Lego v. Twomey

LEGO v. TWOMEY, WARDEN Argued No. 70-5037. November January 12, Decided Lewin, by appointment Nathan Court, 928, argued the cause and for petitioner. filed a brief Zagel, Attorney

James B. Assistant General of Illi- nois, argued respondent. With him on cause Scott, the brief Attorney were William J. General, Joel Flaum, M. Attorney Assistant First and War- General, Smoot, ren K. Attorney Assistant General. opinion Justice White delivered the

Mr. of the Court. In 1964 this Court held that a criminal defendant who challenges voluntariness of a confession made to officials and to be sought used him at his trial process has a due right to a reliable determination that the confession voluntarily fact given and not the outcome of coercion which the Constitution forbids. Jackson v. 378 U. S. 368. While our deci plain sion made only voluntary may confessions be admitted at the trial of guilt or innocence, we did announce, then or even suggest, that the factfinder at a coercion hearing need judge voluntariness with refer ence especially to an severe standard of proof. Never

479 Jackson, have theless, since state and federal courts addressed themselves the issue with a considerable variety We opinions.1 granted certiorari this case question. resolve 401 U. S. 992 since Jackson question State courts have considered the variety adopted standards, have most of them founded Many proof state law. have less strict sanctioned a standard of doubt, including than a reasonable proof of voluntariness or to the satisfaction State, g., in fact. E. Duncan v. court or of voluntariness Dillon, Idaho State v. 145, (1965); 278 Ala. So. 2d 840 (1971); 698, denied, 471 P. cert. 2d 553 U. People Harper, State 398, (1967); 223 N. E. 2d 841 36 Ill. 2d State, Milow, Barnhart (1967); P. 199 Kan. 2d 538 White, (1968); Commonwealth v. App. 222, 5 246 A. 2d 280 Md. Nolan, (1967); 423 S. W. State 409, N. 2d 335 v. Mass. 232 E. 353 White, 146 Mont. 226, 2d 761 v. (Mo. 1968); 405 P. State 2d 815 Brewton, 238 State denied, (1966); v. (1965), 384 U. S. 1023 cert. Butler v. ex rel. Commonwealth 590, (1964); 2d Or. 395 P. 874 State, 218 Rundle, Monts v. 141, (1968); 2d 429 239 A. 426 Pa. Davis, 2d State 31, (1966); v. 73 Wash. 400 2d 722 Tenn. S. W. (1968). 271, P. 2d 185 438 require basis, specifying a States, using law not state Other Ragsdale, 249 g., doubt. E. State beyond v. a reasonable (1967); denied, (1966), S. 1029 420, 427 385 U. 187 2d cert. La. So. State (1966); v. Keiser, 265, 2d 75 v. 274 Minn. 143 N. W. State (1967); People 15 Yough, Huntley, 587, v. A. 2d 49 J. 231 598 N. shield, 83 v. Thunder State (1965); 72, 2d 204 N. 2d 179 N. Y. E. rel. Goodchild v. (1968); State ex 414, 2d 408 D. 160 N. W. S. denied, 384 (1965), cert. Burke, 27 244, N. 2d 753 2d 133 W. Wis. 1017 S.U. power supervisory exercise of have held as an Two federal courts a doubt. reasonable proved must that voluntariness 1970), clarifying United Warden, 786, (CA4 Ralph 438 2d 793 F. States, v. United Pea (CA4 1965); Inman, 2d 954 States 352 F. United States (1967); cf. F. 627 D. C. 397 2d App. (CA2 F. 1262 (EDNY aff’d, 414 2d Schipani, Supp. F. 1968), requiring the denied, Government 1969), cert. not was that certain prove beyond a reasonable doubt Amendment. Fourth tainted violation robbery in of armed was convicted Lego Petitioner County, Superior a in Cook Court, 1961 after trial prison The him to court sentenced Illinois. Lego The at trial years. evidence introduced made to arrest police included a confession he had after custody station house. Prior to trial and while at the suppressed. He did have the confession Lego sought he had done deny making challenge it but did voluntarily. judge hearing, so The trial conducted presence Lego out of at which testified jury, police had beaten him the head neck with about and explanation His of this gun butt. treatment police chief, neighbor local and former classmate of robbery victim, had him. sought revenge Lego introduced into evidence a photograph that had been taken him at the county jail day on the after his arrest. The photograph petitioner’s showed that face had been swollen had traces of blood on it. admitted Lego that his face had been in a scratched scuffle with the rob- bery victim but maintained that the encounter did not explain the condition shown The photograph. police chief and four also They officers testified. denied beating either or threatening petitioner and disclaimed any knowledge other officer had done so. trial credibility resolved this problem in favor of the police ruled and the confession admissible.2 At trial, Lego testified his own behalf. he did Although not dispute the truth of the confession he directly, did tell version the events had transpired the at

