In thе Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: G.A.H. and S.T., Parents (A22-1065). In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: S.T. and A.D., Parents (A22-1066).
A22-1065, A22-1066
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
December 13, 2023
Thissen, J. Took no part, Procaccini, J.
Court of Appeals. Filed: December 13, 2023 Office of Appellate Courts
Kathleen J. Schur, Assistant Otter Tail County Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota, for respondent.
Mallory K. Stoll, Blahnik, Prchal & Stoll, PLLC, Prior Lake, Minnesota;
Natalie Netzel, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Brooke Beskau Warg, Hennepin County Adult Representation Services, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amici curiae Institute to Transform Child Protection and Hennepin County Adult Representation Services.
John L. Lovasz, Assistant Chisago County Attorney, Center City, Minnesota for amicus curiae Minnesota County Attorneys Association.
A parent who failed to appear for the final day of a multiple-day termination of parental rights trial is not entitled to reversal of the district court‘s order refusing to continue or reschedule the trial to allow the parent to testify, offer additional witnesses and cross-examine witnesses when, notwithstanding the parent‘s argument that this violated her procedural due process rights, the parent failed to carry her burden of showing prejudice such that the outcome of the trial wаs materially affected.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
THISSEN, Justice.
Appellant S.T. appeals from an order issued under
FACTS
S.T. is the mother of three children, T.J.D., T.A.D., and T.F.T. G.A.H. is the father of T.F.T. A.D. is the father of T.J.D. and T.A.D. This appeal arises from a petition to terminate S.T.‘s parental rights filed by Otter Tail County (the County).
Otter Tail County District Court terminated S.T.‘s parental rights to T.F.T. and involuntarily transferred permanent legal and physical custody of T.J.D. and T.A.D. to their father, A.D., on June 15, 2022. As discussed in more detail below, this termination and transfer occurred 681 days after the children were first removed from S.T.‘s care. The decision followed a multiple-day trial that occurred over several months. The start date of the trial was reset twice and the proceeding was continued three times. The record shows that none of these scheduling delays were the fault of S.T. or her counsel.
The petition to terminate S.T.‘s parental rights followed several months of efforts to maintain the family relationship between S.T. and the three children. A Children in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) petition was filed on August 3, 2020, based on an allegation that S.T. had repeatedly struck T.J.D. in the head with her closed fist. All three children were removed from the care of S.T. and G.A.H. Following an emergency
On January 19, 2021, the district court conducted a permanency progress review hearing after which the district court extended jurisdiction over the matter for an additional 180 days. In the summer of 2021, the County filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of G.A.H. to T.F.T. While that petition was pending, the children were returned to S.T.‘s home on July 8, 2021, for a trial home visit. The visit was officially terminated on September 20, 2021.
On October 1, 2021, the County first petitioned to involuntarily terminate S.T.‘s parental rights to T.F.T. The County proceeded by amending its earlier, still-pending petition to terminate the parental rights of G.A.H. The County served S.T. with the termination of parental rights papers on November 5, 2021. She denied the allegations on November 17, 2021.
Trial began on March 21, 2022. At that time, the parties and court agreed that the County would present its case first, G.A.H. would present his case next, S.T. would present her case after G.A.H., and the court would take evidence from the guardian ad litem after all parties rested.3 The district court noted that it expected the trial to take 3½ days.
S.T. appeared for every trial date before June 1. But S.T. was not present for trial on the morning of June 1, and, when the case was called, S.T.‘s counsel had no information about her whereabouts.4 The County requested that the district court rule that S.T. had failed to appear for trial and proceed in her absence in accordance with
The district court stated that generally a continuance to after lunch would be the most prudent approach. But the cоurt found that S.T. failed to appear for trial without
The trial proceeded with the testimony of the guardian ad litem. Near the end of the County‘s direct examination of the guardian ad litem, the district court learned from the clerk that S.T. had called court administration. The district court asked the clerk to get S.T.‘s phone number so her lawyer could contact her and the direct examination of the guardian ad litem continued. When it was over, the district court refused to allow counsel for S.T. and G.A.H. to cross-examine the guardian ad litem, reasoning that your client‘s not here, so at this point, I don‘t believe you have the ability to cross-examine, so I‘m not going to allow cross-examin[ation] from any party that hasn‘t appeared in the matter. G.A.H.‘s lawyer objected and the district court took a recess to allow S.T.‘s counsel to speak with her.
