Dаvid R. Clausen, Jr., was adjudged a dependent and neglected child. Custody of the child was transferred to the welfare department. The court imposed conditions to be met by the father and he failed to perform. Parental rights were terminated. We affirm.
David R. Clausen, Jr., was born June 28, 1973. On August 5, 1973, David’s mother was killed in an automobile accident. His father attempted to care for the infant. David R. Clausen, Sr., has alcohol problems. He was confined in the'county jail at the time of the filing of the custody petition. On September 25, 1975, custody was transferred to the Freeborn County Welfare Department which placed the child in a foster home. After an adjudicatory hearing on the neglect petition, the court entered its order on June 8,1976, declaring the child to be neglected. Thereafter, on September 13, 1976, at a dispositional hearing, the court ordered that the treatment plan submitted by the welfare department to correct the neglect situation be adopted. The plan provided that the father (1) continue treatment for alcoholism and remain in the drug an-tiabuse program; (2) meet weekly with a social worker tо learn money management and to establish that the father was maintaining sobriety and noninvolvement with the law; (3) learn parental skills; (4) find full-time employment; and (5) find an adequate residence. The father was given a written copy оf the plan.
Shortly thereafter, the father was convicted of two counts of trespass and one count of assault and sentenced to jail, but was released for work on the Huber plan. On October 28, 1976, he returned to jail intоxicated and his Huber plan was revoked. On December 29, 1976, the welfare department filed a petition for termination of parental rights. In March 1977, the father was released from jail. A revised treatment plan was discussed with him which essentially incorporated the terms of the original plan.
On July 11,1977, an adjudicatory hearing on the termination petition was held. The date of the petition was amended to July 11, 1977. The court ordered the matter continued fоr 90 days. On December 12, 1977, a supplemental hearing was held. The court in its findings found that the prescribed treatment program had not generally been accepted by the father of the child, and has not succeeded. The court terminated the father’s parental rights pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 260.221(b)(5) because the child had been adjudicated neglected and reasonable efforts, under the direction *155 of the court, have failed to correct the сonditions leading to the adjudication.
The issues presented are:
' (1) Are the trial court’s findings legally sufficient to support the termination order?
(2) Is there substantial evidence to support the court’s findings?
(3) Did the father have sufficient time to correct the cоnditions leading to the neglect of the child?
(4) May the court take judicial notice of the files and records from the juvenile division and the criminal division of its own jurisdiction?
1. The parental rights of David R. Clau-sen, Sr., to David R. Clausen, Jr., were terminаted by the trial court pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 260.221(b)(5) (1978). This statutory section provides for termination when “following upon a determination of neglect or dependency, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have fаiled to correct the conditions leading to the determination.”
In
In re Petition of Zerby,
[I]t appears that a proceeding to terminаte rights is intended for those situations where it reasonably appears that a condition of dependency or neglect will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.
The bulk of the evidence in this case indicated that the prognosis for the father’s rehabilitation was poor because the father did not and would not recognize his alcohol problem. Furthermore, implicit in the trial court’s finding that the treatment program (whiсh had been in effect for some 15 months) had been rejected by the father is a recognition that conditions leading to the neglect will continue for a long, indeterminate period. Therefore, we conclude that thе trial court’s findings are legally sufficient.
2. In a termination proceeding, a petitioner has the burden of proving that there is a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence.
Matter of Welfare of Rosenbloom,
The standard of review in a termination case is whether “the findings of fact of the juvenile court are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.”
Matter of Welfare of Sharp,
[T]his court will continue to exercise great caution in termination proceedings, finding such action proper only when the evidence clearly mandates such a result in accordance with statutory grounds.
Matter of Welfare of Kidd,
We have reviewed the entire record and are completely satisfied that the stringent requirements we have imposed in reviewing orders terminating parental rights have been met in this case.
3. The father argues that he did not have sufficient time to meet the conditions imposed because the termination petition was filed within 3½ months of the adjudication of neglect. The father obviously misconstrues the relevant time period for determining whether a reasonable time was given. The order adjudicating the child neglected was entered on June 8,1976. On September 13, 1976, the disposition ordеr was issued. At that time, the father was made aware of and signed the treatment plan which was devised to correct the neglect conditions. While it is true that the termination petition was filed approximately 3½ months after the issuance of the disposition order, the date of that petition was amended to reflect the date of the termination hearing so that evidence concerning the period in between the filing of the petition and the termination hearing could be taken into account. The first termination hearing occurred on July 11, 1977. Furthermore, the trial court continued the matter until December 12, 1977, and held a supplemental hearing in order to allow аll parties to submit additional testimony concerning appellant’s rehabilitation or lack thereof. 2
In the case of
Petition of Linehan,
4. The father objected to the court taking judicial notice of the files and records of its juvenile and сriminal divisions. The attorney for the welfare department advised counsel for the father of its intention to request that the court make these records part of the proceedings.
Rule 201(b), Rules of Evidence, defines the kind оf facts which are judicially noticeable as follows:
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the *157 territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capablе of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
The function of judicial notice is to expedite litigation by eliminating the cost or dеlay of proving readily verifiable facts.
See State Department of Highways v. Halvorson,
Further, in termination proceedings it would appear to be advantageous to the parent to have notice of the records to be relied on by the petitioner so that they may be examined before the hearing. Otherwise, witnesses could be callеd at the termination hearing, testify as to the matters in the records, and possibly the parent would be unprepared to meet such evidence. Therefore, we find that the trial court properly took judicial notice of these records.
Affirmed.
Notes
. However, in termination proceedings under other statutory sections, this court has considered whether a parent will not be able to adequately care for his or her child in the foreseeаble future. In the case of
Matter of Welfare of Kidd,
. Appellant argues that the trial court judge continued the matter because he found that there was insufficient evidence to terminate appellant’s parental rights. The court made no such finding and his order continuing the matter appears to have been made solely in order to give appellant additional time in which to correct the neglect conditions.