2 In ruling the admissible, confession judge the stated: petitioner “The has admitted struggle under oath he had a with complaining the gun; witness wounded, over the he was obtained a facial wound. The bloody Officers testified he was at the time he was arrested. “I don’t testimony believe the defendant’s at that he all was up

beaten the Police. The condition he is in explained is well by the defendant himself.” jury the as to instructed judge trial police station. not He did guilt. proving burden prosecution’s the confes- find the required jury the instruct in judging guilt used could be it voluntary before sion Supreme Illinois the appeal On direct or innocence.3 Ill. People Lego, the conviction. Court affirmed (1965). E. 2d 875 76, 2d 203 N. his conviction challenged years petitioner later

Four States the United corpus habeas by seeking writ He District of Illinois. Northern District Court the found the have judge trial should the maintained before a reasonable doubt voluntary confession had Although judge into evidence. admitting law he Illinois used, mention of the standard made no challenged involuntary a confession provided that if, at a outside into evidence admitted could be voluntary by found it jury, judge presence of In the alternative of the evidence.4 question should the voluntariness argued petitioner for its con- jury separate to the been submitted also have Jackson v. what we described in followed Illinois rule, judge under which the himself as “the orthodox solely finally voluntariness of the confession . . .” and determines the . be procedures of all the States could not at 378. While neatly classified, we that some followed the Massachusetts noted whereby evidentiary procedure himself first resolves con voluntary. If flicts and determines whether a confession in fact conclude, may into is unable so to the confession admitted he voluntary admissible, judged therefore must If evidence. ignore the coercion issue and is instructed to con also determine involuntary. Id., at n. fession it finds 8. Other States had adopted procedure York in Jackson. the New issue Our decision cast pro in Jackson no doubt the orthodox and Massachusetts question practice every cedures but did call into State that clearly procedures. thorough did not of these A follow one tabula Wig appears tion of did in the wake of in 3 what States Jackson J. more, (J. 1970). Chadbourn rev. Evidence 585-593 4People Wagoner, (1956); 188, 8 Ill. 2d 133 N. E. 2d 24 People Thomlison, E. 400 Ill. 81 N. 2d 434 482 writ for failure to denying

sideration. After first granted remedies, state the District Court exhaust no state Lego concluded that had motion, rehearing to him denied on the remedy available relief then Pate, Supp. ex F. Lego United States 308 merits. rel. Cir- (1970).5 Appeals for the Court Seventh cuit affirmed.6

I Court of Petitioner challenges judgment Appeals on three first is he was not grounds. The proved required a reasonable doubt guilty Winship, In re the con- U. S. because him proved used trial had fession been only voluntary by preponderance of the Im- evidence. plicit in the assumption claim is an that a voluntariness designed reliability to enhance the of jury To judge verdicts. whether is so must we return Denno, to Jackson v. 378 U. (1964). S. 368 Jackson, In prior juries New York most often de- termined the voluntariness of confessions and hence whether confessions could be used deciding or innocence. Trial judges required were make initial determination and could only exclude but confession, if any it could not under circumstances be deemed vol- untary.7 When fairly voluntariness was debatable, either dispute because a fact existed or because reasonable men could have drawn differing from undis- inferences puted facts, question whether the confession violated due process jury. was for the This meant the confession 5Respondent makes no petitioner contention here that either right waived adjudicate his federal claims deliberately bypassed procedures state testing Fay those claims. Noia, Cf. U. S. 6The Seventh Circuit’s unreported. affirmance is United States ex Lego Pate, (CA7 rel. No. 1970). 8,Oct. 7A thorough description more of the New procedure York found in Jackson v. S., at 377-391. challenging If evidence itself. at the trial introduced was instructed jury was adduced, were its voluntariness con- found the and, if it upon voluntariness pass first to If, determining guilt. init involuntary, ignore fession to be vol- found were confession hand, on the other or its truth consider free to was then jury untary, weight appropriate an confession falsity give and or innocence. in judging guilt con- was procedure York that the New We concluded way point along no stitutionally defective because at determination clear-cut defendant receive a did a criminal in him was fact volun- used against the confession exclude a con- to tary. The trial entitled was found it he himself would have merely because fession jury and, while we involuntary, recpgnized we doubted it could perform function, empowered Precisely of reliably. guilt, because confessions do so freely may be truthful and coerced or given, whether evidence, jury we did not believe a could be potent of a probative called value truthful ignore likely, thought, we confession; but coerced it was also in voluntariness itself the would be judging reliability influenced a confession considered an accurate account of the facts. “It is now axiomatic,” we said,

“that a in deprived defendant a criminal case is process due founded, law if his conviction is whole or in part, upon involuntary confession, without regard the truth or of the con- falsity Richmond, fession, Rogers v. 365 U. S. and even there though ample from aside the con- support fession to the conviction. Malinski New York, 324 401; California, U. S. Stroble v. Payne Arkansas, 181; 356 U. S. 560. Equally clear is the defendant’s constitutional right at some stage in the proceedings object to the use of the con- a reliable a fair to have fession and de- voluntariness, the issue on determination falsity by the truth uninfluenced termination Richmond, supra.”8 Rogers v. the confession. appropriate, even necessary, or think it did not We required prosecutors would Jackson announce that Jackson hear- in a burden of particular to meet Indeed, the then-estab- judge.9 trial held before the ing not been had duty to determine voluntariness lished it been of nor has proof,10 in terms of a burden framed fairly We could assume Jackson was decided.11 since evi- would admit now, judge can that a then, as we into at found, he only reliably those confessions that dence been made by evidence, had least voluntarily. relationship may Jackson there be a noted in that

We un- of a confession and its between the involuntariness in the reliability.12 But our decision was not based 8 Denno, S., at Jackson v. 378 U. 376-377. 9 throughout opinion mean a “Judge” is used here and factfinder, jury, hearing. judge at a voluntariness whether trial or jury against permitting passes upon proscription The proceeding guilt innocence to voluntariness in the same or jury preclude impaneling separate does not the States from Denno, S., n. 19. determine Jackson v. 378 at 391 voluntariness. U. Spano Haynes (1963); 10 See, g., Washington, S. 503 e. v. Payne Arkansas, (1959); York, New v. 356 U. S. v. 360 U. S. 315 (1958). 560 11 (1969); v. See, g., Cupp, Boulden e. Frazier v. 394 U. S. 731 States, (1969); 392 U. S. Holman, Harrison v. United 394 U. S. 478 Wisconsin, (1968); Clewis 519 (1968); v. 390 U. S. 219 Greenwald Carolina, (1967); 384 U. S. Texas, 707 Davis v. North v. 386 U. S. (1971). Atchley, 446 (1966); cf. Procunier U. part be forbidden in confessions are noted that coerced We unreliability.” Jackson “probable their cause of when this However, been settled S., it had at 385-386. U. confessions of unreliable Jackson that the exclusion Court decided designed to is a voluntariness purpose ac- misjudge the juries might fear on the slightest determina- erroneous arrive confessions curacy of not aimed at case was That innocence. or guilt tions men. innocent convicting possibility reducing reliability and we feared contrary, Quite the impermis- could coerced confessions even truthfulness voluntariness. as to judgment jury’s influence a sibly false, or true confessions, whether of coerced The use of- extract them used to method because the forbidden Richmond, 365 Rogers v. principles. fends constitutional we estab- procedure (1961).13 534, 540-541 U. S. right safeguard designed Jackson was lished inno- from his or entirely apart individual, of an himself to condemn compelled not to cence, Jackson questioned Nothing own utterances. the truthfulness juries to assess capacity or province opinion took from the in that Nothing of confessions. accuracy weight to the any relating A evidence. defendant has admitted into confessions issue in Rogers Richmond, The sole serve. it be was coerced. Whether is whether a confession such a indeed, inquiry irrelevant; such an is forbidden. is true or false indicate evidence that would judge may take into consideration highly reliable, is even so. confession, though compelled, the may accomplish, the be to Id., as such tasks at 545. As difficult reliability in implications duty-bound ignore of judge to is also any his mind internal from coercion and shut facts relevant may itself bear. authenticity that a confession evidence of 13 genesis 377-391, the of Jackson, S., we traced 378 U. at In confessions, the use of coerced process due forbids the view that that view departed from The Court had reliable. or not whether premise was York, whose 346 U. S. 156 Stein v. New in untrustworthiness. because of its inherent excludable a confession is Rogers Richmond and in repudiated premise The Stein Carolina, U. Rogers S., Davis v. North in was reaffirmed (1966). 719, Jersey, 729 n. 739, Johnson v. New evaluating coercion basis for as the continues to serve That case supra. in n. claims. cases cited See to familiarize he was before Jackson as as free since been taking that attend with circumstances jury a weight its bearing facts confession, including course, juries measure, In like and voluntariness.14 confessions that are disregard been at liberty have unworthy or deemed insufficiently corroborated otherwise of belief. de- hearing is that a voluntariness purpose

Since improv- to do with nothing whatever signed serve has jury verdicts, accept we cannot reliability of ing the admissibility by a confession judging charge mandate of the evidence undermines the in Winship, In re Our decision U. S. concerned with for deter- Winship was not standards admissibility prose- of evidence or with the mining proof suppression hearing cution’s burden of at a when on Win- challenged grounds. evidence is constitutional ship went no further than to confirm the fundamental protects except “the right accused conviction every reasonable doubt of upon proof fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is A charged.” high at 364. standard of Cf. Jackson petitioner pursued. This is the course that S., (a) Although at 386 n. 13. 18 U. S. C. §3501 inapplicable here, provisions is relevant to note the of that section:

“(a) any prosecution brought by In criminal the United States confession, Columbia, defined in subsec- District of voluntarily (e) hereof, shall be in if it is tion admissible evidence, given. Before such confession is received the trial any judge shall, presence jury, determine issue out of the the con- If the trial determines that as to voluntariness. voluntarily made it shall be admitted evidence and fession was permit to hear relevant evidence on judge shall the trial jury give shall instruct the such to the issue of voluntariness jury the feels it deserves under the weight the confession as all to circumstances.” unjust convictions ensure said, against we

necessary, of innocence. presumption to the substance giving not rendered less reliable A verdict is at 363. guilty ad- Winship simply because the with or less consonant by a less strin- missibility of a confession is determined either not maintain that Petitioner does gent standard. is an element his confession or its voluntariness chal- He does not charged. crime with which he was by which the constitutionality of the standard lenge innocence; jury was instructed to decide his sufficiency the evidence question nor does he satisfy proper standard reached Winship have not been proof. rights Petitioner’s under violated.15

II Winship inapplicable Even because conceding imple purpose of a voluntariness is not to petitioner presses presumption innocence, ment of ground for reversal on the alternative that evidence fered a defendant at a criminal trial and chal on determined lenged grounds constitutional must be give admissible a reasonable doubt order to exclusionary adequate protection values that to those designed supra, rules are Jackson v. serve. Mississippi, of Brown offspring 297 U. S. 278 requires judicial prior on voluntariness rulings Arizona, admitting confessions. Miranda v. 15Nothing gained restating is to be from the constitutional rule requiring proof guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis constitutionally arguing rights then obtained evidence and Winship admissibility governed by high under are diluted unless question issue, Transparently, standard. this which assumes voluntary by pre is whether a confession is admissible if found Schipani, supra, ponderance of the evidence. United States v. n. unsatisfactory this Amendment case but followed course in a Fourth stopped basing short of the decision on Constitution. from cus flowing excludes confessions (1966),

U. S. 436 warnings were interrogations adequate todial unless Weeks v. and a was obtained. administered waiver Ohio, States, Mapp United v. (1914), and S. impermissible introduc U. make tion defendant’s of evidence obtained in violation of a Fourth In and instance, Amendment each with rights. probative kept out to its is from regard value, evidence wholly apart trier of or innocence for reasons reliability from These inde enhancing verdicts. pendent values, it is urged, require themselves stricter proof in standard of judging admissibility. appeal. and argument straightforward has But

we merely are unconvinced emphasizing the im- portance by exclusionary of the values served rules is itself sufficient demonstration that the Constitution also requires admissibility proved to be beyond reasonable doubt.16 Evidence obtained violation of the Fourth Amendment has been excluded from federal criminal many years. States, trials for supra. Weeks United The same is true of coerced confessions offered in either federal or state States, trials. Bram v. United Brown (1897); v. Mississippi, supra. But, from our experience over this period time no substantial evi dence has accumulated that federal rights have suffered from determining admissibility by a preponderance of the Petitioner offers nothing to suggest that ad evidence.. missibility rulings have been unreliable or otherwise wanting quality because based on higher some standard. good cause, Without we are unwilling to ex pand currently applicable exclusionary rules erecting additional barriers to placing truthful and probative evi 16It persuasive is no more impose the stricter standard supervisory power exercise of than as a constitutional Ralph v. Warden, supra, rule. Cf. n. clarifying United States Inman, supra, Pea 1; n. States, United supra, n. 1. the standards by revising juries dence before state reason proceedings. Sound in collateral applicable offered has not been direction in this further moving This present time. any at the discern here nor do we very exclusionary rules are since the true particularly by police and conduct deterring at lawless much aimed the escalating very doubtful it is prosecution and Amend Fifth in Fourth and prosecution’s burden sufficiently pro hearings would suppression ment public the interest outweigh to respect in this ductive pur for the juries before probative placing about truthful decisions pose arriving innocence. con- in Jackson: when a

To reiterate what we said involuntary to be used sought challenged fession as trial, he is entitled criminal defendant at against a the con- determination that to a reliable and clear-cut the voluntarily Thus, rendered. was in fact fession by at least a prosecution prove must voluntary. confession was Of the evidence that the free, pursuant law, the to their own course, States are may indeed differ as adopt higher to standard. They they find at appropriate to the resolution of the values stake.17

III reject petitioner’s that, We final contention even also he though claim, the trial ruled on his coercion judge decide the claim anew. jury was entitled to have the To the extent asserts that the de- argument judge’s this insufficiently per- reliable, termination was it is no more petitioner’s suasive than other contentions. To the ex- position jury tent assumes that a is better suited judge voluntariness, than a to determine it questions Denno; assumptions basic of Jackson v. ignores also supra. See cases cited in n. the con- any about question raised that Jackson neither rule for validity of the orthodox so-called stitutional even admissibility sug- nor of confessions judging requires submission of gested that Constitution jury judge. Finally, as well as a voluntariness claims to Louisiana, Duncan v. made which right jury applicable Amendment to trial the Sixth did normal rule States, purport change for the admissibility question evidence is a jury. require court rather than the Nor did that decision admissibility pass upon that both evidence when are for grounds constitutional asserted it. excluding disposed impose We are not a consti- requirement procedure tutional we have found wanting merely afford petitioner a second forum litigating his claim. Appeals

The decision of the Court of

Affirmed. Rehnquist MR. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice took part no in the or consideration decision of this case. Doug-

Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. with whom Justice las Mr. and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.

