John Timson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his pro se qui tarn action under the FCA, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. Timson makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint because, as a pro se relator, he was unable to maintain a qui tam action under the FCA. Second, he argues that the district court abused its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. For the reasons set forth more fully below, we affirm.
As an initial matter, Timson also appeals the stay of his motion for a temporary restraining order; however, the merits of this appeal render that issue moot.
See BankWest, Inc. v. Baker,
I.
We review
de novo
the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Glover v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
The FCA permits a private individual, called a
qui
tam
1
“relator,” to file a civil action against, and recover damages on behalf of the United States from, any, person who:
*873
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)-(2), 3730(b)(1), (c)(3);
United States ex rel. Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of America, Inc.,
*872 (1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.
*873 The FCA is silent on whether a private individual can bring a qui tam suit pro se. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. The plain language of the FCA does not limit qui tam actions to those private individuals employing counsel. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1), (c)(3). The FCA simply states that “[a] person may bring a civil action” under the FCA “for the person and for the United States Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
We have yet to decide the issue of whether a private individual can bring a
qui tam
suit
pro se.
Those Circuits that have considered the issue have held that
pro se
relators may not prosecute
qui tam
actions.
See Stoner v. Santa Clara County Office of Educ.,
Section 1654, Title 28, the general provision permitting parties to proceed
pro se,
provides: “In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct
their own cases
personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (emphasis added). The provision appears to provide a personal right that does not extend to the representation of the interests of others.
Accord Stoner,
As noted above, the FCA is silent as to whether a private individual can bring a
qui tam
suit
pro se. See
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. The plain language of the FCA draws no distinction in an individual’s ability to bring a
qui tam
suit based upon whether or not that individual is represented by counsel.
See
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1), (c)(3). The absence of an explicit authorization for
qui tam
suits to be brought
pro se
could indicate, however, an intention by Congress that
qui tam
suits be brought according to § 1654 and “the established procedure which requires that only one licensed to practice law may conduct proceedings in court for anyone
*874
other than himself.”
Stoner,
To the extent that Timson argues that he should be allowed to sever his interests under the FCA from the interests of the United States, that approach would be inconsistent with the purpose of the FCA, which is to aid the government in combating fraud through an incentive to private individuals aware of such fraud.
See Ragsdale,
For all these reasons, the district court did not err in dismissing Timson’s complaint because Timson could not maintain a qui tam suit under the FCA as a pro se relator.
II.
As an initial matter, the government argues that we are without jurisdiction to review the dismissal of Timson’s state law claims because his notice of appeal fails to explicitly reference the claims’ dismissal. “Where an appellant notices the appeal of a specified judgment only[,] this court has no jurisdiction to review other judgments or issues which are not expressly referred to and which are not impliedly intended for appeal.”
Whetstone Candy Co. v. Kraft Foods, Inc.,
Timson, however, fails to address the issue in his opening brief. He argues in his reply brief that his retaliatory discharge claim provided an independent basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. While we read briefs filed by
pro se
litigants liberally,
Lorisme v. I.N.S.,
In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Notes
.
"Qui tarn
is short for
‘qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,'
which means 'who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as well as his own.’ "
Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc.,