KENTUCKY PRESS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, Defendant, JANICE MARSHALL, in her official capacity as the Clerk of the Franklin Circuit Court and The Franklin District Court and on behalf of all others similarly situated; ELEANORE GARBER, in her official capacity as Family Court Judge and on behalf of all others similarly situated; DEBORAH DEWEESE, in her official capacity as District Judge and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 05-5224
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
July 7, 2006
06a0233p.06
NORRIS and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; RICE, District Judge.
Argued: November 29, 2005; Recommended for Full-Text Publication Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
COUNSEL
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Kentucky Press Association (“KPA“), a non-profit corporation whose members include newspapers throughout Kentucky, appeals the dismissal for failure to state a claim of its suit against Defendants-Appellants the Commonwealth of Kentucky and various Kentucky court officials (collectively, “the Commonwealth“), claiming violation of KPA‘s First Amendment right of access to court proceedings. Specifically, KPA makes a facial challenge to four Kentucky statutory provisions, claiming that they deny the media any access to Kentucky‘s juvenile court proceedings and records pertinent thereto. The district court rejected the Commonwealth‘s jurisdictional, abstention, and sovereign immunity arguments, but held that KPA‘s complaint did not state a claim for a First Amendment right of access to juvenile records and proceedings. Because KPA has not challenged the relevant statutes in the Kentucky courts, which could well render an interpretation of these statutes that provides for the access that KPA seeks and thus avoids the constitutional issue presented in this case, we will dismiss the appeal for failure to present a case or controversy sufficiently ripe for adjudication, and remand this case to the district court with instructions that it be dismissed on that ground.
BACKGROUND
KPA filed suit in the district court, making a facial challenge to the constitutionality of four provisions of the Kentucky Uniform Juvenile Code (“KUJC“).
KPA maintained in the district court that these provisions, on their face, violate KPA‘s First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings, as first established by the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). The Commonwealth asked the district court to dismiss the case on several jurisdictional and prudential grounds, including standing, ripeness, sovereign immunity, and abstention. The main thrust of these arguments was that it would be improper for a federal court to pass upon the constitutionality of the Kentucky statutes at issue without knowing whether they actually operate to deny KPA the access it seeks. In other words, because KPA never petitioned the Kentucky courts for access to juvenile proceedings—for example, asserting
KPA appeals this decision, arguing that the district court erred in applying the Supreme Court‘s “experience and logic” test to its claim for access to juvenile proceedings. KPA emphasizes that it does not seek “boundless public access . . . [to] every juvenile court situation.” Rather, KPA contends that Kentucky has thrown a complete “shroud of secrecy” over its juvenile proceedings, and that the “experience and logic” test, properly applied, at least requires that the press be given access to information about a juvenile case sufficient to determine whether to seek access to that proceeding, and that there not be an irrebuttable presumption against access to juvenile proceedings. Noting that it does not waive its jurisdictional arguments, the Commonwealth expressly presses on appeal only its jurisdictional argument that Franklin Circuit clerk Janice Marshall is not a proper defendant under the legal fiction of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1909). In addition, the Commonwealth argues that the district court correctly applied the Supreme Court‘s “experience and logic” test in finding no right of access to juvenile proceedings, because such proceedings are not marked by a history of openness, and because openness would not serve a significant positive role in the functioning of a juvenile court system designed to protect children from the public spotlight. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. for the County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986).
ANALYSIS
Although the Commonwealth does not expressly pursue its basic jurisdictional arguments on appeal, it has not waived them and, indeed, at oral argument, pointed out that it could not concede jurisdiction. And, we have an independent duty “to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction.” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977); see also Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of the State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 525 (1982) (“Because of their unusual nature, and because it would not simply be wrong but indeed would be an unconstitutional invasion of the powers reserved to the states if the federal courts were to entertain cases not within their jurisdiction, the rule is well settled that the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal
Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed “to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985) (internal quotation omitted). “Ripeness becomes an issue when a case is anchored in future events that may not occur as anticipated, or at all.” Nat‘l Rifle Ass‘n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 294 (1997). “The ripeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction, but, even in a case raising only prudential concerns, the question of ripeness may be considered on a court‘s own motion.” Nat‘l Park Hospitality Ass‘n v. Dep‘t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (internal citation and quotation omitted). In performing the ripeness inquiry, we must weigh three factors when deciding whether to address the issues presented for review: 1) “the likelihood that the harm alleged by the plaintiffs will ever come to pass“; 2) “whether the factual record is sufficiently developed to produce a fair adjudication of the merits of the parties’ respective claims“; and 3) “the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied at this stage in the proceedings.” Adult Video Ass‘n v. United States Dep‘t of Justice, 71 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation and brackets omitted).
We find that KPA‘s claim that the KUJC denies the media any access to Kentucky‘s juvenile proceedings in violation of the First Amendment fails to satisfy each of the three prongs of the ripeness inquiry. First, that the Kentucky courts would deny KPA the access it seeks is far from certain.
KPA offers three basic arguments to show that it faces a concrete and cognizable harm necessitating a facial challenge to the Kentucky statutes at issue. First, KPA contends that it has attempted to gain the desired access, but that its members have been denied admission to juvenile hearings by bailiffs, and access to juvenile records by the circuit and district clerk‘s office. But just because bailiffs and court clerks have denied KPA the
certain that Kentucky law actually closes juvenile proceedings and records entirely to the media. See Adult Video Ass‘n, 71 F.3d at 568.
Neither does KPA meet the other two prongs of the test for ripeness. Although, as a facial challenge, the factual basis of KPA‘s claim essentially needs no further developing, there is one fact of crucial importance that has yet to be determined: whether Kentucky law, as interpreted by the Kentucky courts, completely closes juvenile proceedings and records to the media, as KPA contends. See id. Until we know the answer to this question, our adjudicating KPA‘s First Amendment claim would constitute entangling ourselves in an abstract disagreement, contrary to the purposes undergirding the ripeness doctrine, and in contravention of
Because KPA‘s First Amendment claim fails each of the three factors in the test for ripeness, the proper course is for us to dismiss this appeal for failure to present a case or controversy sufficiently ripe for federal court adjudication.
CONCLUSION
KPA‘s First Amendment claim rests upon the mere speculation that the Kentucky courts would interpret Kentucky law in a way that completely denies the media access to juvenile proceedings and records. We therefore DISMISS the appeal on ripeness grounds, and REMAND this matter to the district court with instructions that it be DISMISSED as unripe.