Court reconvened with S.T. present by phone. S.T.‘s counsel explained that S.T. was uncertain as to the date and time the trial was being resumed and although she had
S.T.‘s lawyer requested that the district court set a time for S.T. to testify. The district court denied the request. It reasoned that it would have been more flexible had the nonappearance occurred earlier in the trial, but that the evidence could not be received in the time remaining for trial on the following day and that the matter was well past all deadlines (we‘ve gone almost a third of the year just trying to complete this trial). The district court noted that S.T. had other ways to find out whether the trial was proceeding on June 1 and found that a miscommunication with counsel about the trial date was not sufficient to justify S.T.‘s nonappearance. The court closed the trial on June 1, 2022.
On June 15, 2022, the district court entered an order terminating S.T.‘s parental rights tо T.F.T. on two bases: (1) reasonable efforts have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child‘s placement outside of the home, and (2) the child is neglected and in
The court also involuntarily transferred permanent legal and physical custody of two of the children, T.J.D. and T.A.D., to their father, A.D., after finding that [a]ll of the
S.T. moved for a new trial, arguing that procedural irregularities had deprived her of a fair trial. See
S.T. appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. In re Welfare of Children of G.A.H., Nos. A22-1065, A22-1066, 2023 WL 2565105, at *3–5 (Minn. App. Mar. 20, 2023). This court granted S.T.‘s petition for discretionary review.
ANALYSIS
The questions before us are whether the district court‘s refusal to allow S.T. to testify, cross-examine the guardian ad litem, or call other witnesses—because S.T. did not appear for triаl on June 1, 2022—violated S.T.‘s constitutional right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution and, if it did, whether the violation materially affected the outcome of the trial so as to require reversal. Although we have serious constitutional concerns about the district court‘s refusal to continue the trial to allow S.T. to testify, cross-examine the guardian ad litem, and call other witnesses, we ultimately do
A.
We begin with a brief overview of the relevant procedural requirements for termination of parental rights cases set forth in Minnesota statutes and rules.10 The
The
To that end, we emphasize that district courts must prioritize petitions for termination of parental rights on their calendars. Minn. Judicial Council, Minnesota Judicial Branch Policy 601: Children‘s Justice Policy (2011) (stating that the policy of the Judicial Branch is to expedite juvenile protection cases with the goal of serving the best interests of children); see also
The
In addition,
These countervailing considerations regarding the parent‘s procedural protections on the one hand, and the need for an expeditious conclusion of the proceeding for the benefit of the child involved on the other, mean that the rules establishing procedural protections like the right to be heard, to present evidence, and to cross-examine adverse witnesses are not absolute. The
Importantly, a district court is not required to proceed with a default trial if a parent does not appear. Rather,
B.
With this background in mind, we turn to the central question before us: Did S.T.‘s failure to appear at trial on June 1, 2022, justify, consistent with procedural due process, the district court‘s decision to terminate S.T.‘s parental rights without allowing her to testify, call witnesses in support of her case, and cross-examine the guardian ad litem? We first address S.T.‘s arguments regarding her failure to appear in person on June 1, 2022, and next address whether S.T. has established that she was materially prejudiced by the district court‘s refusal to continue or reschedule the trial so as to permit her to testify, call witnesses, and cross-examine the guardian ad litem.
1.
We first focus on S.T.‘s failure to appear in person for trial on June 1, 2022. S.T. argues that the district court erred when it determined that her failure to appear in person on June 1, 2022, was unjustified and sufficient to trigger the procedures in
S.T. has forfeited these arguments. She made no claim before the district court that she did not know she had to appear in person (as opposed to remotely) or that she effectively appeared for trial through her counsel. See Wesser v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 989 N.W.2d 294, 301 (Minn. 2023) (deeming an argument forfeited when not raised in the district court). Rather, in the district court and the court of appeals, S.T. unsuccessfully claimed that she did not have sufficient notice that the trial would recommence on June 1 (as opposed to June 2). But she does not make that insufficient-notice argument before us.14
Even though the arguments S.T. does press here are forfeited, we note that the district court made clear at the May 11 hearing, which S.T. attended, that the June 1 trial would be in person. Written notice sent to S.T.‘s attorney advised in bold print that a hearing in the above-entitled matter will take place in court at the following date, time, and place above a box containing the court‘s address.
2.
As discussed above, if a parent fails to appear for trial, the district court has the choice under
The strong statutory and constitutional preference in termination of parental rights cases is to allow parents to have their day in court—to refute the county‘s claim that the statutory requirements for termination of parental rights have been satisfied and to explain the parent‘s side of the story. Again, there are few interests more fundamental than a parent‘s relationship with her child and few government acts more significant than terminating that relationship. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753–54. The consequences of an erroneous decision terminating parental rights are serious and, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the risk of erroneous deprivation in child protection proceedings is magnif[ied]. Id. at 762.15 Indeed, in termination of parental rights cases, the State, the parent, and the child all share an interest in getting it right. Recognizing these concerns, the Minnesota Legislature has expressly provided that a minor‘s parent is entitled to be heard, to present evidence material to the case, and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at [a child protection] hearing.
The State—as long as it has provided adequate notice—can condition the right to be meaningfully heard at a meaningful time on a party‘s compliance with reasonable procedural steps. In particular, the United States Supreme Court has observed that a State can, [consistent with due process] enter a default judgment against a defendant who, after adequate notice, fails to make a timely appearance. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971). Although due process requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case, it does not . . . require that the defendant in every civil case actually have a hearing on the merits. Id. (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
As described above, the
The district court implicated grave constitutional concerns when it decided to proceed under Rule 18.02 rather than granting a continuance to S.T. at the very end of her case. Although we generally review a district courts refusal to continue or reschedule a hearing for a future date for abuse of discretion, State v. Smith, 932 N.W.2d 257, 268 (Minn. 2019), as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, there is a point when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.18 Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964). In assessing whether that line has been crossed in a particular
Considering those factors here, we are troubled that a significant factor in the district courts decision to refuse to continue or reschedule the trial to a future date to allow S.T. to appear and present her case was the time crunch facing that court due to previous delays in the case. We recognize that the children had been without a permanent placement for nearly 700 days, that over 6 months had elapsed since S.T. had denied the termination of parental rights petition, and that more than 30 days had passed since the delayed trial began, far exceeding the timelines set forth in statute and rule. See
But S.T. cannot be held responsible for the delays that occurred before June 1, 2022, especially those leading up to, and during, the trial.19 And prior to June 1, all of the parties and the court apparently underestimated the time the trial would take.20 Moreover, while the district court found that the time allotted for trial on June 2 would be insufficient to complete the trial, there is no evidence in the record about whether another trial date was available in the following few weeks or, indeed, whether the district court considered that option.21 The district courts apparent insistence upon expeditiousness at the 11th hour of the case in the face of an arguably justifiable request for a 1-day further delay thus causes us pause.
But we also consider the fact that S.T. had control over whether to be present for the June 1 trial.22 Although we are sympathetic to S.T.s argument that she showed up for every other hearing and trial date before June 1, S.T. offered no reason for not appearing on June 1 other than her assertions that she did not have adequate notice of the date and that she did not understand she had to appear in person; factual assertions that we-likе the district court and court of appeals-find wanting.
In the end, when faced with a choice to proceed to terminate parental rights without allowing the parent to present her case
ii.
We ultimately, however, need not reach the questiоn of whether, on these facts, the district courts decision to refuse to reschedule the hearing to allow S.T.s counsel to cross-examine the guardian ad litem and to the reschedule the trial to allow S.T. and her other witnesses to testify crossed the line of being so arbitrary as to violate due process. Even if we assume-without deciding-that S.T.s rights were violated by the district courts decision not to grant a continuance, S.T. has not shown prejudice warranting reversal.
We have held that a party challenging on constitutional or other grounds a district courts refusal to continue or reschedule a hearing must establish that the party was prejudiced in the preparation or presentation of their case so as to materially affect the outcome of the trial. State v. Vance, 254 N.W.2d 353, 358-59 (Minn. 1977); see also State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 81 (Minn. 2005) (stating that the burden is on the party
In State v. Huber, we said:
The test for determining whether the denial of a continuance was prejudicial as a violation of the [partys] constitutional rights so as to amount to a denial of due process requiring reversal . . . is whether the [party] has been in somе manner embarrassed or prejudiced in preparing his defense so as to materially affect the outcome of the trial.
148 N.W.2d 137, 142 (1967). S.T. has not met that burden. S.T. made no proffer sufficient to show that the testimony that she would have offered or elicited from others would have materially affected the findings and conclusions of the district court for termination, which were supported by the evidence.
We start our prejudice analysis by considering the bases upon which the district court rested its decision. A district court may involuntarily terminate parental rights only if it determines that the County has established by clear and convincing evidence one of the statutory grounds for termination set forth in section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b). We review the district courts findings to determine whether they address the statutory criteria for termination of parental rights and are not clearly erroneous. In re Welfare of P.R.L., 622 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 2001).
