Jonathan CORBETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, United States of America, Alejandro Chamizo, Broward County, Broward Sheriff‘s Office, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 13-14053
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
June 4, 2014.
751 F.3d 1241
Robert Lon Teitler, Dania Beach, FL, Robert D. Yates, Robert D. Yates, PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Sharon Swingle, Laura Grace Lothman, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Kathleen Mary Salyer, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, Miami, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before HULL, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-appellant Jonathan Corbett filed a pro se complaint asserting claims against defendants-appellees: (1) the Transportation Security Administration (the “TSA“); (2) the United States; (3) a TSA employee, Alejandro Chamizo; (4) Broward County, Florida; and (5) the Broward County Sheriff‘s Office (the “Sheriff‘s Office“). The district court dismissed nineteen of Corbett‘s claims and subsequently granted the defendants summary judgment on the remaining two claims. Corbett, pro se, appeals the district court‘s dismissal and summary judgment orders. After careful review of the briefs and the record, we affirm.
I. 2011 AIRPORT SCREENING
This case involves the TSA‘s airport security screening of Corbett.
A. The Screening of Corbett
On August 27, 2011, Corbett went to the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport (the “airport“) operated by defendant Broward County. Before boarding commercial flights at U.S. airports, all passengers must submit to screening of their persons and luggage at a security checkpoint. See
To board his commercial flight, Corbett proceeded to a security checkpoint operated by defendant TSA. Corbett had two pieces of carry-on baggage-“an average-sized backpack” and “a small plastic bag of books.”1 Corbett placed his carry-on bags on the x-ray conveyor belt for screening. Corbett was asked to go through the full-body scanner, and he declined.
Corbett refused to permit the TSA screener to conduct the standard pat-down and further stated the TSA screener could “not touch his genitals or buttocks” during the pat-down. The TSA screener told Corbett that his refusal to consent to the standard pat-down screening was “a problem” and summoned a supervisor.
To the supervisor, Corbett reiterated his demand that he not be touched on his buttocks or genitals, and the supervisor called the non-uniformed TSA manager, defendant Alejandro Chamizo, who came to the security checkpoint. Corbett alleged that defendant Chamizo warned Corbett “that if he did not consent [to having his genitals and buttocks touched], he would be forcibly searched” and “would be arrested.”
B. The Screening of Corbett‘s Carry-on Bags
As Corbett was speaking with the TSA supervisor and defendant Chamizo, TSA screeners manually screened the two carry-on bags that Corbett had placed on the x-ray conveyor belt. The screeners did so pursuant to TSA Management Directive 100.4, which authorizes screening of “all contents of accessible property, including, but not limited to, containers, compartments, and envelopes” and notes that screening “may be conducted for the purpose of finding threat items or identification media, as appropriate.” The TSA screeners removed two items from the bags and examined them more closely. The two items were: (1) “a small stack of credit cards, IDs, and other plastic cards“; and (2) a book.
The screener examined the credit and identification cards because TSA Management Directive 100.4 notes that, once screening at a security checkpoint begins, a TSA screener “may screen an individual‘s accessible property for identification media” to “re-verify that the individual‘s identity has been matched against government watch lists.” In a sworn declaration, the TSA official who oversaw screening at the airport noted that “where identification media are found in a passenger‘s carry-on baggage, they are inspected to ensure that the passenger does not use a different name than the name that was submitted for vetting.... A passenger with identification media in more than one name may be attempting to circumvent the watch-list matching program.”
Corbett “verbally objected to the screener‘s review of his credit cards,” and the TSA screener informed Corbett that he “was just making sure the names matched,” as required by the TSA Management Directive.
Corbett also complained that the TSA screener “began to look through the pages of” one of Corbett‘s books. The TSA security director stated that inspection of a book‘s pages is necessary because “books may be used to conceal prohibited or other potentially dangerous items.” Corbett verbally objected to the review of his book, and the TSA screener told him that the screening of the book was permissible.
In his complaint, Corbett did not allege that defendant Chamizo: (1) personally participated in the inspections of Corbett‘s carry-on bags or the items therein; or (2) gave any verbal instructions to the screen-
C. The Sheriff‘s Background Check of Corbett
During these events, a TSA manager summoned an officer from the defendant Sheriff‘s Office. The manager did so pursuant to the TSA‘s standard operating procedures, which provide that “if the screening of a passenger or his or her property cannot be completed, law enforcement must be summoned to resolve the issue.”
