James Mills v. City of Covina
921 F.3d 1161
9th Cir.2019Background
- On April 14, 2013 Officer Hanou stopped James Mills, searched his car after Mills refused consent, found methamphetamine and cash, and arrested him. Mills moved to suppress; the trial court denied the motion. Mills was convicted and sentenced in June 2014.
- The California Court of Appeal reversed Mills’s conviction on March 3, 2016, holding the vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment and ordering dismissal under the exclusionary rule.
- Mills filed a § 1983 suit on September 22, 2016 against the City of Covina, Chief Raney, and Officer Hanou asserting unlawful stop/detention, false arrest/imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and Monell claims, among others.
- The district court held all claims except malicious prosecution and related Monell claim were time‑barred because California tolling during the appeal (Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.3 and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 356) did not extend to the appellate period given Heck/Wallace principles.
- The district court dismissed the remaining malicious prosecution claim on collateral estoppel grounds (finding probable cause established); the Ninth Circuit reviewed accrual, tolling, collateral estoppel, and favorable‑termination issues on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether California CCP § 356 tolled § 1983 claims during Mills’s criminal appeal because Heck barred filing | Mills: Heck legally prevented filing during appeal, so § 356 tolls the period | Appellees: Heck did not legally prevent filing; no tolling for appeal under § 356 | Held: No tolling. Heck/Wallace do not create a definitive bar that triggers § 356 during appeal; claims (other than malicious prosecution/Monell) are time‑barred |
| Accrual date for Mills’s Fourth Amendment–based § 1983 claims | Mills: accrual should be deferred until appeal resolves (relying on pre‑Wallace Harvey) | Appellees: accrual occurred at arrest/search on April 14, 2013 | Held: Accrual at arrest/search; Harvey’s deferred accrual rule is no longer good law after Wallace |
| Whether collateral estoppel barred relitigation of possession/probable cause after reversal | Appellees: jury verdict established possession, so issue precluded | Mills: reversed conviction is not final and vacated, so no preclusion | Held: Collateral estoppel does not apply—reversal vacated factual determinations, so they lack conclusive effect |
| Whether reversal under the exclusionary rule satisfies favorable termination for malicious prosecution | Mills: reversal = favorable termination allowing malicious prosecution claim | Appellees: reversal ends prosecution and should be favorable | Held: Reversal based solely on exclusionary rule is not a favorable termination—it leaves doubt about innocence, so malicious prosecution and Monell claims fail |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§ 1983 claim that would impugn a conviction is barred unless conviction reversed or invalidated)
- Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (a § 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff can file suit; Heck’s deferred‑accrual application is limited and does not justify retroactive tolling)
- Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2000) (pre‑Wallace Ninth Circuit rule deferring accrual pending criminal proceedings — effectively overruled by Wallace)
- Hoover v. Galbraith, 7 Cal.3d 519 (1972) (California rule that statute of limitations is tolled when plaintiff is "legally prevented" from suing)
- Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2004) (elements of malicious prosecution in § 1983 context require favorable termination, lack of probable cause, and malice)