The district court concluded that the County proved that reasonable efforts had failed to correct the conditions leading to the placement of S.T.s three children out of the home. See
In support of its conclusion, the district court found that S.T. had not established a safe and stable environment for the children: she lacked permanent housing and she was unemployed at the time of the trial.24 It determined that these conditions were unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The district court further found that S.T. did not effectively and honestly communicate with the County and other service рroviders and that she repeatedly engaged in triangulation between the social workers and service providers who were attempting to help reunify the family. In addition, the district court found evidence that S.T. used drugs at times during the out-of-home placement, that she became overwhelmed when all of the children stayed with her for several weeks in the summer of 2021, and that the children were filthy at the end of the home visit.
The district court also reviewed the efforts of the County to assist S.T. in resolving the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement and reunify her with the children as required by
The Court finds that there are no additional services that would be likely to bring about lasting parental adjustment enabling a return of the child to the parent within an ascertainable period of time. None of the multiple social workers or the [guardian ad litem] involved in this case identified any additional service that they believed could or should have been provided to Mother to foster reunification. The Court finds their testimony credible.
Finally, the district court determined that termination of S.T.s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
Based on our review of the record, the district courts findings are reasonably supported by the evidence and, therefore, are not clearly erroneous. In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008) (stating that a finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima, 372 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Minn. 1985)))). The findings are grounded in the testimony of nine witnеsses taken over 7 days of trial, as well as hundreds of pages of child protection reports. S.T. stipulated to admission of the child protection reports and had the opportunity to cross-examine the Countys witnesses as to whether it made reasonable efforts to reunify the family and to test each witnesss credibility. Finally, the district courts findings support its conclusion that the County proved that reasonable efforts for well over a year had failed to correct the conditions leading to the placement of S.T.s three children out of the home.
Turning to the affidavit S.T. presented in support of her motion for a new trial, we now consider whether the district courts refusal to continue or reschedule a hearing so prejudiced S.T.s preparation or presentation of her defense as to materially affect the outcome of the trial. See Huber, 148 N.W.2d at 142; Vance, 254 N.W.2d at 358-59. As an initial matter, S.T. did not make any offer as to what testimony she would have elicited if allowed to cross-examine the guardian ad litem.26 Instead, in her affidavit, S.T. explained what she would have said if she had been allowed to testify.27 S.T. also identified
First, as to the testimony S.T. herself would have offered, she explained why she asked for respite during the trial home visit in the summer of 2021. She stated that she had arranged to move to a four-bedroom farmhouse but that the arrangement fell through when she learned the male landlord would be living with her and her children. She asserted that her house was cluttered near the end of the trial home-visit period because she was packing in anticipation of a move and the children had made a mess with craft supplies. She also averred that she had arranged for two high-school age babysitters to watch the children during the day while she worked but the County refused to approve them. She said that she had been sober for 13 years and claimed that she only tested positive for THC because she used CBD. She noted that a chemical dependency assessment determined she was not in need of any treatment or intervention. She identified several parts of the out-of-home placement plan with which she complied and claimed that her resource worker was unable to prоvide meaningful assistance because she worked in Otter Tail County and S.T. lived in Pope County. She noted problems with volunteer drivers-which, as the district court noted, the County had addressed-and claimed that the County failed to provide her with gas vouchers. She also claimed that her County case worker was mentally abusive.
S.T., however, bears the burden of proving that the district courts decision on termination would have been materially affected if she had been allowed to testify. We cannot assess the impact of potential testimony unless it is provided.
Second, as to other testimony S.T. would have elicited, S.T. identified two other witnesses who would have testified as character witnesses on her behalf. One witness was a life-long family friend who was the father of the two girls who would have babysat her children. According to the affidavit, the witness was willing to let his girls stay overnight at my house (while I was home) because he trusts me so much and has no concerns about the girls safety with me. Further, he could testify as to what a good person I am and how compassionate, loving, and caring I am. The other witness, also a long-time friend, would have testified that S.T. is a good, lоving, appropriate mother to my children over years and that he would leave his own children with me.
Critically, nothing in S.T.s affidavit demonstrates that S.T. had found a home or a stable job that would allow her to provide a safe and stable environment for children. Nothing in the affidavit refutes the examples of times S.T. was dishonest with, or engaged in triangulation between, the social workers and service providers who were attempting to help reunify the family. The affidavit does not point to any additional service that S.T. believes could or should have been provided to foster reunification. Those facts standing alone support the district courts decision to terminate S.T.s parental rights.28
CONCLUSION
Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
PROCACCINI, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Notes
455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982).The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temрorary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.