KENDALL YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
Case No. 5D16-1610
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT
May 12, 2017
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
LAMBERT, J.
Kendall Young, a juvenile offender, challenges the constitutionality of the ten-year mandatory minimum provision of a ten-year prison sentence that he received for committing the crime of robbery with a firearm, a first-degree fеlony punishable by up to life imprisonment.1 Young does not contend that a ten-year prison sentence by itself is unconstitutional,2 but asserts that pursuant to the United States Supreme Court opinions in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the imposition of any mandatory minimum sentence upon a juvenile offender violates the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because such a sentеnce precludes the trial court from making any individualized sentencing considerations and fails to recognize that juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform. Young also raises a second argument, not presented to the trial court, that Florida‘s juvenile sentencing statutes, codified in
In Graham, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids a sentence of life in prison without parole for a juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide. 560 U.S. at 74. Two years later, in Miller, the Court held that a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders who commit homicides violates the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 132 S. Ct. at 2465. In response to both Graham and Miller, the Florida Legislature enacted the afоrementioned juvenile sentencing statutes to comply with both cases. Notably, while
Our review of the constitutionality of a sentence is de novo. Abrams v. State, 971 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing Russ v. State, 832 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)). We reject the argument that the ten-year mandatory minimum sentencе imposed in this case violates the Eighth Amendment as being inconsistent with Miller‘s direction that a judge must have the flexibility to fashion the appropriate sentence for a juvenile offender, allowing for the consideration of the juvenile‘s age. 132 S. Ct. at 2460, 2466-67. Young was adjudicated guilty of a crime for which he faced a maximum sentence of up to life imprisonment. Because Young was a juvenile offender, he was entitled to a separate sentencing hearing pursuant to
We find no constitutional error in the trial court‘s sentence. The court clearly allowed for the consideration of Yоung‘s age in fashioning its sentence, as evidenced by Young receiving the lowest permissible sentence for his crime.4 Although we acknowledge that the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence required here does limit, to some extent, the discretion of a trial court in sentencing a juvenile offender, we do not view this modest limitation as a constitutional infirmity.
“Reviewing cоurts . . . should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislators necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes . . . .” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). “[T]he length of a sentence aсtually imposed for violation of the criminal law is generally a matter of legislative prerogative.” Morrow v. State, 856 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (citing Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993)). In sentencing juvenile offenders, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under Graham is implicated when a juvenile‘s sentence lacks a review mechanism that does not afford him a meaningful opportunity to obtain early release during his or her natural life based
As to Young‘s second argument, we agree with the State that the issue of whether the 2014 enactment of the juvеnile sentencing statutes impliedly repealed the mandatory minimum sentencing requirements in this case under
Moreover, we find that even if this issue had been preserved for review, it lacks merit. First, the repeal of a statute by implication is not favored. Newell v. Fla. Dep‘t of Corr., 42 Fla. L. Weekly D538 (Fla 1st DCA Mar. 3, 2017) (citing Carcaise v. Durden, 382 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)). Second, “[t]here is a general presumption that later statutes are passed with knowledge of prior existing laws, and a construction is favored which gives each one a field of operation, rather than having the former repealed by implication.” Id. (quoting Oldham v. Rooks, 361 So. 2d 140, 143 (Fla. 1978)). Finally, although an earlier statute can be impliedly repealed by a later statute, the enactment of the later statute does not operate to repeal a prior statute by implication unless such is clearly the legislative intent. Am. Bakeries Co. v. Haines City, 180 So. 524, 529 (Fla. 1938).
Here, there is no clear indication that when it enacted the juvenile sentencing laws in 2014, the Florida Legislature intended to affect the ten-year mandatory minimum provision of
AFFIRMED.
TORPY, J., and JACOBUS, B. W., Senior Judge, concur.