After the Sheriff‘s officer arrived, defendant Chamizo gave the officer a copy of Corbett‘s driver‘s license.2 Chamizo gave the driver‘s license copy to the officer because “TSA screening procedures require that law enforcement personnel be notified when a passenger declines to complete screening, and that certain checks be run using the passenger‘s information.” Accordingly, the Sheriff‘s officer conducted a check for outstanding warrants and other background information. The check of Corbett‘s background “came back clear.” Corbett alleged that the entire checkpoint process lasted approximately an hour from start to finish.
Because Corbett would not consent to the manual pat-down to complete the screening, Corbett was denied access to his gate and the Sheriff‘s officer escorted Corbett out of the security checkpoint area. The TSA security director noted in a sworn declaration that a pat-down is “the last available form of screening” and an individual who refuses to consent to a pat-down, like Corbett, “cannot be cleared” to proceed to his gate.
Corbett took his two carry-on bags and driver‘s license, and does not allege that the TSA employees withheld any items.
As discussed later, Corbett claimed that these acts violated his federal and state rights: (1) the detention of Corbett for approximately an hour while the TSA employees attempted to conduct a pat-down screening, screened his two carry-on bags, called a law enforcement officer, and awaited the results of a background check; (2) the inspection of his carry-on bags and two items therein; and (3) the copying of Corbett‘s driver‘s license and boarding pass, and the transfer of the driver‘s license copy to the Sheriff‘s officer.
II. CORBETT‘S RECORD REQUESTS
A. Corbett‘s FOIA Request
In September 2011, Corbett sent to the TSA a request for documents and videos of the August 27, 2011 airport screening, under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA“),
Corbett requested these documents: (1) “[a]ny notes taken by any employees of [the TSA] relating to [the 2011 airport] incident“; (2) “[a]ny incident reports, emails, or other documentation created as a result of this incident“; (3) “[a]ny correspondence between [the TSA] and any other party as a result of this incident“; and (4) “[a]ny audio, video, and[/]or photographic records taken on August 27th between 3:45 AM and 5:15 AM at or around the TSA checkpoint in front of the ‘E’ gates’ (U.S. Airways).” Corbett specified: “[t]his must include all camera views that contain any part of this checkpoint, as well
The TSA referred Corbett‘s FOIA request to airport officials who “performed a manual search for records.” The TSA produced 29 pages of documents, including: (1) incident reports; (2) statements from TSA employees participating in or witnessing the screening; (3) a copy of Corbett‘s boarding pass; (4) handwritten notes; and (5) a TSA inspector‘s statement.
The TSA also sent Corbett videos of the screening, but, before doing so, obscured the faces of the TSA employees, the Sheriff‘s officer, and other passengers in the airport security checkpoint area. The TSA also redacted the printed names of TSA employees and the Sheriff‘s officer. The TSA made these redactions pursuant to FOIA Exemption 6,
Corbett filed an administrative appeal challenging all redactions. The TSA denied Corbett‘s appeal.4
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Corbett‘s Amended Complaint
In March 2012, plaintiff Corbett filed a pro se complaint against defendants the TSA, the United States, Chamizo, and Broward County. In May 2012, Corbett filed an amended complaint (the “amended complaint“), adding the Sheriff‘s Office as a defendant.
Corbett‘s amended complaint asserted twenty-one claims, including, inter alia: (1) claims against TSA manager Chamizo, in his individual capacity, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), alleging that Chamizo violated Corbett‘s Fourth Amendment rights; (2) tort claims against the United States, based on its waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA“),
B. Rule 12(b) Dismissal and Summary Judgment
Each of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Corbett timely filed a notice of appeal. We construe Corbett‘s pro se notice of appeal as covering the district court‘s orders on the motions to dismiss and the summary judgment motion.
IV. THE BIVENS CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT CHAMIZO
We first address the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Corbett‘s Bivens claims against defendant Chamizo based on the 2011 airport screening.6
A. Qualified Immunity Principles
“Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).
Here, undisputedly, defendant Chamizo was engaged in discretionary functions during the 2011 airport screening. Therefore, we examine: (1) whether the facts alleged, accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Corbett, show that Chamizo‘s conduct violated one of Corbett‘s federal constitutional rights; and if so, (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the 2011 airport screening. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quotation marks omitted).
To analyze these questions, we review the law regarding airport screening.
