American Bakeries Co. v. City of Haines City

de- the Constitution were interstate clauses of commerce ideas, in- and signed goods, to commerce keep open these, police power, power dividuals and as to tax, the State employed by no could be power other isola- in a itself legislative position other agency place reasons, local tion, competition suppress purely in similar busi- acquire advantage engaged an over those nesses. is therefore affirmed. below judgment

Affirmed. and Whitfield, Brown, Buford, J., C.

Ellis, Chapman, Concur. J. J. corporation Company, organized an d

American Bakeries Georgia, under the laws of Seybold Baking existing Company, corporation organized and under existing City City, Florida, Georgia, Haines laws of Robinson, Corporation, Mayor Earle Municipal as L. Commissioner, C. and as W. City Lockhart R. J. Commissioners, Beagle, as Wadsworth, E.R. City as Treasurer, K. Manager, Eva as Winger, City City Clerk, Collector, Yale, City Paul D. Zed as Joyce, R. Murphy, Municipal V. as Chief A. Judge, City. Police Haines 524. March Opinion Filed 1938. 28, 1938. April

Rehearing Denied J. Keen and A. Frank Jr., Velma for O’Kelley, Appel- ; lants Cobbey Huie,

Maxwell & and Gordon C. Appellees. question case involves of whether Brown, J. This licenses certain impose contained in power munic- ipal legislative repealed, superseded, charter or sus- was pended, provision in a by contained later Act. general This often general question proved difficult of solu- has in tion jurisdiction. consideration has been some- Its what complicated Article III of the Constitu- by provides tion which that: “The shall establish Legislature a uniform system of county municipal government, which shall be applicable except cases where local or special laws are provided Legislature that be by may inconsistent therewith.” at section was amended the general

This election in 1934 so as to read as follows: “The Legislature shall establish a uniform system of county municipal government, which shall be applicable, except where local or cases special provided laws counties are Legislature by for that may be inconsistent therewith. The Legislature shall by law for provide their incorporation, government, jurisdiction, powers, duties and under privileges such classi- fications, and no special or local cities incorporating laws towns, for their government, jurisdiction, ^providing duties powers, privileges shall be passed Leg- islature.” (Italics supplied.)

It that will observed the amendment of 1934 appears contemplate laws relating government municipalities counties shall be applicable “except cases where local or laws are pro- counties vided Legislature be inconsistent there- with.” The words “for counties” were inserted amendment of seem would limit the to so clause as to indicate that uniform the government laws for municipalities should be applicable fact that spite there or special local laws might municipal- relating However, ities inconsistent therewith. the amendment little 1934 has if any, application the question before us 796 principles

here, which is governed by we think .amend- Furthermore, that this have held construction. we 1934, in in far 24, Ill, adopted so ment to Section Art. to the local relating government as it affects laws cannot be- towns, cities self-executing operative come the seen fit to the Legislature pass until has general system for the classification and of' govern- laws ment cities the amend- and towns so commanded by 628, 80; Alsop, ment. See State v. So. 216, 590; Emerson, Jones, 121 State v. Fla. Fla. 171 So. 663.

In this case the American Bakeries Company Sey- bokl Baking Company, Georgia both a corporations, filed bill against City, Florida, City enjoin Haines enforcement of in Ordinance No. so far itas affected plaintiffs. business The bill alleged that American Company Bakeries operates owns and in bakery Orlando, Florida, and Seybold Bakery Company owns operates Lakeland, in Florida, bakery and that each of them takes orders for and makes sales and deliveries of bak- in a products large number in ery cities State of Flor- ida, Haines including City; at products bakery sold wholesale by plaintiffs of Haines City are manu- City factured their respective bakeries in Orlando and Lake- are land and delivered by trucks owned and operated by complainants large number retail business houses in City; of Haines that the City methods of the or- taking ders and deliveries to making stores is, Haines instaAces, certain orders are some taken opera- the trucks certain tors of from business and such or- houses filled by being delivered the operators ders of and, subsequent day days, trucks on in other instances, are filled and that the orders taken delivery made from goods trucks, products that time on the making at loaded thus immediate thereof. delivery bill that Ordinance No. alleges further August requires

became plaintiffs pro- effective occupational permitted cure licenses they may before City; to on to in Haines the business above referred carry up been such licenses to plaintiff September that had paying 1937, 160, 30, af- but in far it that Ordinance No. so as 18011, business, Chapter fects is in with plaintiff’s conflict 1937, thereof, Acts that of and and Section especially in far said is void so inoperative Ordinance therefore and as it at- affects the A plaintiffs. of copy Ordinance to the bill. tached

The defendant City interposed and officers motion its to complaint dismiss the bill of upon grounds and various the Court to dismiss sustained the motion and denied injunction for. In this prayed connection with ruling in Chancellor below a well opinion rendered considered which other it that ad- among things was stated was it that impose to attempt mitted Ordinance does on license that part business done the trucks of plaintiffs which is done orders and by taking subsequently into bringing products Haines and City delivering same, that but to applies portion that only the busi- trucks, done by plaintiffs ness where the City said having products them, the bakery on and at places business customers, of various prospective take for such orders prod- ucts and deliver same immediately from trucks. such legislative 12790, of Haines City, Charter Chapter thereof, Acts of City authorizes the taxes, Commission impose to for the purpose reg- revenue, or upon ulation occupations, numerous businesses and privileges conducted within the City. Ordinance No. 160, adopted under general power, a whole- requires merchant, the re- to ambulatory,” selling

