JAVIER VANEGAS v. CITY OF PASADENA; CITY OF PASADENA POLICE DEPARTMENT; KLOTZ, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; ARELLANES, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; STARK, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; RIEHL, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; MURREN, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; LEMOS, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; SALAZAR, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; BUNDY, Individually; in his/her capacity as Police Officer for Pasadena Police Department; DOES, 1-10, individually, and in their capacity as Police officers for Pasadena Police Department
No. 21-55478
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
August 31, 2022
D.C. No. 2:20-cv-07845-SVW-AGR
FOR PUBLICATION
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 2, 2022 Pasadena, California
Filed August 31, 2022
Before: Daniel A. Bress and Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges, and Roger T. Benitez,* District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Bumatay; Concurrence by Judge Bumatay; Concurrence by Judge Bress; Concurrence by Judge Benitez
SUMMARY**
Civil Rights
The panel affirmed the district court‘s summary judgment in favor of the City of Pasadena and Pasadena police officers in an action brought pursuant to
At issue was whether police officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff either for reports that he followed and harassed an attorney outside a courthouse or for plaintiff‘s refusal to identify himself during an investigatory stop. Defendants asserted that they had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on two grounds: (1) disturbing the peace under
Plaintiff first argued that, because he was arrested under
Plaintiff next asserted that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him under
Concurring, Judge Bumatay stated that although the panel properly affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff‘s false-arrest claim on qualified immunity, he was left wondering whether
Concurring, Judge Bress was compelled to write separately in this straightforward case only to address Judge Bumatay‘s separate concurring opinion, which expounds on California criminal law and suggests that various federal court decisions interpreting California law may be wrongly decided. Judge Bress wrote to make clear that, in his respectful view, Judge Bumatay‘s evaluation of California law was both unnecessary to the resolution of this case and substantively incorrect, advocating a narrow interpretation of
Concurring, Judge Benitez agreed with the court that summary judgment was properly granted for the City of Pasadena and its police officers. He wrote separately to explain that this was an easy case. Although, undoubtedly, an arrest for refusing to give one‘s name without at least reasonable suspicion would be an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, that was not this case. Here, a crime had been reported. Plaintiff‘s name was reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop and central to the investigation of a crime, whether the crime was stalking (
COUNSEL
Krista R. Hemming (argued), The Hemming Firm, San Pedro, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Arnold F. Lee (argued), Assistant City Attorney; Michele Beal Bagneris, City Attorney; Office of the City Attorney, Pasadena, California; for Defendants-Appellees.
BUMATAY, Circuit Judge:
At issue in this civil rights lawsuit is whether police officers had probable cause to arrest Javier Vanegas either for reports that he followed and harassed an attorney outside a courthouse or for his refusal to identify himself during an investigatory stop. The district court found that officers had probable cause for both crimes. We hold that Vanegas‘s
I. Background
This lawsuit stems from events immediately following Vanegas‘s 2019 divorce proceedings at the Superior Courthouse in Pasadena, California. Vanegas appeared at the family court hearing, along with his ex-wife, Sandra Kerguelen, and her attorney, Karen Suri. According to Suri, Vanegas raised his voice and yelled at Suri and the judge during the hearing. As a result, the judge admonished Vanegas to control himself or face sanctions. After the hearing, Suri asked a court bailiff to help her and Kerguelen leave without Vanegas following them. The bailiff stood in front of Vanegas, blocking the way so that Suri and Kerguelen could exit.
After Suri and Kerguelen left the courthouse, Vanegas followed them. Vanegas started yelling aggressively at Suri. Suri and Kerguelen tried to walk away, but Vanegas continued to follow while calling Suri a “scumbag” and “liar.” Vanegas eventually came within arm‘s reach of
At that point, Suri saw a Pasadena Police Department Community Service Officer and flagged him down. Suri told the officer that Vanegas was following her and that she did not feel safe. The officer asked Suri to walk to the police station across the street to file a report. Suri and Kerguelen did so.
Pasadena Police Officer Philip Klotz was at the courthouse on other business. While there, he heard an alert over the police radio about a 911 caller being followed outside the courthouse. So Officer Klotz exited the Courthouse and headed toward the southeast corner of Garfield Avenue and Walnut Street. As he walked to the intersection, Officer Klotz received an update, advising that the suspect, named “Javier Vanegas,” was walking northbound on Garfield Avenue. After Officer Klotz reached the intersection, he observed only one man, later identified as Vanegas, heading north on Garfield Avenue.
Officer Klotz asked Vanegas whether his name was “Javier.” Vanegas responded by asking Officer Klotz who he was. Officer Klotz identified himself as a law enforcement officer and asked Vanegas for his identification. Despite at least three requests for identification, Vanegas did not comply and instead took out his cell phone to record the interaction. Officer Klotz then gave Vanegas the option of either producing his identification or being placed in handcuffs. Vanegas still refused to identify himself.
After several other officers arrived, Officer Klotz placed Vanegas in handcuffs for officer safety. Afterward, Officer Klotz received a radio call that Vanegas violated
While other officers remained with Vanegas, Officer Klotz walked across the street to speak with Suri. Officer Klotz saw Suri almost crying and visibly shaking. Suri relayed that Vanegas began following her and Kerguelen after the family court hearing. After interviewing Suri, Officer Klotz walked back to Vanegas and advised him that he was under arrest. The officers then took Vanegas to the Pasadena police station for booking. Vanegas was eventually released with a citation for violating
A few months later, Vanegas sued the police officers involved and the City of Pasadena alleging, among other claims, violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under
Vanegas appeals the dismissal of his
II. § 1983 Claim Against the Officers
To prevail under
On the first question, Vanegas‘s challenge implicates the Fourth Amendment since he claims he was unlawfully “seized.” In the context of a
On the second question, even with a constitutional violation, officers may still receive qualified immunity if the unlawfulness of their conduct was not “clearly established” at the time of arrest. By “clearly established,” we mean that the “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 800, 824 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (simplified). In other words, “existing law must have placed the constitutionality of the officer‘s conduct beyond debate.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589 (simplified). And we only look to “controlling authority” or “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” to determine settled law. Id. at 589-90 (simplified).
While Vanegas asserts he was unlawfully arrested, the officers maintain that they had probable cause to arrest him on two grounds: (1) disturbing the peace under
A. California Penal Code § 415(2)
Under California law, “making loud noises, shouting obscenities, and making
Vanegas argues that, because he was arrested under
First, it does not matter that Officer Klotz stated that the basis of Vanegas‘s arrest was under
Second, by the time of Vanegas‘s arrest, the officers learned of enough facts to believe that Vanegas had violated
There is one wrinkle. Violation of
Having found no violation of the Fourth Amendment, we need not proceed to the second question of whether the officers violated a “clearly established” right for Vanegas‘s offense under
B. California Penal Code § 148(a)(1)
But to succeed on his
“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Gelhaus, 871 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2017) (simplified). So, it‘s not enough that the legal answer be “suggested by then-existing precedent“; the answer must be “so well defined” that “the legal principle clearly prohibit[s] the officer‘s conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590. In other words, qualified immunity still attaches when officers “reasonably but mistakenly concluded that probable cause [wa]s present.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 591 (simplified); see also Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Even absent probable cause, qualified immunity is available if a reasonable police officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.“).
No “controlling authority” or “robust consensus of cases” prohibited Officer Klotz from arresting Vanegas under the facts confronting him. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589 (simplified). Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has said that arresting a person for failing to provide an identification violates the Constitution. In fact, we have both said the opposite. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. of Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 187-88 (2004) (upholding a state law permitting arrest for failure to identify oneself where the request for identification is reasonably related to circumstances justifying the stop as “consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures“); United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 869 (9th Cir. 2019) (“In some circumstances, a suspect may be required to respond to an officer‘s request to identify herself, and may be arrested if she does not.“).
And no California case clearly establishes that Officer Klotz should have known he lacked probable cause to arrest Vanegas for failing to identify himself in the course of the stalking investigation. Indeed, multiple district courts, including the one here, thought Officer Klotz could make the arrest. See Nakamura v. City of Hermosa Beach, 2009 WL 1445400, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Abdel-Shafy v. City of San Jose, 2019 WL 570759, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Vanegas v. City of Pasadena, 2021 WL 1917126, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2021). And so did we. See Kuhlken v. Cnty. of San Diego, 764 F. App‘x 612 (9th Cir. 2019).
Thus, even if Vanegas‘s failure to identify himself did not provide probable cause to arrest under
III. § 1983 Claim Against the City
Vanegas also appeals the dismissal of his
Monell liability can turn on a municipality‘s failure to train its officers, but the failure must amount to a “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Flores v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). To allege such a failure, the plaintiff must establish “sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference (1) of a constitutional violation; (2) of a municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; and (3) that the constitutional injury would not have resulted if the municipality properly trained their employees.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2021). Monell liability is “at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Id. at 1154 (simplified).
Vanegas alleged a failure to train and argues that factual disputes exist on whether the City of Pasadena failed to train its officers on the “well-established” right to refuse to identify oneself prior to arrest. But, as we discussed above, we doubt that any such right is so “well established” that its alleged omission from training would constitute deliberate indifference on the part of the City. See Flores, 758 F.3d at 1158 (the failure to train must be “a conscious or deliberate choice on the part of a municipality” (simplified)). And a failure-to-train theory of Monell liability usually requires a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” See id. at 1159 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). Vanegas fails to establish such a pattern here. See also Bd. of Cnty. Comm‘rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1997) (explaining that a “one-time negligent administration” of a training program does not “tend to show . . . the lack of proper training“). We thus affirm the dismissal of Vanegas‘s claim against the City.
IV.
Because probable cause supports his arrest under
AFFIRMED.
BUMATAY, Circuit Judge, concurring:
Although we properly affirmed the dismissal of Javier Vanegas‘s false-arrest claim on qualified immunity, I‘m left wondering
This question is important because probable cause generally defeats a claim like Vanegas‘s, Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019), and we look to state law to determine “[w]hether an officer is authorized to make an arrest,” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979).
So, I think it‘s reasonable to consider whether
*
Several federal cases have interpreted the law to mandate cooperation with an officer‘s request to produce identification during a valid police investigation. See, e.g., Kuhlken v. Cnty. of San Diego, 764 F. App‘x 612, 613 (9th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (“Deputy Smith had probable cause to arrest Fox for a violation of
But California courts have not been so quick to endorse that view of
Take a recent example—People v. Knoedler, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586, 589 (Cal. App. Dep‘t Super. Ct. 2019). There, the defendant was caught with an open beer can on the street and an officer asked him for an identification to issue him a citation. Id. at 587. The defendant refused and was charged with resisting under
Another California court suggested that “a simple refusal to identify one‘s self” doesn‘t violate
On the other hand, a
held that even refusing to give identification after a misdemeanor arrest, but pre-booking, isn‘t prosecutable under
And finally, back in 1980, another California court questioned whether “a person who merely refuses to identify himself or to answer questions” violates
In sum, I have found no California court case that categorically holds that the failure to identify oneself to an officer during a police investigation—without more—furnishes probable cause to arrest under
*
I welcome Judge Bress‘s spirited disagreement with my analysis of California law. Such debates, I hope, will help clarify the law. I make just a few points in rebuttal.
First, I am truly agnostic on whether
Second, I agree with Judge Bress that the Fourth Amendment protects officers who make reasonable mistakes about whether the law supports an arrest. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66 (2014). But it promotes the law to clarify whether a mistake was made in the first place.
Third, contrary to Judge Bress‘s view, this question was squarely presented in this appeal. Deciding this case on other grounds doesn‘t make the issue irrelevant.
And finally, if Judge Bress is right that California law is so clear, it should have been an easy task to come up with California caselaw supporting his view. The lack of any should give us all pause.
BRESS, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I am compelled to write separately in this straightforward case only to address Judge Bumatay‘s separate concurring opinion, which expounds on California criminal law and suggests that various federal court decisions interpreting California law may be wrongly decided. I write to make clear that, in my respectful view, Judge Bumatay‘s evaluation of California law is both unnecessary to our resolution of this case and substantively incorrect, advocating a narrow interpretation of California Penal Code
I
Judge Bumatay writes separately on the question of whether California law “holds that the failure to identify oneself to an officer during a police investigation—without more—furnishes probable cause to arrest under
There was also independent probable cause to arrest Vanegas for violating California Penal Code
The majority opinion holds that the officers should receive qualified immunity for any arrest under
Judge Bumatay‘s concurrence nonetheless opines on whether “the failure to identify oneself to an officer during a police investigation—without more—furnishes probable cause to arrest under
As a matter of federal constitutional law under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court‘s decision in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004), resolves that a person can be lawfully arrested for failure to provide identification during a valid Terry stop, if the request for identification is reasonably related to the stop. There is no question that officers here at the very least had reasonable suspicion to stop Vanegas under Terry (indeed, the majority opinion holds they had probable cause to arrest him under
That question of California law is not only not presented on the facts of this case, deciding it would be unnecessary even with the right facts. With sufficient supporting information, officers are entitled to make arrests based on reasonable, even if ultimately mistaken, views of the law. See, e.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66 (2014); Barrera v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 12 F.4th 617, 620–21 (6th Cir. 2021). Even if the facts presented it in this case, we still would not need to resolve whether California law would criminalize a failure to provide identification in response to a valid Terry stop, or whether something “more” would be required.
Why? Because the officers’ belief that they had probable cause to arrest in that situation would at least be a reasonable interpretation of California law. And because it is reasonable, “we need not decide exactly what [
I thus see no reason to broach the not-presented, legally irrelevant question of
II
Because Judge Bumatay‘s concurring opinion has raised the issue, however, it is worth making clear that I do not think its reading of California law is correct. The concurrence asserts that “California courts have suggested” that a person cannot be arrested based on the refusal to produce identification to a police officer during a valid Terry stop. Concurrence 21. That seems to me incorrect: the California cases the concurrence cites do not demonstrate that something more than a valid Terry stop is required before a refusal to provide identification comes within the prohibitory bounds of
Consider People v. Knoedler, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586 (Cal. App. Dep‘t Super. Ct. 2019). The concurrence suggests Knoedler “accept[ed]” that “the ‘failure to identify oneself cannot, on its own, justify an arrest’ under
The concurrence points also to People v. Lopez, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), claiming that the court there “suggested” that “‘a simple refusal to identify one‘s self’ does not violate
The other cases the concurrence cites were themselves distinguished in Knoedler. Knoedler distinguished People v. Quiroga, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), on the grounds that it considered the defendant‘s refusal to identify himself after arrest. Knoedler, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 589. Knoedler explained that a misdemeanor defendant‘s post-arrest failure to disclose his identity does “not delay
In contrast, Vanegas here refused to identify himself to an officer who had not yet arrested him and who was searching for him by name. And although the concurrence correctly notes that Quiroga called for “great caution” when applying
Finally, Knoedler also distinguished In re Gregory S., 169 Cal. Rptr. 540, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), another case on which the concurrence relies. Although that case found no violation of
Gregory S. thus does not support any broader conclusions about the reach of
In sum, California courts have not suggested that a mere refusal to identify oneself cannot justify a conviction or arrest under
Because Judge Bumatay‘s concurrence rests on an overreading of California case law, it also errs in implying that three federal decisions—Kuhlken v. County of San Diego, 764 F. App‘x 612 (9th Cir. 2019), Abdel-Shafy v. City of San Jose, 2019 WL 570759 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2019) (Koh, J.), and Nakamura v. City of Hermosa Beach, 2009 WL 1445400 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2009) aff‘d, 372 F. App‘x 787 (9th Cir. 2010)—may have misinterpreted the
In Kuhlken, an officer responded to a report that a woman had used her car to run over another person. Kuhlken v. County of San Diego, 2018 WL 454444 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2018), aff‘d, 764 F. App‘x 612 (9th Cir. 2019). Because of the involvement of a vehicle, the woman was obligated to provide her driver‘s license to the officer under
Similarly, in Abdel-Shafy, 2019 WL 570759, the plaintiff was arrested for violating
When she later brought unlawful arrest claims under
Finally, the concurrence suggests that Nakamura, 2009 WL 1445400, held that a mere refusal to identify oneself alone provides probable cause to arrest under
*
In short, California case law does not support the limitations Judge Bumatay‘s concurrence would impose on
BENITEZ, District Judge, concurring:
I agree with the court that summary judgment was properly granted for the
Appellant paints this as a case of the police unconstitutionally arresting him for simply refusing to divulge his identity. Although, undoubtedly, an arrest for refusing to give one‘s name without at least reasonable suspicion would be an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, that is not this case. This was not a slow crime day for the police. Time was not passing idly by with no police work to do and a quiet police radio. The officer was not walking down streets and interrogating citizens about crimes yet to come. That would be an unreasonable seizure. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
No. In this case, a crime had been reported. From his police radio, the police officer had a description (a man), a place (walking north near the courthouse on Garfield Avenue), and a name: Javier Vanegas. When Officer Klotz found a lone man walking near the courthouse travelling north on Garfield Avenue he stopped the suspect and asked for his name. Vanegas’ name was reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. His name was central to the investigation of a crime, whether the crime was stalking (
Even if the officer did not have probable cause to arrest for the reported crime, Vanegas obstructed a permissible investigation. “The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. . . . A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145–146 (1972) (emphasis added). And reasonableness is the cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment.