Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla.

THE OF REGENTS OF STATE OF v. BOARD PATSY FLORIDA June Argued March 1982 Decided No. 80-1874. J., Court,

Marshall, opinion of the Brennan, delivered the which Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, JJ., Blackmun, joined, and and all J., White, O’Connor, J., joined. of which but Part III-B filed a concur- Rehnquist, J., ring opinion, joined, post, p. White, in which J., 516. Powell, opinion concurring part, post, p. J., filed an 517. filed a dis- senting Burger, J., II opinion, joined, Part of which post, C. p. 519.

Charles S. Sims the cause for argued petitioner. With Ennis, Bruce J. E. Jr., Richard him on were the briefs Shapiro, R. Larson, Steven and Joel M. Gora. D.

Mitchell Franks the cause argued for respondent. Jeffrey H. Klink.* With him on the brief was urging by *Briefs of amici curiae reversal were filed Jack Greenberg, III, Lee, James M. Nabrit Bill Lann and Eric Schnapper for the NAACP Legal Fund, Inc.; by Defense and Educational Ellen Josephson and Steinglass H. Legal Steven for the National Aid and Defender Association. urging Briefs amici curiae by of affirmance were Inbau, filed E. Fred Wayne Schmidt, W. P. James Manak for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.; Ross, Jr., by John C. for the Texas Municipal League al. et Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Washington et al. Eikenberry,

Kenneth Attorney 0. Washington, General of Malachy R. Murphy, Deputy General, Attorney Bjorgen, and Thomas R. Assistant At- General, torney Attorneys and the respective General for their States or jurisdictions as Samoa, follows: Aviata F. Faalevad of American Charles Alabama, A. Graddick Alaska, of Wilson L. of Condon Robert Corbin of Arizona, Michael J. Georgia, Tany Hawaii, Bowers of Hong S. of David H. Leroy Idaho, Tyrone of Illinois, C. Fahner Linley of E. Pearson of Indi- ana, Kansas, Robert T. Stephan of L. Kentucky, Steven Beshear of Wil- Guste, Jr., liam Louisiana, J. of Kelley Michigan, Frank J. of Warren R. Spannaus Minnesota, of William A. Attain Mississippi, of John D. Missouri, of Greely Montana, Michael T. Douglas of Paul L. Ashcroft Nebraska, Bryan Richard Nevada, H. Gregory H. Hamp- Smith of New shire, JamesR. Zazzali Jersey, ofNew L. Edmisten of North Caro- Rufus lina, Dakota, Robert Ohio, 0. of North LeRoy William Brown of J. Wefald Pennsylvania, S. Zimmerman of Island, Dennis J. Roberts II of Rhode Carolina, Daniel R. Texas, McLeod of South Mark White of David L. Wil- Utah, Easton, Jr., kinson Vermont, John J. Chauncey H. Broum- Jr., ing, Virginia, of West Wisconsin, Bronson C. LaFollette of and Steven F. Wyoming; Freudenthal of and for the National Education Association et al. Gottesman, Michael H. Weinberg, Collins, Robert M. Jeremiah A. Richard C. Dinkelspiel, Robinson, William L. and Norman J. Chachkin. opinion the Court. delivered Marshall Justice question whether presents the case This prerequisite to an action is a remedies administrative IV). (1976 Supp. §1983 Petitioner employer, ed., C. alleging her action, Georgia Patsy filed (FIU), University her em had denied International Florida her race and solely basis on the opportunities ployment Appeals Court of States By the United vote, a divided sex. required petitioner found that Circuit for the Fifth appropriate” reme administrative “adequate and exhaust consider District Court to case to remanded dies, and procedures. Patsy v. adequacy the administrative (1981) (en University, 634 F. 2d 900 Florida International banc). 813, and reverse granted certiorari, We of Appeals. of the Court the decision I though qualified alleges well she is that even

Petitioner uniformly performance evalua- excellent has received rejected supervisors, more for she has been tions from her positions further claims that FIU at FIU.1 She than unlawfully positions through intentional discrimination

filled declaratory on the basis of race and sex. She seeks injunctive damages.2 alternative, relief in the or, dismiss, true the accept Because this case here on a is motion to we allegations petitioner’s com complaint. factual In her initial amended Byron Uni plaint, petitioner Relying named FIU as the defendant. (ND versity Florida, 1975), Supp. 403 F. District Court Fla. granted dismiss, Regents and holding FIU’s motion to that the Board university not the individual capacity had sue and be sued amend, law. The granted petitioner Florida District Court leave to complaint she amended her of” Regents to name the “on behalf Board FIU. requested 2 Petitioner “[r]equire District Court Defendants

remedy practiced by promoting the discrimination upon Plaintiff her to the position next available previously applied consistent for and for with those The for United States District Court the Southern District granted respondent Regents’ of Florida Board of motion to petitioner dismiss had not because exhausted available ad- appeal, panel remedies. ministrative On of the Court of Appeals pro- reversed, and remanded the case for further ceedings. Patsy University, v. Florida International granted respondent’s F. The 2d 946 full court then petition rehearing panel and vacated the decision. Appeals opinions reviewed numerous of this holding that exhaustion administrative remedies required, pre- was not and concludedthat these cases did not application clude of a “flexible” exhaustion rule. 634 canvassing policy arguments 2d, F. at 908. After requirement, Appeals favor of an the Court of plaintiff required decided that a 1983 could be to exhaust following administrative remedies if the minimum conditions (1) orderly system appeal provided are met: by an of review or (2) agency agency grant statute or rule; can relief (3) more or less claim; commensurate with the relief is avail- (4) period procedures able within a reasonable time; unduly fair, are are not burdensome, and are not used to discourage legitimate harass or those with claims; and appropriate prevent interim relief is irreparable injury available, cases, preserve plaintiff’s rights during and to process. the administrative Where these minimum stand- particular ards met, are a court must further consider the plaintiff’s administrative scheme, the nature of interest, and the values served the exhaustion doctrine order to required. determine whether Id., exhaustion at should be Appeals 912-913. The Court of remanded the case to the which qualified alternative, she is require or in the Defendants to pay to the $500,000 damages.” Plaintiff exemplary the sum of as actual and Record 47. fur- requested Petitioner also Court “order District equitable injunctive necessary ther appropriate relief as it deems Id., to correct the conditions of of herein.” complained discrimination 48.

500 whether exhaustion would be ap- to determine

District case. in this propriate

II exhaustion of administrative reme- whether The question in §a 1983 action has prompted be required should ever dies g., e. See, Turner, and disagreement. debate vigorous Prisoner A Section 1983 Cases Study Prisoners Sue: When (1979); L. Rev. 610 Note, Harv. 8 Courts, 92 Federal Comment, 41 U. L. (1975); Chi. Rev. 537 L. Rev. 565 Ind. issue, however, is (1974). of this made much resolution Our a clean slate. This not on writing are because we easier issue, issues, on as well related has addressed occasions. several prior not that our do prior precedents suggests

Respondent cases can be these today, arguing decision control our or that this Court did not “fully” on their facts distinguished exhaustion should required. whether consider the question us long. need detain Beginning This contention Education, 373 U. S. McNeese v. Board of 668, 671-673 numerous occasions rejected argu- we have on (1963), §1983 dismissed where the ment that a action should be has not exhausted state administrative remedies. plaintiff Barry Barchi, Gibson n. v. 55, 63, (1979); v. 443 S. 10 U. Berryhill, Stanton, Carter v. 405 564, (1973); 411 U. S. Wilwording Swenson, 249, (1972); v. 404 U. S. U. S. Houghton Shafer, (1968); (1971); v. 392 U. S. King Smith, Damico v. 309, 312, (1968); v. S. n. U. Thompson, California, U. S. Cf. Steffel (1974) (“When are 472-473 federal claims on have not re- premised they are here —we [§1983]—as reme- or administrative quired judicial dies, assigned recognizing paramount role Congress Re- to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights”). these deci- be correct in that several of spondent may arguing sions could have been based traditional exceptions exhaustion stated Nevertheless, doctrine. this Court has

categorically prerequisite that exhaustion not a to an action position and we have not deviated from under 1983. in years Therefore, the 19 since McNeese. we do not address presented question impression. in this case as one first (

n —< »—4 Respondent argues that we should reconsider these deci adopt Appeals’ sions rule, Court of which McKart States, based on United This never announced a definitive formula for determining prior decisions whether be should overruled or City Dept. Monell However, reconsidered. v. New York (1978), Services, Social 436 U. 695-701 S. we articu of lated four be factors should Two of considered. these question factors—whether the decisions misconstrued the meaning legislative history the statute revealed in overruling and whether these decisions would be inconsistent expressions congressional with more recent intent —are particularly today.3 relevant to our decision Both concern legislative purpose, paramount importance which is in the ICongress exhaustion context because is vested with the power prescribe procedural the basic scheme under which may claims course, heard federal courts. Of courts play important determining an role in the limits an exhaus requirement may impose requirement tion such a even expressly provided. However, where has not so question required the initial whether should be exhaustion is congressional intent; answered court reference to ques The other factors discussed in Monell —whether the decisions departure prior overruling tion constituted from whether decisions and legitimate holdings these would their decisions frustrate reliance on —do McNeese was not a support overruling departure these decisions. prior applica from previously decisions —this Court had not addressed Overruling decisions tion of the exhaustion rule these to 1983 actions. might injure plaintiffs forgone who had waived their those administrative remedies in reliance on these decisions. of jurisdiction the exercise under a federal not defer

should with that intent.4 Therefore, is it consistent statute unless should reconsider our prior we decisions whether deciding in administrative remedies, of state we exhaustion and require in as reflected the legislative intent his- congressional look to §to recent congressional of the tory predecessor this area. activity in

