Carcaise v. DurdenCarcaise v. Durden
Petitioner seeks our Writ of Prohibition in order to prevent his prosecution for violation of the laws prosсribing unlawful sale of securities. Ch. 517, Fla. Stat. (1973). When the state seeks to prosecute after the statutе of limitations has expired, the proper method to prevent the prosecution is by prohibition. Reino v. State, 352 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1977).
Petitioner and others have been charged in an information filed May 18, 1977 alleging violations of the securities laws which violations, in various counts, are alleged to hаve occurred between June 1, 1973 and December 31, 1974.
The question on appeal is whеther we should apply the general two year statute of limitations applicable to crimes generally or the special five year statute of limitations for securities violations. If the former applies, then we must prohibit the trial judge from allowing the prosеcution to continue; if the latter is applicable, then the statute of limitations did not expire before this case began and the prosecution should continue.
The statutе of limitation in effect at the time of the incident giving rise to the criminal charges is the one to be applied in determining the timeliness of the prosecution. State ex rel. Manucy v. Wadsworth, 293 So.2d 345 (Fla. 1974). At the time petitioner is alleged to have committed the crimes, there were two statutes of limitations; onе concerning non-capital crimes generally1 and the other concerning securities violations particularly.2 Generally speaking, a special statute of limitations which addresses itself to specific matters will take precedence over a general statute.
But petitioner urges that the generality cannot apply here, because in consideration of the history of legislative enactments of
Petitioner urges, and we agree, the lаtest enactment takes precedence over prior enactments. State v. Board of Public Instruction, 113 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1959). We also agree with the proposition that the legislature is presumed to know its own statutes аnd when it enacts a new statute, it is done with that knowledge. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Lee, 142 Fla. 68, 194 So. 305 (1940). However, we are also guided by thе “general presumption that later statutes are passed with knowledge of prior еxisting laws, and a construction is favored which gives each one a field of operаtion, rather than have the former repealed by implication.” Oldham v. Rooks, 361 So.2d 140, 143 (Fla. 1978) (emphasis added). See also State ex rel. Gerstein v. Hialeah Race Course, Inc., 245 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1971).
Using the reasoning in Oldham, we cannot helр but decide the legislature fully intended to retain the five year statute of limitations as it pеrtained to securities violations rather than by implication repeal that statute by another found somewhere else in the books. This is especially so since the legislaturе again dealt with the five year limitations statute in 1971 after the effective date of the general two year statute when in Chapter 71-136, Laws of Florida, it changed the wording in regard to the punishment and left the limitations part alone.
WRIT OF PROHIBITION DENIED.
CROSS and SHARP, JJ., concur.