JEAN FRANTZ GUILLAUME v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS - SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, THOMAS MCGRATH, in his individuаl and official capacity, BENJAMIN WARD, in his individual and official capacity, et al.
No. 24-13584
United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
September 10, 2025
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-23287-MD
Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jean Guillaume, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court‘s dismissаl of his amended complaint against the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, U.S. Small Business Administration, and various officials in both agencies for removing his application as a service-disabled veteran-owned small business under
I
We first consider Guillaume‘s argument that Counts I and XII—that the federal government violated his First Amendment rights and res judicata, and that Guillaume is entitled to a declaratory judgment against the federal government—are not barred by sovereign immunity. “Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature,” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994), and we review a district court‘s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov‘t of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007). A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is entered “without prejudice.” Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg‘l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008). We agreе with Guillaume that the district court erred in dismissing Counts I and XII with prejudice, but, for reasons we will explain below, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal because they fail to state a plausible claim.
We may affirm for “any reason supported by the record, even if the district court did not rely on that reason.” Wright v. City of St. Petersburg, Fla., 833 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation modified). “Specifically, where we determine that a district court
We “review de novo [a] district court‘s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Counts I and XII fail to state a plausible claim on which relief can be granted. In Count I, Guillaume alleges that the United States violated his First Amendment right of redress and disregarded the principles of res judicata. His First Amendment claim amounts to a conclusory allegation regarding “a violation of his First Amendment right of redress against the Defendant, the United States” that fails to provide enough facts to state a claim to relief that is facially plausiblе. First Am. Compl. ¶ 24. Under res judicata, a claim is barred by a prior suit if: “(1) there is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity with them, are identical in both suits; and (4) the same сause of action is involved in both cases.” Griswold v. Cnty. of Hillsborough, 598 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2010). Guillaume‘s case does not qualify for res judicata treatment because his introduction of facts pertaining
Count XII fails to state a plausible claim for relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Declaratory Judgment Act allows federal courts to issue declaratory judgments “upon the filing of an appropriate pleading.”
II
We next consider whether Counts II–III, VI–VII, and IX–X state a claim on which relief can be granted. Counts II and III allege violations of Guillaume‘s rights under the Whistleblower Protection Act; Counts VI and IX allege Bivens violations; Count VII alleges a conspiracy under
Counts II and III do not statе a claim on which relief can be granted because Guillaume is not a federal employee. Both are asserted under the Whistleblower Protection Act, which protects federal employees against agenсy reprisal for whistleblowing activities,
Counts VI and IX fail to provide sufficient facts to plausibly state Bivens violations. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court recognized an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen‘s constitutional rights. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). Count VI fails to state a plausible Bivens violation under the First Amendment because the Supreme Cоurt has been cautious about expanding Bivens to new contexts and has consistently rejected the application of Bivens to the First Amendment. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983); Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663 n.4 (2012) (“We have never held that Bivens extends to First Amendment claims.“).
Count IX alleges а Bivens violation against McGrath, Perkins, and Ward for “unreasonably seiz[ing]” four documents to review his eligibility for a government contracting program, First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 104–18, but Bivens actions cannot be brought against federal officers in their official capacities. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69–71 (2001).
Count VII fails to state a claim on which relief could be granted under
Count VII also fails to state a claim under the False Claims Act because Guillaume‘s allegations do not assert any specific fraudulent claim with particularity. A claim under the FCA “must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Hopper v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2009). A claim has sufficient particularity if it “sets forth facts as to time, place, and substance of the defendant‘s alleged fraud, specifically thе details of the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent acts, when they occurred, and who engaged in them.” Id. (citation modified).
Count X fails state a claim under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause applies only to criminal punishmеnts, and it provides that no “person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
III
We next consider the district court‘s determination that Counts IV and XI constitute shotgun pleadings. “We review a dismissal on Rule 8 shotgun pleading grounds for an abuse of disсretion.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018). The abuse-of-discretion standard requires us to “affirm unless we find that the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004).
A shotgun pleading is а complaint that fails “to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff‘s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). Shotgun pleadings “waste scarce judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine the public‘s respect for the courts.” Vibe Micro, Inc., 878 F.3d at 1295 (citation modified). One category of shоtgun pleading “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. But a complaint is not a shotgun plеading if it “can be fairly read to aver that all defendants are responsible for the alleged conduct.” Kyle K. v. Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2000). If a court identifies that a complaint is a shotgun complaint, it generally must give the litigant one chance to replеad, with instructions on the deficiencies. Vibe Micro, Inc., 878 F.3d at 1296–97.
The district court didn‘t abuse its discretion in dismissing Counts IV and XI as shotgun pleadings. Count IV is a shotgun pleading because it failed to specify which defendants were liable for the alleged wrongdoing, which in turn fails to give thе defendants adequate notice of the claims against them. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. Count XI is a shotgun pleading because, even though Guillaume identified particular defendants, he failed to identify which defendants are responsible for which claims, and his allegations in this claim alternately target “Defendant” and “Defendants,” creating confusion as to whom he intended to sue for each claim. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. Furthermore, the district court had provided Guillaume with instructions on the deficiencies of his initial complaint, but he failed to cure the deficiencies when given the opportunity to amend.
IV
We next consider whether the district court failed to construe Guillaume‘s complaint liberally under the liberal pleading standards affоrded to pro se litigants. When “a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a [pro se] plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.” Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation modified).
We conclude that the district court construed Guillaume‘s complaint liberally, as it referenсed the liberal pleading standards for pro se plaintiffs four times in its dismissal order. Because Guillaume has already had two bites at the apple, further opportunities to amend are unlikely to uncover plausible claims upon which relief can be granted. Thus, granting him another chance to amend his complaint would be futile, and dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.
* * *
Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of Guillaume‘s first amended complaint with prejudice.
AFFIRMED.