B. Screening at Airport Security Checkpoints
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreasonable searches and seizures,”
Congress explicitly requires “the screening of all passengers and property ... that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft.”
In short, airport security screenings are generally “permissible administrative search[es] under the Fourth Amendment, even though [they are] initiated without individualized suspicion and [are] conducted without a warrant.” See George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 577 (3d Cir. 2013). “[S]creening passengers at an airport is an ‘administrative search’ because the primary goal is not to determine whether any passenger has committed a crime but rather to protect the public from a terrorist attack.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “[T]hose presenting themselves at a[n] [airport] security checkpoint thereby consent to a search, and may not revoke that consent if the authorities elect to conduct a search.” United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 776 (11th Cir. 1984).
With these legal principles in mind, we turn to Corbett‘s claims against defendant Chamizo.
C. The Screening of Corbett‘s Bags, Cards, and Book
It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials, such as defendant Chamizo, are “not liable under Bivens for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). Thus, to state a Bivens claim based on supervisory liability against defendant Chamizo, Corbett must allege that supervisor Chamizo “personally participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or that there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).
Corbett, however, did not allege that defendant Chamizo personally opened any bags, inspected the bags’ contents, or verbally directed the TSA employees to do any specific conduct. Corbett alleged only that Chamizo “was the ‘officer‘-in-charge on the scene and approved of the searches.” Such “vague and conclusory allegations” do not establish a causal connection between a supervisor and unlawful activity. See Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1235.
Alternatively, even if this allegation was arguably sufficient, the search of Corbett‘s bags and contents did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Here, the TSA screeners were authorized, and indeed required, to inspect Corbett‘s carry-on bags and the items contained therein. See
As the TSA security director pointed out, when TSA screeners find identifica-
We recognize that Corbett‘s amended complaint alleged that a TSA screener looked through the pages of one of Corbett‘s books “in a manner that was not to determine if [weapons, explosives, or other incendiary devices] were somehow hidden within the book, but rather to inspect the text of the book.” It was not unreasonable for a TSA screener to closely inspect Corbett‘s book, though, because “thin, flat explosives called ‘sheet explosives’ may be disguised as a simple piece of paper or cardboard, and may be hidden in just about anything, including a laptop, book, magazine, deck of cards, or packet of photographs.” United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, a TSA screener could have reasonably factored the contents of a book possessed by a passenger into the totality of the circumstances relevant in determining whether the passenger presented a security threat. See George, 738 F.3d at 585-86 (noting that the facts that an individual carried a book critical of American foreign policy in the Middle East and Arabic flash-cards were circumstances which “raised the possibility that [the individual] might pose a threat to airline security“).
For all of these reasons, Corbett‘s allegations about the search of his bags and the items therein failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim against defendant Chamizo individually.
D. Detention of Corbett
We also affirm the dismissal of Corbett‘s detention claim against defendant Chamizo. Corbett consented to a screening of his person by presenting himself at the security checkpoint. Corbett could not revoke this consent by merely leaving the checkpoint. See Herzbrun, 723 F.2d at 776 (observing that a rule allowing an individual to revoke his consent to an airport security screening by leaving the airport security checkpoint “constitute a one-way street for the benefit of a party planning airport mischief, since there is no guarantee that if he were allowed to leave he might not return and be more successful” (quotation marks omitted)).
We recognize that the entire security checkpoint screening lasted approximately one hour. Yet, accepting the alleged facts as true, Corbett was primarily to blame for that screening lasting as long as it did. If Corbett had permitted the TSA screeners to conduct a full pat-down screening, he would have swiftly proceeded to his gate. Although a seizure may become “unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [its lawful] mission,” see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 837, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), we cannot say that the time here, given all the factual circumstances, was unreasonable for the TSA employees to satisfy themselves that Corbett did not pose a security threat.