A decisions misconstrued prior whether our determining In with a review of the 1983, §of we begin legisla- meaning the 1871,17 13, § 1 of the Civil Act Stat. Rights to history tive we recognize § 1983.5 the Although the precursor the contemplate not exhaustion expressly did Congress over the tenor debates we believe question, that exhaustion of administrative our conclusion supports not be imposed. in 1983 actions should judicially remedies determining application the Congressional important intent is remedies are to cases in which federal administrative exhaustion doctrine available, in which state remedies are available. Of well as those course, provides certain ad required Congress is where exhaustion Myers Ship v. Bethlehem remedies shall be exclusive. See ministrative (1938). statutory building require Corp., 303 U. S. 41 Even where guided congressional explicit, ment of is courts are exhaustion application be consist determining whether of the doctrine would intent statutory determining scheme. whether exhaustion ent generally focus on required, federal administrative remedies courts assigned agency, and tailor role relevant federal created particular rule fit the administrative scheme States, Congress. See McKart U. 193-195 v. United S. remedies, on the role With is not so much state administrative the focus im assigned agency becomes agency, to the state but role the state jurisdiction is con portant deferring finds that exercise of once court statutory sistent with intent. relating 2,§ certain federal crimes Some of debates which created Act, Rights 14 Stat. in addition to in 2 those defined 1866 Civil Klan, primarily Klux to our discussion aimed Ku are also relevant §1. Rights along Act of Civil with the Fourteenth ingre- to enforce,

Amendment was enacted were crucial system dients the basic alteration our federal accom- plished during During the Reconstruction Era. that time, clearly guaran- the Federal Government was established as a rights against tor of basic of federal individuals incursions power. recognized state As we in Mitchum v. Foster, (1972) (quoting parte Virginia, 407 Ex U. S. (1880)), very § purpose “[t]he U. S. of 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, guardians people’s rights pro- as of the federal —to people tect the from unconstitutional action under color of legislative, law, ‘whether that action executive, be ” judicial.’ recurring At least three themes in the debates over 1 cast suggestion requiring serious doubt on the exhaustion of state administrative remedies would be consistent with the Congress. passing Congress intent of the 1871 First, in assigned paramount protecting to the federal courts a role in rights. Representative expressed constitutional Dawes this view as follows: remedy proposed by

“The first this bill is resort to proper place the courts United States. Is that a wrongs? in which to find redress for such If there power call into courts of the United an States of- against rights, privileges, fender these immunities, civilly and hold him to an there, account either or crimi- nally, infringement, for their I submit to the calm and judgment every candid member of this House that equal jus- there is fitted, no tribunal so where and exact likely temper, tice would be more in in be meted out severity, always moderation, in if be, need but accord- ing great to the law and the fact, as that tribunal of the Cong. Cong., Constitution.” Globe, Sess., 42d 1st (1871)(hereinafter Globe). (remarks Hoar); Rep. id., at 375 id., at See also (remarks Lowe); Rep.

(remarks 448-449 Rep. id., at Cobum).6 (remarks Rep. Butler); id., at open Congress 1to “throw the doors of intended The 1871 who were individuals threatened courts” States the United deprivation of constitutional suffered, had with, or who (remarks Lowe), provide Rep. and to rights, id., at 376 federal not- access to the courts immediate individuals these withstanding any provision contrary. to the For of state law introduced the bill in the example, Edmunds, who Senator closing that the bill was similar his remarks Senate, stated Prigg upheld by principle act earlier an (1842): Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. . Supreme

“[T]he decided . . that was the sol- duty Constitution secure emn spite State, aid, or with its individual, to the precisely rights might be, the Constitu- the case gave should no him, and that there intermediate tion authority oppose performance or the direct to arrest of added). duty Congress.” (emphasis this Globe 692 Similarly, Representative Elliott issue as viewed the [has] of whether “the Government the United States right, protect Constitution, under the citizen the exer- rights as- cise of his vested an American citizen . . . the jurisdiction through sertion courts, immediate without of appeal agency or of the State in which the citizen domi- 6Opponents recognized purpose of the bill also complained usurp power, per the bill would government, States’ centralize (remarks g., e. haps ultimately destroy See, the States. of Globe 338 (remarks id., (remarks id., Whitthorne); Rep. Rep. Beck); at 352 of 361 at (remarks (remarks Swann); id., id., Rep. of Rep. Arthur); at 365 of at 385 (re Lewis); id., (remarks id., Rep. of Rep. McHenry); at 431 of at 454 (remarks id., Cox); Rep. of Eldridge); Cong. marks at 511 of Rep. (remarks Kerr) (herein Cong., Globe, Sess., App. Rep. 42d 1st 46 of (remarks id., (re id., App.); Thurman); 216 after Globe at of Sen. at 243 Bayard). marks of Sen.

505 g., added). See, e. Id., id., at 459 (emphasis at 389 died.” (remarks id., (remarks at 807 of Coburn); Rep. of Rep. Garfield); id., (remarks Pool); 141 of Sen. Globe App. at 609 Shanks).7 (remarks of Rep. further suggests

A theme the debates second an not have wanted to exhaus- impose would 1871 A factor major motivating expansion tion requirement. §§ and of bill was the through of jurisdiction federal the state authorities had of the 1871 Congress belief the constitutional rights or unwilling protect been unable who violated those these rights. of individuals or punish g., (remarks (“The e. See, Rep. Stoughton) Globe unable or and local courts are unwilling State authorities criminals”); id., at (remarks the evil or punish check (“the Lowe) been found in- local have administrations Rep. corrective”); id., at the proper adequate unwilling apply id., (remarks (remarks Coburn); at 609 Sen. Rep. Shurz); id., (remarks Pool); id., at 687 (remarks Sen. Platt).8 (remarks Edmunds); Rep. Globe App. Sen. very example, For provision ground. on this Opponents criticized this Representative lamented: Storm try ques- chance to give not even the State courts a “[Section one] does tions, might come be- they try questions that or to show whether will amendment, fairly or fore them under the first section of the fourteenth Id., beginning.” in the question away It the whole from them not. takes at 86. (“for (remarks rights, Biggs) the violation Rep.

See also Globe 416 by pro- had remedy is to be privileges, and immunities of the citizen a civil courts, premises to ceedings in the in the Federal State authorization Whitthome); id., (remarks id., contrary Rep. notwithstanding”); at 337 of (remarks (remarks of Sen. Archer); 216 App. at 373 Rep. of Globe Thurman). 8 passing urging the message expressed This view was in the Presidential (“That these to correct legislation. power of corrective See Globe 244 doubt”) (message beyond evils is I do not control of State authorities Grant). consti protect of President to inability authorities of state Judiciary rights House expressed findings tutional was also in the Committee, See investigate which the situation. had been to directed 506 question importance exhaustion was the primary to

Of factfinding proc- Congress for the held 1871 that the mistrust g., (testimony See, 320 e. Globe institutions. esses of the North Carolina Settle, Justice of Su- Thomas of Hon. (“The Committee) Judiciary the House preme before Court, juries”); as with the much with courts not so lies defect (re- (remarks Rainey); Rep. App. of Globe id., at 394 Maynard). Rep. This believed fed- of marks susceptible prejudice to local and to be less would eral courts factfinding processes existing of in the the state defects (remarks Rep. Stoughton); g., of e. See, Globe courts. Cobum).9 (remarks perceived Rep. This defect

id., at factfinding particularly processes is relevant in the States’ question ex- of administrative remedies: exhaustion superior applied in deference often rules are haustion factfindingability agency. See, ofthe relevant administrative g., S., States, 395 U. at 192-196. McKart v. United e. relevant third of the debates to the

A feature many legislators interpreted question the bill is the fact that provide in the state and federal or concurrent forums dual enabling plaintiff system, the forum in which to to choose Pape, Monroe v. seek relief. Cf. (“The U. S. remedy, remedy supplementary is to the state

federal sought before the and the latter need not be first and refused invoked”). example, Thurman federal one For Senator noted: object centralizing [§