sale “including stock, take out a tail merchant direct license of from business, place provides each and annually for $25.00 stand, car, vehicle, truck, R. that “each and R. every a separate shall be of business.” place construed the Acts Chapter Appellants contend imposes County is a state law which upon profes- of businesses and broad field license taxes sions, the businesses city authorized the other- additional license taxes when impose except located to law, that the effect provided wise other thereof, was of said of Section especially above supersede ordinance part city which, attempted impose referred Haines set upon forth. license tax the business of above plaintiffs as follows: part reads Said Section in the business engaged 5. of Every person “Section or1 tangible trading, buying, bartering, serving selling per- otherwise, owner, broker, agent, as property sonal shall entitle (which a license tax shall him to main- of pay $25.00 movable) business, stationary tain one of place and shall business, provided for each additional place pay $25.00 re- dollar license tax shall not be twenty-five that the said of business licensed under place provi- for any quired Florida, 1935. Acts Chapter sions Laws a calcu- not license tax Wholesalers others who do pay receipts or in from their sales gross on part lated wholly merchandise an for sale shall pay who stock of keep their for each thousand dollars of additional tax of $1.50 merchandise, than (other petroleum products.) stock the sale any delivery used by person Vehicles for from paid, at wholesale his established property tangible personal shall be on which license business not place of be business and license separate places no construed on may levied such vehicles or the as operator thereof otherwise, salesmen or or Munic- State or any County other ipality, any law to contrary notwithstanding.” (Italics supplied.)

It will be 5 of observed Section said Act imposes a State and tax license all County upon $25.00 en- persons gaged the business of tangible selling personal property wholesale, at retail or “which shall entitle him maintain place business, one movable,” stationary or and “shall business,” for each additional pay $25.00 place of but adds that: “Vehicles used by any person for the sale and delivery of tangible personal at wholesale from property his estab- place lished of business on license paid shall be construed to a separate place of no business and license may be on levied such vehicle or the as operator thereof otherwise, salesman or State or Mu- County or any ” nicipality, other law contrary notwithstanding of said provides statute county cent, license tax of fifty per tax, of the State license then adds: “Provided incorporated towns cities and such impose further license taxes of same kind upon the same as subjects deem they may proper, except when otherwise provided law, or other but imposed so taxes fifty per shall exceed cent of tax, the State license except otherwise authorised by law.” (Italics ours.)

Said 19011 is a broad statute con- sections, tains but does not purport cover the entire taxes, field of license nor to afford revision new of the licenses; entire subject nor does it contain any general clause. repealing to,

Counsel for the city shall call attention and empha- size, Sections 38 39 Act, and of said general which read as fellows:

800 inclusive; 886, 803 to both That Sections

“Section 38. inclusive; 910, inclusive; both 899, 901-to both to inclusive; 971, 985, 969, to inclusive; both 964, to both inclusive; of 1005, 993, both inclusive; 995 988 to both to 1920; Chap- of Florida Revised Statutes General Florida, Acts of Chapter Laws of ter 14491 and Laws 1929; Chapter Florida, repealed.” hereby Acts of shall herein to That be construed nothing 39.

“Section imposed specifi- tax law and now repeal any license repealed hereby.” cally - v. DeLand Lake Helen S. R. & Stewart

In case of Dist., this Court reviewed our B. 71 So. cases, at certain principles Florida earlier and arrived here, construction, interest which have since statutory stated Court, and are concisely been by this followed case, follows: the first nine headnotes to “1. The maxim of posteriores contrarias leges priores applicable is not Act abrogant cases where the precedent special subsequent and the Act is particular, general, the rule later Act general being work does not repeal a former particular statute. In

“2. the construction of general special Acts the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant applies, and general repeal will be held modify one within the of the embraced terms a general unless revision of general Act is the whole or unless Acts are so ir- subject, repugnant two as, indicate a legislative reconcilable intent that the one the other. repeal should or modify will not be “3. One held to statute a former one a positive there is unless between repugnancy two, latter intended prescribe clearly was only rule for, or the case revises the govern provided which should former, expressly repeals matter of the it. subject respect “4. invariable rule of construction to earliest implication is that the of statutes the repealing force, incon- the two unless are manifestly remains with each other. repugnant and to sistent be with reference “5. Laws should construed to to be designed accomplished, Constitution purpose materia, though laws in connection with other pari contain no reference to each other. they a comprehensive terms covers “6. Where one statute only particular and another later a subject statute embraces should be construed to- part subject, of the same the two appears; intent gether legislative unless a different subject particular part statute to the relating exception an qualification gen- will to or operate as the extent eral the more comprehensive terms of statute only repugnancy, any. if as expressly well “7. While statutes be impliedly as may operate enactment of statute does repealed, yet the clearly such statutes unless repeal by implication prior intent. legislative An intent thereof repeal prior portions “8. statutes when, a positive there and irrec- apparent may made a later provisions oncilable between repugnancy statutes. mere enactment those But prior existing statute in whole fact that later relates matters covered part or in statute not cause by prior does older statute. If two operate

“9. statutes the same subject upon positive without in the inconsistency practi- repugnancy cal effect each consequences, should they given effect unless a designed them intent clearly contrary appears.” were, are, still principles closely thus down and laid

in with in line the this See weight authority country. 904-924, 59 C. 931-936. J. opinion the appellees strongly

