JAMES MILLS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF COVINA, a California municipal corporation; KIM RANEY, in his official capacity as the Chief of the City of Covina Police Department; TERRANCE HANOU, Officer; DOES, 1–100, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-56343
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-07127-DOC-RAO
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
April 24, 2019
Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, and Ryan D. Nelson, Circuit Judges.
FOR PUBLICATION
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 8, 2019 Pasadena, California
Filed April 24, 2019
Opinion by Judge R. Nelson
SUMMARY*
Civil Rights
The panel affirmed the district court‘s dismissal of plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment claims as time-barred and affirmed a judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants in an action brought pursuant to
Plaintiff brought suit under
The panel held that plaintiff‘s claims for unlawful stop and detention, false arrest and false imprisonment were time-barred because Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) did not legally prevent plaintiff from commencing those claims during his criminal appeal and thus tolling under
Addressing the malicious prosecution and Monell liability claims, the panel found that collateral estoppel did not apply because a conviction or judgment that has been reversed on appeal and vacated lacks preclusive effect and cannot serve as collateral estoppel in a later proceeding. The panel nevertheless affirmed the district court‘s dismissal of the claims on the alternative ground that the reversal of plaintiff‘s conviction on basis of the exclusionary rule was not a favorable termination, for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, because the reversal did not address plaintiff‘s guilt or innocence.
COUNSEL
Joseph M. Adams (argued), Adams & Pham APC, Costa Mesa, California; Thomas H. Schelly and Kevin A. Lipeles, Lipeles Law Group APC, El Segundo, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Trisha E. Newman (argued), Tony M. Sain (argued), and Andrea K. Kornblau, Manning & Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester LLP, Los Angeles,
OPINION
R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:
We consider whether the statute of limitations for a criminal defendant‘s
I
On April 14, 2013, Covina Police Department Officer Terrance Hanou pulled Mills over for a traffic stop after seeing Mills exit a hotel and drive to another hotel. Hanou claimed he pulled Mills over because his vehicle registration was expired. Mills alleges Hanou noticed Mills “for no reason other than his physical appearance—large framed, bald headed, Caucasian,” and that when Hanou checked Mills‘s vehicle license, the database showed the registration was current.
Hanou acknowledged Mills‘s registration was valid but asked to search Mills‘s car. Mills refused. Hanou then made two calls to his supervisor and asked Mills if there were any weapons in the vehicle. Mills
Prior to Mills‘s criminal trial, Mills moved to suppress evidence of the alleged drugs, arguing Hanou‘s search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The California Superior Court denied the motion. At trial, Hanou testified he found drugs during the search. Mills testified “there were no drugs in his vehicle,” “there was evidence that the drugs were planted,” and Mills‘s counsel closed by stating, “Mr. Mills did not have drugs in his car. Those drugs were planted, and he‘s not guilty.” On June 6, 2014, Mills was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and one count of possession of a smoking device and was sentenced to eighteen months’ probation.
On March 3, 2016, the California Court of Appeal overturned Mills‘s conviction. The Court of Appeal held, in an unpublished opinion, that Hanou violated Mills‘s Fourth Amendment rights by searching the vehicle without probable cause and therefore, the Superior Court erred by denying Mills‘s suppression motion. Because “[t]he methamphetamine Hanou recovered from the center console and the methamphetamine and methamphetamine pipe he recovered from the luggage formed the evidentiary basis for [Mills‘s] convictions in th[e] case,” the Court of Appeal held that further proceedings below would be an “idle gesture,” and remanded for dismissal. On September 22, 2016, Mills filed this suit against the City of Covina, Covina Police Chief Kim Raney, and Hanou, alleging, under
Mills filed two amended complaints against only the City of Covina and Hanou (collectively “Appellees“) alleging, under
II
We have jurisdiction under
III
A
We begin by determining whether Mills‘s
present causes of action for all but his malicious prosecution and Monell liability claims when he was subjected to a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and was arrested; therefore, those claims accrued at that time.
Next, to determine whether the statute of limitations ran on Mills‘s claims, we “apply [California‘s] statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with [California‘s] law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with federal law.” Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). California‘s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions thus applies to Mills‘s claims. See
Mills filed his claims on September 22, 2016, roughly three years and five months after the search and arrest. His claims would therefore be time-barred absent tolling. The parties agree that
Under
In Heck, the Supreme Court announced that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a
In Wallace, the Supreme Court recognized a “complication” in applying the Heck bar to claims like Mills‘s that “arises from the fact that
Finding no basis for tolling under Illinois state law, the Court declined to adopt a federal equitable tolling rule in such circumstances. Id. The Court reasoned:
Under such a regime, it would not be known whether tolling is appropriate by reason of the Heck bar until it is established that the newly entered conviction would be impugned by the not-yet-filed, and thus utterly indeterminate,
§ 1983 claim. It would hardly be desirable to place the question of tolling vel non in this jurisprudential limbo, leaving it to be determined by those later events, and then pronouncing it retroactively.
Id. at 394-95 (internal footnote omitted).
For these same reasons, we find that where, as here, a
Ultimately, nothing prevented Mills from commencing his suit during his criminal appeal. Had he done so, the district court could have determined whether his claims impugned his conviction. If so, the district court could have dismissed those claims without prejudice, and Mills could have refiled the claims once his conviction was reversed. See id. at 395 n.4 (“If under those circumstances he were not allowed to refile his suit, Heck would produce immunity from
1
We next consider whether the district court properly dismissed Mills‘s
State law also governs the application of collateral estoppel to a state court judgment in a federal civil rights action. Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990). Under California law, collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of an issue in a subsequent proceeding when certain threshold requirements are fulfilled:
- the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding;
- this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding;
- it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding;
- the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits;
- the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.
Gikas v. Zolin, 6 Cal. 4th 841, 849 (1993).
In holding collateral estoppel applied, the district court reasoned that “[w]hether Hanou actually discovered drugs and thus had probable cause to arrest [Mills], as opposed to planting or fabricating the drugs, appear[ed] to be identical to an issue already decided in the prior criminal proceeding.” That was because “[t]he jury necessarily had to determine whether [Mills] actually possessed drugs in order to convict him of possession of a controlled substance in violation of
Mills argues he is not collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of probable cause here because his reversed conviction was not final. We agree. Under California law, “[f]or purposes of issue preclusion, final judgment includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.” People v. Cooper, 149 Cal. App. 4th 500, 520 (2007) (quoting Border Bus. Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 142 Cal. App. 4th 1538, 1564 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A final judgment is defined as one that is free from direct attack. Stated differently, [t]o be final for purposes of collateral estoppel the decision need only be immune, as a practical matter, to reversal
That Mills challenged his conviction on Fourth Amendment grounds rather than attacking the jury‘s underlying factual determinations does not change this result. As the Sixth Circuit explained considering nearly identical facts: where a criminal defendant successfully appealed his conviction on constitutional grounds, “he was not acquiescing in adverse factual determinations made at his trial.” Dodrill v. Ludt, 764 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1985). Thus, “[w]hen he won his appeal and the judgment was vacated, all such factual determinations were vacated with it, and their preclusive effect surrendered.” Id. at 444–45.
Nor does the Court of Appeal‘s reference to Mills possessing methamphetamine change the fact that the jury‘s underlying factual determinations to that effect were vacated with Mills‘s conviction. The Court of Appeal had no occasion to reassess the jury‘s underlying findings of fact. Instead, the Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether violation of Mills‘s Fourth Amendment rights warranted overturning his conviction. The Court of Appeal concluded that it did and reversed. That “reversal
vacate[d] the judgment entirely, technically leaving nothing to which we may accord preclusive effect.” Dodrill, 764 F.2d at 444.
Finally, Appellees’ reliance on the California common law rule, that probable cause in a malicious prosecution action may be conclusively established by a conviction or judgment despite reversal, does not support their collateral estoppel argument. As the California Supreme Court has made clear, that common law rule, sometimes referred to as the “interim adverse judgment rule,” is not part of the doctrine of collateral estoppel as it “does not operate, like collateral estoppel, to preclude relitigation of an issue of fact.” Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th 811, 825 (2002); see also L.G. v. M.B., 25 Cal. App. 5th 211, 230 n.15 (2018) (“Our Supreme Court has explained that the interim adverse judgment rule is not part of the doctrine of res judicata or any of its branches, but is derived from the definition of probable cause.“) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the district court did not make any findings as to the applicability of the interim adverse judgment rule, and because we affirm the district court‘s dismissal on alternative grounds, we do not decide whether the interim adverse judgment rule applies here. It is enough to find that collateral estoppel does not bar Mills from pursuing his malicious prosecution claim.
2
Appellees argue that we can affirm the district court‘s dismissal of Mills‘s malicious prosecution claim on the alternative ground that Mills‘s reversed conviction did not constitute a legal termination in Mills‘s favor. We agree.
Under California law, the favorable termination element of a malicious prosecution claim “requires a termination
The California Court of Appeal reversed Mills‘s conviction because it held that the government‘s evidence that Mills possessed drugs should have been excluded on Fourth Amendment grounds. We have never considered whether reversal of a conviction under the exclusionary rule qualifies as a favorable termination. District courts in this circuit have held categorically that it does. See, e.g., Willis v. Mullins, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1241 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that “a conviction overturned due to the exclusionary rule does not qualify as a favorable termination for the purposes of malicious prosecution“). At least in circumstances such as these, we agree.
The exclusionary rule excludes relevant and probative evidence not because of a person‘s innocence, but rather to prevent violations of the Fourth Amendment. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488–89 (1972). As the Supreme Court has explained, applying the exclusionary rule diverts “from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976). Indeed, “the physical evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Id. In reversing Mills‘s conviction based on the exclusionary rule, the Court of Appeal did not find that Mills actually possessed drugs or that those drugs were planted. The Court of Appeal held only that the drug evidence should have been excluded. Absent more, the Court of Appeal‘s ruling does not speak to Mills‘s “innocence of the misconduct.” Pattiz, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 827. Certainly, the Court of Appeal‘s decision leaves at minimum “some doubt” as to Mills‘s innocence. Id. That is sufficient under California law to find that there was no favorable termination. Id. Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of Mills‘s malicious prosecution and Monell liability claims on this alternative ground.
IV
All but Mills‘s
AFFIRMED.