“I tend- 1], first, because ency transferring private well as suits, all mere id., instructing the at 320. The resolution introduced Sherman Senator Judiciary report expressed Senate similar view. See Committee to a bill (state by organized App. utterly powerless Globe “courts are rendered crime”). perjury punish 9 Opponents tribu viewed the bill as a of mistrust for state declaration (remarks (remarks id., g., See, e. Swann); Rep. nals. at 397 Globe (remarks (remarks id., Rep. Rice); Cox); Rep. App. at 454 Globe Thurman). Representative McHenry offensive particularly Sen. found factfinding the removal of the institutions. function from the local Globe 429. into the Fed- punishment offenses, from State gives say to the that this section I do

eral courts. suppose jurisdiction. I do not exclusive Federal courts presume, in it, I It leaves is so understood. that it injured imagines person himself to be option who op- court, Federal an court in the State to sue injured, but who has the least has been he who tion that likely gratify, to avail will be the most malice to some App. 216. himself of.” Globe (remarks Edmunds); id., of Sen. 694-695 See also Globe (remarks (remarks Hoar); Rep. Rep. id., at at 384 (“Ad- (remarks Rep. Bingham) Famworth); App. Globe power mitting enforce the have concurrent the States respective lim- within their of the United States Constitution action?”). must we wait their its, legislative history supports conclusion that our This holding prior state adminis- that exhaustion of decisions, prerequisite action under remedies is not a to an trative statutory § misperceive it seems fair 1983,did not intent: Congress individ- not intend that an to infer that the 1871 did compelled every adminis- ual be case to exhaust state § filing trative remedies before an action under of the Civil Rights recognize, drawing such a however, Act. We history precarious: conclusion from this alone is somewhat Congress presented question of ex- the 1871 was not with the remedies, haustion of administrative nor was it aware of potential agencies. Therefore, role of state administrative rely exclusively legislative history we do not on this decid- ing question presented here. addressed question recently enacted exhaustion under 1983when it (1976 IV). §1997e Supp. legislative 42 U. ed., S. C. history provides strong congressional of 1997e evidence of intent on this issue.

B Rights Act, The Civil of Institutionalized Persons (1976 IV), seq. pri- Supp. U. S. C. 1997et was enacted ed., Attorney General manly States the United that to ensure existing rights standing constitutional “legal enforce has persons.” statutory rights of institutionalized and Federal (Conf. Rep.). p. Rep. 96-897, 9 In No. H. R. Conf. specific, limited exhaustion Congress § a also created 1997e, bringing pursuant prisoners actions requirement for adult history legislative demonstrate § 1997eand its 1983. Section generally is not Congress that exhaustion re- understood that only out it decided to carve quired actions, that 1983 imposed judicially ex- exception rule. A to this a narrow Congress’ requirement would be inconsistent haustion usurp policy judgments adopt would 1997e and decision to Congress for itself. reserved that has requirement considering should an exhaustion whether In clearly expressed incorporated bill, into the require exhaustion certain that a decision belief testify- change the law. Witnesses would work actions ing the bill discussed that drafted Subcommittee before the holding exhaustion was not this Court the decisions of g., Hearings required. on H. R. and H. R. 5791 e. See, Liberties, and Courts, on Civil before the Subcommittee Ju- Committee on the of Justice of the House Administration diciary, (1977)(1977Hearings); Cong., id., Sess., 20 95th 1st Hearings H. R. 10 before the Sub- 77, 323; Administration Courts, Liberties, and the committee on Civil Judiciary, 96th of Justice House on the Committee (1979)(1979 Hearings). During Cong., these Sess., 1st hearings, Representative Sub- Kastenmeier, Chairman committee, stated: thing requires I discussion

“Another think some point argument, is ... within committee, and is ought of remedies whether there to be an requirement. [we] pointed

“. . if fact, . I think it has out that been particularly require were to that would it, regression of the law. constitute from the current state clearly presently back, It would set the law because Supreme held, has held, that is the necessarily litigant fully rights need not suits civil Hearings 57-58. exhaust State remedies.” Drinan) (remarks (Representative Rep. id., also at 272 doing something “grounds which his bill on the Su- Railsback consistently namely require preme do, refused to (remarks remedies”); Hearings Rep. exhaustion of Kastenmeier) §1997e possible (adopting “was resisted as a say, liberties; free, that is to in the un- civil encroachment on 1983”). impeded resort to requirement adopting an exhaustion also

The over debates g., Cong. understanding. e. Rec. 11988 See, reflect this (1978) (remarks Kastenmeier); Rep. Rep. and of Volkmer (remarks (remarks Ertel); Rep. id., at of id., at 15445 (“it Wiggins) Rep. settled law that an exhaustion of of is required precondition is as a administrative remedies action”); Cong. maintaining Rec. 12496 of (remarks a 1983 (“Under Butler) existing Rep. is law there no prison complainant requirement first ask the State that him”). understanding system help exhaus- that to With adopt generally required, decided to tion is not requirement to re- of 1997e order the limited exhaustion by diverting certain the federal courts lieve the burden on through prisoner petitions institutions, back state and local develop appropriate encourage and also to the States Cong. Rep. grievance procedures. g., 9; 124 See, e. Conf. (1978) (remarks Kastenmeier); Rep. at id., Rec. 11976 (re- (remarks Railsback); Rep. id., at 15442 11976, 11983 (remarks Rep. Kastenmeier); Rep. id., marks of at 15445 (remarks Kastenmeier); Ertel); Rep. id., id., at 23176 (remarks (remarks Butler); Rep. id., at 23180 23179-23180 Ertel). Congress’ Rep. Implicit conclu- is this decision standing with left sion the no-exhaustion rule should be that respect suits. to other 1983 requirement judicially imposed also would

A exhaustion extraordinarily exhaustion detailed with the inconsistent 1997e a nar- §in 1997e. Section carves out embodied scheme no-exhaustion rule to govern the general row exception and establishes claims, procedure ensure certain prisoner remedies are and effective. adequate administrative that the limited to 1983 ac- is expressly requirement of a crime. 42 adult convicted U. S. C. an tions brought IV).10 1997e(b)(l) (1976 in- §1997e(a)(l) Section ed., Supp. minimum stand- “promulgate General Attorney structs of a implementation plain, development ards for remedies, administrative system” effective speedy, §1997e(b)(2) certain minimum standards specifies exhaustion of ad- A court may require must be included.11 if Attorney “the General cer- only ministrative remedies has determined such administrative or the court tified explains why juveniles were not included 10 Representative Kastenmeier §in 1997e: very candidly should admit that the first reluctance to resort “I we think possible resisted as a encroach- [§ 1997e] embodied in mechanism 1983; free, liberties; say, unimpeded resort to that is to in the ment on civil temporarily event— petitions back it does deflect 1983 because into — system. Therefore, even so to the extent

back into the State 1997e], also that it should viewed, notwithstanding [§ the limited form of Hearings 26. juveniles rejected.” 1979 extend 11 1997e(b)(2)states: Section provide— “The minimum standards shall “(A) prison, any jail, advisory employees inmates of for an for role (at as is rea- level correctional institution the most decentralized or other sonably formulation, implementation, operation possible), in the system;

“(B) with grievances replies specific maximum time limits for written system; reasons thereto each decision level within the na- “(C) emergency an are of priority processing grievances for which grievant to sub- ture, subject the including delay matters in which would personal damages; risk injury stantial or other “(D) participant grievant safeguards reprisals against for to avoid grievance; in the resolution of a including “(E) grievances, independent disposition for review of the supervi- the direct entity reprisals, by not under alleged person or other sion or control of the institution.” direct

511 with the compliance in substantial are minimum remedies (b).” subsection promulgated standards acceptable may be 1997e(a)(2). required, exhaustion court Before “would be appropriate that and in conclude must further 1997e(a)(l).12 in those Finally, justice.” interests of all the ex- statutory requirements meeting § 1983 actions case, not dismiss the but may may district court haustion, the not to for a exceed period ninety such case “continue only Ibid. This detailed exhaustion.” order to days require ad on an hoc impose, inconsistent scheme is discretion rule other cases. exhaustion basis, developed a judicially would condi- § 1997e improve prison that Congress hoped of successful grievance the development tions by stimulating g., e. No. H. R. 96- Rep. 9; Conf. See, Rep. mechanisms. (remarks (1979)' Rails- Rep. Hearings p. (remarks (1978) Rails- back); 124 Rec. 11976 Cong. Rep. (remarks back); Drinan); Rec. Cong. Rep. (1980) (remarks Kastenmeier). Rec. 10780 of Rep.. Cong. for the de- To further Congress provided purpose, ferral the exercise of federal over certain jurisdiction §1983 on the the state only prisons claims condition be frus- This would develop adequate procedures. purpose gener- trated discretion to by judicial impose have ally: grievance States would no incentive to adopt every Reports Congress Committee state that not intend did brought appropriate prisoner action an adult in institutions with grievance procedures delayed pending be exhaustion: require-

“It is the intent of not find such court brought pursuant appropriate ment in which those situations the action cannot, probability, re- [§ 1983] raises which reasonable issues grievance system, including solved cases imminent resolution where danger alleged. Allegations to life is of confine- unrelated to conditions ment, institution, such as those which on events outside center by grievance would reso- appropriately not be for resolution continued system.” lution Rep. Conf. 15. 96-416, p. 96-80, Rep. (1979); Rep.