Counsel for rely upon Howell, this 73 Fla. decision of Court in Sanders v. case, head- approval which cites with above the case, In notes to which have the Sanders quoted. we Pensacola, an appears that ordinance of the enacted City of under the in its general power legisla- contained licensing charter, iniposed upon dairymen tive a license per- other in milk or whereas selling city, sons cream said delivering that farm and general the Act there all involved provided therefrom, grove products, products manufactured when farmer for sale or sold by pro- offered or grower all exempt said be forms ducing products, from “shall State, tax, license This Municipal.” general County us, re- like the one before contained no general now not clause. The Court that Act did pealing held general operate repeal of the of the Pensa- licensing provisions vig- cola charter Act. Mr. Chief filed a Justice Browne opinion. orous dissenting petition rehearing On that opinion Court said was controlled majority by McDonald, 915; that the Ferguson 63 So. v. Act general under consideration “does refer expressly law”; or repeal special that the local or law any existing involved, that, applicable subject was to the under Sec- Ill, Constitution, tion Art. law is applicable, “when local or laws provided Legislature that be inconsistent therewith.” McDonald,

The case Ferguson cited the Sanders case, stipra, involved license of per year imposed $100.00 Miami, under its general licensing power, on Telegraph Companies. The charter Act that connec- provided tion that the amounts of such licenses should de- shall not be ordinances,” amounts which fixed by city The general law.” revenue state pendent upon should telegraph systems provided state revenue law mile, cents Comptroller fifty per a license tax to pay ran the line to the through one-half counties go that “no in each proportion county, mileage munici- imposed county further shall be also provided another portion But pality.” way in any Act shall construed as “Nothing been granted have the powers or limiting abridging Act Act or charter special municipal corporation by to any license taxes.” the payment for the purpose of requiring in con- considered this latter provision, court held that municipal powers to control the organic power nection with the laws, imposed the made special or local Art. Ill quoted Court city legal. The also However, headnote reads: the fourth Constitution. the special relating “When there valid local or are laws powers particular municipalities the government law, local in with the such statutory that are general conflict special or' prevail.” laws the “inconsistent.” provision The constitutional uses word correct, the in the decision of case was undoubtedly But itself, of the above of the Act language general view very quoted. v.

However, opinion the the Sanders Howell majority from that approval portion express case with quotes v. Lake Helen & B. DeLand and S. R. opinion Stewart District, wherein it said: was supra,

“In special the construction of general and Acts maxim non specialibus applies, generalia derogant and a Act general repeal will be held to or a modify special Act, one embraced within the of the general general terms is a general general revision Act of the whole unless ir- or unless the two so repugnant Acts subject reconcilable, legislative a intent that the one indicate other.” repeal modify should a former un- statute will not be held one “One two, between the positive is repugnancy less there rule prescribe latter was the only intended to clearly for, itor revises govern provided which would the case former, it.” repeals matter or expressly of the subject in the construction enunciated Sanders Thus rules of as those estab- already case were same substantially a special It thus previous appears lished by decisions. Act will not be in whole where repealed, part, it. Act., but such subsequent inconsistent with merely general with effect when direct repealing only occurs conflict even when repugnant to the Act. And clearly general re- exists, the later Act will repugnancy such special peal or local when its terms, contrary. evidences clear intention legislative court Sanders, Fla.

In State said: later words, gen-

“In or local law and other if a merely a are municipality powers eral law to the relating in respective provisions, general inconsistent their and1 in express repeal supersede some terms or law does law, sphere within proper the latter will its prevail local the local or operation, repeal unless an intent to supersede ours.) law.” (Italics law in the clearly appears general The cases of v. Stewart DeLand and Helen Lake R.S. Dish, & B. supra, cases Sanders v. Howell and Sanders, v. State rules and the supra, construction therein enunciated, have been frequently followed with quoted cases; It approval by this Court. is not necessary to cite the

Counsel appellant rely upon strongly the case Lundsford, v. Langston 122 Fla. 898. In that So. power under charter City, licensing case Panama acting that an ordi- passed similar to Haines possessed by City, in the nance engaged a license busi- imposing upon persons liquors.. orders for alcoholic soliciting ness of and taking law was licensing State general liquor Subsequently regulation to cover the field of both passed, designed manufacture, sale all taxation distribution and cent, alcohol. beverages than more one containing per case, In that the Court said:

“The general rule Act will general not be held to or impliedly repeal one, modify subject local to the qualification that this does not rule apply where general Act is a general revision of the whole subject, where the two Acts so irreconcilable as repugnant and to indicate a intent that legislative one should Howell, other. modify Sanders v. 73 Fla. 802; Co., 999; v. So. Land 45 Fla. 33 So. Stewart Dist., Road Special 42; Fla. 71 So. Sanders, State v. 85 So. 333.

“But here Section 7 of the state statute expressly pro- vides no tax shall be placed manufacture, on the dis- tribution, transportation, importation or sale of such bev- erages license, excise, way or otherwise, mu- any nicipality, anything the municipal charter to the con- trary notwithstanding, ‘except as herein author- expressly ized.’ That provision case, disposes of this clearly show- ing legislative intent that such no ordinance as the one here in question should be adopted or enforced municipality the State.” Act construed Langston v. Lundsford,

did contain a clause but repealing the Court did not mention it opinion, as the legislative its intent was clearly resorting Act without the general the terms shown addi- an clause, was merely repealing to general the Indeed, a general intent. such legislative indicia tional does, repeal repugnant to operate may, frequently Act and no Act contains law, though general the special local or clause, intent re- legislative to where general repealing n plain made local or laws is peal conflicting all Act. purposes general the terms and 300, Wentworth, 75 Fla. So. in Anderson v. Thus 1917, to Act general comprehensive on high- motor the public vehicles the running regulate ordinance in there- conflict city way, was held entire made subject Act covered with. The any collect county municipality it “unlawful for any except on motor vehicle” license or fee registration True, hire. vehicles contained used clause, doubtful that Court but general repealing had if that clause have different conclusion would reached (cid:127) been omitted. _ State, Greeson, Roberts, Likewise ex rel. Fla. .126 114, 170 state relating statute slot machines was deprive held to power Jacksonville coin-operated In impose a license on devices. that case Court, Mr. through said: speaking Justice Terrell,

