In rе T.O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. T.O., Defendant and Respondent.
E077783
COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
10/18/22
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. (Super. Ct. No. SWJ2000222)
See Concurring Opinion
OPINION
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Natalie M. Lough, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Steven L. Harmon, Public Defender, and William A. Meronek, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant
I. INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal by the People after the juvenile court‘s order declaring defendant and respondent T.O. (minor) a ward of the court and placing him in a secure local facility for committing a sexual offense against his seven-year-old cousin. The People contend that the juvenile court erred in refusing to impose mandatory sex offender registration pursuant to
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2020, then 17-year-old minor pulled his seven-year-old cousin, Jane Doe, into a bedroom, covered her mouth with a scarf, and then anally and vaginally raped her. Jane reported the sexual assault to her mother and aunt the following day. Minor was subsequently arrested.
On May 6, 2020, a juvenile delinquency petition was filed charging minor, who was six weeks shy of his 18th birthday, with rape of a child under 14 years old (
On May 7, 2020, the Riverside County District Attorney‘s Office filed a request to transfer jurisdiction to adult criminal court pursuant to
On April 13, 2021, the juvenile court issued a written order denying the People‘s request to transfer the matter to adult court. The court thereafter referred the matter to the probation department for dispositional recommendations.
The parties thereafter disputed whether minor would be required to register as a sex offender pursuant to
On July 22, 2021, after reviewing the briefs and hearing arguments from the parties, the juvenile court denied the People‘s request to require minor to register as a sex offender pursuant to
On July 26, 2021, pursuant to a negotiated agreement, minor admitted that he had raped a child under 14 years of age and seven or more years younger than him (
III. DISCUSSION
The People argue that the juvenile court erred in refusing to impose mandatory sex offender registration because its statutory interpretation of
Minor initially responds that the matter is not cognizable on appeal because the court‘s order is lawful. As to the merits, minor contends the juvenile court properly denied the People‘s request to impose a registration requirement because the plain language of
A. Standard of Review
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961; In re Isabella G. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 708, 718 [“Our review of the interpretation and application of a statute is de novo.“].) As with any case involving statutory interpretation, our primary goal is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature‘s intent. (People v. Lewis, supra, at p. 961.) We begin by examining the statute‘s words, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent, giving them a plain, usual and commonsense meaning. (People v. Law (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 811, 819.) “When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. However, when the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objеcts to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citations.]” (People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1063.)
B. Appealability
An appellate court has “no authority to hear an appeal in the absence of appellate jurisdiction.” (In re Almalik S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 851, 854.) Appeals from juvenile court orders and judgments are permitted only as provided by statute: “The People‘s right to appeal in . . . juvenile court proceedings is conferred exclusively by statute.” (People v. Superior Court (Arthur R.) (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 494, 497.) “It is settled that the right of appeal is statutory and that a judgment or order is not appealable unless expressly made so by statute. [Citations.] The
The People assert that the order at issue here is appealable under
The People contend the juvenile court‘s order denying its request to impose a registration requirement is unlawful because the plain language of
C. Senate Bill 823
On September 30, 2020, Senate Bill 823 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) became effective. On May 14, 2021, Senate Bill No. 92 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 92) became effective. This bill made some amendments to the laws implemented by Senate Bill 823.4
Through these bills, the Legislature has reduced the maximum period of confinement a juvenile ward faces when committed to DJJ. Before this change in law, a juvenile could be committed for the maximum term an adult would face if convicted of the same offense. (Former
In addition, the Legislature has announced its intent to close DJJ, which will be effective June 30, 2023. (
Furthermоre, the Legislature has announced that, beginning July 1, 2021, a juvenile court (with certain limited exceptions) may no longer commit a ward to DJJ unless the ward is transferred to a criminal court under
In the present matter, minor was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court on July 26, 2021, well after the effective date of Senate Bill 823 and before it was repealed, and after the juvenile court could not commit minor to the DJJ. He was committed to the Pathways program, a local secure program, as opposed to the DJJ, pursuant to Senate Bill 823 and
We summarize the Legislative intent for Senate Bill 823, which is instrumental for some of the arguments. In enacting Senate Bill 823, the Legislature declared as follows: “Evidence has demonstrated that justice system-involved youth are more successful when they remain connected to their families and communities. Justice system-involved youth who remain in their communities have lower recidivism rates and are more prepared for their transition back into the community.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subd. (a).)
“To ensure that justice-involved youth are closer to their families and communities and receive age-appropriate treatment, it is necessary to close [DJJ] and move the jurisdiction of these youth to local county jurisdiction.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subd. (b).) In Senate Bill 823, the Legislature enacted
“It is the intent of the Legislature and the administration for counties to use evidence-based and promising practices and programs that improve the outcomes of youth and public safety, reduce the transfer of youth into the adult criminal justice system, ensure that dispositions are in the least restrictive appropriate environment, reduce and then eliminate racial and ethnic disparities, and reduce the use of confinement in the juvenile justice system by utilizing community-based responses and interventions.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subd. (e).)
Finally, the Legislature stated its intent “to end the practice of placing youth in custodial or confinement facilities that are operated by private entities whose primаry business is the custodial confinement of adults or youth in a secure setting. It is further the intent of the Legislature to end placements of justice system-involved youth in out of state facilities that do not appropriately address the programming, service, safety, and other needs of placed youth once appropriate and sufficient capacity within California is achieved.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subd. (f).)
D. Section 290.008
Subdivision (c)
Subdivision (d) of
Finally,
E. Statutory Interpretation Analysis
The plain language of
Contrary to the People‘s position, the language of
Accordingly, mandatory sex offender registration may not be imposed on juveniles, like minor, who were committed as wards to a county-administered program, such as Pathways, rather than to the DJJ. The language of
The People argue that it appears
Furthermore, the People misconstrue these provisions. These statutory provisions do not suggest sex offender registration for a juvenile offender is no longer possible. A juvenile offender may still be subjected to registration if the juvenile‘s case is transferred to adult criminal court under
We also disagree with the People‘s insinuation that
Moreover, even if the juvenile court purportedly erred in only focusing on the plain language of
It was also “the intent of the Legislature and the administration for counties to use evidence-based and promising practices and programs that improve the outcomes of youth and public safety, reduce the transfer of youth into the adult criminal justice system, ensure that dispositions are in the least restrictive appropriate environment, reduce and then eliminate racial and ethnic disparities, and reduce the use of confinement in the juvenile justice system by utilizing community-based responses and interventions.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subd. (e).)
The Legislature also declared its intent “to end the practice of placing youth in custodial or confinement facilities that are operated by private entities whose primary business is the custodial confinement of adults or youth in a secure setting. It is further the intent of the Legislature to end placements of justice system-involved youth in out of state facilities that do not appropriately address the programming, service, safety, and other needs of placed youth once appropriate and sufficient capacity within California is achieved.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subd. (f).)
These county-based facilities thus address different needs and purposes; serving as an alternative tо DJJ rather than an equivalent. (Sen. Bill 823 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.)), § 15; see also
We also reject the People‘s contention that the juvenile court‘s interpretation of
F. Equal Protection
Finally, the People contend that treating juvenile wards placed in out-of-state facilities that are “equivalent to the [DJJ]” (
Prisoners are not a suspect clаss and they have no fundamental interest in a specific term or type of imprisonment. (People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 178; People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838; In re J.M. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 999, 1010 [“[J]uveniles have not been recognized as a suspect class.“].) “Where, as here, a disputed statutory disparity implicates no suspect class or fundamental right, ‘equal protection of the law is denied only where there is no “rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.“‘” (Johnson v. Department of Justice, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 881.) “This standard of rationality does not depend upon whether lawmakers ever actually articulated the purpose they sought to achieve. Nor must the underlying rationale be empirically substantiated. [Citation.] While the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored [citation], a court may engage in “rational speculation” as to the justifications for the legislative choice [citation]. It is immaterial for rational basis review “whether or not” any such speculation has “a foundation in the record.” [Citation.] To mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must “‘negative every conceivable basis“’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity. [Citations.] If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-guess its “‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.“‘” (Ibid.)
