Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), statements made during judicial proceedings are generally privileged and nonactionable (except in a malicious prosecution claim).
The trial court found that the divorce proviso applied here because Appellant's statements were included in a pleading "filed in" her dissolution action, and Respondent neither asserted nor was the subject of any request for relief in that action. ( § 47, subd. (b)(1).) Appellant and amicus curiae Family Violence Appellate Project
Although we differ on the reason, we also agree with the trial court's conclusion that Appellant's success in obtaining two temporary restraining orders-one against Ex-Husband in the dissolution action and one against Respondent in a separate civil harassment action-did not establish as a matter of law that there was "reasonable and probable cause" to believe that Appellant's challenged statements about Respondent were true. ( § 47, subd. (b)(1).) The record does not contain sufficient information concerning the reasons for the two temporary restraining orders to permit a conclusion that the judges who granted those orders actually made any findings concerning the facts underlying the particular statements that Respondent challenges in this action.
Appellant's legal arguments concerning the litigation privilege and the effect of the prior rulings on the restraining orders are her only challenges on appeal to the trial court's finding that Respondent established a "probability that [she] will prevail" on her claims. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Because we reject those legal arguments, we affirm the trial court's denial of Appellant's anti-SLAPP motion.
BACKGROUND
1. The Anti-SLAPP Procedure
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) provides for a "special motion to strike" when a plaintiff's claims arise from acts involving the exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances, "unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." ( Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (a), (b)(1).) Ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step procedure. First, the moving defendant must show that the challenged claims arise from activity that is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. ( Baral v. Schnitt (2016)
2. Appellant's Requests for Restraining Orders
a. The dissolution action
On April 3, 2017, Appellant filed an ex parte request for a restraining order against Ex-Husband in her pending dissolution action. In her declaration in support of the request, Appellant described abuse by Ex-Husband, including physical beatings
Appellant also claimed that Ex-Husband threatened to release embarrassing video recordings of sexual encounters that Ex-Husband forced her to have. She testified that Ex-Husband brought "random women" to hotel rooms and compelled Appellant to participate in sexual intercourse with him and these women, which he recorded against Appellant's wishes. Ex-Husband used threats to release these recordings as a means of control over Appellant.
Appellant's declaration also made various allegations about Respondent. Among other things, Appellant alleged that: (1) Ex-Husband began a sexual relationship with Respondent after he hired her as a nanny and set Respondent up as Appellant's "rival"; (2) Ex-Husband paid Respondent large amounts of Appellant's money for purported nanny services, including a large lump sum paid to an entity affiliated with Respondent after Appellant finally fired Respondent; (3) Respondent became pregnant with Ex-Husband's child, and Ex-Husband used Appellant's money to pay for an abortion; (4) at Ex-Husband's instruction, Respondent took Appellant's children to Europe without Appellant's permission; (5) Respondent acted as an "agent" for Ex-Husband to "keep tabs" on Appellant for Ex-Husband; and (6) acting under Ex-Husband's protection, Respondent becаme "manipulative and demanding" and acted as if she were Ex-Husband's wife.
The court granted Appellant's request for a restraining order and issued a temporary order on a standard Judicial Council form. The order was to stay in effect until a hearing that was scheduled for April 24, 2017. At Ex-Husband's request, the hearing was continued until October 2017. The record does not reflect any further hearing on Appellant's request.
On April 10, 2017, Appellant filed an ex parte petition for a restraining order against Respondent in a civil harassment proceeding separate from the dissolution action. The petition sought various stay-away and personal conduct orders as well as orders permitting Appellant to have access to a storage facility and prohibiting Respondent from removing items from that facility.
In a declaration filed in support of her request, Appellant repeated many of the allegations against Respondent that she had included in her restraining order request in the dissolution action, including allegations that Respondent verbally abused her. Appellant also made additional allegations concerning her personal property. Appellant alleged that Respondent had said she was in possession of videos that Ex-Husband was using to extort Appellant and that Respondent said she will "give them to [Ex-Husband] if he needs them." Appellant also claimed that some of her personal items, including valuable memorabilia from her entertainment career, had been moved to a storage locker that was rented using Respondent's e-mail address and telephone number and that was under the control of Ex-Husband and Respondent.
The court issued a temporary order granting Appellant's stay-away and personal conduct requests. The order also granted Appellant immediate access to the identified storage facility and permission
There was no aрpearance for Respondent at the May 3rd hearing. The court initially granted a five-year restraining order at that hearing, but subsequently vacated that ruling following a motion by Respondent claiming that she had not been properly served prior to the hearing. The court instead continued the temporary order pending a further hearing. The action subsequently settled.
3. Respondent's Complaint
Respondent filed her complaint in this action on April 20, 2017. The complaint asserts claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based entirely on Appellant's allegations against her in Appellant's declaration filed in the dissolution action.
The complaint alleges that Appellant's allegations were false. According to the complaint, Respondent was a naïve 18-year-old woman when she first
4. Appellant's Anti-SLAPP Motion
Appellant filed an anti-SLAPP motion seeking dismissal of each of Respondent's claims. The motion argued that Respondent could not show a probability that her claims will succeed on the merits, as Appellant's declaration was absolutely privileged under section 47. She also argued that, even if the exception to the privilege under section 47, subdivision (b)(1) was applicable, the statements in her declaration were nevertheless privileged because the decisions granting the restraining orders against Ex-Husband and Respondent showed that there was probable cause for Appellant's allegations against Respondent.
Respondent's opposition did not dispute that, because her claims against Appellant are based on statements made during litigation, they "arise from" protected activity under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP procedure. ( Codе Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) However, Respondent argued that, under prong 2, the evidence was sufficient to show that she would prevail on her claims. Respondent argued that only a
The trial court denied Appellant's anti-SLAPP motion. The court concluded that the express language of section 47, subdivision (b)(1) covers
DISCUSSION
As in the trial court, Appellant's arguments on appeal are limited to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP procedure. Appellant argues that Respondent failed to show a probability that she would prevail on her claims because the statements that Respondent challenges in her lawsuit were made in a court filing and therefore were absolutely privileged under section 47. Alternatively, she argues that, even if only a qualified litigation privilege applied to those statements under section 47, subdivision (b)(1), the statements were privileged as a matter of law because the trial courts' prior decisions issuing the restraining orders against Ex-Husband and Respondent showed that Appellant had probable cause to believe the truth of the challenged statements. We apply a de novo standard of review to these issues. ( Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006)
1. The Divorce Proviso Exception to the Litigation Privilege Applies to Appellant's Challenged Statements Filed in Her Marital Dissolution Action
The litigation privilege established by section 47, subdivision (b) applies to any communication (1) made in judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action. ( Silberg, supra,
a. Prior precedent
Appellant argues that we are not painting on an empty canvas in interpreting the divorce proviso because our Supreme Court already defined its scope in Silberg . Appellant argues that the divorce proviso should be interpreted narrowly, citing the court's observation in Silberg that the divorce proviso "may well be an unnecessary anachronism." ( Silberg, supra,
In Silberg , the court disapproved an "interest of justice" exception to the litigation privilege that several Courts of Appeal had adopted. ( Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 212-213,
In rejecting this exception, the court relied in part on the language of the divorce proviso. The court noted that the divorce proviso was added to section 47 in 1927 to provide that "an allegation involving corespondents in pleadings and affidavits filed in divorce actions is not privileged unless stated under oath, without malice, and on reasonable grounds." ( Silberg, supra,
We do not agree with this interpretation. First, the court in Silberg did not purport to make any holding on the scope of the divorce proviso. It did not need to do so. The divorce proviso was relevant in the court's discussion only to show that, in actions outside the scope of that proviso, there is no malice requirement. The precise scope of the proviso was not important; its only significance was to show that the malice requirement is limited to the dissolution actions in which it applies. Thus, the court's description of the divorce proviso and its observation that the proviso may be an anachronism were not part of its holding. "[A]n opinion is only authority for those issues that it actually considered or decided." ( Rosen v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2003)
Third, to the extent that the court did understand the divorce proviso to be an anachronism that no longer applied to any pleading filed in a dissolution action, that view is no longer tenable in light of subsequеnt legislative action. The Legislature amended section 47, subdivision (b) effective September 1990, seven months after the court filed its opinion in Silberg identifying the divorce proviso as an "unnecessary
Whatever the precise scope of the amended subdivision, we presume that the Legislature's decision to retain and apply the exception to dissolutiоn actions in 1990 rather than repealing it means that it intended the provision to be something other than a dead letter. As the court observed in Silberg , "we presume that the Legislature does not engage in idle acts." ( Silberg, supra,
The court in Thornton v. Rhoden (1966)
Thus, in the absence of relevant precedent, we must consider whether the scope of the divorce proviso includes Appellant's challenged statements that she filed in her dissolution action. We begin, as we must, with the language of the statute. ( Day v. City of Fontana (2001)
b. Statutory language
Appellant's challenged statements fall within the express scope of the divorce proviso. Rеspondent's claims are based on "allegation[s]" and "averment[s]" that Appellant made concerning her in a declaration that was "filed in" Appellant's dissolution action. Appellant's request for a restraining order against Ex-Husband was filed under the same case number as her dissolution action, and the restraining order was issued in that action. Respondent was a nonparty in that proceeding who neither sought nor was the subject of any "affirmative relief."
Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)(1) is not ambiguous about the judicial filings to which it applies. It applies to "any pleading or affidavit filed in an
Because the language of the statute is clear, we need not resort to legislative history or policy considerations as a guide to interpret the statute. We nevertheless address Appellant's arguments on these topics to " 'test our construction against those extrinsic aids that bear on the enactors' intent.' " ( Day, supra,
c. Legislative history
Appellant argues that the Legislature did not intend the divorce proviso to apply to requests for domestic violence restraining orders because (1) the Family Code makes restraining orders available in circumstances beyond dissolution actions, and (2) the Legislature established the procedure for obtaining such orders well after the divorce proviso was enacted. Neither point is persuasive in light of the broad language of the proviso.
Just as dissolution actions typically include requests for many different types of relief, many of the types of relief that are available in dissolution actions are also available in other contexts. For example, child сustody and child support awards may be sought in an action separate from a dissolution proceeding ( Fam. Code, §§ 3120, 4000 ); parties in civil actions may obtain preliminary injunctions to avoid waste or irreparable injury ( Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a)(2) ); creditors may obtain orders against the disposition of assets ( Civ. Code, § 3439.07, subd. (a)(3)(A) ); and motions for attorney fees are available in a variety of proceedings,
Appellant's arguments concerning the original purpose for the divorce proviso do not change this conclusion. Appellant citеs scholarly commentary suggesting that the proviso was adopted to avoid " 'legal blackmail' " through unfounded allegations of adultery against third parties in divorce proceedings. (See Friedman, Guarding Life's Dark Secrets: Legal and Social Controls Over Reputation, Propriety, and Privacy (Stanford U. Press 2007) p. 290, n. 48.) Presumably the defamatory effects of such unfounded allegations would be just as severe whether they appeared in the original complaint seeking a divorce based upon the fault of a spouse or in some other pleading filed during the proceeding, such as a motion for child custody or a restraining order.
Appellant's argument that the procedure for obtaining domestic violence protective orders did not exist in 1927 when the divorce proviso was originally enacted does not take account of the Legislature's 1990 amendment. A procedure for obtaining domestic violence restraining orders did exist when the Legislature amended the divorce proviso in 1990. Indeed, in September 1990, the same month that the Legislаture amended the divorce proviso, it also enacted substantive changes to the procedures for obtaining a domestic violence restraining order. (See Stats. 1990, ch. 752.) If the Legislature wished to exclude applications for a domestic violence restraining order from the scope of section 47, subdivision (b)(1), it could have done so expressly by amendment.
As discussed above, the Legislature's 1990 amendment to the divorce proviso also precludes any argument that the proviso no longer applies because its original purpose has become irrelevant. The Legislature's decision to retain and amend the provision in 1990 requires us to presume that it has some current application, particularly as the amendment occurred after the court observed in Silberg that the marriage proviso "may well be an unnecessary anachronism."
Thus, the legislative history of the divorce proviso does not support a reading that would exclude Respondent from its scope.
d. Policies underlying domestic violence restraining orders
Appellant and Amicus present various reasons why reading the divorce proviso narrowly to exclude declarations in support of restraining orders would be consistent with the policies and goals of the statutory scheme governing domestic violence restraining orders. For example, they argue that applying the divorce proviso to pleadings seeking domestic violence restraining orders in dissolution actions would: (1) create inconsistency with cases holding that family law motions, including motions for restraining orders, are immune even from malicious prosecution actions;
While many of these arguments articulate persuasive policy goals, whether this court believes that those goals are important is not the issue. Appellant has not raised any equal protection or other constitutional challenge to the application of the divorce proviso to her challenged statements. Our review is therefore limited to interpreting the statute.
In doing so, this court " 'has no power to rewrite the statute so as to makе it conform to a presumed intention which is not expressed.' " ( City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002)
Citing Cassel v. Superior Court (2011)
The Legislature could have made rational distinctions concerning the scope of the litigation privilege between pleadings filed in dissolution actions and in
We do not suggest that the Legislature actually had this rationale in mind in declining to amend or repeal the divorce proviso. But the decision to give effect to the plain language of section 47, subdivision (b)(1) does not lead to absurd results. If the Legislature believes that the divorce proviso is no longer necessary, or that it improperly interferes with policies underlying proceedings for restraining orders, it is free to change the language of the provision or repeal it entirely.
Appellant argues that the two judges' decisions granting her requests for temporary restraining orders in the dissolution action and in her separate civil harassment action against Respondent established as a matter of law that she had "reasonable and probable cause for bеlieving the truth of" the allegations she made about Respondent. Appellant analogizes to the doctrine applied in malicious prosecution actions commonly called the " 'interim adverse judgment rule.' " ( Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017)
The interim adverse judgment rule operates to preclude a malicious prosecution claim when a ruling in the prior action on which the claim is based shows that the defendant (i.e., the former plaintiff) had probable cause to bring that action. The elements of a malicious prosecution claim include proof that the defendant "initiated or maintained" a previous action "without
We agree with Appellant that the rationale underlying the interim adverse judgment rule is potentially relevant to determining whether a ruling in a prior case established the probable cause required under section 47, subdivision (b)(1). The interim adverse judgment rule is based on the principle that "[c]laims that have succeeded at a hearing on the merits, even if that result is subsequently reversed by the trial or appellate court, are not so lacking in potential merit that a reasonable attorney or litigant would necessarily have recognized their frivolousness." ( Wilson, supra,
However, the analogy is not perfect. A malicious prosecution action will fail if the defendant hаd probable cause to bring a claim in the prior action. In contrast, the litigation privilege applies under
We need not decide whether, and how, the interim adverse judgment rule applies to proof of probable cause as a matter of law under section 47, subdivision (b)(1). Even assuming that, in some circumstances, a prior ruling
In the malicious prosecution context, our Supreme Court has observed that a prior ruling cannot establish probablе cause if the reasons for the ruling are uncertain. In Wilson , the court held that a prior ruling denying an anti-SLAPP motion may establish probable cause for the plaintiff's action under the interim adverse judgment rule.
For the reason discussed above, the potential for uncertainty about the scope of a prior ruling is even greater in a case such as this, which involves challenges to particular statements, than in a malicious prosecution case, which involves a broader challenge to a claim. In a defamation case or similar action challenging particular allegations, it is not enough to discern from a prior ruling whether the court found that a claim had sufficient merit to proceed. One must also determine whether the court made favorable findings about each challenged allegation underlying the claim.
The difficulty here is similar to the problem that can arise in determining whether to give collateral estoppel effect to a prior judicial decision.
The record in this case does not contain sufficient information to discern which, if any, of Appellant's challenged allegations the court found had merit when the temporary restraining orders were issued. Appеllant's statements in support of the restraining order in the dissolution action (which include all the statements directly at issue in this action) primarily concerned Ex-Husband, who was the person that Appellant sought to restrain. Those statements included direct allegations of abuse by Ex-Husband that could have been sufficient in themselves to support the judge's decision to issue a temporary restraining order against Ex-Husband without ever considering Appellant's allegations about Respondent.
Although Appellant sought a restraining order against Respondent in the civil harassment action, the judge's ruling in that action nevertheless does not reveal what findings, if any, the judge made about Appellant's particular allegations in support of her application. Along with standard personal conduct and stay-away orders, Appellant sought-and the court granted-an order giving Appellant access to a storage facility where she alleged her personal property was present and prohibiting Respondent from removing property from that storage facility. Appellant supported her request with a number of detailed allegations, some of which were the same or similar to her allegations in the request filed in the dissolution action that are at issue in this case (e.g., allegations concerning Respondent's sexual relationship with Ex-Husband and Ex-Husband's alleged extravagant payments to Respondent). However, the judge need not have relied on those allegations in deciding to grant the temporary restraining order. The judge could have issued the order based simply on Appellant's allegations that Respondent had become verbally abusive and was in control of Appellant's personal property.
Other than legal arguments concerning the litigation privilege and the interim adverse judgment rule, Appellant does not raise any other challenge to the trial
3. Respondent is not Entitled to Attorney Fees
Respondent does not challenge the trial court's ruling denying her attorney fees for successfully opposing Appellant's anti-SLAPP motion below. However, she argues that Appellant's appeal was frivolous and that Respondent is therefore entitled to her fees on appeal.
We conclude that Appellant's appeal was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) Her appeal raises colorable issues. We therefore deny Respondent's request for attorney fees on appeal.
The trial cоurt's order denying Appellant's anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to her costs on appeal.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
HOFFSTADT, J.
Notes
"SLAPP" is an acronym for "[s]trategic lawsuit against public participation." (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999)
Because this case involves allegations of abuse and M.B. and S.B. have a minor child, we do not use names in this opinion. We refer to M.B. as "Appellant," S.B. as "Ex-Husband," and L.G. as "Respondent."
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
The dissolution action apparently was settled in November 2017.
Moreover, a number of courts have held that, because of the difficult and often bitter disputes in family law cases and the sanctions that are available in those proceedings for meritless filings, no malicious prosecution claim may arise from family law motions. (See Bidna v. Rosen (1993)
It is not clear why Amicus suggests that this scope, if applicable, would be only "largely" obsolete. Under California's no-fault marital dissolution regime, the only two grounds for dissolving a marriage are "[i]rreconcilable differences" or "[p]ermanent legal incapacity to make decisions." (Fam. Code, § 2310.) The grounds for dissolution must be "pleaded generally." (Ibid. ) Thus, there is no longer any reason to identify a corespondent to establish adultery as a ground for divorce. (See Diosdado v. Diosdado (2002)
Amicus suggests that Appellant indirectly sought relief against Respondent because Appellant requested an order precluding Ex-Husband from contacting Appellant "directly or indirectly," which would include contact by him through Respondent. The suggestion is creative but unpersuasive. The order that Appellant sought in the dissolution action, and the temporary restraining order that the court issued, did not direct Respondent to do or not do anything. It was an order only against Ex-Husband. Appellant independently sought a civil harassment restraining order in a separate action against Respondent, which is not at issue here. Thus, Respondent was not a "person ... against whom ... affirmative relief [was] prayed" in the dissolution action. (§ 47, subd. (b)(1).)
A declaration is, of course, the functional equivalent of an affidavit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5.)
Nor does the fact that a request for a restraining order can be filed in a separate action mean that such a request that is filed in a dissolution action should be considered somehow separate from that action. As the trial court observed, if that were the case, motions or requests for injunctions filed in civil cases would all be considered separate actions.
Even if we were to read the proviso as limited to allegations against the modern version of a corespondent, that limitation would not help Appellant. As this case illustrates, even under a no-fault marital dissolution regime a party seeking dissolution can still accuse his or her spouse of adultery. A third party who is accused of participating in such adultery is the closest contemporary analog to a coresрondent. Respondent fits that definition. Appellant's allegations in the dissolution action that Respondent engaged in an extramarital sexual relationship with Ex-Husband are among the statements that Respondent claims were defamatory.
Appellant goes even further in suggesting that such cases are controlling here. They are not. The cases that Appellant cites considered whether an action for malicious prosecution may be based upon family law motions. They did not concern the exception to the litigation privilege in section 47, subdivision (b)(1). (See Bidna v. Rosen, supra,
Indeed, Respondent alleges such a strategic purpose in this case. Respondent claims that Appellant "needlessly and gratuitously" made the allegedly defamatory accusations against her in the dissolution action "as a preemptive strike to discredit any potential testimony from [Respondent] during the divorce and child custody proceedings." In ruling that Respondent had sufficiently shown a probability of success on her claims, the trial court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Appellant made the allegedly false accusations against Respondent out of such a motive.
This assumes that the existence of probable cause under section 47, subdivision (b)(1) is an objective question rather than subjective, and, like the probable cause at issue in a malicious prosecution claim, may be determined as a matter of law based on " 'the facts known to the defendant.' " (Parrish,
A subsequent amendment to the anti-SLAPP statute abrogated this holding by providing that a court's ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion finding a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on its claims is not admissible, and that "no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that determination ... in any subsequent proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(3) ; Hutton v. Hafif (2007)
The requirements to establish collateral estoppel are relevant only by analogy. Our Supreme Court has explained that the interim adverse judgment rule is not part of the "doctrine of res judicata or any of its branches," but is derived from the definition of probable cause. (Wilson, supra,
Because the parties' briefs did not directly address this issue, pursuant to Government Code section 68081, we invited the parties to submit supplemental letter briefs addressing whether the reasons for the trial court's prior decisions granting the restraining orders can "be determined with sufficient certainty to permit those rulings to establish the existence of probable cause as a matter of law for the statements by [Appellant] that are the subject of [Respondent's] lawsuit." Along with her letter brief, Appellant filed a request for judicial notice of some additional documents from the trial court's file in the restraining order proceedings. We grant the motion. However, these additional documents do not provide any further information concerning the specific basis for the rulings. The documents include court orders on procedural issues that continued the restraining orders in force pending further hearings. None of these procedural orders addressed the bases for the initial decisions to issue the restraining orders.
The preliminary nature of the restraining orders would not necessarily preclude a finding that they established probable cause as a matter of law. In Wilson , our Supreme Court cited with approval Butler v. Ratner (1994)