“Chapter is the Acts latest expression of on the Legislature subject of licensing slot machines devices, operated coin it covers the whole mat- subject a different from that ter it defines heretofore policy fully, force, out in the amounts im- it sets terms bemay state, county, municipality, as license taxes posed such as to expressly repeal every provisions and its State, Bradford, ex rel. subject. on the v. Stout- law other 486, 123 So. therein cited; cases Fla. amire, State, Baker, 122 Fla. 166 So. McCarthy, ex rel. v. 280.” case, repeal-

In that contained general Act general clause, the entire but its intent to preempt occupy ing manifest from the affirmative provisions field was Act. in construed City Orlando Gill. also dealt with one particular sub- It a general contained

ject. clause as repealing conflict- laws, to ing which “But was added: this shall not be con- strued as law consistent repealing any herewith.” The adopted prescribed a certain sale of licenses to for the paid operation pool and billiard halls accord- tables, to the ing number of provided incor- any porated or town city might impose license tax to ex- ceed fifty per cent of the state license. The had there- city adopted tofore an ordinance imposing higher scale license fees under charter power given by special Act authorized city impose and fix taxes the amounts regard thereof “without to any provi- sions of revenue law now or here- force after to be enacted which does not this specifically Court, Act.” This Mr. through speaking Justice Buford, said: “We construe this Act to mean that it fixes a state policy for the of pool licensing and billiard halls this state and that in so far as it limits the-license which be.imposed aby for the municipality privilege of operating pool or billiard supersedes all halls special legislative Acts there- tofore passed inconsistent provisions. with the It is not necessary for tous go beyond jurisdiction this for author- ity holding. State, this See ex Greeson, rel. v. Roberts (Fla.), So. 457.” cases—Langston v. group appears

It thus Wentworth, State, Greeson, ex rel. Lundsford, Anderson v. court was deal Roberts, v. Gill—the of Orlando and City to completely that intended were laws with ing general in with, manifestly and which subject dealt were cover legislative policy to a new or different also define tended of so that happens reference It also each with thereto. intent legislative evident emphasized Acts said this general Act clause. The a repealing general embracing general by not, opinion, in our now for consideration does before us cases, in that the Act a within this of as group fall entirely licenses, nor subject cover of does not completely whole But a clause. certain par it contain general repealing does Act, themselves, are of ticular considered provisions used, prescribe intended to apparently, language from govern to those particular an exclusive state rule or policy matters, contrary all or laws to the special local nulli apparent Whether this notwithstanding. intent was other, a in sections of Act contrary fied evidencing Indeed, tention, we do appellants will consider. presently cover the that 18011 was intended contend to field, or to all whole revision licensing Their municipalities. posi license laws powers or that, tion is otherzvise except specifically provided by as Act, municipalities the license were not and powers laws repealed superseded, contained cite they proviso Act, in Section of the hereinabove quoted, support that, op But in order position. contend they do laws, repeal erate local it is conflicting special the Act the entire of license necessary cover field possible subject; that it sufficient for but every taxes subjects as to those which are particular to have that effect Act, respect dealt with to which an intention with therewith laws conflict mani- repeal plainly fested, such, instance, provision re- as the imposition taxes specting upon of license trucks used for the sale person tangible personal delivery wholesale from property place at established busi- his on which is paid. ness a license Acts, between As two where general statute covers the whole Act, matter earlier subject of an and was for, evidently of, intended a revision substitute the earlier although express contains no words effect, it operates as a of the earlier Act to the extent that provisions are its revised thus supplied, effect giving intention, to the evident legislative though even the later Act contains express no clause. repealing Stoutamire, 486, 834, v. 98 Fla. 123 So. cases cited. And may be true even where later the Act a covers broader field than earlier State, the Act. Sparkman 71 v. Fla. 71 So. 34. Holden, See also v. Jernigan Fla. 413; Smith, 16 So. Dees v. 46 So. 173. of statute intent to is be determined considera- used, of matter, tion the language subject purpose the the designed be accomplished, all other relevant and matters that proper legislative assist ascertaining the Sparkman State, intent. supra. v. As was said Mr. Chief in his dis- Justice Browne, opinion Howell, Sanders

senting supra: “The rules the governing construing legislative enactments pre- are scribed for the purpose of the legislative in- ascertaining tent, and not be applied should thwart it.” And as was Mr. said case, another Peoples Justice Whitfield Arbuckle, Bank v. Fla. “The intent of law, statute the is the and that intent should be ascer- duly tained and effectuated.” is the fundamental rule This all are construction to other rules subordinate. 909, 912, said: it is In 59 C. J. in enacting Legislature, that the

“It will be presumed statutes re- statute, existing full knowledge acted with express where terms to the subject; same lating an against repeal used, always the is presumption are not statute, there is such earlier unless repeal intention to an pre- between statutes as to the inconsistency repugnancy statute whole the later revises clude presumption, former. matter subject Acts, is specific there repeals expressly a statute “Where not repeal others that it was intended to presumption implied approval In case there specified. such is intention evidence an specified, well as statutes as undisturbed, of implied doctrine leave them and the not apply.” does to, or in con- repugnant legislative

“Where Acts two other, latest with, one passed, last being flict each will, will, it contains expression legislative although of the clause, control, or so prevail, no repealing govern, supersede earlier to the extent impliedly repeal conflict, inconsistency, repugnancy, provided requisite to degree of the character and is repugnancy application the rule.” 931-934,

And in 59 said: C. J. that a undoubtedly “While rule affirmative Act, Act, an general provisions express or the without not -repeal, repeal pre- will affect a words or ordinarily Act, special special pro- or or the or particular vious local Act, a prior visions of on the same it .subject, is not a yet law, rule a positive but one of construction only; special a, one, may repealed general Act be impliedly question repealed whether has been one of so always is rule, In legislative intention. accordance with this pre- is a sumption Act does not a general repeal local or special not presumption apply statute. The rule only where the two are not inconsistent or repug- Acts nant, inconsistent, even are somewhat or but where they even of the are though terms law broad general enough embraced) special to include the in the Act. cases or local a different intent They apply legislative unless is plainly, manifested, clearly and two Acts unequivocally as where the are inconsistent or or repugnant, where irreconcilably Act general subject not covers the whole matter of only one, the special but is to contain all the law intended also on the subject exclusive, and to be or take place to the special isor intended to a manda- establish clearly and uniform or datory rule for the system whole state. local, a an a implied Also construction favor of repeal of special, specific adopted one will by general unless it in order absolutely words of necessary give Act any at general all. meaning general intent statute supersede particular statute special relating will municipality implied unless between repugnancy their provisions so irreconcilable that reasonable no operation field of either can be without on the trenching cov- ground found other, ered when the manifest intention of the later is to enactment revise the matter whole covered by enactments, disconnected to furnish a all, to introduce a substitute for netv and exclusive rule 934; upon the C. subject. St. Petersburg J. Co., 315, 100 Power So. 509. Pinellas We have reviewed these rules of statutory construc- tion some length at because instant case presents what to an enigma, almost amounts also because of the fre- with which quency brought this cases court involv- ing question whether a general statute ex- in suspends, supersedes or repeals, or pressly impliedly Act. special local part, previous whole or some or licens- adopted under general The ordinance its charter legislative Haines by power granted ing merchants Act, (includ- a “wholesale imposed upon license every for of each and ambulatory)’’ annually ing $25.00 business, every each and place of vehicle provided that of separate busi- place or truck be construed should Act, ness, 5 of the general whereas an annual license tax on imposed of of Laws $25.00 tangible person selling per- each of engaged business entitle such agent, sonal owner or which would property, as business, or place maintain person stationary one movable, additional place for each annually and also $25.00 business; a license others paying wholesalers and for sale to receipts pay tax who stock gross on keep ,$1000.00 stock; and per an additional tax of add- $1.50 the sale by person that: “Vehicles used ing any at from -wholesale delivery tangible property personal paid, on which a license is place established business (cid:127)his business, places separate to be shall not be construed or the operator on such vehicles and no license levied otherwise, thereof as salesmen or not- contrary law to the Municipality, any other County withstanding.”

If were portions foregoing only would, considered, statute to be we of the light above authorities, Act, that the hold im- unhesitatingly of the pliedly repealed suspended authority City, power under its charter licensing granted by impose tax on each ordinance truck every operated wholesaler for the sale used delivery tangible from his personal property place established on which a paid, business license had been treating each business, at- as separate vehicle truck of' place or as in- tempted to be authorized ordinance here by volved, respect and because the ordinance in that is clearly in conflict to the repugnant provi- with irreconcilably of the later statute from. In- above quoted sions the statute “shall expressly deed such says trucks business,” separate construed as places expressly prohibits “any county municipality” from li- levying thereon, cense other to the notwithstand- “any law. contrary ing.” The in ordinance that respect is not “incon- merely sistent” with quoted provisions statute; of the general it is intent, repugnant thereto. directly And the legislative which in the last analysis is the cardinal rule this which by determined, case must be clearly by manifested the lan- in guage used said Section 5.

Now, ordinance, does Section earlier quoted opinion, intent rebut the so ? clearly Section 5 by shown While equivocal, somewhat in our if opinion, anything, tends more strongly support plain intent Section than it support does contentions appellees to the contrary. law,” “or other other- “except words as law,” wise authorized as used said Section well very have meant some other law enacted Legis- lature as distinguished from a mere ordinance city passed under the general licensing power city contained charter Act. This charter power therein impose contained to on businesses licenses the city, within were repealed, themselves but the in- tent of Section 5 was limit of, toi restrict the exercise or at most supersede partially suspend, the general power of licensing and all municipalities any as to so ex- clude therefrom power impose on licenses trucks for the used purposes named Section separate places business, which particular power had never been ex- rule new Act. This charter this special granted by pressly uniformly operate 5 to intended manifestly was policy State, a new establishing throughout thus pro- were municipalities all that subject on violating. hibited from 38 and 39. the effect of now Sections

