John JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF FRANKLIN; Williamson Medical Center; Marc Swain; Carlos Cordero; Jeff Carson; Ryan Frazier; Nick Grandy; Cory Kroeger; David Jenkins; Shawna M. Daniel; Jon Andrew Russell, M.D., Appellees-Defendants.
Case No. 16-5558
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Filed January 27, 2017
279 Fed. Appx. 279
Barnes entered his conditional guilty plea pursuant to
Although Barnes argues that language in his motion to dismiss is sufficient to preserve this issue for appeal, he is mistaken. He points to language from that motion, such as “[g]iven the recent changes in position regarding marijuana, both at the state and federal levels, the Court should not accept the government‘s general interest in regulating marijuana as a compelling interest,” but all of the language he cites is part of his argument for a RFRA defense, and not a separate argument regarding the scheduling of marijuana. Upon further review of Barnes‘s motion to dismiss, he makes only two arguments: 1) that the indictment should be dismissed because he was authorized by the ONAC to grow marijuana as part of a RFRA exemption; and 2) that in the alternative, he should be allowed to raise a RFRA defense at trial. Nowhere in his motion does he ask the district court to reschedule marijuana.
Barnes may be correct that his motion argues that “recent research shows that marijuana is not as dangerous as was once believed, and in fact has medicinal properties.” However, this is not nearly enough to constitute making the argument to the court that marijuana is improperly scheduled as a Schedule I controlled substance. Nowhere does Barnes mention that it should instead be Schedule III, nor does he ask the court to do so and sentence him accordingly. In the conclusion section of his motion to dismiss, he asks the district court for only two things, and he cannot now attempt to argue on appeal an issue which he did not preserve through his conditional guilty plea. The entry of his plea waived any right Barnes had to this argument. See Herrera, 265 F.3d at 351.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Jerry Gonzalez, Law Offices, Murfreesboro, TN, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Robert M. Burns, Patrick James Gray, Howell & Fisher, Nashville, TN, for Defendants-Appellees City of Franklin, Marc Swain, Carlos Cordero, Jeff Carson, Ryan Frazier, Nick Grandy, Cory Kroeger, David Jenkins
Bryan Essary, Justin Blake Carter, Gideon, Cooper & Essary, Nashville, TN, for Defendants-Appellees, Williamson Medical Center, Shawna M. Daniel
Edward A. Hadley, North, Pursell, Ramos & Jameson, Nashville, TN, for Defendant-Appellee Jon Andrew Russell, M.D.
BEFORE: GIBBONS, COOK, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
APPENDIX
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE COLUMBIA DIVISION
JOHN JONES v. CITY OF FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE, et. al.
Case No. 1:14-0114
Magistrate Judge Holmes
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This civil action is before the undersigned for all further proceedings, pursuant to the consent of the parties and the order of the District Judge. Docket Entry No. (“DE“) 30. Currently pending are two amended motions for summary judgment, one filed by Defendants Shawna Daniel and Williamson Medical Center (collectively referred to as “Defendant WMC“) (DE 65) and one filed by Defendants Jeff Carson, Carlos Cordero, Ryan Frazier, Nick Grandy, David Jenkins, Cory Kroeger, Mare Swain, and the City of Franklin, Tennessee (collectively referred to as “Defendant City of Franklin“) (DE 68). Also pending is a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendant Jon Andrew Russell M.D. (“Defendant Russell“) (DE 75). For the reasons below, all three motions are GRANTED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment is reviewed under the standard that summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine factual disputes from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, “[t]he moving party need not support its motion with evidence disproving the non-moving party‘s claim, but need only show that ‘there is an ab-sence of evidence to support the non-mov-
The applicable standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings made pursuant to
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
Plaintiff John Jones (“Plaintiff“) filed this action on August 22, 2014, seeking relief under
In the complaint Plaintiff alleges that the John Doe defendants are individuals acting under color of law in the course and scope of their employment as police officers of the City of Franklin Police Department. DE 1 at ¶¶ 10-23, 41-43. Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 21, 2013, officers with the Franklin Police Department detained him without probable cause in the parking lot of the Marriott Courtyard Hotel in the Cool Springs area and questioned him about what drugs he was on in order to get him medical treatment.
Once Plaintiff was admitted to the Williamson Medical Center emergency room, the police officers instructed Plaintiff to provide a urine sample and a blood sample, to which Plaintiff alleges he did not give consent, in the presence of the emergency room doctor, the Jack Doe, M.D. defendant. DE 1 at ¶¶ 14-17. Plaintiff alleges that when he was unable to urinate in a cup in the presence of medical personnel and police officers, the police officers restrained Plaintiff so that the Jane Doe defendants, who are nurses, could forcefully insert a catheter into Plaintiff‘s penis to obtain a urine sample. Id. at ¶¶ 18-20.