See also H. R. No. p. No. S. (1979). § prisoner 1983 certification, because capable of procedures remedies state administrative be diverted could cases any event. provisions sense, Act make sum, the exhaustion

In only could not be if exhaustion superfluous, are Congress if intended enactment required before exception no-exhaustion rule. a narrow to carve out § history demonstrates legislative of 1997e The specific exceptions carving approach out taken the has require cannot general courts that federal rule province §1983. alter the balance It is not our establishing procedural framework by Congress struck § bringing under 1983. actions

C argue Appeals Respondent exhaus- and the Court required it because remedies should tion of administrative They argue policies. that an exhaus- various would further perceived requirement burden that would lessen the tion impose courts;13would further the on federal 1983 actions by post- goal comity improve relations federal-state poning until the state adminis- federal-court review after agency passed enable issue;14 had on the and would trative agency, expertise presumably at which area enlighten issue, to the federal court’s ultimate decision. 13 course, justify judicial deci Of this burden alone is not sufficient to Prod Thermtron congressionally jurisdiction. sion to imposed alter See ucts, Hermansdorfer, (1976); v. Inc. Steelworkers Inc., (1965). event, no Bouligny, U. S. 150-151 judicial impose requirement means clear discretion to an exhaustion courts, in the at least actions would lessen the caseload the federal infra, 513-514, short run. and n. 18. brought pursu application principles of these federalism to actions g., e. See, prompted ant to 1983 has criticism several commentators. Seesaw, 25 Koury, Comity: Section 1983 and Civil Two for the Federalism (1979); Note, Loyola L. L. Rev. 659 39 N. Y. U. Rev. 838

513 earlier, As we considerations alone cannot policy noted exhaustion unless exhaustion is justify judicially imposed 501-502, intent. at consistent with congressional supra, Furthermore, n. 4. debates over and incorporating §in demonstrate, 1997e rele exhaustion requirement do not one invariably point vant considerations policy is over the va direction, disagreement and there vehement of them.15 The assumptions underlying many lidity considerations, these and very difficulty policy Congress’ debate, institutional competence pursue sug superior gest solutions are legislative judicial preferable. 303, 317 (1980); 447 Cf. Diamond v. U. S. Steel Chakrabarty, (1965). Inc., 145, 153 workers Bouligny, must be resolved deciding issues that Beyond policy exhaustion, are difficult whether there require equally of an exhaustion design scope questions concerning how define These include those requirement. questions §of 1983 claims which exhaustion be de- categories might 15 judicial example, disagreement is whether For there serious over swiftest, plaintiffs costly, procedures administrative 1983 least offer id., 263-264; g., See, e. remedy. Hearings and most reliable (1968). 232-233; Note, Similarly, there is L. Rev. Colum. specialization in constitutional debate over whether the of federal courts agen specialization law of administrative important is more than the symbolic institu expertise, cies in their and over whether the areas enforcing legitimizing, and defining, tional function of federal courts state and local function that outweighs constitutional claims the educational Torts, Mich. g., agencies See, Whitman, can serve. e. Constitutional Finally, it (1980); Note, Rev., supra, L. at 1208. Rev. L. 68 Colum. liti system, which present is under uncertain whether the “free market” truly appear to be gants they if are free pursue administrative remedies efficient, effective, likely to induce more cheaper, more more which McKart-type standard adequate creation of remedies than a (1975). See, g., Note, e. plaintiffs L. Rev. have Ind. no initial choice. 21, 34, 51; before the Subcommittee Hearings Hearings Cf. 1977 on S. 1393 Cong., Judiciary, 95th on the the Constitution of the Senate Committee Sess., 442 1st and centralize the standards for sirable; unify judging how that should be ex- procedures administrative kinds and time limitations tolling requirements what hausted;16 res and judicata what collateral adopted;17 be should determinations; administrative effect of particular estoppel to the failure to comply should attach what consequences of administrative proceedings; requirements with procedural necessary could interim in- federal courts grant whether and or exhaustion, hold the action pending relief and pro- junctive exhaustion even though without requiring to judgment ceed be where the relevant required, otherwise might exhaustion is either not inclined to powerless agency administrative These similar might relief. and questions such interim grant by legislation, and but would cre- swiftly surely answered if remedy-delaying, court-burdening litigation costly, ate and in di- the context of incrementally by judiciary answered of different claims to thousands relating verse constitutional state agencies.18 Attorney by directing Gen problem 1997e resolved Section procedure by and to establish a promulgate to minimum standards

eral and certified. prison remedies could be reviewed which administrative 1997e(b) (c). certified, is di the court procedure §§ and If a has not been Attorney standards General’s compare procedure rected with procedure is in only if the pending the case exhaustion continue Attorney General. compliance the standards of the substantial 1997e(a)(2). § pending not tolled that statutes of limitations are 17 Unless doctrine Tomanio, S. 446 U. overruled, Regents v. exhaustion were see Board of might in the (1980), result judicially imposed requirement exhaustion by di in 1997e repeal Congress problem effective of 1983. avoided this merely period not exceed recting the for a court to continue the case days. in requirement

18 The an exhaustion proposing initial bill to include provided: § 1997e brought pur- an granted by “Relief shall court in action not be district insti- State involuntarily confined [§ 1983]

suant an individual , plain, such exhausted tution . . . that the appears unless individual claimants, and state claims, agencies variety The very consider- congressional argues §1983 cases involved considerations, may explain the myriad policy ation of exhaustion whether to require deciding why Congress, out adult carved brought by prisoners, § 1983 actions certain to the no-exhaustion rule. narrow, exception detailed such a of the various policy argu- debate and consideration After full 1997e, class of taking largest ments, adopted Congress an constructing requirement §1983 actions standard from the substantially McKart-type that differs the Court of Appeals. and adopted urged by respondent whether say not for us n. It is supra. scheme for other categories create a similar will or should should an al- will or Congress adopt or whether § 1983 claims for nonprisoner different exhaustion requirement together claims.19 remedy H. R. administrative as is available.” speedy, and efficient State (1977). Sess., §4 Cong., 1st 95th witnesses tes- adopt McKart-type standard after declined bog procedural in massive procedure tified that this would down the courts litigation thereby frustrating purpose relieving the caseloads of the courts, take too procedures federal that are often not effective and state time, myriad proce- judge a of state much and that the court would have to 34-35, 51, g., e. guidance. See, Hearings 164- dures without much 165, 169-170, 323; 263-264, Hearings 48-49. whether the question posed argument oral from the bench at ground Eleventh the Board might Amendment bar this suit on the that Regents is an arm of the Eleventh Amendment. purposes State for of the (1978). Pugh, Arg. Com 20. Cf. Alabama v. Tr. of Oral 438 U. S. 781 (1911), pare Hopkins v. Agricultural College, Clemson with 221 U. S. 636 Assn., Dept. Nursing Florida Health v. Home Florida 450 U. S. and no pleadings, The District Court dismissed this action on the Regents Amendment first Eleventh issue had been raised. The Board of original panel appeal, in its did not raised this issue brief to the on but rehearing original panel on nor argue it in its brief en banc. Neither the Although court addressed mentioned the en banc this issue. State opposition to the possible response Eleventh in its Amendment defense 51(1

IV §1983 both histories the legislative on Based of state administrative exhaustion we 1997e, conclude as a prerequisite bringing required not be should remedies decline to overturn our We § 1983. pursuant an action is not required. that such exhaustion holding decisions prior reversed, and the case of Appeals of the The decision with this opinion. consistent for proceedings is remanded

It is so ordered. whom Justice Rehnquist O’Connor, Justice concurring. joins, dissenting opinion, in Justice

As discussed Powell’s below, of the court considerations inas the opinion well should required a 1983 plaintiff sound policy suggest fil- remedies before state administrative adequate to exhaust least, adminis- very At prior his ing complaint. certiorari, argument. press it the issue it at oral petition for did not brief Indeed, respondent urged Appeals we the Court of affirm counsel Arg. 27. solely holding. Tr. Oral sufficiently par- “the Eleventh Amendment defense We have noted that may jurisdictional be raised of the nature of bar” that takes Jordan, Edelman appeal. for the first time on State (1974). However, analyzing importance of state law because may, certain questions State Eleventh Amendment and because the circumstances, defense, jurisdic- it is waive this we have never held that in the Court on tional sense that it must be raised and decided Healthy City Doyle, own motion. Cf. Mt. Bd. Ed. v. 279 (1977). Where, here, expressly requested that Regents Board of Eleventh question pass potential we address the on its exhaustion and not and, briefed immunity, consequence, parties Amendment have not as a issue, we and appropriate deem it issue that was raised to address the opin- vigorously Nothing decided below and in in this pressed this Court. precludes Regents raising ion the Board of its Eleventh Amendment from in claim on remand. address position District Court in the best to necessary the first to competing questions instance of fact and state law issue, resolve the discre- stage Eleventh Amendment and at this it has the permit any potential tion to pleadings might amendments cure problems. Eleventh Amendment many thereby claims, proceedings would resolve de-

trative §1983 creasing actions filed in the federal the number straining under excessive now caseloads. courts, which are opinion, in the set forth Court’s However, for the reasons already in the that, has ruled absence of additional this Court congressional legislation, exhaustion administrative reme- § Perhaps Congress’ required in 1983actions. en- dies is Rights Act, of Institutionalized Persons actment of the Civil (1976 IV), § Supp. seq. ed., which et creates S. C. 1997 U. requirement prisoners bringing limited exhaustion a prompt possibility suits, it to reconsider the of re- will quiring in the remainder 1983cases. Reluc- exhaustion tantly, I concur. in White, part.

