Kansas v. Garcia
140 S. Ct. 791
| SCOTUS | 2020Background
- IRCA requires employers to verify work authorization using Form I‑9 and limits the use of I‑9s and information "contained in or appended to" them to enforcement of the INA and a few listed federal statutes. 8 U.S.C. §1324a(b)(5), (d)(2)(F), (h)(2).
- Employees must also supply personal data (including Social Security number) on the I‑9; federal law makes false statements or use of fraudulent documents on I‑9s a federal crime, but does not criminalize unauthorized work itself.
- Respondents (three unauthorized immigrants) used other persons’ Social Security numbers on their I‑9s and on federal (W‑4) and Kansas (K‑4) withholding forms when starting jobs; Kansas prosecuted them under state identity‑theft and false‑information statutes based on the W‑4/K‑4 entries.
- Trial courts admitted the W‑4/K‑4 evidence (the State agreed not to rely on I‑9s); convictions were affirmed by Kansas Court of Appeals but reversed by the Kansas Supreme Court, which read §1324a(b)(5) to bar any state use of information "contained in" an I‑9.
- The U.S. Supreme Court reversed: it held (1) §1324a(h)(2) express preemption applies only to employers/recruiters; (2) §1324a(b)(5) does not broadly preempt all uses of facts that also appear on an I‑9; and (3) neither field nor conflict (obstacle) preemption prevents Kansas prosecutions based on withholding forms.
- Separate opinions: Justice Thomas concurred (arguing to abandon "purposes and objectives" preemption doctrine); Justice Breyer (joined by three) would have found implied preemption for prosecutions that police fraud used to demonstrate federal work authorization.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state prosecutions are expressly preempted by IRCA (§1324a(h)(2) or §1324a(b)(5)/(d)(2)(F)) | Kansas prosecutions barred because relevant information was "contained in" I‑9s and §1324a(b)(5) forbids non‑federal uses; §1324a(d)(2)(F) bars use of the employment‑verification system for other law enforcement | State: express employer preemption (§1324a(h)(2)) covers only employers; §1324a(b)(5) restricts use of the I‑9 itself but does not make information unusable wherever it appears; W‑4/K‑4 not part of federal verification system | Held: No express preemption. §1324a(h)(2) targets employers; §1324a(b)(5) does not mean every fact appearing on an I‑9 is categorically unusable elsewhere; W‑4/K‑4 are outside the federal employment‑verification system. |
| Whether IRCA impliedly preempts the field of policing fraud used to demonstrate federal work authorization (field preemption) | Respondents: IRCA occupies the field of fraud on the federal employment‑verification system (so States cannot prosecute fraud related to obtaining employment authorization) | State: Submission of withholding forms and tax enforcement are unrelated to the federal verification system; IRCA does not create a comprehensive, exclusive scheme over all employment‑related information | Held: No field preemption. The withholding forms and tax fraud enforcement are distinct from the federal verification system; IRCA does not evince clear intent to occupy that broader field. |
| Whether Kansas prosecutions conflict with federal law or pose an obstacle to IRCA's purposes (conflict preemption) | Respondents: State prosecutions undermine federal enforcement discretion and IRCA's balance (citing Arizona analogy) | State: Federal law criminalizes some related conduct (W‑4 fraud), federal authorities cooperated in these cases, overlap is common and not dispositive; enforcement priorities do not create preemption | Held: No conflict preemption. Allowing state prosecutions that overlap federal offenses does not alone create an obstacle; Arizona is distinguishable because Congress chose not to criminalize unauthorized employment, which is different here. |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (states may be preempted from criminalizing unauthorized employment under IRCA)
- De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (States historically had room to regulate employment of aliens prior to IRCA)
- Chamber of Commerce of U.S.A. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (interpreting IRCA's employer‑focused preemption provisions)
- Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (field preemption in alien‑registration context)
- Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (fraud‑on‑federal‑agency preemption principles)
- Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (federal scheme for regulating employer conduct may be comprehensive)