delivered the opinion of the Court.
The costs that may be awarded to prevailing parties in lawsuits brought in
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This case arises from a personal injury action brought by petitioner Kouichi Taniguchi, a professional baseball player in Japan, against respondent Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., the owner of a resort in the Northern Mariana Islands. Petitioner was injured when his leg broke through, a wooden deck during a tour of respondent’s resort property. Initially, petitioner said that he needed no medical attention, but two weeks later, he informed respondent that he had suffered cuts, bruises, and torn ligaments from the accident. Due to these alleged injuries, he claimed damages for medical expenses and for lost income from contracts he was unable to honor. After discovery concluded, both parties moved for summary judgment. The United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands granted respondent’s motion on the ground that petitioner offered no evidence that respondent knew of the defective deck or otherwise failed to exercise reasonable care.
In preparing its defense, respondent paid to have various documents translated from Japanese to English. After the District Court granted summary judgment in respondent’s favor, respondent submitted a bill for those costs. Over petitioner’s objection, the District Court awarded the costs to respondent as “compensation of interpreters” under § 1920(6). Explaining that interpreter services “cannot be separated into ‘translation’ and ‘interpretation,’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a, the court held that costs for document translation “fal[l] within the meaning of ‘compensation of an interpreter,’” ibid. Finding that it was necessary for respondent to have the documents translated in order to depose petitioner, the court concluded that the translation services were properly taxed as costs.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed both the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and its award of costs. The court rejected petitioner’s argument that the cost of document translation services is not recoverable as “compensation of interpreters.” The court explained that “the word ‘interpreter’ can reasonably encompass a ‘translator,’ both according to the dictionary definition and common usage of these terms, which does not always draw precise distinctions between foreign language interpretations involving live speech versus written documents.”
Because there is a split among the Courts of Appeals on this issue,
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A
Although the taxation of costs was not allowed at common law, it was the practice of federal courts in the early years to award costs in the same manner as the courts of the relevant forum State. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
“That there be allowed and taxed in the supreme,.circuit and district courts of the United States, in favour of the parties obtaining judgments therein, such compensation for their travel and attendance, and for attornies and counsellors’ fees ... as are allowed in the supreme or superior courts of the respective states.” Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 20, §4, 1 Stat. 333.
Although twice reenacted, this provision expired in 1799. Alyeska Pipeline, supra, at 248, n. 19; Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc.,
Not until 1853 did Congress enact legislation specifying the costs allowable in federal court. Id., at 251. The impetus for a uniform federal rule was largely the consequence of two developments. First, a “great diversity in practice among the courts” had emerged. Ibid. Second, “losing litigants were being unfairly saddled with exorbitant fees for the victor’s attorney.” Ibid. Against this backdrop, Congress passed the 1853 Fee Act, which we have described as a “far-reaching Act specifying in detail the nature and amount of the taxable items of cost in the federal courts.” Id., at 251-252; The substance of this Act was transmitted through the Revised Statutes of 1874 and the Judicial Code of 1911 to the Revised Code of 1948, where it was codified, “without any apparent intent to change the controlling rules,” as 28 U. S. C. § 1920.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) gives courts the discretion to award costs to prevailing parties. That Rule provides in relevant part: “Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs — other than attorney’s fees — should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Rule 54(d)(1). We have held that “§ 1920 defines the term ‘costs’ as used in Rule 54(d).” Crawford Fitting,
B
To determine whether the item “compensation of interpreters” includes costs for document translation, we must look to the meaning of “interpreter.” That term is not defined in the Court Interpreters Act or in any other relevant statutory provision. When a term goes undefined in a statute, we give the term its ordinary meaning. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer,
Many dictionaries in use when Congress enacted the Court Interpreters Act in 1978 defined “interpreter” as one who translates spoken, as opposed to written, language. The American Heritage Dictionary, for instance, defined the term as “[o]ne who translates orally from one language 'into another.” American Heritage Dictionary 685 (1978). The Scribner-Bantam English Dictionary defined the related word “interpret” as “to translate orally.” Scribner-Bantam English Dictionary 476 (1977). Similarly, the Random House Dictionary defined the intransitive form of “interpret” as “to translate what is said in a foreign language.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 744 (1973) (emphasis added). And, notably, the Oxford English Dictionary defined “interpreter” as “[o]ne who translates languages,” but then divided that definition into two senses: “a. [a] translator of books or writings,” which it designated as obsolete, and “b. [o]ne who translates the communications of persons speaking different languages; spec, one whose office it is to do so orally in the presence of the persons; a dragoman.” 5 Oxford English Dictionary 416 (1933); see also Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 566 (6th ed. 1976) (“[o]ne who interprets; one whose office it is to translate the words of persons speaking different languages, esp. orally in their presence”); Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary 686 (1973) (“one who translates orally for the benefit of two or more parties speaking different languages:... a translator (obs.)”).
Pre-1978 legal dictionaries also generally defined the words “interpreter” and “interpret” in terms of oral, translation. The; then-current edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, for example, defined “interpreter” as “[a] person sworn at a trial to interpret the evidence of a foreigner... to the court,” and it defined “interpret” in relevant part as “to translate orally from one tongue to another.” Black’s Law Dictionary 954, 953 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); see also W. Anderson, A Dictionary of Law 565 (1888) (“[o]ne who translates the testimony of witnesses speaking a foreign tongue, for the benefit of the court and jury”); 1 B. Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American or English Jurisprudence 639
Against these authorities, respondent relies almost exclusively on Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (hereinafter Webster’s Third). The version of that dictionary in print when Congress enacted the Court Interpreters Act defined “interpreter” as “one that translates; esp: a person who translates orally for parties conversing in different tongues.” Webster’s Third 1182 (1976).
That a definition is broad enough to encompass one sense of a word does not establish that the word is ordinarily understood in that sense. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa,
Based on our survey of the relevant dictionaries, we conclude that the ordinary or common meaning of “interpreter” does not include those who translate writings.
To be sure, the word “interpreter” can encompass persons who translate documents, but because that is not the ordinary meaning of the word, it does not control unless the context in which the word appears indicates that it does. Nothing in the Court Interpreters Act or in § 1920, however, even hints that Congress intended to go beyond the ordinary meaning of “interpreter” and to embrace the broadest possible meaning that the definition of the word can bear.
If anything, the statutory context suggests the opposite: that the word “interpreter” applies only to those who translate orally. As previously mentioned, Congress enacted § 1920(6) as part of the Court Interpreters Act. The main provision of that Act is §2(a), codified in 28 U. S. C. §§ 1827 and 1828. See 92 Stat. 2040-2042. Particularly relevant here is § 1827. As it now reads, that statute provides for the establishment of “a program to facilitate the use of certified and otherwise qualified interpreters in judicial proceedings instituted by the United States.” § 1827(a). Subsection (d) directs courts to use an interpreter in any criminal or civil action instituted by the United States if a party or witness “speaks only or primarily a language other than the English language” or “suffers from a hearing impairment” “so as to inhibit such party's comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel or the presiding judicial officer, or so as to inhibit such witness' comprehension of questions and the presentation of such testimony.” § 1827(d)(1).
The references to technical terminology in the Court Interpreters Act further suggest that Congress used “interpreter” in a technical sense, and it is therefore significant that relevant professional literature draws a line between “interpreters,” who “are used for oral conversations,” and “translators,” who “are, used for written communications.” Zazueta, supra n. 4, at 477; see also M. Frankenthaler, Skills for Bilingual Legal Personnel 67 (1982) (“While the translator deals with the written word, the interpreter is concerned with the spoken language”); Brislin, Introduction, in Translation: Applications and Research i (R. Brislin ed. 1976) (explaining that when both terms are used together, translation “refers to the processing [of] written input, and interpretation to the processing of oral input” (emphasis deleted)); J. Herbert, Interpreter’s Handbook 1 (2d ed. 1952) (“In the present-day jargon of international organisations, the words translate, translations, translator are used when the immediate result of the work is a written text; and the words interpret, interpreter, interpretation when it is a speech delivered orally”). That Congress specified “interpreters” but not “translators” is yet another signal that it intended to limit § 1920(6) to the costs of oral, instead of written, translation.
In sum, both the ordinary and technical meanings of “interpreter,” as well as the statutory context in which the word is found, lead to the conclusion that § 1920(6) does not apply to translators of written materials.
