KUHLMAN v. THE STATE
S23A0699
Supreme Court of Georgia
September 6, 2023
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court‘s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court‘s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
After the Georgia Board of Public Safety (“the Board“) denied Rick Allen Kuhlman‘s application for relief from the prohibition on the possession of firearms by convicted felons in
1. In 2011, Kuhlman pled guilty in federal court to one count of health care fraud under
Board denied Kuhlman‘s application, “determin[ing] that [his] application for [relief from] [d]isabilities pursuant to
A week later, Kuhlman filed his action for declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that his “conviction pertained to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, or restraint of trade and therefore qualifies for relief under
In its order granting the State‘s motion for summary judgment, the superior court ruled that “[s]overeign immunity bars [Kuhlman‘s] claim for a declaration as to the nature of his conviction“; that “[e]ven if not barred by sovereign immunity, [Kuhlman] is not entitled to a declaration that his conviction qualifies for relief pursuant to
2. We turn first to Kuhlman‘s contention that the superior court erred by ruling that sovereign immunity barred his statutory claim.2
that the Board‘s “act” of denying his application for relief under
is a claim that the Board‘s act of denying his application was “in violation of the laws . . . of this state,” and that claim therefore comes within the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity in
3. Having made the necessary threshold determination that sovereign immunity does not bar Kuhlman‘s statutory claim, we
next consider the superior court‘s ruling on the
When interpreting a Georgia statute, federal court decisions construing a federal statute or rule have persuasive value only to the extent that the language and context of the Georgia statute at issue are materially similar to the federal statute or rule. See
General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811, 821 (2) (c) (874 SE2d 52) (2022) (“[W]here the language of a Georgia statute deviates from the federal rules [of evidence], the persuasive value of the authority interpreting and applying the federal rules is diminished.“); Stubbs v. Hall, 308 Ga. 354, 358 (3) (a) (840 SE2d 407) (2020) (“In construing a Georgia statute that closely tracks federal statutory law, we may look to federal court decisions and commentary interpreting the federal statute as persuasive authority.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Community & Southern Bank v. Lovell, 302 Ga. 375, 377 (2) n.6 (807 SE2d 444) (2017) (“[A]lthough there are some differences between the state and federal provisions, those differences are not material to the question presented here. We may, therefore, look for guidance in decisions of the federal courts.“). See also Buckner-Webb v. State, 314 Ga. 823, 834 (878 SE2d 481) (2022) (Pinson, J., concurring) (“[W]hen we need to figure out the meaning of Georgia law, decisions of federal courts . . . are helpful ‘only to the extent that [those] decisions actually were guided by the same language, history, and context’ of the Georgia law in question. When we rely on such federal decisions without making sure the relevant text and context match up, we risk giving an ‘interpretation’ of Georgia law that is arbitrary, wrong, or both.” (quoting Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 188 (II) (C) (824 SE2d 265) (2019))).
The federal statute that contains language similar to
Very few federal courts have construed the language of the similar federal statute, and every United States Court of
offenses are ‘unfair trade practices’ is unnecessary.“). Under Georgia law, however, not only is such a separate examination of the former necessary, any consideration of whether the offense at issue is similar or generally related to regulation of business practices is simply not relevant at any point in an analysis of the pertinent exclusion in
Kuhlman makes no argument that his healthcare fraud conviction is an offense that pertains to any of these three specific categories. Instead, he only applies the federal courts’ test for
Accordingly, the superior court‘s alternative ruling that rejected Kuhlman‘s statutory claim on the merits must be affirmed.
4. Because Kuhlman has not prevailed on his statutory claim, we must proceed to his constitutional claims. Although the superior court did rule on the merits of Kuhlman‘s state constitutional claim, the court erred in concluding that it could not reach the merits of Kuhlman‘s federal constitutional claim.
Kuhlman contends that the superior court erred because it effectively ruled that
But the State has conceded in its appellate brief, as well as in oral argument, that “§ 1983 does not preclude state causes of action for violations of federal constitution[al] rights.” (Emphasis omitted.) And the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that “the § 1983 remedy is, in all events, supplementary to any remedy any State might have.” Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U. S. 411, 430 (II) (B) (1) (143 SCt 1444, 1453, 216 LE2d 183) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).
In this case, Kuhlman did not mention section 1983 in his amended complaint, but he expressly sought a declaratory judgment. Under a plain reading of that complaint,8 construed in Kuhlman‘s favor as required, the superior court could not have reasonably concluded that it was brought under section 1983, especially given that theory of recovery would not have been viable.
See Lynch v. Waters, 256 Ga. 389, 391 (349 SE2d 456) (1986) (on motion for summary judgment, both “the evidence and pleadings will be construed in favor of the non-moving party“). To the contrary, a theory of recovery based on general state law regarding declaratory judgment actions can be reasonably and fairly drawn from Kuhlman‘s amended complaint. See City of Rome v. Turk, 235 Ga. 223, 225 (1) (219 SE2d 97) (1975) (“Under the Civil Practice Act a complaint is to be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn are to be construed in plaintiff‘s favor, and in a motion for summary judgment this same preference is to be given to the party opposing the motion.” (citation omitted)).
