999 F. Supp. 2d 8
D.D.C.2013Background
- Plaintiffs Landrith (disbarred attorney) and Lipari (medical-supply business owner and former client) sue Chief Justice Roberts in his official capacity as administrator of the Judicial Conference.
- Plaintiffs claim First Amendment and Due Process violations by federal judges and government actors, alleging retaliation, a so-called Code of Silence, and surveillance linked to their litigation activity.
- They seek prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against Judicial Conference policies and ethics processes, including posting ethics complaints publicly on the Internet.
- Plaintiffs filed an original complaint; after defendant moved to dismiss, they amended it and sought leave to file a second amended complaint, sanctions, and CM/ECF password access.
- The court dismissed Counts I and II for lack of standing, held Count III moot, and denied leave to amend as futile; sanctions and password requests were denied as moot.
- The court’s ruling rests on standing, redressability, mootness principles, and the limited authority of the Judicial Conference over ethics and bar admission.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do Counts I and II have standing? | Landrith and Lipari allege injuries traceable to the Chief Justice as head of the Judicial Conference. | The Chief Justice cannot control third-party judges or bar admissions; causal link and redressability are lacking. | Counts I and II lack standing; dismissed. |
| Is Count III moot> | Abuse of process and due process claims against the Chief Justice remain live regardless of other counts. | With Counts I–II dismissed, Count III cannot affect ongoing rights and is moot. | Count III is moot and dismissed. |
| Is the proposed second amended complaint futile? | Would add new counts and name Holder; seeks broader relief and new theories. | Proposed amendments restate existing claims and present new theories that fail; futile. | Proposed amendments are futile; leave to amend denied. |
| Should Rule 11 sanctions be imposed? | Defendant engaged in misconduct and misrepresentations in pleadings. | Arguments are in good faith; no bad faith or improper purpose shown. | Rule 11 sanctions denied. |
| Should plaintiffs obtain CM/ECF password access? | Access needed to prosecute claims. | Action is being dismissed; password requests moot. | Requests denied as moot. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (standard for treating factual allegations as true in subject-matter-jurisdiction disputes)
- Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (standard of review for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6))
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (standing requires injury, causation, and redressability)
- Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (jurisdictional pleading standards and standing principles)
- Ins. Co. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (U.S. 1982) (analyze jurisdictional prerequisites and independent standing rules)
- Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (U.S. 1994) (court has limited jurisdiction; dismissal for lack of jurisdiction proper when outside authority)
- Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (U.S. 2007) (standing and redressability principles in environmental regulation context)
- Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (standing elements and traceability considerations)
- Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (patently insubstantial claims and lack of federal-question jurisdiction)
- Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (judicial review of agency actions and evidentiary rule considerations)
- Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (jurisdictional inquiry; vacated on other grounds though cited for standard)
- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (U.S. 1972) (pro se pleadings held to less stringent standards)
- Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (liberal construction of pro se filings; pleading standards)