C
No other rule of construction compels us to depart from the ordinary meaning of “interpreter.” The Court of Appeals reasoned that a broader meaning is “more compatible with Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which includes a decided preference for the award
Our decision is in keeping with the narrow scope of taxable costs. “Although ‘costs’ has an everyday meaning synonymous with ‘expenses,’ the concept of taxable costs under Rule 54(d) is more limited and represents those expenses, including, for example, court fees, that a court will assess against a litigant.” 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2666, pp. 202-203 (3d ed. 1998) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). Taxable costs are limited to relatively minor, incidental expenses as is eyident from § 1920, which lists such items as clerk fees, court reporter fees, expenses for printing and witnesses, expenses for exemplification and copies, docket fees, and compensation of court-appointed experts. Indeed, “the assessment of costs most often is merely a clerical matter that can be done by the court clerk.” Hairline Creations, Inc. v. Refalas,
As for respondent’s extratextual arguments, they are more properly directed at Congress. Respondent contends that documentary evidence is no less important than testimonial evidence and that it would be anomalous to.require the losing party to cover translation costs for spoken words but not for written words. Brief for Respondent 20. Respondent also observes that some translation tasks are not entirely oral or entirely written. Id., at 20-24. One task, called “ ‘sight translation,”’ involves the oral translation of a document. Id., at 21. Another task involves the written translation of speech. Ibid. And a third task, called “ ‘document comparison,’ ” involves comparing documents in the source and target language to verify that the two are identical. Id., at 21-22. Respondent argues that a narrow definition cannot account for these variations and that a bright-line definition of “interpreter” as someone who translates spoken and written words would avoid complication and provide a simple, administrable rule for district courts.
Neither of these arguments convinces us that Congress must have intended to dispense with the ordinary meaning of “interpreter” in §1920(6). First, Congress might have distinguished between oral and written translation out of a concern that requiring losing parties to bear the potentially sizable costs of translating discovery documents, as opposed to the more limited costs of oral testimony, could be too burdensome and possibly unfair, especially for litigants with limited means. Cf. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Second, respondent has not shown that any of the hybrid translation/interpretation tasks to which it points actually arise with overwhelming frequency or that the problem of drawing the line between taxable and nontaxable costs in such cases will vex the trial courts. It certainly has not shown that any such problems will be more troublesome than the task of sifting through translated discovery documents to ascertain which can be taxed as necessary to the litigation. In any event, the present case does not present a hybrid situation; it involves purely written translation, which falls outside the tasks performed by an “interpreter” as that term is ordinarily understood.
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Because the ordinary meaning of “interpreter” is someone who translates orally from one language to another, we hold that the category “compensation of interpreters” in § 1920(6) does not include costs for document translation. We therefore vacate the judgment of the United States Court of Ap- . peals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Notes
Compare BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc.,
A handful of other contemporaneous dictionaries used a similar formulation. See Funk & Wagnalls New Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English Language 665 (1977) (“[o]ne who interprets or translates; specifically, one who serves as oral translator between people speaking different languages”); 1 World Book Dictionary 1103 (C. Barn-hart & R. Barnhart eds. 1977) (“a person whose business is translating, especially orally, from a foreign language”); Cassell’s English Dictionary 617 (4th ed. 1969) (“[o]ne who interprets, esp. one employed to translate orally to persons speaking a foreign language”).
This provision remains substantially the same as it appeared when first enacted. See 28 U. S. C. § 1827(d)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. II); see also 92 Stat. 2040.
The simultaneous mode requires the interpreter “to interpret and to speak contemporaneously with the individual whose communication is being translated.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-1687, p. 8 (1978). The consecutive mode requires the speaker whose communication is being translated to pause so that the interpreter can “convey the testimony given.” Ibid. And the summary mode “allow[s] the interpreter to condense and distill the speech of the speaker.” Ibid.; see generally Zazueta, Attorneys Guide to the Use of Court Interpreters, 8 U. C. D. L. Rev. 471, 477-478 (1975).