In the present matter, we are not persuaded that juvenile wards placed in out-of-state facilities that are “equivalent to the [DJJ]” are similarly situated to juvenile wards committed to in-state local facilities with respect to registration. The lawmakers had to create two different classifications for in-state and out-of-state juvenile offenders because each group‘s situation is different. For an out-of-state wards, the juvenile court must examine whether their commitment facility is “equivalent to the [DJJ],” a task presumably
Assuming for the sake of argument that juvenile wards committed to out-of-state facilities “equivalent to the [DJJ]” are similarly situated to juvenile wards who are placed in an in-state local facility for purposes of sex offender registration, treating wards differently based on their placement is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. The Legislature may have reasonably concluded that some out-of-state facilities may be the same as the DJJ, thus requiring sex offender registration for “[a]ny person who is discharged or paroled from a facility in another state that is equivalent to the [DJJ]” for a comparable qualifying offense. (
“Nothing compels the state ‘to choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.’ [Citation.] Far from having to ‘solve all related ills at once’ [citation], the Legislature has ‘broad discretion’ to proceed in an incremental and uneven manner without necessarily engaging in arbitrary and unlawful discrimination.” (People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1110.) There is no equal protection violation.
The judgment is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
CODRINGTON
J.
I concur:
MCKINSTER
J.
[E077783, In re T.O.; The People v. T.O.]
Ramirez, P. J., Concurring
I agree with the conclusion, the analysis of the revised statutory scheme, and the discussion of the majority. I write separately only to express concern that the recent legislative actions have omitted an ingredient. In its zeal to insure for juvenile offenders the opportunity to be rehabilitated without the disabilities accompanying a commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice or a conviction as an adult, which would require sex offender registration, the safety of the public and the trauma to the victim have been overlooked.
I agree with the legislative policy of insuring an opportunity for rehabilitation for persons who commit offenses during their youth, when lack of or incomplete brain development may lead them to commit acts that may not have been committed with the benefit of the wisdom that comes with emotional maturity. This policy has emerged following extensive scientific research and a series of decisions focusing on the lack of cognitive development manifest in youth. “As the United States Supreme Court observed in Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 570 [161 L. Ed. 2d 1, 125 S. Ct. 1183], ‘the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult,’ and consequently, ‘[t]he personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.“’ (In re Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 907-908.) Scientific research increasingly supports the notion that juveniles are evolving and that developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.
As the United States Supreme Court observed, as compared to adults, juveniles have ““[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility“; they “are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure“; and their characters are “not as well formed.” (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569-570 [125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1].) These salient characteristics mean that “[i]t is difficult even fоr expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” (Id., at p. 573 [125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1].)
Our nation‘s High Court therefore concluded that, “juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.” ( Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 569 [125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1].) For this reason, “[a] juvenile is not absolved of responsibility for his actions, but that his transgression ‘is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.“’ (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 68 [130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825], quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 815, 835 [108 S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702] (plurality opinion).)
While the legislation embodies the laudable concern for the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, it is not counterbalanced by concern for public safety (which was responsible for the massive overhaul by Proposition 21, in 2000, providing prosecutors with discretion to directly file criminal charges in adult court against minors of the age of 14 or older). The pendulum has now swung 180 degrees in the opposite direction.
Here, the denial of the People‘s petition to transfer the minor‘s case to adult court through
Because the opinion correctly analyzes and interprets the legislation as written, I concur in the judgment.
RAMIREZ
P. J.