Justice concurring fully agree frequent unequiv I our with the Court that and explained or dis ocal statements on exhaustion cannot be tinguished away attempted Fifth do. For as the Circuit nearly years and on at occasions, least this Court clearly held no of administrative remedies is required in a Ante, 1983suit. at 500. Whether or not this initially choice, decisions stare decisis, a wise these are statutory particularly showing strong is re case, and quired its his that we have misread the relevant statute and tory. difficulty concluding I the issue of have no that on immunity municipal question exhaustion, faced unlike the City Dept. Services, in Monell v. New York Social (1978), misappre previously U. S. the Court has not meaning rejecting an ex hended the 1871 debates U. S. Education, haustion rule McNeese Board of (1963), position adhering since. 668, 671-673 ever and history precedents legislative sufficient Our are support join judgment accordingly and all I reversal, opinion but Part III-B the Court. unwisely unnecessarily ven- III-B, Part the Court may support had. The none

tures further find where §1983 general was suits a rule wisdom of no-exhaustion passed the Civil considered when at issue not § 42Act, U. S. C. 1997et Persons Rights Institutionalized IV). (1976 persuasively Supp. As Justice seq. ed., Powell dissenting opinion, and as reflected the points in his out narrowly congressional focused attention Act, title of prisoners legal rights concerning procedures on Unsurprisingly, legis- persons. institutionalized other only specific problem emerged addressed which lation approval investigation; neither no- it indicates preclude fromus reconsider- an intent to nor rule exhaustion ing issue. policy argu acknowledges, ante, at

As the The concludes that directions. ments cut in both difficulty policy very considerations, and Con of these “the gress’ superior suggest leg competence...

institutional preferable.” judicial sure, To are decisions not islative statutory dispositive word issue and the is a exhaustion belongs Congress. follow, It not how does matter by decisions, not foreclosed earlier ever, that, the issue were institutionally incompetent an to formulate we would be requirement in The lack of an exhaustion exhaustion rule. judi exception general rule, an is itself actions cially remedies administrative formulated, exhaustion Myers Shipbuild required is v. Bethlehem in civil action. (1938); ing Corp., States, S. 41 McKart v. United U. statutory questions, U. S. 185 exhaus Unlike other judicial Myers tion is “a v. Bethlehem administration,” rule Shipping Corp., supra, Congress directs and unless judges. rightfully subject crafting by otherwise, Our governed by decisis, rein resolution of this case as stare legislative history taken forced should not be long general undercutting principle standing. today fully our result also consistent decisionsthat a enforce defendant a civil or administrative proceeding may enjoin proceed ment ing sidetrack that resorting court, to a 1983action in federal Huffman

519 Pursue, Vail, Juidice v. Ltd., (1975); 430 v. 420 U. S. 592 Hernandez, Trainor (1977); v. S. 434 (1977); U. U. S. Sims, Moore (1979), and that a v. 442 U. federal action S. of state-law issues determination stayed should be pending Railroad Comm’n v. dispute. central to the constitutional (1941). On this Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 understanding, I III-B of the Court.* opinion but join all Part whom The Chief as joins Powell,

Justice Justice II, dissenting. Part on the limitations federal judicial The holds that in Eleventh Amendment in the embodied power are not I immunity jurisdictional. doctrine of con- sovereign view, present serious Eleventh my case does not Amendment *In authorizing against Regents, suits the Board of The Florida statute issue. (1981), I on its face. see no reason to read a Fla. 240.205 is clear Stat. law equity” in “all courts of as mean- broad waiver sue and sued anything I in Florida ing am aware of law that all but federal courts. Nor by un- meaning was than indicated suggests a more limited intended Certainly, gone of our have so equivocal terms of the statute. none cases for an effec- expressly far hold federal courts must be mentioned as to tive Eleventh Amendment waiver. Powell, by post, in statutes cases recited at issue Justice intent. For

522-523, presented embodiments of state equivocal n. more Assn., 450 Nursing Home Dept. in Health v. Florida example, Florida curiam), be sued was to sue and (per U. the authorization S. and, provision, did not extend unlike instant limited to contract actions com of the interstate equity.” courts of law and The same is true “all Comm’n, U. S. Bridge pact Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri involved Comm’n, Tax Corp. Copper The decision Kennecott “any court for suit (1946), providing U. S. 573 which involved a statute in courts’ incongruity federal jurisdiction,” competent turned language employs explicit terpreting fact that “Utah state tax laws and the Id., courts.” indicate, in federal litigation, suits other consent to at 579. Amend- Eleventh Thus, leaving object while I the Court’s do not where, least courts —at lower issue for further consideration

ment im- Amendment here, resolving Eleventh logical priority in there is no be an- sufficiently clear to munity find issue before exhaustion —I says. means what here now. The statute swered departure holding from established to be serious sider this constitutional doctrine. rejection of the rule of “flex- from the Court’s

I also dissent developed remedies administrative ible” Appeals persuasively for the Fifth and stated judges disagreeing sitting with the 17 of banc. Circuit, en adopted Appeals the flexible exhaustion who of the Court places reliance on principle, mistaken Civil this Court 42Act, S. 1997et Rights Persons U. C. of Institutionalized IV). (1976 disagree portions Supp. I both seq. ed., holding dissent. and therefore the Court’s Amendment.1 The Eleventh

I. A petitioner, action, an em- discrimination” In this “reverse University, brought ployee suit Florida International of the against Regents the Board of 42 U. S. C. Regents did not name the individual State of Florida.2 She damages, for $500,000 for She sued defendants. injunctive equitable ante, at 498- and other relief. See arguing dismiss, n. 2. Board a motion to 499, petitioner’s The filed premature light her failure to suit was District exhaust available administrative remedies. The granted agreed Court motion dismiss. to provides: The Eleventh Amendment power “The Judicial of the to extend United States shall not be construed equity, prosecuted against in law or one of the suit commenced or State, Subjects United States Citizens of another Citizens or any Foreign State.” ante, notes,

2 As the Court named petitioner originally see n. University Florida the Florida International as defendant. Because University sued, International capacity lacks the to sue or be District proper permitted found it was a not defendant. Petitioner was complaint, Regents. amend her simply and she substituted Board of discrimination, In addition to racial petitioner also that she had claimed against been discriminated on the basis of her sex. the bar the Board added appeal,

On petitioner’s It that as an argued defense.3 Amendment Eleventh the Board could be sub- State, instrumentality court absent waiver immunity.4 suit in federal jected held defense of the Eleventh Amend repeatedly has that the 3 TheCourt Jordan, Edelman appeal. first on may be raised for the time ment (“Eleventh sufficiently par Amendment defense S.U. bar so that need not be raised in the jurisdictional nature takes of the of a court”). trial parts. into Part III was appeal brief divided three The Board’s precludes subject argument “the Eleventh Amendment devoted to complaint.” Defendant-Appel- Brief for jurisdiction plaintiff’s matter over (CA5), statutory lengthy 17. A addendum was at- p. lee 79-2965 in No. arguments advanced this section of the brief. support tached bane, rehearing parties en filed the case was scheduled After e., briefs considered in addi- short —i. 10-page supplemental 4- and to be — Appeals. already submitted to the tion to the main briefs of the Eleventh Amend- briefs not add the discussion supplemental did Appeals placed But was before the Court of en question ment issue. the banc, thorough panel, through before the discus- placed as it had been the sion in the main briefs. addressing the explanation for not Eleventh Amendment This Court’s ante, 515-516, See n. 19.

issue is that it was not considered below. at explanation, the contrary implication But to the the Court’s issue —as by argued urged here —was the here. shown Board 4 Department Regents The Board of of the Division of Universities of the by part the of the Code as a of Education established Florida Education University §240.2011 con System. Fla. The Board State Stat. by appointed the of 12 the sists of Commissioner Education and citizens general supervisory authority Governor. The Board over 240.207. ap University System. Among duties are the State 240.209. its pointment requests each university presidents, budget of review of of budget for university system, aggregated in the of an preparation state plan, of University System, development the State a master Ibid. pay plan. systemwide personnel establishment of a classification and Relyea agency The Board is an 216.011. See of State of Florida. (Fla. 1980). State, may v. 385 the defense of App. So. 2d 1378 It claim ibid. sovereign immunity in suits under state law. See Appeals Numerous held state universities or Courts of have of Regents by Boards of from reason the Elev- immune suit in federal court 522 no waiver. Although been it asserted that there

And had a with body corporate as of created Regents the Board and be impleaded ... plead sue and be sued “to power §240.205(4)(1) (1981), Fla. Stat. equity,” courts of law and all this does not oper- such as language it is well established Amendment.5 of the Eleventh the defense to waive ate See, Regents, g., Rutledge v. Arizona Board 660 e. Amendment. enth (CA9 University Kansas, 1981); v. 451 F. 2d 1345, Brennan 1349 F. 2d 1981). (CA9 (CA10 Shapiro, F. 1071 1971); 657 2d Ronwin v. 1287 5 Assn., Nursing v. Florida Home See, Dept. Health g., Florida e. Comm’n, (1981); Petty Bridge 147, v. Tennessee-Missouri U. S. (“The (1959) that there has been waiver of 275, conclusion a 276-277 U. S. public . . . where lightly inferred. And instrumen will not be immunity immunity right sued’ that waiver of ‘to sue be tality is with created proceedings spe may restricted to suits or particular setting be courts”); state, Corp. Copper Kennecott in the not the federal cial character Comm’n, (language pro in state v. 327 U. S. 573 statute Tax State “any jurisdiction” will be under viding competent court of for suit in Amendment); Ford Motor De of the Eleventh Co. v. stood a waiver (1945) (same); Indiana, Treasury S. 459 Great partment U. (1944)(“a Read, clear dec Insurance Co. v. S. Northern U. Life problems fiscal to other courts laration of the state’s intention submit its found”); Giles, Jagnandan own v. than those creation must (“In (CA5 1976). Jordan, supra, F. 2d Cf. Edelman at 673 deciding protection whether a State has its constitutional waived Amendment, only ‘by find the most Eleventh we will waiver where stated express language implications such from the text as overwhelming ”). leave no room It is difficult [will] for other reasonable construction' requirement express to reconcile' the Court’s consistent an waiver approach ante, advocated n. White. Justice argument At oral Florida respondent here counsel stated that the Legislature had not waived waived the the Eleventh Amendment and had sovereign defense of Tr. of Oral immunity “only in tort cases.” selected (Fla. Instruction, Arg. Bragg 26. See v. Board Public So. 2d of (“The 1948) mere that is created fact the Board of Public Instruction body corporate a its power as affect to sue and be sued does not (Board tort”); immunity Relye State, from supra Regents a v. of retains de 111.071(l)(b)(4) (1981) of sovereign immunity); (provision fense Fla. Stat. payment against for the rights judgments State civil state officers— (1976 IV) including judgments ed., §1983 Supp. under 42 U. C.S. —does sovereign not immunity immunity” waive “or other defense or lawsuits). 1975) (CA6 Richardson, Long such Cf. 2d 525 F. that whether or the statute argued reply, petitioner a amounted to waiver —and petitioner the Board creating Amendment it Eleventh was simply believed that did—the claims she had lodged against irrelevant the equitable Brief Petitioner 3-4. for State. See Reply nor the Court Appeals panel Ap- the Court Neither the Board’s Eleventh Amendment en banc addressed peals their attention solely question directed They defense. The remedies. held administrative panel of exhaustion §1983 exhaustion suits requirement was no that there Court consideration of the to the District and remanded v. Florida Patsy argument. Amendment Board’s Eleventh (1980). 612 F. 2d The Court University, International reversed, §1983 banc, en that holding sitting of Appeals, must exhaust available reasonable adminis- plaintiffs v. Florida International Univer- Patsy trative remedies. sity, Again 634 F. 2d 900 court did not consider Eleventh Amendment defense. Board’s The was raised before this question Eleventh Amendment de- Court, after the Court of Appeals’ at the first opportunity for writ of cer- cision, in the Board’s to the petition response it tiorari. The Board it had that argued, appeal, immunity arm the not waived its an State that had from suit in federal court.6 answered Again petitioner (state disposes of Eleventh university’s immunity suit state law from question). Amendment writ, (“Should grant Opposition See Brief juris should be limited to respectfully Board submits review should vacate Fifth dictional issues and this Court discussed below for lack [petitioner’s] suit Circuit’s decision with instructions to dismiss jurisdiction”). ante, statement Court, importance to the n. attaches wanted the Board argument by at oral counsel for the Board however, viewed, light issue decided. This must be the Elev- decide attempt Board’s unsuccessful to have this Court first binding of a Moreover, request party’s enth Amendment issue. —short jurisdictional duty to resolve waiver —cannot relieve this question. bar defense would her Amendment the Eleventh

at most claim, to this as And, petitioner even damages. claim would bar if damages Amendment the that argued now of its “own funds” —e. out g., the claim meet could Board from than the state treas- bequests and from gifts —rather at oral argument.7 repeated were arguments These ury. B presented question the jurisdictional views The Court if were of little or no impor as it Amendment the Eleventh is a of the question relegated discussion Its entire

tance. ante, at 515- end of the opinion. at the note conclusory that Amendment concedes 19. The Court 516, n. in are but “jurisdictional,” only immunity sovereign

bar of the claim at may any point raise that State the sense made then that the Amend The statement is proceedings. that must “in the sense it be raised ment is not jurisdictional on its own motion.” Ibid.8 The this Court and decided statement,9 this no authority support cites to Court 25-28, Arg. argument, At Board’s counsel Oral 40-41. oral 7 Tr. of question Eleventh Amendment had not been addressed stated that the Id., grant its of the at main briefs to Court “because certiorari.” 27. repeated In view of Amend the Board’s efforts raise the Eleventh question, specific request ment decision that this Court vacate the supra, Appeals jurisdiction, 6, hardly for lack of see n. say jurisdiction question correct to must now raise the (1975). Iowa, 393, 396, its own motion. Cf. Sosna v. n. 2 419 U. S. any event, sponte obliged sua inquire “we are arises whenever doubt City Healthy Mt. Bd. Ed. v. jurisdiction.” as to the existence of federal Doyle, Healthy City Bd. cites, to Mt. The Court “compare” signal, Doyle, Ed. supra, Healthy Mt. v. way suggested at 279. no Court in sovereign immunity the Eleventh Amendment and principle embodied in Ill Indeed, Art. were jurisdictional. less than the Court necessary found it to resolve question Eleventh Amendment prior reaching case the merits. contrary, On the consistently the Court has viewed the Amendment jurisdictional. Iowa, In Sosna supra, n. the Court raised surprising existed. The reason that if the be would it may any point be question raised at Amendment Eleventh places precisely because it limits on is the proceedings the against authority to entertain courts suits of federal basic history the of Eleventh Amendment, and text The State. immunity exemplified by sovereign it, principle of and the precedents of this make clear that well-established the today’s jurisdiction pur our and the misconceives decision pose Amendment. this of system principle that constitutional is of our

A basic jurisdiction. limited Their au- are courts of courts federal judicial only thority within those matters extends power as defined the Constitution. the United States of language clearer, not be the Eleventh Amend- could power, judicial forth in from the as set removes ment prosecuted against one of suits “commenced Ill, Art. Amendment When an Constitution United States.” judicial plain language power “the the United states against shall not construed extend” to suits States be juris- today State, from what source does the Court derive its diction? Court’s “back-of-the-hand” treatment this jurisdiction issue answer. Questions threshold offers no power legitimate exercise are fundamental system.10 our federal constitutional question though of the Eleventh Amendment even the State had asserted only complaint the bar of the in its answer had Amendment to the Regents thereafter abandoned Unlike this this defense. the Board case, the State of advanced the Even Iowa had not defense in Court. the Sosna so, question. precedents Court raised and addressed These ignored by today. are the Court nature, simply “Because of their unusual because would wrong powers indeed but would be an unconstitutional invasion of the re if served to the states not within the federal courts were to entertain cases jurisdiction, seeking their party the rule is well invoke settled jurisdiction of a must the case is within federal court demonstrate that Miller, competence Wright of that court.” C. & A. Federal Practice (1975). and Procedure p. 45