We come to consider numerous repeals Act expressly Section 38 of general this 1920, Chap- and also the Rev. Gen. Statutes sections 1929, 14528,. Chapter 16801 and and Laws ters ex- laws thus 17167, All of these Laws 1935. Chapter and to relating repealed were statutes general pressly taxes, occupational except Chap- various license imposing impos- which were statutes 16801 and ters business, such as special licenses on certain classes ing and (14528), beauty-parlors merchants (16801) itinerant respectively. halls None of (17167) billiard and pool Acts; none special local these Acts were or repealed so city. applied particular them to any as statute general expressly contention is that this Acts, it specific must be repealed presumed certain general not repeal that it was intended to others not modify any rule, special either specified general. There general is authorities, the supported the effect that where a by to Acts, the repeals specific statute expressly presumption repeal specified. it not others not that intended to But was argument thereon applied based as this special char- .to thereunder, ter or to the ordinance enacted is weakened that fact clause in by repealing general this Act re- statutes, other state fers to only dealing, like the involved, occupational with here license imposed one taxes occupations throughout State, on certain businesses throughout applicable the State. or potentially provides: of the Act “That Section nothing herein tax now repeal any imposed shall be construed by not repealed hereby(Italics law and specifically ours.) section, taken connection this with It contended that section, the intent tends to rebut plainly so preceding 5 of the “and expressed Section unless words mean repealed Legislature that hereby” sepcifically had, specifically Section by embracing considered suspended power theretofore repealed might municipalities impose have been vested license taxes trucks, on used wholesalers for sale and delivery wares, their separate Considering business. places of whole, as a mandatory the Act definite and very have been their language used latter must mean, failing intention. Legislature did Surely designate expressly specifically number each one of hundreds of every Acts, literatim, charter municipal seriatim ad nullify clear provisions of Section which established new rule in these particular subject, exclusive on this words: for the sale person delivery any

“Vehicles used by wholesale from his estab- tangible personal of at property a license is not on which paid, lished of business shall place business, of li- separate places construed to be be no levied on such vehicles or the thereof operator cense bemay otherwise, the or or or mu- county as any salesman laza to the any notwithstanding other nicipality, contrary must have been the language this considered Surely the operative ef- superseding suspending as or Legislature laws, adopted under fect, gen- of ordinances any law, to said powers, charter contrary eral matter. this particular the ques- closeness of freely difficulty

Admitting not, involved, Legislature is that the our conclusion did tion 816 set aside the plain intend nullify Sections 38 and section same in another of the

intent of used language 5 Act, thereof: Section said namely that, appellees But contend if its stated even given plainly effect, 5 al- provision this Section cannot be particular of stand, it a permits lowed because classification which Art. repugnant discriminatory, to Sections Constitution, in a IX of our that authorizes license upon city, local wholesale merchant business within the doing but prohibits city license on non- imposing from resident wholesale merchant business within doing by trucks classification the fact city; solely this is based on an one place wholesale merchant established has not; within the while other has Ham- city business citing Collins, But, city ilton 201. if the we think is a raise this proper party question, do founded, the contention is well nor that case cited is point. recognize We rule that cannot be businesses taxation, classified, upon for license purposes merely here, their location. But that rule because apply does not, wholesale in Haines City businesses located under in a manner from taxed different located other any city wholesalers businesses from tax- exemption State with to the regard on operated ation sale and trucks delivery goods from an place established business on which license paid. that the that the intended Legislature conclusion is

Our this Act provisions mandatory general effect, suspend and that it should super- given should effect operative provisions any special sede Acts, thereunder, charter or ordinances municipal passed with, to, repugnant are conflict said plainly which the ordinance of particular such as City Section

817 Haines here involved. The wisdom or fairness of the statute was a question Legislature, not this and court, to determine. remanded.

Reversed and J., C. J., Ellis, Whitfield, Buford, and Terrell and J. concur. J., dissents.

Chipman, of Chapter Acts of Whitfield, J. Section sections specifically repeals chapters enumerated statutes, of general state license and Section 39 expressly enacts “that herein Chapter) in the shall nothing (meaning license tax repeal imposed nozv law any construed by Act). hereby” and not specificallyrepealed by (meaning The repealed laws stated in 38 of specifically Section none of which are local or laws. Act does not, repeal laws, all Section specifically conflicting but statutes, repeal does stated expressly Section ex repeal statutes, pressly stated expressly pro shall vides he nothing construed repeal license tax law not any repealed specifically Act. by Acts Section 5 of contains a provision that:

“Vehicles used for the sale and any person delivery tangible at from his personal property wholesale established on which a license is place business shall be con- paid, business, separate places strued to be no on such be levied vehicles thereof as operator otherwise, salesman or or munic- any county other law ipality, any contrary notwithstanding.” provision does quoted conflicting Such any law; intended effect as shown given but should its used, which it its connection language is that law to notwithstanding(cid:127) other no contrary,

818 may municipality or any county or tax

license by as stated thereof operators or the on levied vehicles provision. quoted the particular used provision as particular effect of the legal quoted 39, 38 and in connection with Sections and considered suspend supersede, or until otherwise repeal but to not to laws, if provisions all conflicting provided, duly taxes that are spe license any, county State or levying to suspend 38 of the Section repealed cifically or municipal charters other provisions all supersede or ordinances, relating authorized local laws duly municipal operators taxation vehicles and their when the operators used thereof are en the vehicles particular stated in the gaged quoted provision of Sec 18011, Acts Chapter tion of 1937. See Mernaugh Orlando, 34; 59 C. 940. Sec Fla. J. repealed C. L. ( tion 90 relates statutes. The G. 74) (cid:127) its policy provision of the statute was determined by have enactment. Courts no in de part responsibility of statutes. termining policy Buford, J.,concur. Brown and J.

Chapman, dissent (dissenting).—I majority from J. in this reasons: opinion following filed cause Chapter 39 of Acts of pro- First: Section vides, herein shall be “That construed to nothing imposed re- license tax now law and specifically 5 of Acts hereby.” pealed provides:

“Vehicles used any person for the sale delivery tangible at personal property wholesale from his estab- place paid, of business on license is lished which a shall not separate places business no be construed to operator on such be levied vehicles or thereof as otherwise, salesmen or the or or by State Mu- any County to contrary notwithstanding.” other law the nicipality, any that the opinion The holds above majority quoted por- 18011, 1937, Chapter tion Acts of sufficient legally of 12790, to 116 Chapter strike down and of Sections Florida, Laws Haines (the present of charter for City), which as follows: reads

“Sec. 115. Commission author- Licenses.—The City ordinance, impose ized the to and taxes for levy by purpose revenue, regulation occupations, all upon upon all create privileges fix the any to provide be amounts to to the collection of the paid; for same, and to for failure or refusal to provide penalties' pay All imposed such license license taxes shall taxes. such so re- legal constitute indebtedness be City, covered in competent jurisdiction Court of and no sale, exempt of such debtor from forced property shall law, City after due process for such The indebtedness. ordinance, Commission for may, provide licensing, dogs, dogs, and for the destruction of when keeping keeper owner or the regula- thereof shall with comply thereto, prescribed in effect and for tions ordinance persons ordinance punishment city upon violating this subject.