The dissent agrees that context should help guide our analysis, but instead of looking to the Court Interpreters Act, it looks to “the practice of federal courts both before and after § 1920(6)’s enactment.” Post, at 579 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). The practice of federal courts after the Act’s enactment tells us nothing about what Congress intended at the time of enactment. And federal-court practice before the Act under other provisions of § 1920 tells us little, if anything, about what Congress intended when it added paragraph (6). We think the statutory context in which the word “interpreter” appears is a more reliable guide to its meaning.
Some provisions within the United States Code use both “interpreter” and “translator” together, thus implying that Congress understands the terms to have the distinct meanings described above. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1555(b) (providing that appropriations for the Immigration and Naturalization Service “shall be available for payment of . . . interpreters and translators who are not citizens of the United States”); 28 U. S. C. § 530C(b)(1)(1) (providing that Department of Justice funds may be used for “[pjayment of interpreters and translators who are not citizens of the United States”).
Our conclusion is buttressed by respondent’s concession at oral argument that there is no provision in the United States Code where it is clear that the word extends to those who translate documents. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39; see also Brief for Petitioner 32 (“And the Code is wholly devoid of any corresponding definition of ‘interpreter’ extending to the translation of written documents”). As respondent acknowledged, either the word is used in a context that strongly suggests it applies only to oral translation or its meaning is unclear. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38.
The dissent contends that document translation, no less than oral translation, is essential “to ecpiip the parties to present their case clearly and the court to decide the merits intelligently. ” Post, at 579. But a document translator is no more important than an expert or consultant in making sense of otherwise incomprehensible documentary evidence, yet expenses for experts and consultants are generally not taxable as costs. To be sure, forgoing document translation can impair a litigant’s case, but document translation is not indispensable, in the way oral translation is, to the parties’ ability to communicate with each other, with witnesses, and with the court.
Dissenting Opinion
with whom Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor join, dissenting.
To be comprehended by the parties, the witnesses, and the court, expression in foreign languages must be translated into English. Congress therefore provided, in 28 U. S. C. § 1920(6), that the prevailing party may recoup compensation paid to “interpreters.” The word “interpreters,” the Court emphasizes, commonly refers to translators of oral speech. Ante, at 566-567. But as the Court acknowledges, ante, at 567-568, and n. 2, “interpreters” is more than occasionally used to encompass those who translate written speech as well. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 1182 (1976) (hereinafter Webster’s) (defining “interpreter” as “one that translates; esp: a person who translates orally for parties conversing in different tongues”); Black’s Law Dictionary 895 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “interpreter” as a “person who translates, esp. orally, from one language to another”); Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 655 (3d ed. 1969) (defining “interpreter” as “[o]ne who interprets, particularly one who interprets words written or spoken in a foreign language”).
Notably, several Federal District Court decisions refer to translators of written documents as “interpreters.” E. g., United States v. Prado-Cervantez, No. 11-40044-11,
Most Federal Courts of Appeals confronted with the question have held that costs may be awarded under § 1920(6) for the translation of documents necessary to, or in preparation for, litigation. Compare
In practice, federal trial courts have awarded document translation costs in cases spanning several decades. See, e.g., Raffold Process Corp. v. Castanea Paper Co.,
The purpose of translation, after all, is to make relevant foreign-language communication accessible to the litigants and the court. See S. Rep., at 1 (The Court Interpreters Act is intended “to insure that all participants in our Federal courts can meaningfully take part.”). Documentary evidence in a foreign language, no less than oral statements, must be translated to equip the parties to present their case clearly and the court to decide the merits intelligently. See, e. g., United States v. Mosquera,
Distinguishing written from oral translation for cost-award purposes, moreover, is an endeavor all the more dubious, for, as the Court acknowledges, ante, at 573-574, some translation tasks do not fall neatly into one category or thé other. An interpreter, for example, may be called upon to “sight translat[e]” a written document, i. e., to convey a written foreign-language document’s content orally in English. R. González, V. Vasquez, & H. Mikkelson, Fundamentals of Court Interpretation: Theory, Policy, and Practice 401 (1991) (hereinafter González). In-court sight translation, Tani-guchi concedes, counts as “interpretation,” even though it does not involve translating verbal expression. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. Yet an interpreter’s preparation for in-court sight translation by translating a written document in advance, Taniguchi maintains, does not count as “interpretation.” Ibid. But if the interpreter then reads the prepared written translation aloud in court, that task, in Taniguchi’s view, can be charged as “interpretation,” id., at 11, even though the reading involves no translation of foreign-language expression — written or oral — at all.
Similarly hard to categorize is the common court-interpreter task of listening to a recording in a foreign language, transcribing it, then translating it into English. See González 439. Although this task involves oral foreign-language communication, it does not, Taniguchi contends, qualify as “interpretation,” because it involves “the luxury of multiple playbacks of the tape and the leisure to consult extrinsic linguistic sources.” Reply Brief 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). But sight translation — which Tani-guchi concedes may be charged as “interpretation” — may sometimes involve similarly careful linguistic analysis of a written document in advance of a court proceeding. Davis & Hewitt, Lessons in Administering Justice: What Judges Need To Know About the Requirements, Role, and Professional Responsibilities of the Court Interpreter, 1 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 121,131 (1994).
Taniguchi warns that translation costs can be exorbitant and burdensome to police. Reply Brief 19-22; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-21. The Court expresses a similar concern. Ante, at 574.
In short, §1920(6)⅛ prescription on “interpreters” is not so clear as to leave no room for interpretation. Given the purpose served by translation and the practice prevailing in district courts, supra, at 577-578, there is no good reason to exclude from taxable costs payments for placing written words within the grasp of parties, jurors, and judges. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
Translation costs, like other costs recoverable under § 1920, may be “denied or limited” if they “were unreasonably incurred or unnecessary to the case.” 10 Moore’s Federal Practice §54.101[l][b], p. 54-158 (3d ed. 2012).
Currently, some Federal District Courts make the practice of allowing fees for translation of documents explicit in their local rules. See Rule 54-4.8 (CD Cal. 2012) (allowing “[f]ees for translation of documents . . . reasonably necessary to the preparation of the ease”); Rule 54.1(b)(7)(B) (Guam 2011) (same); Rule 54.1(c)(7) (Idaho 2011) (allowing reasonable fee if the “document translated is necessarily filed or admitted in evidence”); Rule 54.4(7) (MD Pa. 2011) (same); Rule 54.1(e)(7) (Ariz. 2012) (same); Rule 54.1(b)(4)(e) (SD Cal. 2012) (same); Rule 54.1(g)(2) (NJ 2011) (same); Rule 54-5(d) (Nev. 2011) (same); Rule 54.2(d) (NM 2012) (allowing translator’s fee if the translated document is admitted into evidence); Rule 54.1(c)(4) (SDNY 2012) (allowing reasonable fee if translated document “is used or received in evidence”); Rule 54.1(e)(4) (EDNY 2012) (same). See also Rule 54.03(F)(1)(e) (SC 2012) (allowing costs of certain document translations under §1920(4)); Rule 54.1(b)(5) (Del. 2011) (same); Rule 54(c)(3)(i) (Conn. 2011) (same); Mise. Order, Allowable Items for Taxation of Costs ¶7 (ND Fla. 2007) (allowing “fee of a competent translator of a non-English document that is filed or admitted-into evidence”); Taxation of Costs Guidelines, 11(H) (PR 2009) (allowing fees for translation of documents filed or admitted into evidence), available at http://www.prd.uscourts.gov/ courtweb/pdf/taxation_of_costs_guidelines_2007_with_time_computation_ amendments.pdf (All Internet materials as visited May 17, 2012, and included in Clerk of Court’s case file.); Taxation of Costs (Mass. 2000) (allowing fees “for translation of documents . . . reasonably necessary for trial preparation”), available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/resources/ pdf/taxation.pdf.
Noteworthy, other paragraphs Congress placed in § 1920 cover written documents. See 28 U. S. C. §1920(2) (2006 ed., Supp. IV) (“[f]ees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts”); §1920(3) (2006 ed.) (“[flees and disbursements for printing and witnesses”); §1920(4) (2006 ed., Supp. IV) (“[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any [necessary] materials”). Nothing indicates that Congress intended paragraph (6), unlike paragraphs (2)-(4), to apply exclusively to oral communications.
The Court also observes that “[t]axable costs are limited to relatively minor, incidental expenses.” Ante, at 573. The tab for unquestionably allowable costs, however, may run high. See, e. g., In re Ricoh Co., Patent Litigation, No. C 03-02289,