On December 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, and in place of the John Doe, Jane Doe, and Jack Doe, M.D. defendants named the following individuals: Marc Swain, Carlos Cordero, Jeff Carson, Ryan Frazier, Nick Grandy, Cory Kroeger, and David Jenkins, all police officers of the City of Franklin Police Department and employed by the City of Franklin (DE 10 at ¶ 7); Shawna M. Daniel, a registered nurse employed by either Williamson Medical Center or by an entity contracted through Williamson Medical Center (DE 10 at ¶ 8); and, Jon Andrew Russell, M.D., a medical doctor employed by either Williamson Medical Center or by an entity contracted through Williamson Medical Center (DE 10 at ¶ 9). Of note, Defendant Russell alleged in his answer to the amended complaint that Plaintiff presented at Williamson Medical Center “with an altered mental status.” DE 52 at ¶ 17.
Each of the pending motions contends that Plaintiff‘s claims must be dismissed because both the original complaint and the amended complaint were untimely filed and are barred by the statute of limitations. Each defendant contends that Plaintiff‘s original complaint was filed more than one year after the date that Plaintiff‘s cause of action arose and is therefore time-barred. Defendant Russell additionally contends that even if Plaintiff‘s original complaint is deemed timely, the claims against him in the amended complaint are barred by the statute of limitations, and would not relate back to the original complaint under
On the evening before oral arguments were conducted, Plaintiff filed a supplemental brief that included exhibits pertaining to SB0850, which is the bill that amended the Tennessee statute at issue in this matter,
Plaintiff advances state law arguments in maintaining that there are material issues of fact about when the incident giving rise to his claims occurred and when the cause of action accrued. Plaintiff further maintains that, similarly, the application of
ANALYSIS
Statute of Limitations
For
However, for a
Objectively, the events described in Plaintiff‘s complaint would have alerted the typical lay person that he had a cause of action. Plaintiff argues that this does not end the inquiry in this particular case, however, because his amended complaint states that the events occurred on or about August 21, 2013. DE 10 at ¶ 10. Despite this allegation, Plaintiff later admitted in response to Defendant City of Franklin‘s motion for summary judgment that the records indicate that the events giving rise to the complaint occurred exactly on August 21, 2013. Defendant City of Franklin‘s statement of undisputed material facts submits that the relevant medical records indicate that Plaintiff was admitted to and discharged from Williamson Medical Center on August 21, 2013. DE 73 at ¶¶ 29, 37-38. Instead of responding to each asserted statement of undisputed material fact, Plaintiff responded generally that “all statements in [Defendant City of Franklin‘s] ‘Statement of Facts‘, although not ‘material‘, are undisputed for purposes of ruling on the motion for summary judgment only.” DE 92 at 1. Plaintiff also conceded in his response to Defendant City of Franklin‘s motion that the “incident alleged in his complaint occurred on August 21, 2013.” DE 89 at 2. Additionally, several of the answers filed on behalf of the City of Franklin defendants state that, “[t]his Defendant admits [Franklin Police Department] Officers encountered the Plaintiff on August 21, 2013....” DE 31 at ¶ 10; DE 32 at ¶ 10; DE 34 at ¶ 10; DE 37 at ¶ 10; DE 38 at ¶ 10; DE 39 at ¶ 10.
Defendant WMC‘s statement of undisputed material fact similarly states that Plaintiff was taken to Williamson Medical Center on August 21, and discharged shortly thereafter on August 21. DE 63 at ¶¶ 1, 3. Because this document and other documents submitted by Defendant City of Franklin were either redacted or filed under seal, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that, among other things, these defendants “properly serve all documents to the plaintiff, in unsealed and unredacted form....” DE 79 at 1. The Court granted this motion “to the extent that the defendants shall serve plaintiff‘s counsel with unredacted versions of all filings filed under seal or filed with portions redacted.” DE 87 at 2. However, even before this order was entered, counsel for Defendant WMC provided counsel for Plaintiff with a copy of its statement of undisputed material facts.1
Nevertheless, Plaintiff apparently failed to provide a response to Defendant WMC‘s statement of undisputed material facts, in violation of Local Rule 56.01(c). The Court therefore admits the statements contained therein, including the aforementioned statements that Plaintiff was taken to and discharged from Williamson Medical Center on August 21, 2013, as undisputed material facts. See Simpson v. Bredesen, No. 2:10-CV-02950-JPM, 2015 WL 5655999, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2015), appeal dismissed (Dec. 14, 2015) (internal citations omitted) (“When a nonmoving party fails to respond to a summary judgment motion in the time frame set by the local rules, district courts in the Sixth Circuit have largely ‘consider[ed] the [moving party‘s] statement of material facts to be undisputed for purposes of the instant motion of summary judgment.’ “).