“Sec. 116. Period Licenses.—Licenses eqr Covered shall periods, be issued and he transferable as pro- vided General Laws for License. The agent proprietors or of non-resident agents shall re- severally sponsible for on business in manner like as if carrying they fact that proprietors. were The firm or any person, corpo- ration himself or itself reporting engaged any busi- ness, or calling profession occupation for the transaction required, a license is or that person of which exhibiting indicating engagement or advertisement such sign busi- be conclu- shall occupation, ness, profession calling corpo- firm or such person, liability evidence of sive a license.” ration pay Florida, Constitution 8 of Article VIII 12790, Acts Chapter enact Legislature power

gave Act, being the general as whether question of 1927. Charter 6924, 1915, over the Chapter prevail Acts of should Pensacola, provision being of the in the before this Court Sanders was case Acts of Howell, when p. text said: Court, Mr. speaking through Justice Shackleford, “We approve this.holding. We would call fully of also Chapter attention the fact 6924 that contains no repeal- Unless, then, clause. ing Chapter 6924 and Section 1 of Chapter 6087 of the Acts of 1909 are so repugnant irreconcilable as intent legislative indicate that latter, repeal former pro should both modify tanto statutes must In Florida East Coast permitted stand. Hazel, 263, 43 Ry. 272, Co. v. Fla. 31 South. Rep. 99 Amer. 114, Rep. St. we that ‘Repeals held implication are by favored, order that the court declare one statute another repeals implication, must appear that positive two, there is a between the repugnancy that the prescribe last clearly was intended to rule only for, provided should or that it govern case revises subject-matter County of the former.’ See also State v. Gadsden, 620, In Rep. 63 Fla. 58 232. Ferguson South. McDonald, 494, 915, that, Fla. 63 Rep. 66 South. we held v. to the relating there laws ‘Where are valid local particular municipalities powers government law, statutory such local or in conflict with authorities, these Under we must prevail.’ special laws Chapter 1 6087 of Acts of 1909 hold that

821 has repealed not been 6924 of modified or Acts of 1915.”

It appears that question raised as every of the charter of the provisions Haines City City stated Sanders opinion fully answered majority Howell, v. supra. ' Second: This Court has cited with approval the rule

expressed Howell, v. Sanders in the supra, following Anderson, cases: Stephens 575, v. 75 205; Fla. 79 So. State, ex 180, rel. v. Duval Young, 76 County, Fla. 79 So. 692; Davidson, Ex 272, Parte 76 727; State, Fla. 79 So. ex Triay, Burr, rel. 290, 61; v. 79 Fla. 84 So. City St. Co., 315, v. Petersburg Power Pinellas 87 Fla. 100 So. 509; City Apalachicola State, 921, 93 v. 112 So. Fla. 618; 984, Abell v. Town of 95 Boynton, 507; Fla. 117 So. 127, Placid, West v. Town Lake 361; 97 Fla. 120 So. Miami, 292, v. 608; 101 134 City Fla. So. Lawless, 84, Lake 895; Alfred v. 102 135 Fla- Fla So. mingo Park Warehouse Solberg, Co. v. 113 Fla. 151 281; So. Co., Critchlow v. 116 Fla. Maryland Casualty 440; 156 So. v. Broward Garrison Investment Cor- poration, State, 212; 163 ex So. rel. Mul- doon, v. 700; McCarthy, Fla. Langston Lundsford, v. 898; Stone, Fla. So. Scott 784, 129 Fla. 176 So. 852.

The opinion violates doctrine stare de- majority the of cisis.

Third: In the case Sanders, 835, State v. 85 333, So. this Court considered before and had it the ex- istence or of a general non-existence It clause. repealing held if the that law not in general does some express terms law, supersede the local the local will law pre- vail, this rule the applied should case at It bar.

822 attempted as is by implication a statute cannot strike down here. 813, Lunsford, 122 165 v. Fla. Langston

Fourth: In 1935, 16774, there is 898, Chapter Acts So. based on. Í8011, clause, Chapter whereas repealing contained a general authority the 1937, taxing Acts of seeks to strike repealing no general the Haines contained City City, the Legislature, Chapter clause. The fact that by, 18011, repeal- therein place failed and omitted the clause it was not intention ing is conclusive Legislature to'repeal Chapter 12790, Laws of charter Haines City upon question which the ordinance predicated. Gill,

Fifth: In of Orlando v. City Fla. law subject licensing controlled halls pool amount to be fixed way collected State; of taxes (a) for: (b) (c) county; municipality; clause, contained the following “All laws or parts laws in conflict with inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed superseded. this shall not But be construed law therewith.” repealing consistent It stands to reason a different Legislature was before the policy with “pool reference to halls only” right of mu- tax the same. such nicipality to We find language no clause in Neither 18011. the in- repealing itwas tention of the Legislature change of business policy here petitioners and no intention clear to affecting deprive municipalities of revenue. this

We are recognize previous forced ruling of Howell, Court v. Sanders supra. case of upon Orlando Gill no bearing has case at bar. The Special case of Stewart v. DeLand-Lake Helen R. & B. Dist., 71 So. has no application Fla. to the prin- bar, in ciple of case at rules except fixing law involved the in construction. controlling court making statutory in a of in Sixth: This has held number cases Court of, statute, in the as well testing construing validity the of the necessary resort had if may history legis- to lation, to in which it public of times was history it in passed, compared cognate with laws order determine its as an and effect aid purpose, meaning to Amos, its See v. 100 Fla. determining validity. Sheip State, Davis, Clearwater, 699; ex rel. 139 So. 377. Court can take judicial This of common knowledge prevalent notice Florida previous to and at the time of the passage of 18011 by We of the Legislature. municipalities find many In Florida some instances munic- financially embarrassed. ipalities were with rates of interest. involved heavily' high were Many unable to interest on bands financially pay or to extend the time of payment. Taxpayers many it impossible knew was pay cities towns It interest rate heavy and declined taxes. was dif- pay ficult to meet the current the towns expenses operating months, and cities. been met in Payrolls had many other items were in difficult maintain default and was the costs of State government. municipalities organized and were before 1937 Legislature begging financial assistance at the very passage time Chapter 18011. They represented their bonds were default, strike, were aon taxpayers past payrolls due, filed, current bill unpaid, suits costs being heavy of municipal government meet. asked the 1937 They Legislature tax, for financial from gasoline pointing aid out that cities and towns formed instances many Florida; links on the connecting highway system stabilized, that if was help bonds could be pay- extended 824 met, re- taxpayers current debts would liquidated,

rolls assist and the spond that this would Florida policy and nation financial rehabilitation The mu- program. their Florida 1937 see nicipalities requested Legislature of It is diffi- right, justice prevail. that fairness and should these cult to conceive under facts and circumstances that the limited cities and be further of should resources towns of 1937 Chapter Leg- reduced 18011. The members islature did not that Florida intend and towns of cities of deprived should be this revenue. 4 the Constitu- Rights

Section Declaration of of of provides: tion of Florida so every

“All in this shall be open, per- courts lands, goods, person for him his done injury son law, of have course reputation remedy, by shall due sale, denial justice shall administered without right and delay.” right If are to be in this cause justice administered revenues of Haines shall continue in City, future as in and the past decree from appealed be affirmed. should Rehearing

On Petition contended Section 5 of Chapter It Brown, J. sentence of the paragraph last first especially Court, section, as construed is unconstitu said 16 of the as Article III tional violation Constitution, in that the title of Act not broad The title such of the provisions. reads enough to cover follows: Taxes, License Act Relating Repealing Chapter “An Florida, Chapter 1929; Acts Laws of VI, Chapter Parts Title of Division Repealing of! Florida, 1920; Re- Statutes Revised General of the Florida, 17167, Laws of Chapter pealing Pro- 1935; License Certain Taxes Imposing Acts the Prop- a Lien on License Taxes Shall Be That viding Certain Cir- Therefor, Liable Under Person of the erty cumstances.” Act, ex- of the as that the subject

It real will noted taxes,” title, is “An Act to relating in the pressed it also appears in its and scope, broad and section, ’’mat- 5, of said and provisions Section all the Act.” with the subject ter connected properly that Section 5 opinion of the We are clearly upon thus made it. See Grand attack subject is not Moore, 761, 120 Fla. 163 v. Knights Pythias So. Lodge Lee, State, 639, 249; 122 166 108; ex rel. Adams So. v. Fla. 18, 587; Singleton Flint 126 Fla. 170 County, v. Duval So. 1077, Knott, 71; Hunt, 133 109 101 Fla. So. Spencer v. v. Amos, 248, 282; 100 Fla. Company Fla. 147 So. v. Sheip 863, 130 So. 699. the title of statute does not invali-

The generality no- fairly comprehends it as the title and gives date long so accomplished statute, to be sought by tice of subject con- employed not deceptively such generality when to the incongruous gen- unrelated provisions ceal Hillsborough County, Act. v. of the subject Whitney eral 478; Sullivan, 99 Fla. 128 State v. So. supra; Bethea, 61 Fla. 829; 50 Fla. 39 So. State v. Bryan, v. Chase, 550; 91 Fla. 94. Smith v. So. So. title an index to body need of the not Act. 677; DeWoody, In re 94 Fla. Butler Perry, v. 405, 66 So. 150. was in not The Court justified considering this question because it original opinion, presented in its was involved” as stated the briefs of “question ap- either the However, it pellants appellees. or the was discussed to- brief, some extent in their appellees view of importance of it question, we have deemed advisable However, petition on this for rehearing. discuss we con- doubt, sider the so question presented thus free from 5 so title subject expressed within the clearly it is grant rehearing necessary on this nor point, of the other points raised petition for rehearing.

Petition for denied. rehearing Ellis, Terrell, C. Wi-iitfield, J., Buford Chapman, J., concur. J. Hutchins,

Victor County Judge Orange Ramseyerk. State, County, ex rel. A. C. 180 So. 48.

Division B.

Opinion Filed March 1938. Wayne G. Gray, for in Error; Plaintiff Garrett, George P. Defendant Error.

Per appears Curiam. from the record on this ap- peal that B. C. Datson died Orlando, testate on Florida, on 5, 1926. last His will and testament was probated June

Case Details

Case Name: American Bakeries Co. v. City of Haines City

Court Name: Supreme Court of Florida

Date Published: Mar 16, 1938

Citation: 131 Fla. 790

Court Abbreviation: Fla.