V. THE TORT CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
We turn to Corbett‘s tort claims for assault, false arrest, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“emotional distress“), against the United States. The district court dismissed these claims under Rule 12(b)(1) as barred by sovereign immunity, but Corbett contends the FTCA‘s limited waiver of sovereign immunity applies to these
A. The FTCA‘s Limited Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity protects the federal government and its agencies from civil liability. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 1000, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). The FTCA in
The first problem for Corbett is that this limited waiver of sovereign immunity in
Importantly, this intentional torts exception in
Two of Corbett‘s intentional tort claims-assault and false arrest-are specifically named in
Because Corbett‘s invasion of privacy and emotional distress claims are based on the same underlying conduct as his assault and false arrest claims, they are likewise subject to the intentional torts exception to the sovereign immunity waiver. See id. at 1265 (noting that claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion upon privacy were barred when they were
B. The Law Enforcement Officer Proviso
We do not stop there, though, because there is also a statutory exception-termed the “law enforcement proviso“-to the statutory intentional torts exception to the sovereign immunity waiver. Immediately after stating that sovereign immunity is not waived with regard to certain intentional tort claims,
Thus, the sovereign immunity waiver applies to the intentional tort claims here if the TSA employees involved were “investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.”
Several courts have concluded that TSA screeners perform consensual, pre-boarding administrative searches for certain prohibited items (i.e., knives, firearms, liquids, gels, etc.), not traditional law enforcement functions such as making arrests and executing searches for violations of federal law, although their reasoning has varied. See Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., No. 09-5505, 2014 WL 1489939, at *5-8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2014) (concluding that the phrase “searches ... for violations of Federal law” is ambiguous and determining that an analysis of the FTCA‘s legislative history “strongly suggests that the law enforcement proviso was enacted as a response to specific egregious behavior during raids conducted by federal law enforcement officers, and was not intended to be expansive enough to cover airport security screeners” (omission in original)); Walcott v. United States, No. 13-CV-3303, 2013 WL 5708044, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2013) (concluding that “the meaning of ‘empowered by law to execute searches ... for violations of Federal law’ under
We need not resolve this thorny “search” issue. The TSA screeners are not subject to the law enforcement proviso for a simpler reason-they are not “officers of the United States Government,” as required by
Further, the federal statutes governing airport security screening differentiate between federal employees of TSA and law enforcement officers. Significantly,
These provisions show that, within TSA, there are: (1) federal employees, who conduct airport security screening; and (2) law enforcement officers, who perform various law enforcement functions. The TSA screeners here are the first type-federal employees conducting airport security screening. Nothing in the record in this particular case shows that the TSA employees who screened Corbett had been specially designated as officers under
Therefore, the intentional torts exception does apply, and sovereign immunity
VI. THE PRIVACY ACT CLAIMS AGAINST THE TSA
The district court also did not err in dismissing Corbett‘s Privacy Act claims. The TSA is subject to the Privacy Act‘s requirements for federal agency record-keeping. See
To prevail on a Privacy Act claim under
Alternatively, Corbett contends that the district court should have liberally construed his Privacy Act claims as requests for an injunction ordering the TSA “to amend” its records by destroying the copies of Corbett‘s driver‘s license and boarding pass. The Privacy Act does provide for injunctive relief in the form of ordering an agency to: (1) “amend the individual‘s record in accordance with his request or in such other way as the court may direct“; or (2) produce to the individual “any agency records improperly withheld from him.”
VII. THE FOIA CLAIM AGAINST TSA
The next issue is whether the district court properly granted the TSA‘s motion for summary judgment on Corbett‘s FOIA claim.10
A. FOIA Principles
Under FOIA, a government agency must disclose to the public requested documents unless they fall within one of the nine statutory exemptions. Moye, O‘Brien, O‘Rourke, Hogan, & Pickert v. Nat‘l R.R. Passenger Corp., 376 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004); see
Here, the TSA produced documents and videos, but redacted: (1) the names of the TSA employees and Sheriff‘s officer; and
B. FOIA Exemption 6
Exemption 6 provides that an agency need not disclose “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
FOIA does not provide a definition of the term “similar files.” In U.S. Dep‘t of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 102 S.Ct. 1957, 72 L.Ed.2d 358 (1982), the Supreme Court instructed that “the phrase ‘similar files’ was to have a broad, rather than a narrow, meaning.” Id. at 600. Exemption 6 is not limited to “a narrow class of files containing only a discrete kind of personal information.” Id. at 602. Instead, the exemption applies to “detailed Government records on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Congress‘s “primary purpose in enacting Exemption 6 was to protect individuals from the injury and embarrassment that can result from the unnecessary disclosure of personal information.” Id. at 599. In light of this purpose, the Supreme Court determined that Congress intended that “the balancing of private against public interests, not the nature of the files in which the information was contained, should limit the scope of the exemption.” Id.