Additionally, it is undisputed that Plaintiff called an attorney from the emergency room after he had been transported there by police officers to “explain[] what was happening” with respect to the blood and urine samples. DE 10 at ¶ 15; DE 73 at ¶ 10; DE 92.2 By calling an attorney while detained in the emergency room, Plaintiff demonstrated (both objectively and subjectively) that he felt the need to protect his rights. Finally, counsel for Plaintiff conceded during oral arguments that there was no dispute that the events in question occurred on August 21, 2013. The Court therefore finds that there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the alleged injury forming the basis of this action on August 21, 2013.3 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff‘s cause of action accrued on August 21, 2013.4
In light of this finding, the Court turns to the crux of Plaintiff‘s defense to both motions for summary judgment and the
Plaintiff correctly recites the rule that application of a state‘s tolling statute is appropriate in a
Tennessee law provides the following with respect to the tolling of the statute of limitations due to incompetency:
If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued ... adjudicated incompetent, such person ... may commence the action, after legal rights are restored, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceeds three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from restoration of legal rights.
The phrase “adjudicated incompetent” in the current version of
The Tennessee Supreme Court has established clear and plain methods for interpreting Tennessee statutes:
When we interpret a statute, we must ascertain and give full effect to the General Assembly‘s intent. Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 309 (Tenn. 2008). Our pri-
mary concern is to carry out this intent without unduly expanding or restricting the language of the statute beyond the legislature‘s intended scope. Premium Fin. Corp. of Am. v. Crump Ins. Servs. of Memphis, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Tenn. 1998). Furthermore, “[w]e presume that every word in a statute has meaning and purpose and should be given full effect if so doing does not violate the legislature‘s obvious intent.” State v. Casper, 297 S.W.3d 676, 683 (Tenn. 2009).
When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning of the statute. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). When the language is ambiguous, however, we look to the “broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources to discern its meaning.” Casper, 297 S.W.3d at 683. In doing so, we must also presume that the General Assembly was aware of the state of the law at the time it enacted the statute at issue. Id. Finally, statutes relating to the same subject or having a common purpose should be construed together. Graham v. Caples, 325 S.W.3d 578, 582 (Tenn. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Westgate Smoky Mountains at Gatlinburg v. Phillips, 426 S.W.3d 743, 747-48 (Tenn. 2013). See also Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006) (“[E]xceptions to a limitations statute in favor of persons under disability should be strictly construed and never extended beyond their plain import.“).
The revised language in the tolling statute is clear and unambiguous. The term “adjudicated incompetent,” by any reasonable interpretation, means that the person must have been the subject of judicial declaration that he was incompetent to handle his own affairs as a matter of law. See Black‘s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (“adjudicate” means to “rule upon judicially“). The legislature‘s use of past tense and the phrase “at the time the cause of action accrued” also clearly requires that incompetency be declared prior to the injury-causing event. See Amos v. Metro. Gov‘t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., 259 S.W.3d 705, 713 (Tenn. 2008) (“This Court recognizes the importance of verb tense in a [statutory] phrase.“). Likewise, the use of the phrases “after legal rights are restored” and “restoration of legal rights” instead of “removal of such disability” evinces a shift from a subjective standard to an objective one. See Casper, 297 S.W.3d at 683 (every word is presumed to have a meaning and purpose):
Notwithstanding Plaintiff‘s detailed and well-reasoned arguments, both the Sixth Circuit and the Tennessee Court of Appeals have determined that the “adjudicated incompetent” language contained in
[O]ur review of the statute at issue demonstrates that the meaning of the phrase “adjudicated incompetent” is clarified by the surrounding language in the statute. Specifically, the statute provides that the plaintiff may commence the action “after legal rights are restored” within the applicable statute of limitations unless that time exceeds three years and, in that case, within three years “from restoration of legal rights.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106 . Pursuant to nosicur [sic] a sociis, the term “adjudicated incompetent” must be read in conjunction with the other parts of the statute that clearly contemplate a loss and restoration of “legal rights.” Undoubtedly, it is the courts, rather than physicians, who can adjudicate an individual‘s legal rights.
Johnson v. Uhs of Lakeside, LLC, No. W2015-01022-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 9426034, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015). Additionally, and significantly, the Court of Appeals determined that this reasoning was supported by a prior decision in which it held that the term “adjudication of incompetency” referred to an order appointing a conservatorship, which “impl[ied] that this term denotes judicial action.” Id. (citing Foster v. Allbright, 631 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982)). See also Efferson v. Stephens, No. M2014-00326-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 544849, at *2, n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2015) (“The current version of
While the Court finds that the language of the statute is clear, to the extent any ambiguity exists, the Court agrees with the Tennessee Court of Appeals’ application of noscitur a sociis in determining the meaning of “adjudicated incompetent.” Tennessee courts have frequently employed the interpretive maxim noscitur a sociis—a word is known by the company it keeps—to determine the meaning of “questionable or doubtful” terms. City of Goodlettsville, Tenn. v. Priceline.com, Inc., 844 F.Supp.2d 897, 905 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (citing Sallee v. Barrett, 171 S.W.3d 822, 828-29 (Tenn. 2005)). See also Steppach v. Thomas, 346 S.W.3d 488, 507 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 186 F.Supp. 636, 638 (E.D. Tenn. 1960); State v. Beeler, 387 S.W.3d 511, 524 (Tenn. 2012) (“[W]ords are known by the company they keep.“) (citation omitted). For this additional reason, to toll the statute of limitations,
In his reply brief, Plaintiff argues that this reasoning is flawed based on discussions that took place before the Tennessee General Assembly. Plaintiff quotes the statements of multiple state senators and representatives in support of his contention that the purpose of the amendment to
Plaintiff finds merit for his arguments because the statements made by various members of the Tennessee General Assembly regarding the subject amendment are at best confusing in light of the decision to use the term “adjudicated” in the amendment, which clearly suggests the involvement of the judiciary. However, as noted by the Sixth Circuit, the plain meaning of “adjudicate” means to “rule upon judicially.” Cobb, 595 Fed.Appx. at 458 (citing Black‘s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)). The Court also notes that Webster‘s New World College Dictionary6 holds “adjudicate” to mean “to hear or decide a case” or “to serve as a judge.” Similarly, Oxford English Dictionary, which the Supreme Court of the United States has identified as “one of the most authoritative” dictionaries,7 defines “adjudicate” in the following way: “[t]o pronounce or decree by judicial sentence, or by a similar legal or official ruling.”8 These definitions are significant because, as noted by the Tennessee Court of Appeals, the term “adjudicated incompetent” is not defined in Title 28 of the Tennessee code. Johnson, 2015 WL 9426034, at *5.
That “adjudicated incompetent” is legally distinct from “unsound mind” is further supported by the legislature‘s shift from “after the removal of such disability” to “after legal rights are restored.” One can be of unsound mind or “incompetent” yet never have lost any legal rights subject to restoration.
Finally, Plaintiff‘s contention that comments by members of the General Assembly demonstrate that the amendment merely revamped terminology without recasting legal rights is unavailing because, as noted by the Tennessee Court of Appeals:
We must be cautious about consulting legislative history. A statute‘s meaning must be grounded in its text. Thus, comments made during the General Assembly‘s debates cannot provide a basis for a construction that is not rooted in the statute‘s text. When a statute‘s text and the comments made during a legislative debate diverge, the text controls.
Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. Baker, No. M2005-00802-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 461042, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2006) (emphasis added).9 Considering the plain language and entire context of the tolling statute, and the directives of Tennessee courts for construction of Tennessee statutes, the Court declines to rely on the legislative history of
Reading
Certification to Tennessee Supreme Court
Plaintiff in this matter has also requested that the Court certify the question of whether a judicial determination is required for an individual to have been “adjudicated incompetent” under
CONCLUSION
The Court understands the seemingly harsh nature of this ruling, and is not without sympathy that it leaves Plaintiff without a remedy for the brutal indignities he suffered because of a limitations period missed by one day. However, the Court is not permitted to allow sympathy to enter into its decisions on matters of law. Johnson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 48 (Table), 1988 WL 122962, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 16, 1988) (“If courts were to toll the limitation period whenever a plaintiff was one day late, the effect would be to create a [one-year and one day] limitation period.“). See also Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 1726, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (“Procedural requirements ... for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants.“).
Based on the foregoing, the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants WMC (DE 65) and City of Franklin (DE 68) are GRANTED. Because the Court has found no material issue as to when the statute of limitations began to run, Defendant Russell‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings (DE 75) is also GRANTED.
An appropriate Order will follow.11
/s/ BARBARA D. HOLMES
United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Karla M. RUIZ, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-3205
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Filed February 13, 2017
291 Fed. Appx. 291
Laura McMullen Ford, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff-Appellee
David Lawrence Doughten, Law Office, Cleveland, OH, for Defendant-Appellant
BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; STRANCH and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Karla M. Ruiz appeals the district court‘s denial of a mitigating role reduction under USSG § 3B1.2. We affirm.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ruiz pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of