superior court for a declaratory judgment is the appropriate litigation mechanism for . . . review” of the constitutionality of statutes. (citing
Kuhlman also contends that the superior court erred by ruling that his state constitutional claim fails on the merits under our decision in Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 501, 503 (3) (299 SE2d 707) (1983). The holding of Landers squarely forecloses that claim, and Kuhlman asks us to overrule it. We need not address that argument at this time. Because the superior court rejected the federal constitutional claim under its section 1983-based theory, it did not reach the merits of that federal claim. Now that the superior court will presumably reach the merits of that claim, it is possible that the court would decide the claim in Kuhlman‘s favor, and if that were the case, it would avoid the need to reach his state constitutional claim, and his corresponding argument that Landers should be overruled. Because we generally do not decide constitutional questions unnecessarily, see Raffensperger v. Jackson, 316 Ga. 383, 399 (888 SE2d 483) (2023) (“Because we have determined that the Act is unconstitutional on one of the grounds asserted, we need not address Plaintiffs’ arguments that the trial court erred in ruling that the Act does not violate their equal protection rights under the Georgia Constitution.“), we therefore vacate the superior court‘s decision as to the state constitutional claim and leave it to that court in the first instance to address Kuhlman‘s federal and state constitutional claims on remand. If the court rejects each of those claims on their merits, they will be reviewable on appeal.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.
Notes
More fully, the relevant part of
A person who has been convicted under federal or state law of a felony pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, or restraint of trade shall, upon presenting to the Board of Public Safety proof, and it being established from said proof, submitted by the applicant to the satisfaction of the Board of Public Safety that the circumstances regarding the conviction and the applicant‘s record and reputation are such that the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms by the person would not present a threat to the safety of the citizens of Georgia and that the granting of the relief sought would not be contrary to the public interest, be granted relief from the disabilities imposed by this Code section.
Although our order granting Kuhlman‘s application for discretionary appeal identified only one specific claim of error with which we were “particularly concerned,” we did not direct the parties to file briefs on that issue only and, therefore, “we have not limited the scope of the discretionary review more narrowly than the enumeration of errors in the application.” Zekser v. Zekser, 293 Ga. 366, 369 (2) n.13 (744 SE2d 698) (2013) (“When we do limit the scope of review more narrowly, we do so explicitly.“). We first address sovereign immunity because its applicability “is a threshold determination, and, if it does apply, a court lacks jurisdiction over the case and, concomitantly, lacks authority to decide the merits of a claim that is barred.” McConnell v. Dept. of Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 19 (805 SE2d 79) (2017). See also Polo Golf & Country Club Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Cunard, 306 Ga. 788, 790 (1) (a) (833 SE2d 505) (2019) (“Sovereign immunity . . . must be ruled upon prior to the case moving forward on the more substantive matters.” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, the superior court properly addressed sovereign immunity first and then proceeded to make an alternative ruling on the merits of Kuhlman‘s statutory claim. See Department of Labor v. McConnell, 305 Ga. 812 (828 SE2d 352) (2019) (affirming the Court of Appeals’ holdings on remand that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on sovereign immunity grounds but that the trial court correctly ruled in the alternative that the complaint failed to state a claim).
In full, subparagraph (b) (1) provides:
Sovereign immunity is hereby waived for actions in the superior court seeking declaratory relief from acts of the state or any agency, authority, branch, board, bureau, commission, department, office, or public corporation of this state or officer or employee thereof or any county, consolidated government, or municipality of this state or officer or employee thereof outside the scope of lawful authority or in violation of the laws or the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States. Sovereign immunity is further waived so that a court awarding declaratory relief pursuant to this Paragraph may, only after awarding declaratory relief, enjoin such acts to enforce its judgment. Such waiver of sovereign immunity under this Paragraph shall apply to past, current, and prospective acts which occur on or after January 1, 2021.
We recognize that such a declaration, standing alone, would not entitle Kuhlman to relief under the statute. The Board still would have to be satisfied from proof submitted by Kuhlman that under the circumstances, his “acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms by the person . . . would not present a threat to the safety of the citizens of Georgia and that the granting of the relief sought would not be contrary to the public interest.”
No party disputes, and we agree, that the federal and state constitutional violations Kuhlman alleges come within this constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity. As the superior court recognized in that regard, “the above waiver of immunity applies to [Kuhlman‘s] request for declarations that
The superior court properly made an alternative ruling on the merits of Kuhlman‘s statutory claim before addressing his constitutional claims, and we similarly reach the statutory issue before the constitutional claims. See Cottrell v. Smith, 299 Ga. 517, 520 (I) (A) (788 SE2d 772) (2016) (stating that “a trial court should first resolve other questions regarding a statute before addressing an issue of constitutionality,” and adding that “it is well-settled that this Court will not decide a constitutional question if the decision in the appeal can be made upon other grounds“). See also State v. Randall, 315 Ga. 198, 200 (1) (880 SE2d 134) (2022) (“[I]nquiry into the constitutionality of a statute generally should not be made by the trial courts if a decision on the merits can be reached without doing so.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
One United States Court of Appeals considered the federal statute prior to the 1986 amendment. See United States v. Meldish, 722 F.2d 26, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1983).
The Civil Practice Act provides that, on motion for summary judgment, although the non-movant “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,”
Of course, an action for declaratory judgment must meet other longstanding requirements for such actions. See Sexual Offender Registration Review Bd. v. Berzett, 301 Ga. 391, 392-393 (801 SE2d 821) (2017) (The Declaratory Judgment Act gives superior courts the power to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party only “in ‘cases of actual controversy’ under