Further, an agency‘s investigative reports constitute “similar files” for purposes of Exemption 6. See Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 524 F.3d 1021, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2008) (based on the Supreme Court‘s Washington Post opinion, the court had “little difficulty in concluding that the names and identifying information contained in [an agency report of an investigation into a fatal forest fire] me[t] the ‘similar file’ requirement of Exemption 6“); Wood v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 432 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Exemption 6 applies to any personal information contained in files similar to personnel or medical files, such as administrative investigative records.“); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 449 F.3d 141, 152-53 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (an agency‘s redactions of names from records of the approval process for a drug was permissible under Exemption 6 because the statute exempts “not just files, but also bits of personal information, such as names and addresses, the release of which would create a palpable threat to privacy” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
Our circuit has applied Exemption 6 in several cases. In Federal Labor Relations Authority (F.L.R.A.) v. U.S. Department of Defense, 977 F.2d 545 (11th Cir. 1992), this Court held that the Defense Department‘s disclosure of a list of names and addresses of non-union federal employees within a relevant bargaining unit would result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and withholding was allowed under Exemption 6. Id. at 547-50. We noted that “employee addresses say nothing about a federal agency‘s character or function” and therefore “the public interest side of the balance” carried little weight. Id. at 548. We rejected as overly tenuous
Next, in Office of the Capital Collateral Counsel v. U.S. Department of Justice, 331 F.3d 799 (11th Cir. 2003), this Court concluded that, under Exemption 6, the Department of Justice (“DOJ“) could withhold certain documents pertaining to internal disciplinary proceedings against a former Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA“). Id. at 801-02, 804. We noted that “[t]he fact that [the AUSA] was a public official ... [did] not render her interest in preserving her personal privacy without weight.” Id. at 803. The AUSA‘s privacy interest was significant, as the documents reflected “her private thoughts and feelings concerning her misconduct ... and its effect on her, her family, and her career.” Id. And there was “already substantial information available to the public about [the AUSA‘s] misconduct and her subsequent sanctions.” Id. at 804. This already-public information satisfied the public interest in knowing about how the DOJ responded to the misconduct, and the AUSA‘s personal reflections about her misconduct were “not relevant to the public interest in knowing what the government is doing.” Id.
In News-Press v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, this Court permitted the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS“) to redact from documents the names of individuals who applied for federal disaster relief funds after four hurricanes struck Florida. 489 F.3d at 1177-79, 1205. However, we required the DHS to disclose the applicants’ addresses. Id. at 1205. This Court observed that the three news organizations did not articulate a “terribly strong” public interest in disclosure of the names. Id. at 1185, 1205. Further, withholding the names would “substantially reduce the potential for negative secondary effects of disclosing the addresses.” Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
C. Applying Exemption 6 Here
Under the particular facts here, we conclude Exemption 6 permitted the limited redactions the TSA made. The TSA produced its full investigative files, including incident reports, witness statements, and videos. The TSA protected only names in the documents and faces on the videos.
The TSA‘s documents and videos describe in full detail every aspect of the events at issue and the TSA‘s response to those events. Disclosure of the names of the individuals in those documents, or faces of the individuals, would not add to a reader‘s or viewer‘s understanding of those documents and images. See F.L.R.A., 977 F.2d at 548. Additionally, the TSA employees named and depicted are low-level screeners and security-checkpoint supervisors, and disclosure of their personal identities would not shed any light on the TSA‘s operations. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 88-89; see also Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Homeland Sec., 384 F.Supp.2d 100, 116-17 (D.D.C.2005) (concluding Exemption 6 allowed the TSA to redact names of its employees in documents because: (1) “federal employees have an identifiable privacy interest in avoiding disclosures of information that could lead to annoyance or harassment“;
Here, the individuals, named or depicted, have privacy interests in avoiding disclosure of their personal identifying information. See U.S. Dep‘t of Defense v. F.L.R.A., 510 U.S. 487, 500, 114 S.Ct. 1006, 1015, 127 L.Ed.2d 325 (1994). And, Corbett has not shown the public has a compelling interest in disclosure of these personal identities. Corbett has not offered a reasonable, much less a compelling, explanation for a public interest, or even his own personal need, for the names and faces in the records here. For example, Corbett does not contend that knowing the personal identities would assist him in this or other litigation.
In short, based on the record before us, we conclude the individuals’ privacy interests outweigh any public interest in disclosure of the names and faces here.
We thus affirm the district court‘s summary judgment to the TSA on Corbett‘s FOIA claim.11
VIII. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.