C adopted response as a Amendment The Eleventh original jurisdiction assumption in a suit to this Court’s Georgia. Georgia, brought against Chisholm the State language Relying upon express in Art. Dall. power judicial extending controversies between a Ill the Court found that it State, another and citizens State jurisdiction. said to have created a shock The decision had throughout country. Louisiana, Hans v. (1890). adopted shortly was there The Amendment 1, 11 it had been understood that overruled: Court after, and the being constitutionally adopted, there could amendment “‘the past any jurisdiction, future, in case, or exercised by State, sued the citizens another in a which State subjects any foreign by Ibid. state.’” citizens or light history wording the Amendment, of the the explicit placing limits has viewed the Amendment as Court by judicial power III. as defined Art. See Nevada v. on the be that, But more than Hall, 410, 421 S.U. yond express provisions Amendment, of the the Court the recognized principle of that the Amendment stands for a has sovereign immunity by authority grant in Art. the

which Louisiana, v. Thus, Ill itself must be Hans measured.11 power supra, judicial the held that did not the federal by against nonconsenting of its extend a suit a State one Although by its own citizens. Amendment the Eleventh apply terms does not the suits, such Court found clarify “[T]he Eleventh the of the Amendment was introduced intent concerning power.. Framers the reach of . . The Elev judicial the federal enth effectively holding Amendment particular served the reverse Chisholm, and, understanding more generally, original to restore the Thus, Amendment, .... despite language the narrowness of the of the spirit consistently guided reach of interpreting judicial federal Employees v. Missouri Public power generally. . . .” Health Dept., concurring (MARSHALL, 411 U. S. 291-292 J., result). language was but an illustration a the Amendment , jurisdiction against

larger principle: over suits a Federal contemplated consent, “was not Con- State, absent establishing judicial power of the United when stitution Reeves, S. 436 15.12 Smith U. Id., at Sée States.” (1900). (1921), Similarly, parte York, New 256 U. S. 490 in Ex specific despite Eleventh Amendment’s Court found principle equity,” the of sov- in “law or to suits reference exemplified by immunity ereign Amendment would not admiralty jurisdiction permit over a of federal the extension applied approach nonconsenting the same The Court State. (1934), Mississippi, in which the in Monaco v. jurisdiction against suit a take over a State Court refused provided jurisdiction by foreign Ill face, On its Art. state. foreign Nor a State . . . and States.” over suits “between exempt specifically the States Eleventh Amendment did the by foreign con- Nevertheless, state. the Court from suit granted judicial power States, cluded United Madison not extend so far: “We think that Ill, Art. did §2 correctly interpreted III of Article one Clause making provision jurisdiction suit of a for Constitution against by foreign a in the event of the State’s a State State Id., consent but not otherwise.” at 330. sued a Florida has this case a resident of the State of sovereign exercising major

Board a function of the State’s authority. prior this case held, whether As decisions have only is the Eleventh Amendment—with viewed constitutional debates quoted length The Hans at some from the Feder of the concerning scope eighty-first number the of Art. III. In the Ill Art. alist, example, dispel suggestion that sought Hamilton the the States: jurisdiction brought against one of extended federal “ over suits the suit sovereignty not to be amenable ‘It inherent the nature of gen and the general sense of an mthout its consent. is the individual This of sov mankind; of the attributes practice exemption, eral and the as one ” in the Union.’ every State ereignty, enjoyed by government is now S., original). quoted (emphasis As 134 U. at 13 jurisdiction Ill, federal under Art. limitation explicit —or consent, same. Absent be the the “judi- must analysis States,” by as defined Art. Ill and the United cial power Amendment, not does extend to suits Eleventh simply a of that by one citizen State:13 of the States against not without its be sued consent is a may “That a State so having jurisprudence important fundamental rule construction of Constitution of the bearing upon it has established become by repeated United States the entire judicial this court power decisions of does not authority the Constitution embrace granted by suit brought by parties against to entertain a private not one citizens given: brought without consent by State State, or citizens or of a by subjects foreign of another of the Eleventh not State, Amendment; because citizens, its own because of the brought by even one rule of which the Amendment is but an fundamental Ex York, New at 497 parte supra, exemplification.” added). (emphasis distinguish

The Court these unquestioned prece- does wholly dents. are ignored. Quite They inexplicably imposed jurisdiction, Unlike other limitations on federal the limitation may sovereign immunity the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine unequivocally be waived This was understand expressed. consent ing adopted, the time n. doctrine at the Constitution was see supra, interpreted “judicial power of the United accordingly. States” as used in Eleventh Ill Amendment and Art. may But the fact federal that the State United States consent jurisdiction, not render the or the doctrine does Eleventh Amendment sovereign Quite immunity jurisdictional. “quasi” embodied Art. Ill simply, jurisdiction. where consent, there has not been no there is (1941) (“The Sherwood, States, States United U. S. United sovereign, sued, as is from be . . . and immune suit save it consents to jurisdic the terms of its in any consent to be sued court define that court’s Fidelity & suit”); United States States United tion entertain the v. Co., (“Consent Guaranty (1940) gives jurisdiction 309 U. S. alone adjudge against consent, sovereign. attempted exer a Absent that judicial power cise of is void”>. decisions and controlling disregards today the Court

simply Ill in Art. jurisdiction on federal-court limitation the explicit recognize The Court does Eleventh Amendment. and “in the sense” Amendment jurisdictional Eleventh that the Amendment for the raise the bar may the State misses the of this point Yet the Court on appeal. first time the Amendment that the bar of may reason The statement. has explained— the Court previously time —as raised at be it is jurisdictional: because is precisely violation suit as a to petitioner’s objection “The and ... argued was first made Amendment Eleventh however. The Eleventh time, was in This this Court. sets forth an explicit a policy declares Amendment of such compelling judicial power federal limitation on the issue arising will consider this force that for the first . . . though urged Amendment even Department Motor Ford Co. v. in this Court.” time Treasury (1945).14 Indiana, 323 U. S. 459, 467 un- because of an these apparently Despite precedents, decided by issue to reach anxiety explained of its own remands the issue this Court the Court Appeals, to the courts below. jurisdiction

D must be I that the Amendment question believe Eleventh This clearer. the answer hardly addressed could relief from § 1983.15 seeks is an action under Petitioner Iowa, S., Jordan, at S., 678; 419 U. See Edelman v. Sosna v. 415 U. S., Healthy City Doyle, n. Mt. Bd. Ed. v. 2; at 278. 429 U. juris consistently question as Court has viewed the Eleventh Amendment Read, S., at dictional. See Great Northern Insurance Co. v. 322 U. Life (“A litigation as a constitutional state’s was established freedom from Amendment”) added); Monaco right through (emphasis the Eleventh Mississippi, this Court (Question is “whether entertain a suit jurisdiction foreign against State brought State consent”) added). (emphasis without her by ratifying sovereignty 15 TheStates consented to a of their diminution powers granted Fourteenth Amendment. In its exercise of the instrumen Florida, major a of State the Regents Board of that the argument Petitioner’s State. or tality agency be understood should Boárd incorporating statute numerous by is foreclosed Amendment Eleventh waive the State law. is unsupported this Court decisions Nursing Dept. Home v. Florida g., Health See, e. Florida supra. Similarly, n. Assn., (1981); peti 450 U. S. Amendment does not the Eleventh suggestion tioner’s the Board must be rejected. against claims bar her equitable ” or “in All suits equity. law to suits The Amendment applies or for damages State —whether unconsenting an against Cory White, ante, v. See barred. relief —áre injunctive Young, parte rule in Ex Finally, 85.16 p. state court to order a federal

(1908), permitting officials irrelevant to this future, simply law in federal obey members of Board of not sue the did case.17 Petitioner Amendment, Congress may lift the bar of sover- §by 5 the Fourteenth (1976). Bitzer, Thus, if Fitzpatrick v. 427 U. S. 445 eign immunity. Rights Act brought this suit Title VII of Civil petitioner had jurisdictional petitioner But did problem. no there would have been not the bar of so, held has removed do and the not Jordan, Quern v. S. 332 immunity §in U. sovereign 1983actions. See the Eleventh Amendment proposition “It be a novel indeed that would money judg simply because no enjoin the State itself does not bar suit clearly ap sought. its terms [T]he ment is . . . Eleventh Amendment only equity.” from seeking injunction, remedy plies to a suit an available ante, White, Cory at 90-91. Young does parte of Ex theory Amendment Under the the Eleventh “comes against because when a state officer bar suits state officer? Constitution, he is authority of ... superior [the] into conflict with the S., stripped representative . . . of his or character.” U. official against to suits application 159-160. The has no rationale that decision may be viewed as agencies. Although or its an individual official the State acting authority against federal acting on his own and without state when law, than in offi agency an of the State —cannot act other State —or State, Similarly, against capacity. damages an action cial State, damages paid own an arm of the that must from State’s seeks damages directly general from fund coffers —whether the come the State’s itself, the Board an arm of sued She State Regents. Florida. Eleventh Amendment —and view,

In the the my principle by the Amendment immunity exemplified of sovereign in the suit clearly bar this case. The in Art. embodied Ill — of its own the jurisdiction refusal to address question Court’s of this Court as well as precedents violates well-established federal courts are courts of limited that the basic premise had to address neglected Even the parties jurisdiction. it would have been our question, the Eleventh Amendment fact, it on own motion. In the consider our responsibility briefed the of fully been Court Appeals has question Copper Corp. v. Tax state fund. See Kennecott State or from some other Comm’n, (segregated funds of the State Tax 327 573 Commis U. S. Amendment). moneys subject to the Eleventh sion are state entity Moreover, corporate state law that the Board is a the fact parte Young in Ex the Board permit application rule does not repeatedly if were an official. itself —as the Board This held agencies. against corporate bar suit state Eleventh Amendment to such Assn., Nursing Home Florida Health Florida v. Dept. See of Read, supra; Ford Motor Co. (1981); Great Northern Insurance Co. v. 147 Indiana, Treasury Kennecott (1945); Department 323 459 v. U. S. of of Comm’n, Copper Corp. supra. Tax State v. Agricultural (1911), Hopkins College, 221 Clemson v. U. S. 636 college-in contrary. brought against suit was astate In that case dyke. court damages college’s caused construction of recover detail, Although the Amendment in some Court discussed Eleventh It was was in that case. simply question there no Eleventh Amendment bar Hopkins apply to clear before that the Amendment did not Eleventh against presented in a suit question review this Court of federal (1904). Dix, 590, 592 state court. See Chandler v. 194 S. State U. (1978). Regents Bakke, 438 University 265 Cf. v. U. S. California Moreover, Hopkins college’s activities Court did not consider the short, S., case to In no Eleventh governmental. 221 at 647. U. Hop opinion The question presented Amendment to the Court. Elev kins has never been cited proposition this Court for in fed corporate agency against enth Amendment is no bar to suit a state Assn., Nursing Home Dept. Florida Florida Health v. eral court. See R. supra; Pugh, Parden v. Terminal (1978); Alabama v. U. S. Co., 377 U. (1964). S. supra. Iowa, Cf. Sosna v. n. raised in this Court. this suit I would dismiss n. U. S. Appeals for lack of vacate decision jurisdiction. Remedies.

II. Exhaustion of my should be dismissed case view belief question grounds, jurisdictional I address joined Ap judges only briefly. in the Court of Seventeen opinion adopting persuasive a rule “flexible” peals’ ex §in remedies Other administrative suits. haustion adopted g., Appeals a similar e. See, rule. have Courts (CA2 1969); 421 F. 2d 560 Secret v. Eastman, Eisen (CA7 1978). opinion for the en 2d Brierton, 584 F. carefully gen exhaustion doctrine in reviewed the banc court prior § applied It found that the 1983actions. as eral and clearly question.18 decide did not this Court decisions of (1979); Barry 63, n. 10 v. 55, Gibson Barchi, 443 U. S. v. See (1973). it concluded Berry n. 14 And 564, 575, hill, 411 U. S. appropriate adequate state admin that the exhaustion promote of the the achievement would istrative remedies §by rights protected 1983. require- opinion. agree Appeals’ The

I with the Court of adequate § plaintiff state adminis- exhaust ment a 1983 that quite accepted re- rule law until remedies was the trative cently. supra, The rule Eastman, at 567. Eisen v. See federal- does not defeat It rests on sound considerations. merely permits jurisdiction, the States it.19 defers It court its no- Supreme all the cases in which the articulated “[I]n sufficiently inade were rule, administrative remedies the state any event.” appropriate quate that exhaustion would not have been Federalism, L. Rev. Law, 90 Harv. Developments in the Section 1983 and (1977). 1133, 1274 McNary, S. in Real Estate Assn. v. 454 U. Fair Assessment 19 Cf. (exhaustion (Brennan, require J., concurring judgment) showing . . . lesser justified by somewhat in 1983 can be “a ment cases rem- displacement we not with where ... are concerned through procedures, own and it violations their en correct procedures.

courages of such It is consist the establishment comity apply principles that whenever federal ent supersede state action or to review courts are asked (1971). Younger proceedings. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 functioning highly relevant to effective Moreover, and system, the rule federal court conserves overburdened year judicial supplements In resources. scarce only Pape, decided, 167, was 365 U. S. Monroe v. begun rights district courts. the federal actions were civil Report of the Administrative Director Office Annual (1961). 30,000 such suits over Courts, 238 the U. S. Report Annual of the Director were commenced.20 (1981). 63, 68 of the U. S. Courts Administrative Office rights litigation unprecedented increase in civil result of this heavy federal courts to the detriment of all is a burden including litigants, who that their others assert federal-court infringed. rights have been constitutional categori argues past decisions of the Court The Court cally requirement in 1983 is no exhaustion hold there Appeals demonstrates, and as the But as the Court of suits. many explained recognizes, of these can be decisions exceptions applications exhaustion re of traditional to the quirement. Education, v. Board See McNeese speak question in an Other decisions briefing conclusory offhand and fashion without full Wilwording argument. 249, Swenson, v. 404 U. S. See (1971) curiam); (unargued per California, Damico v. curiam). (1967) (unargued per Moreover, a cate- U. S. pending exhaus- edy, but with the deferral of federal court consideration tion of the state administrative process”). 1981, 30,000 year approximately rights filed in fiscal Of the civil suits involved 15,639 § The remainder prisoners were 1983. filed state Ad variety rights Report Director of the a of civil suits. Annual of the Tay Parrott v. ministrative Office of the U. S. Courts result). lor, (POWELL, J., concurring in n. 13 with the gorical inconsistent would seem rule no-exhaustion prescribing supra, Younger abstention Harris, in v. decision pending. proceedings At least are criminal when state Younger pending, proceedings are administrative where appropriateness suggest of exhaustion. would seem the. Berryhill, supra, Yet the Court at 574-575. Gibson Cf. exception. today adopts rule without a flat support rule with in- its no-exhaustion The seeks to Court Finding nothing directly congressional intent. dications Rights history point itself, Act of the Civil on in the Rights primary places on the recent Civil reliance (1976 § seq. Act, 42 1997et Persons U. S. C. Institutionalized IV). designed Supp. legislation authorize This was ed., Attorney rights civil to initiate actions behalf General § persons. placed 1997a. The Act also of institutionalized authority existing Attorney Gen- limits on the certain bégun by persons. in institutionalized suits eral to intervene § § in the Act sets forth an ex- addition, 1997e, See 1997c. § brought by only requirement claims but haustion prisoners. provision 1997e, re-

On the basis of the exhaustion by Representative primarily Kastenmeier, the marks Congress general contends that has endorsed no-exhaustion irony reasoning A rule. The should obvious. prompted Department principal Justice to concern that adopt, support, in- the vast and the 1997ewas brought prisoners in federal crease 1983 suits year-by-year in these increase courts. There has been 1981 over in fiscal suits since the mid-1960’s. The increase resulting 15,639 such a total 26%, fiscal 1980 some compared The 1981 in 1980. 12,397 filed in with suits court district over 8.6% of the total federal total constituted Although present frivolous docket. most of these cases civil through appeals many litigated the courts of claims, are fairly system de- can be on the this Court. burden any, that would if benefits few, scribed as enormous appropriate if exhaustion of cases meritorious in available be required prior any were to remedies state administrative problem primarily litigation. It was federal-court § 1997e.21 prompted enactment history legislative from the Con- clear Moreover, it is problem addressing the exhaustion in simply gress was problem focused any general The concern fashion. purpose in this petitions. new Act had a dual prisoner requiring prior exhaustion of ade- respect. to In addition Congress wished authorize the At- to quate remedies, necessary protect torney when to constitu- act General rights prisoners, same time minimize the but at the tional prior by requiring exhaus- kind for federal action need sponsors made this clear. of the Act the Senate tion. Both explained 1997eas follows: Hatch Senator relating alleged violations constitu- “In actions may persons required rights prisoners, such tional procedures grievance the At- exhaust internal before pursuant [the torney can become involved General added).22 (emphasis Cong. Act]” Rec. 3716 Bayh, the exhaus- Act, the author of the described Senator provision tion similar terms: At only effective if the requirement The exhaustion in 1997e becomes the available

torney or a federal district court determines General forth in subsection prison grievance procedures comply with standards set (b) date, has not certified Department of 1997e. As of this of Justice grievance procedures single inmate of even State. explanation Hatch on several other occasions Senator offered the same (1980) (“Section 7 Cong. in the course of the debate. See 126 Rec. 9227 At specific procedures applicable before the would establish that would be imprisoned or in torney could enter into an of an General action behalf fully person. person exhaust all carcerated Such would first have had in which he grievance internal mechanisms in the institution that existed (“Section 7(D) confined”); id., that the admin at 10005 further clarifies only pur grievance procedures istrative 7 are for the established section poses prisoners be requiring grievance to exhaust internal mechanisms behalf”). Attorney litigate fore the can General on his rights being alleged prison inmate’s

“[I]n a event of Department before the Justice . . . then violated prison inmate or suits, the initiate could intervene pursue all of their ad- have of inmates class would law the State before within remedies ministrative provisions Department under the intervene could Justice Act].” [the Id., at 3970. Rights enacting of Institutionalized in the Civil short, powers focusing on the Persons Act question prisoners’ particular Attorney and the General, § question general in ac- of exhaustion on the suits, not purpose revealing the limited 1997e as to tions. Also adopt legislation imposing Congress’ consistent refusal example, requirement. general Thus, for no-exhaustion providing: into the Senate 1979, bill was introduced stay any shall or dismiss court of the States “No United brought ground Act on the civil action party bringing failed to the rem- such action exhaust agencies edies available the courts or the administrative Cong., Sess., S. 96th 1st State.”' reported The bill out of committee. was never requirement plaintiffs available and ade- exhaust quate subject well-developed administrative remedies— exceptions firmly virtually every established area of —is law. This is sense, dictated actions common by comity adequate as well as where federalism, administrative remedies are available. question properly

If the exhaustion were I us, before Appeals. would affirm Court of

Case Details

Case Name: Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla.

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Jun 21, 1982

Citation: 457 U.S. 496

Docket Number: 80-1874

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS