IRVINE RANCH WATER DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ORANGE COUNTY WATER DISTRICT, et al., Defendants and Appellants. GOLDEN STATE WATER COMPANY, Cross-Complainant and Appellant, v. IRVINE RANCH WATER DISTRICT, Cross-Defendant and Respondent.
B329089 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Nos. BS168278, BS175192, 21STCV33390, 22STCV22517)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE
Filed 10/7/24
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
Alston & Bird, Edward J. Casey, and Matthew C. Wickersham for Irvine Ranch Water District.
Rutan & Tucker, Joseph D. Larsen, and Jeremy N. Jungreis for Orange County Water District.
Meyers Nave, Gregory J. Newmark, and Kiana Amiri-Davani for East Orange County Water District, Yorba Linda Water District, and Mesa Water District.
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Scott S. Slater, Christopher R. Guillen, and Jessica L. Diaz for Golden State Water Company.
Anaheim City Attorney‘s Office, Alison M. Kott, and Daniel J. Payne; Best & Krieger, Jeffrey W. Dunn, and Wendy Y. Wang for City of Anaheim.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Pertinent Provisions of the Orange County Water District Act
“To maintain an adequate level of groundwater in its territory and protect groundwater quality, [OCWD] acquires water from various sources at its own expense and discharges it
As we shall discuss in more detail, producers collectively pump the majority of their water from the Basin, but they also rely on other sources. Because it generally costs producers less to pump groundwater than to purchase water imported from outside the Basin, the Act empowers OCWD to impose limitations on, and disincentives to, groundwater extraction. (
Pursuant to the Act, OCWD commissions a report each year evaluating, among other things, the amount and cost of water produced from Basin groundwater and “supplemental sources” in the prior year, the condition of groundwater supplies in the Basin, and the probable availability of water from supplemental sources in the next water year. (
This case chiefly concerns basin equity assessments and the formula used to determine the amount of an assessment for producers. Following the public hearings just described, OCWD‘s board of directors may establish the next year‘s “basin production percentage,” which is “the ratio that all water to be produced from groundwater supplies within the district bears to all water to be produced by persons and operators within the district from supplemental sources and from groundwater within the district during the ensuing water year.” (
The basin production percentage does not establish a hard cap on the amount of Basin groundwater that producers may pump (either collectively or individually). Producers, however, are subject to an assessment or rebate based on whether their actual basin production percentage is greater or less than the prescribed basin production percentage. (
The basin equity assessment rate may vary from year to year, it need not be uniform among producers, and, for an individual producer, it may vary between water used for irrigation and non-irrigation purposes. (
This is all a bit obscure, so we shall briefly recapitulate the key points in what we have said so far. One of OCWD‘s tools for managing the Basin is a system of incentives encouraging
Whether a particular water source is classified as a supplemental source has consequences for an individual producer and for the Basin as a whole. First, the classification may impact the Basin-wide target. If OCWD counts water from a particular source as a “supplemental source,” the expected ratio of water produced from groundwater to water produced from groundwater plus supplemental sources will be lower and the basin production percentage will be set lower. If OCWD does not count the source as among the “supplemental sources,” the basin production percentage will be set higher. For producers making use of the source in question, all other things being equal, more water produced from supplemental sources means a lower basin production percentage and a correspondingly lower basin equity assessment (if any).
B. Irvine Ranch‘s Water Recycling Activities
Irvine Ranch serves approximately 108,000 water service connections within an area that includes all of Irvine; parts of Tustin, Newport Beach, Costa Mesa, Orange, and Lake Forest; and unincorporated areas of Orange County. Since the 1960s, Irvine Ranch has spent millions of dollars building and
Since at least 2013, Irvine Ranch has taken the position that the water it recycles should be classified as supplemental source water in calculating its basin equity assessment. The interpretive dispute hardened in April 2016, when Irvine Ranch sent OCWD a letter protesting the agency‘s determination that recycled water does not qualify as a supplemental source. Irvine Ranch argued its recycled water qualifies as water from a supplemental source under the Act because it is outside the watershed of the Santa Ana River. Specifically, Irvine Ranch contended the Act‘s definition of “supplemental sources” as “sources of water outside the watershed of the Santa Ana River” should be understood to mean water that is not taken from a source that flows to the replenishment of the groundwater basin. Because the wastewater treated at Irvine Ranch‘s recycling facilities is not taken from such a source (the water would otherwise flow through sewer pipes to the ocean), Irvine Ranch asserted the water it recycles must be a supplemental source. OCWD rejected this understanding of the Act.
At its meeting in April 2016, OCWD‘s board of directors adopted Resolution No. 16-4-37 (the 2016 Resolution) establishing the basin production percentage and setting basin equity assessment rates for the upcoming water year. A couple months later, Irvine Ranch filed a petition and complaint challenging the 2016 Resolution because OCWD did not count recycled water as a supplemental source in calculating the basin production percentage. When OCWD adopted a similar resolution the following year, Resolution No. 14-4-25 (the 2017 Resolution), Irvine Ranch filed an amended petition and complaint challenging that resolution as well.5 Beyond challenging the classification of recycled water, Irvine Ranch also sought a declaration of its right to pump up to 4,500 acre feet of Basin groundwater for export to customers outside OCWD boundaries pursuant to a judgment entered in 1933.
The Other Producers (see footnote 2, ante) who do not operate water recycling facilities in the Basin intervened and filed cross-complaints for declaratory relief that asked the court
The Third Petition was tried in multiple phases pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.
The first phase addressed the Third Petition‘s first through fourth causes of action that respectively sought: (1) a writ of mandate compelling OCWD to re-calculate the basin equity assessment owed for 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 with recycled water counted as a supplemental source; (2) a writ of mandate compelling OCWD to rescind the Corrective Resolution based on procedural objections and because it excluded recycled water from the class of supplemental sources; (3) invalidation of the 2016 and 2017 Resolutions because they excluded recycled water from the class of supplemental sources; and (4) a writ of mandate compelling OCWD to rescind the 2016 and 2017 Resolutions and conform its actions to an interpretation of the Act classifying recycled water as a supplemental source. The first phase also addressed the Other Producers’ causes of action for declaratory relief related to the classification of recycled water.
Following a hearing in June 2018, the trial court issued a Phase One ruling rejecting Irvine Ranch‘s construction of the Act‘s definition of a supplemental source and siding with OCWD and the Other Producers’ understanding of the term. Relying on the plain text of the Act, the court found the definition of “supplemental sources” (“sources of water outside the watershed of the Santa Ana River, excepting that portion of that watershed on and along Santiago Creek upstream of the downstream toe of
Although the trial court believed there was no need to consider historical revisions to the Act, it explained that doing so
D. Subsequent Proceedings
The only subsequent trial phase that is relevant for our purposes in this appeal is phase three, which addressed Irvine
In a seventh amended supplemental petition and complaint, Irvine Ranch sought a declaration that it is entitled to pump and export a certain amount of groundwater without being assessed a surcharge based on a judgment in favor of The Irvine Company, its predecessor in interest, in 1933. In their cross-complaints, the Other Producers sought opposing declarations that Irvine Ranch has no such right. Golden State contends it also sought additional relief by way of two claims in its own cross-complaint: a third cause of action for declaratory relief “pertaining to the rights of the parties to groundwater underlying the Basin pursuant to the 1933 judgment” and a fourth cause of action to enjoin Irvine Ranch “from extracting non-surplus water under a claim of water rights from the 1933 [j]udgment, or any other claim under applicable law, in a manner that causes harm to [Golden State] and the Basin.”
After asserting its declaratory relief claim, Irvine Ranch discovered that The Irvine Company abandoned its rights under the 1933 judgment prior to the alleged transfer of rights to Irvine Ranch. Upon discovery of this fact, Irvine Ranch moved to dismiss the relevant cause of action seeking declaratory relief concerning its purported rights under the 1933 judgment and stipulated to declaratory relief in favor of each of the Other Producers—except Golden State, which was attempting to assert its own water rights—on their corresponding cross-claims.
Irvine Ranch filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings to terminate the litigation as to Golden State. Irvine Ranch argued Golden State was entitled to declaratory relief that Irvine Ranch had no rights under the 1933 judgment but there was no
The trial court granted Irvine Ranch‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings following a hearing. The court recognized it confronted a “very odd motion” in which Irvine Ranch was “insisting that [it] lose on a cross-complaint and [Golden State] insisting that it not win.” But the court believed the matter “c[ame] down to” a careful reading of Golden State‘s cross-complaint, which made “pretty clear that the third cause of action is about rights under the 1933 judgment.” It was “[l]ikewise[ ] clear as well that [the fourth cause of action] is . . . about the 1933 judgment.” The trial court accordingly issued an order declaring Irvine Ranch does not possess any rights under the 1933 judgment, declining to “issue declaratory or injunctive relief as to any aspect of groundwater rights that may be held by [Golden State] . . . as such relief is beyond the scope of [Golden State‘s] Fourth Amended Cross-Complaint,” and denying Golden State injunctive relief “because there is no present demonstrated need for such relief in light of the judicial declaration” it granted. The trial court emphasized the judgment to be entered “shall not prejudice [Golden State‘s] groundwater rights, if any, or [Golden
Following the trial court‘s ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, all parties stipulated to entry of a final judgment consistent with their earlier stipulations and the court‘s prior orders. Irvine Ranch now appeals the Phase One ruling that recycled water in the Basin is not a supplemental source and Golden State appeals the order granting Irvine Ranch‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
II. DISCUSSION
The sole issue Irvine Ranch raises in its appeal is whether the phrase “sources of water outside the watershed of the Santa Ana River” refers to water coming from outside the area of land in which water drains into the Santa Ana River or, as Irvine Ranch prefers, any water outside the “drainage system” flowing into the Santa Ana River and replenishing the Basin. Our review is de novo, and we hold the text of the Act clearly employs the term “watershed” to describe a geographical area. The unambiguous statutory text obviates any need to delve into earlier revisions to the Act, but, as the trial court explained, that history would only confirm what we hold based on the text of the statute alone.
In its cross appeal challenging the order granting Irvine Ranch‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Golden State contends its cross-complaint raised claims unrelated to the 1933 judgment and, in any case, the trial court abused its discretion in denying it leave to file an amended complaint asserting such claims. Both arguments lack merit. The operative cross-complaint reveals Golden State was asserting its rights vis-à-vis
A. The Phase One Ruling Is Correct Because Recycled Water Is Not Water from a Supplemental Source Under the Act
1. Plain meaning
The Act defines “supplemental sources” to mean “sources of water outside the watershed of the Santa Ana River, excepting that portion of that watershed on and along Santiago Creek upstream of the downstream toe of the slope of the Villa Park Flood Control Dam, such as, but not limited to, water produced from the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California.” (
To decide whether Irvine Ranch is correct that the water it recycles falls under this definition, we begin with “the words of a statute, ‘because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ [Citation.]” (Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 529.) “We do not consider statutory language in isolation; instead, we examine the entire statute to construe the words in context. [Citation.] If the language is unambiguous, ‘then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.’ [Citation.] ‘If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute‘s purpose, legislative history, and public
Absent any indication the Legislature intended a word or phrase to be read in a special or technical sense, we give the statutory language its “‘“plain and commonsense meaning.“‘” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 616; Turo Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 517, 521.) “Courts appropriately refer to dictionary definitions ‘to ascertain the ordinary, usual meaning of a word.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Here, the Act does not define “watershed,” and there is no indication the Legislature intended the term to have a technical or special meaning. Dictionary definitions of “watershed” emphasize its spatial character. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, defines it as either “3. . . . (a) The slope down which the water flows from a water-parting[ or] (b) the gathering ground of a river system; a catchment area or drainage basin.”9
(Oxford English Dict. Online (2015) <https://www.oed.com/dictionary/watershed_n1?tab=meaning_and_use#15070030> [as of May 22, 2024], emphasis added.) Merriam-Webster likewise defines “watershed” to mean “a region or area bounded peripherally by a divide and draining ultimately to a particular watercourse or body of water.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2024) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/watershed> [as of May 24, 2024], emphasis added.) These definitions make clear that hydrologic features may help define the area of a watershed, but they do not constitute the watershed itself.
The geographic character of the term “watershed” is underscored in the Act‘s exception to the general rule that only sources of water outside the watershed of the Santa Ana River qualify as supplemental sources. In deference to vested water rights, the Act provides that “supplemental sources” include sources of water within “that portion of that watershed on and along Santiago Creek upstream of the downstream toe of the slope of the Villa Park Flood Control Dam . . . .” (
Irvine Ranch suggests that if the Legislature had intended to define supplemental sources as those outside a geographic area, it would have described the boundaries by metes and bounds as it did in describing OCWD‘s boundaries in section 40-1. There is no indication, however, that OCWD‘s boundaries are identical to those of the watershed. The Legislature might well have decided the need for immediate certainty as to OCWD‘s boundaries dictated a metes-and-bounds approach but left the term “watershed” to speak for itself.
Venturing beyond section 40-31.5, the Act also uses the term “watershed” in a geographic sense in its provision for OCWD‘s exercise of eminent domain. In section 40-2, subdivision (10), the Act authorizes OCWD “[t]o exercise the right of eminent domain to take any property necessary to the exercise of any of the powers granted by this act, except that the district shall not have the right of eminent domain as to water, water rights, reservoirs, pipelines, water distributing systems, waterworks, or powerplants, all or any of which are already devoted to beneficial or public use and located within the watershed of the Santa Ana River . . . . No language or provision of this act . . . shall be interpreted or construed so as to limit or abridge the right of the district . . . to exercise its right of eminent domain to condemn
There is good reason to understand the reference to watershed in the supplemental sources definition in this same geographic sense. (See, e.g., People v. Partee (2020) 8 Cal.5th 860, 868 [“‘One of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is that interrelated statutory provisions should be harmonized and that, to that end, the same word or phrase should be given the same meaning within the interrelated provisions of the law.’ [Citation]“]; Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 132.) Although ‘“[w]hen the occasion demands it, the same word may have different meanings to effectuate the intention of the act in which the word appears‘” (People v. Hernandez (1981) 30 Cal.3d 462, 468), this occasion makes no such demand. It is not reasonable to suppose the Legislature used “watershed” in its standard, dictionary sense in one part of the Act and silently adopted a non-standard usage in another—particularly where alternatives were readily available.
Notwithstanding this textual evidence, Irvine Ranch contends the term “watershed” must be understood to refer to a “water system” in order to “fulfill the undisputed statutory purpose underlying the [basin equity assessment]—to discourage the overproduction of local groundwater supplies by encouraging the use of sources of water that are not part of the watershed‘s drainage system that replenishes the Basin.” Even if a geographic reading of “watershed” results in a smaller set of “supplemental sources,” however, this does not necessarily mean
At a more fundamental level, Irvine Ranch‘s statement of the Act‘s purpose falsely suggests natural re-charge by the watershed‘s drainage system is the sole means by which the Basin is replenished. Far from passively relying on natural re-charge, however, the Basin is a heavily managed underground reservoir into which OCWD pumps a substantial amount of imported water. Counting recycled water as a supplemental source would permit Irvine Ranch to pump more groundwater while depriving OCWD of revenue needed to buy imported water to replenish the Basin (or else forcing other producers to shoulder those costs). (
Irvine Ranch‘s further argument that a geographic understanding of “watershed” leads to absurd results also lacks merit. Although “we ‘will not give statutory language a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences that the Legislature could not have intended,‘” “troubling” consequences are not absurd. (In re D.B. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 941, 946, 948.) “To
2. History of statutory revisions
The Act‘s unambiguous meaning governs in this case, and we have no need to consider legislative history as an additional aid to construction. (Kirzhner, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 972.) But even if the statute were determined to be ambiguous in its use of “watershed,” a survey of past revisions to the statute overwhelmingly supports reading the term in a geographic sense, as we have done.12
In 1991, the Legislature amended the definition of “supplemental sources” in
Significantly, the 1991 amendment did not list reclaimed water as another example of “sources of water outside the watershed of the Santa Ana River” alongside water purchased from the Metropolitan Water District. Instead, reclaimed water was listed as a separate category of water. Thus, pursuant to the 1991 amendment, reclaimed water‘s status as a supplemental source did not rest on its being outside the watershed and Legislature evidently did not regard all wastewater as water outside the watershed. The 1991 amendment accordingly refutes Irvine Ranch‘s view that any water not draining into the Santa Ana River is outside the watershed.14
Irvine Ranch nonetheless argues the significance of 1995 amendment is unclear because the Legislature could have “use[d] words of exclusion . . . to effectuate an exclusion of all reclaimed water from the definition of [s]upplemental [s]ource . . . .” But this point is not relevant to the dispute before us. OCWD‘s construction of the Act to exclude recycled water generated and treated within the watershed as a supplemental source does not imply that recycled water generated and/or treated outside the watershed is not water from a supplemental source.15
B. The Trial Court Properly Granted Irvine Ranch‘s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Golden State‘s Cross-Complaint
1. Legal framework
“‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a general demurrer, tests the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint, supplemented by any matter of which the trial court takes judicial notice, to determine whether [the] plaintiff or cross-
“‘Denial of leave to amend after granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed for abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Brooklyn Restaurants, Inc. v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1043.) “An abuse of discretion occurs if ‘“there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.“’ [Citations.]” (Starlight Cinemas, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 24, 32.)
2. Golden State‘s operative complaint did not assert claims unrelated to the 1933 judgment
As we have already mentioned, Golden State‘s operative cross-complaint included a third cause of action for declaratory judgment and a fourth cause of action for injunctive relief. Golden State contends each cause of action addressed both Irvine Ranch‘s purported water rights under the 1933 judgment and its own allegedly prior appropriative rights. We construe the allegations liberally (Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 272), but even so construed, these causes of action only concern Golden State‘s rights in relation to Irvine Ranch‘s abandoned claims under the 1933 judgment.
The third and fourth causes of action in Golden State‘s cross-complaint incorporate preceding portions of the cross-complaint by reference. In the first paragraph of the cross-complaint, Golden State explains that it “seeks to constrain the rights of [Irvine Ranch] to take or export water from the Basin to
Golden State mentions its own water rights in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the cross-complaint. It alleges it “has been continuously and without interruption pumping groundwater from the Basin and distributing the water for reasonable and beneficial use since well before 1933” and “[a]s between [Irvine Ranch] and [Golden State], the entirety of [Golden State‘s] use has a priority date arising before 1933 based upon the doctrine of ‘gradual development’ under its continuous and uninterrupted application of water to a public use.” In paragraphs 40 and 42, Golden State alleges Irvine Ranch‘s “claimed right to groundwater in the Basin, whatever it may be, is junior in time and priority to [Golden State‘s]” and California law “prevented any rights acquired by [Irvine Ranch], whatever they may be, from diminishing the pre-existing rights held by [Golden State].” In paragraph 45, Golden State alleges that “[e]ven if [Irvine Ranch] acquired water rights under the 1933 Judgment, [Golden State‘s] rights in the Basin are paramount to any water rights [Irvine Ranch] acquired under the 1933 Judgment or otherwise relegated to a junior priority in favor of the intervening-public use of [Golden State] and other public water suppliers.”
Golden State points to language in paragraph 55 (desiring a judicial declaration “as to the validity of [its] appropriative water rights to pump groundwater from the Basin“) as a request for a declaration of its rights independent of Irvine Ranch‘s rights under the 1933 judgment. The conditional framing of the subsequent paragraph, however, makes clear that it sought a declaration of its rights only if the trial court determined Irvine
Golden State‘s emphasis on its allegations that its water rights have priority over any rights claimed by Irvine Ranch—based on the 1933 judgment or otherwise—does not indicate Golden State sought a more general declaration. Putting aside Irvine Ranch‘s failed challenge to OCWD‘s construction of the Act and its abandoned claim to rights under the 1933 judgment, there are no allegations that Irvine Ranch asserted any rights that would disrupt OCWD‘s management of the Basin in accordance with the Act. Because the relative priority of the parties’ water rights does not matter under this regime and Golden State‘s cross-complaint expressly disclaims any intent to alter this regime, the cross-complaint cannot be read to seek a declaration of Golden State‘s rights except in relation to Irvine Ranch‘s rights under the 1933 judgment.18
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Golden State leave to file an amended cross-complaint
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend where, in all probability, amendment would be futile. (Foroudi v. The Aerospace Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 992, 1000.) Here, it does not appear Golden State can plead an actual
Golden State contends it is entitled to a declaration of its water rights relative to Irvine Ranch based on Irvine Ranch‘s efforts “to alter OCWD‘s management of the Basin and obtain a ‘discrete and specific advantage in the apportionment of water‘” through “each of the claims [Irvine Ranch] has pursued in this case—e.g., claims relating to the definition of ‘supplemental source’ in the . . . Act, the export of water from the Basin, and the 1933 judgment . . . .” This legal maneuvering has not, however, resulted in any advantage to Irvine Ranch relative to other producers in the Basin.
Golden State alternatively contends “the present shortage in the Basin” gives rise to an actual controversy because “if there
Even if we assume the possibility of curtailment is more than conjecture, a declaration of Golden State‘s rights relative to only one of the many other producers in the Basin does not realistically facilitate planning. Golden State‘s alleged appropriative rights would be of no use—regardless of their priority relative to those of Irvine Ranch—if there is no surplus water in the Basin. (City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1241 [explaining that only surplus water is subject to appropriative rights].) A declaration of one party‘s rights relative to another‘s in a basin is appropriate in some instances. It is no substitute for a basin-wide adjudication, however, where the concern is a general shortage—and Golden State has made clear it is not seeking a basin-wide adjudication. In short, a general shortage of water in the Basin does not give rise to a concrete dispute between Golden State and Irvine Ranch, and withholding declaratory relief will not prejudice Golden State.
Golden State further contends an actual controversy necessarily exists where two parties claim groundwater rights in the same basin. That is not our view of the authorities on which Golden State relies. For example, Golden State characterizes Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District (1935) 3 Cal.2d 489 (Tulare) as establishing that “the courts have, since 1935, authorized a plaintiff water right holder
Golden State‘s reliance on Peabody v. City of Vallejo (1935) 2 Cal.2d 351 is misplaced for the same reason. (Id. at 374 [“the owner [of water rights] is entitled to a judgment declaring his preferential and paramount right and enjoining the assertion of an adverse use which might otherwise ripen into a prescriptive right“], emphasis added.)
Other authorities Golden State cites also fail to establish an actual controversy exists between Golden State and Irvine Ranch. The principle that the owner of water rights may “maintain an action to quiet title to [the rights] as against any adverse claimant or to protect [the rights] by obtaining
Because there is no actual controversy warranting a declaration of Golden State‘s rights relative to Irvine Ranch, there is likewise no threat of harm sufficient to warrant injunctive relief. (Costa Mesa City Employees’ Assn. v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305-306.) Golden State does not articulate how Irvine Ranch‘s continued production of groundwater from the Basin will harm either Golden State or the Basin itself.
The judgment is affirmed. OCWD, East Orange County Water District, Yorba Linda Water District, Mesa Water District, Golden State, and the City of Anaheim are awarded costs on Irvine Ranch‘s appeal. Irvine Ranch is awarded costs on Golden State‘s cross-appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J.
KIM, J.