When the prosecution, or federal, put state seeks in evidence an involuntary allegedly confession, its ad- missibility is determined the command of the Fifth Amendment person . . compelled . shall be “[n]o in criminal any case be a witness against himself.” Davis Carolina, v. North 384 S. 737, (1966) U. ; v. Malloy Hogan, 378 U. S. 7-8 1, Bram (1964); v. States, United 168 U. S. 532, (1897). 542-543 This right against compulsory self-incrimination is the “essen- mainstay” tial system our of criminal prosecution, Malloy Hogan, supra, system at 7, “a in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently its prove by coercion may not freely secured and Rogers mouth,” of his own out an accused charge against What (1961). Richmond, 534, 365 U. S. quite is, invasion governmental from protected thereby unless remain silent person of a right “the simply, exercise in the unfettered speak he chooses Hence, supra, 8. Hogan, Malloy v. will.” own it is unless involuntary and inadmissible confession is will.” free and a intellect of a rational product “the (1960); see Alabama, 199, 361 U. S. Blackburn v. Pate, 433, Reck v. 367 U. S. utterance compelled a defendant’s course,

Ideally, him. As into evidence never be admitted would we said in Jackson stand cannot a criminal conviction

is “axiomatic” that involuntary in if founded, part, it “is whole ample . there is though confession . . even conviction.” support from the confession to aside the criminal I informed observers Yet doubt utter- compelled deny at least some process would scrupulous adherence assuming slip through, ances even pro- rigorous and the most to constitutional standards to move attempt Jackson was an protections. cedural there the ideal. We reality somewhat closer to it “did not afford New York rule because rejected the determination of the voluntariness a reliable and conse- trial” confession offered evidence at the quently adequately protect “did not defendant’s] [a upon a coerced to be free of conviction based right today points the Court confession.” at 377. As in Jackson was we established out, procedure “[t]he entirely individual, right of an designed safeguard the compelled to innocence, or not to be from his apart Ante, by at 485. himself his own utterances.” condemn importance the our is no need to dwell There the concept justice preserving of attaches American rule Both the privilege. constitutional integrity of the in- when conviction reverses a that automatically and the trial at voluntary confession was admitted whether determining in Jackson procedure established the to further means voluntary are a confession was product not the of a defendant end no utterance that him. against be used choice will own free in Jackson: today what we held “[W]hen Court reaffirms sought involuntary challenged a confession he trial, at his used a criminal against defendant that and clear-cut determination entitled to a reliable Ante, voluntarily rendered.” the confession was in fact that it follows But the on hold goes at 489. Court prove at least prosecution from must Jackson “the that the confession evidence that preponderance my In voluntary.” disagree. view, was Ibid. I requires rationale of Jackson the conclusion pro- provide does not sufficient standard confessions tection danger involuntary employed will be criminal trials. factfinder normally presents

A Jackson and law testimony with from the defendant conflicting during occurred enforcement officers about what the defendant. The factfinder’s interrogation officers’ practical matter, resolution of as a often, this conflict is Jackson, the final issue. resolution the voluntariness example. supra, typical 390-391. This case is a police Petitioner testified he confessed because the had no him; police beaten testified that there beating. notes, As the Court trial resolved “[t]he credibility problem police this in favor of the and ruled Ante, the confession admissible.” at 480. When the question before the factfinder is whether to one believe accounts of self-serving hap other two what has apparent pened, persuasion it is standard in many instances be of controlling will significance. Randall, 513, 525-526 Speiser v. See have rights federal “that Although suggests the Court admissibility by pre determining suffered from [not] has been there and that ponderance of the evidence” unre been have rulings admissibility “that showing no standard,” higher . not based on some liable . . because denied, given ante, I it can do not think 488, at determina ordinary nature of voluntariness factual will proof a lower standard tion,' permitting involuntary of more in result the admission necessarily prosecu were the confessions than would be admitted converse, required higher to meet a standard. tion higher standard course, Requiring is also true. voluntary will be excluded means confessions that some found have been involuntary though even would they voluntary under the lower standard. required criminal convic- proof

The standard yet have held that presents situation, tion a similar we by beyond a reasonable guilt must be established In Winship, (1970) ; re doubt. 361-364 U. id., Permitting (Harlan, J., concurring.) see at 370-372 proof by a would neces- preponderance the evidence are sarily in the more defendants who result conviction of in burden Conversely, imposing fact innocent. de- proof beyond that more a reasonable doubt means It in found innocent. guilty fendants who are fact are that demand seems to me that the same considerations standard when innocence reasonable-doubt the question at stake also demand standard when admissibility allegedly involuntary of an confession. permit proof of the evidence We no more serious litigation civil because “we view it as general for there to be an erroneous in the de- verdict than fendant’s favor for there to be an erroneous verdict plaintiff’s in the favor.” con- J., (Harlan, do curring). We not take that view in criminal cases. standard Winship reasonable-doubt said in that the We convic- the risk of reducing prime “is a instrument provides error. The standard resting tions on factual ... of innocence presumption concrete substance for the in con- put Mr. at 363. As Justice Harlan a rea- opinion, the curring requirement on value sonable doubt is “bottomed a fundamental far con- society determination of our that it is worse to let man free.” guilty go vict innocent man than to a Id., at 372. permit prove by preponder

If we to a prosecution the voluntary, ance of the evidence that a confession was then, paraphrase Harlan, pre to Mr. Justice we must be pared justify the view it is no more serious in that general involuntary to admit confessions than it tois voluntary exclude I prepared confessions. am not justify that Compelled view. self-incrimination is so alien to the American I justice sense of no way that see that such a justified. view could ever If we are to provide “concrete substance” for the command of the Fifth Amendment no person shall be compelled to condemn himself, we must insist, we do as at the trial of guilt or innocence, the prosecution prove the defendant’s confession was voluntary beyond a reason able my doubt.* In judgment, paraphrase Mr. Jus *My view that the reasonable-doubt imposed standard must be prosecution the depend does not upon whether that standard would be more effective than some lower standard in deterring police misconduct. aWhen defendant challenges his confession as in- voluntary, “the inquiry constitutional is not whether the conduct of state in obtaining officers the confession shocking, but whether the voluntary confession was ‘free and Malloy Hogan, ....’” It is true that frequently defendant will police allege misconduct, petitioner as Nevertheless, did here. as we Sain, said Townsend v. 293,308 “[a]ny question- ing police officers which in produces a confession which is not fact product of a free intellect renders that confession inadmissible.” (Emphasis original.) Fifth Amendment command of

tice Harlan again, worse society it is of our the determination reflects than it is to involuntary self-condemnation permit do not we Just probative evidence. a deprive we guilt, doubt when is reasonable convict there into evi introduce prosecution to permit should reason there confession when dence defendant’s free rational of his product doubt that it was able choice. bar admission

I absolute add that the only his criminal trial compelled utterance of a defendant’s American commit- expression fundamentally an individual. What we said worth ment to moral reason- Winship repeating here. bears “[U]se re- indispensable command the is able-doubt standard community applications spect and confidence moral force of criminal It critical that the law. criminal law be diluted a standard men being innocent are people in doubt whether leaves just 364. I condemned.” believe per- that when system justice to our of criminal critical no reasonable doubt against him, words used son’s are of his free will. spoke remains that he own

Case Details

Case Name: Lego v. Twomey

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Jan 12, 1972

Citation: 404 U.S. 477

Docket Number: 70-5037

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS