Peters v. Obama, No. 10-0298(CKK), 2010 WL 2541066, at *1-2 (D.D.C. June 21, 2010) (sua sponte dismissing complaint alleging that President Obama had been served with and failed to respond to an “Imperial Writ of Habeas Corpus” by the “Imperial Dominion of Axemem,” requiring the plaintiff‘s immediate release from a correctional institution).
Although mindful that complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, see Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, 92 S.Ct. 594; Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008), plaintiff‘s allegations in proposed Count V present “no federal question suitable for decision.” Best, 39 F.3d at 330. Therefore, proposed Count V is futile because it would not survive a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
III. The Court Will Deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
Plaintiffs move under
In this motion, plaintiffs re-allege the same misconduct and ethical violations they assert in Count III of their amended complaint and in Count IV of their proposed second amended complaint. Compare Pls.’ Mot. for Sanctions ¶¶ 3-13, with Am. Compl. at 51-52, and Prop. 2d Am. Compl. at 54-55. Specifically, they accuse the Chief Justice and his counsel of materially misrepresenting plaintiffs’ claims, relevant case law, and the powers of the Chief Justice as administrator of the Judicial Conference. Pls.’ Mot. for Sanctions ¶¶ 3-8. Plaintiffs further contend that the Chief Justice and his counsel have committed “extrinsic frauds in an attempt to obstruct justice” by causing disruptions of plaintiffs’ email and cell phone service, Lipari‘s website, and Lipari‘s nephew‘s Internet service. Id. ¶¶ 9-13.
Plaintiffs’ motion is meritless. There is no indication whatsoever that the Chief Justice has acted in bad faith with respect to the representations made in his pleadings; rather, the Chief Justice has made good-faith arguments with which plaintiffs simply disagree. Moreover, even if the Chief Justice and his counsel did misrepresent aspects of plaintiffs’ complaint, as plaintiffs allege, the Court declines to find bad faith because plaintiffs’ pleadings are difficult to decipher and because the minor errors plaintiffs allege do not warrant an “extreme punishment.” See Naegele, 355 F.Supp.2d at 144. Finally, plaintiffs’ bare assertion that defendant has caused the disruption of their (and Lipari‘s nephew‘s) email, Internet, and cell phone service does not fall within the scope of Rule 11 because those activities do not constitute representations to the Court by defendant. Therefore, plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions under
IV. Plaintiffs’ Motions for CM/ECF Password
Plaintiffs filed two motions requesting access to the Court‘s electronic filing system. Pls.’ Mot. for CM/ECF Password; Pls.’ 2d Mot. for Leave to File Electronically via CM/ECF and to Receive Passwords. As the Court will dismiss plaintiffs’ action in its entirety, plaintiffs’ motions for access to electronic filing will be denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
Because plaintiffs lack standing as to Counts I and II of their amended complaint, and because Count III is moot, the Court will grant the Chief Justice‘s motion to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety. Moreover, because plaintiffs’ proposed amendments to their complaint are futile, the Court will deny their motion for leave to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions against defendant and his counsel is meritless and will also be denied. Finally, plaintiffs’ motions for access to electronic filing are
Civil Action No. 13–260(JEB)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
November 12, 2013