Case Information
*1 Filed 9/30/21
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA In re Miguel C., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, D078013
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. J242744) MIGUEL C.,
Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Richard R. Monroy, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Charles C. Ragland and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioner and Respondent.
Before committing a minor to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ),
the state’s most restrictive placement for its most severe juvenile offenders,
the law requires the juvenile court to find both that the placement would
probably benefit the minor, and that less restrictive options would be either
ineffective or inappropriate.
In re Carlos J.
(2018)
We conclude that where a minor presents evidence suggesting that a DJJ placement would be harmful for reasons specific to the minor, the People must provide some contrary evidence that would enable the juvenile court to make a comparative analysis of the placement options before it concludes the minor will probably benefit from DJJ, and that less restrictive options would be ineffective or inappropriate. Here, expert testimony indicated that placing this minor in DJJ would be counterproductive because it would likely assure his entrenchment in gang culture and, due to the ready availability of drugs in DJJ facilities, undermine efforts to treat and improve a significant substance abuse disorder that led to a single episode of violent criminal behavior over the course of a few hours. Beyond identifying that substance abuse treatment was available at DJJ, the People introduced no responsive evidence. So, as in Carlos J. , we reverse and remand in an opinion that *3 focuses not on the substantive correctnes s of the juvenile court’s conclusion, but on the procedural requirement that there be evidence in the record to support whatever conclusion the court reaches. On remand, given intervening changes to the juvenile court law, the trial court must first make a threshold finding as to whether juvenile justice realignment now precludes commitment to DJJ. (See Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 736.5.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In the fall of 2019, a large group of teenagers including 16-year-old Miguel C. gathered at Grove Park in Escondido and severely beat M.R., who later died from blunt force trauma. One witness told police officers she saw about 20 young people “jump” M.R., using skateboards and knives in the attack. A hammer recovered near the scene was likely also used as a weapon. Officers who responded detained several suspects, including one minor who had recorded part of the beating on her cellphone. The video showed about 30 seconds of the incident and captured over 70 blows aimed at the victim from multiple youths involved in the assault.
While officers were responding to the initial assault, another attack was reported just a few blocks away. After leaving Grove Park, Miguel accosted a man as he was parking his car to unload groceries, punching him in the head repeatedly. When the man attempted to run away — abandoning his car in the process Miguel pursued him and punched him in the head again. Miguel was then arrested, and quickly connected to the earlier Grove Park assault.
The video, a witness account, and some details provided by the teenagers involved confirmed that Miguel was a primary actor in the assault 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
on M.R. — though it appeared he did not use any weapons. Miguel consistently maintained that he did not remember the park incident or attacking the second man because he blacked out from excessive alcohol consumption, in addition to ingesting cocaine.
Investigators eventually determined that the fatal assault at Grove Park was gang related. M.R. was apparently a known associate of the Diablos gang, which has recently been feuding with a tagging crew known as “B.A.D -K. ” or “ B.D.K .” Miguel denied any B.D.K associa tion, but admitted his friends were members and said that if the group had encountered a Diablos associate , they would probably “jump” that person. There were conflicting stories about how the fight started. At least two accounts from the teenagers indicated M.R. attacked Miguel first, putting him in a chokehold. But an uninvolved witness watched the group surround M.R. before attacking him, apparently unprovoked.
A juvenile wardship petition filed by the San Diego District Attorney alleged that Miguel had committed murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and assault likely to produce great bodily injury ( id. , § 245, subd. (a)(4)). The petition was later amended to include a manslaughter charge for the benefit of a gang (Pen. Code, §§ 192, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), to which Miguel pleaded guilty in exchange for dismissal of the other charges.
While the violence committed in the span of a few minutes by the group of minors – and particularly by Miguel is both tragic and stunning, Miguel’s previously unblemished record only makes his participation more perplexing. He had never been arrested, and was not even documented as a potential gang associate. As his defense attorney explained to the court, she would usually have contested the gang enhancement for a case like this, but *5 counseled her client to accept it as part of his plea deal because the prosecutor’s overall offer was reasonable.
The defense retained Dr. Gimel Rogers, a clinical psychologist, to evaluate Miguel. She chronicled his difficult family history, which included neglect and abandonment by his parents both of whom have addictions that inhibited their ability to care for Miguel and his siblings. Miguel was exposed to substance abuse in early childhood, and although his home life improved significantly since he went to live with his aunt at the age of 12, that was also about the age he began using marijuana heavily. Miguel disclosed that by the time he was 16, he was using alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine on a regular basis.
Dr. Rogers diagnosed Miguel with severe substance use disorders for alcohol and cannabis, and a moderate use disorder for methamphetamine. She indicated that he also dealt with anxiety and depression, as well as behavioral issues such as running away from home and fighting. Despite these challenges, she found Miguel demonstrated resilient characteristics and could overcome adversity, but would need intensive therapy to help with his substance abuse and to address his family history. Dr. Rogers did not consider Miguel to be gang entrenched, and believed that he did not remember the assault given the evidence corroborating Miguel’s acco unt of his state of mind,2 and the mixture of substances he had consumed.
Dr. Rogers assessed Miguel to have a low to moderate risk of committing future serious violence, noting that most of his risk factors were 2 Among other things, Dr. Rogers took note of the transcript of an audio recording of Miguel and another involved youth talking in the back of a police car after the incident, while they were alone and unaware that they were being recorded. Miguel consistently stated that he did remember anything and asked the other minor a lot of questions about what occurred. *6 historical, such as early caregiver disruption, and that his protective factors going forward were promising, such as strong social support and positive attitudes toward intervention and authority. Ultimately, Dr. Rogers recommended Miguel be placed in a lower level security structured environment, such as the youthful offender rehabilitation program offered at Youthful Offender Units (YOU), and warned that a commitment to a higher level security environment such as the DJJ might put his rehabilitative chances at risk by exposing him to more drugs, higher instances of violence, and a social structure revolving around gang affiliation.3
In contrast, the probation department prepared a social study that judged Miguel’s recidivism risk to be high and recommended a commitment to DJJ. The report put particular emphasis on the seriousness of Miguel’s crimes, and four documented fights he was involved in at Juvenile Hall. Although the report acknowledged that Miguel was performing well in other ways, having improved significantly in his schoolwork while in custody, it nonetheless concluded that this was evidence that Miguel “responds well” when “placed in a structured environment” before recommending a more secure setting. The report acknowledged that Dr. Rogers’ s primary diagnosis concerned Miguel’s substance abuse , but said nothing about her conclusion that a DJJ placement would undermine Miguel’s rehabilitation. It also listed 3 Megan Baldwin, senior program manager of the Second Chance Youthful Offender Rehabilitation Program had not evaluated Miguel but testified generally about programs offered through YOU specifically for gang at-risk youth. Core curricula help youth offenders examine the behaviors that brought them to juvenile hall, overcome gang mentalities, and address their substance abuse. Upon release, minors continue to work with regional counselors throughout the probationary term who can refer them to appropriate programs and services.
programs available at DJJ that it thought Miguel would benefit from, one of which was a substance abuse program.
At Miguel’s contested disposition hearing, t he defense asked for Miguel to be given an opportunity in the less restrictive YOU program. Dr. Rogers testified and reiterated her conclusion that YOU would be a more appropriate placement than DJJ. A senior program manager for YOU also testified and detailed the support programs available for youth at risk of gang involvement and those with substance abuse issues. She specified that minors can typically stay at YOU for 6 to 12 months, with counseling support that usually lasts 12 to 18 months an d ends when a youth’s probation period is over.
The People presented no witnesses and relied solely on the probation report. In her closing argument, the prosecutor asked for a DJJ commitment because she thought the 12 month residential program that YOU could offer would not be long enough to rehabilitate Miguel. The court ultimately agreed, committing Miguel to DJJ for the maximum term of 16 years (6 years for the manslaughter plus 10 for the gang enhancement) based on its concern that Miguel needed to be in a structured environment for as long as possible to have the best chance at rehabilitation.
DISCUSSION
Miguel raises only one issue on appeal, citing the Court of Appeal
opinion in
Carlos J., supra,
A . Background: The Shifting Landscape of Juvenile Justice
In
In re Aline D.
(1975)
The analysis changed slightly in 1984, when statutory amendments to
section 202 expanded the focus of the court’s placement decision to “recognize[ ] punishment as a rehabilitative tool and emphasize[ ] the
protection and safety of the public .” (
In re Lorenza M.
(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d
49, 57; § 202.) Before the 1984 amendment , a minor’s rehabilitation was the
only permissible concern in determining a proper placement. (
Lorenza M.
, at
p. 57;
In re Michael D.
(1987)
More recently, the pendulum has shifted back toward primarily rehabilitative aims, with the Legislature in 2020 overhauling the juvenile court law through “juvenile justice realignment.” (See Stats. 2020, ch. 337 (Sen. Bill No. 823).) By closing DJJ and transferring jurisdiction over youth offenders to counties, the stated purpose of juvenile justice realignment is “[t]o ensure that justice -involved youth are closer to their families and communities and receive age-appropriate treatment. ” ( Id. , § 1(b).) The expansive legislation draws from evidence that “justice system -involved youth are more successful when they remain connected to their families and communities,” have lower recidivism rates, and are better prepared to transition back into their communities. ( Id. , § 1(a).) To implement realignment, counties are to be given funding to implement public health and community based programs that support positive youth development and reduce crime. ( Id. , § 1(c).) A new Office of Youth and Community Restoration, housed under the Health and Human Services Agency rather than the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, is tasked with helping counties make the transition , including by promoting “trauma responsive, culturally informed services for youth involved in the juvenile justice system.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 823 (2019−2020 Reg. Sess.); § 2200.)
The realignment bill substantively rewrote major portions of the juvenile court law. Effective July 1, 2021, newly enacted section 736.5 shifts responsibility for convicted youth offenders from DJJ to the county level. *10 (§ 736.5, subd. (a).) All wards committed to DJJ prior to July 1, 2021 will remain in DJJ custody. ( Id. , subd. (d).) But pending final closure of DJJ in June 2023, a court may only make a DJJ commitment if the minor “is otherwise eligible to be committed under existing law and in whose case a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction was filed.” ( Id. , subds. (b), (c), (e); see also § 733.1, subds. (a)−(b) .) As an alternative to DJJ commitment, courts “shall consider . . . placement in local programs,” including county level programs created to implement realignment. (§ 736.5, subd. (c).) Although realignment does not change section 202, which recognizes punishment as a potential rehabilitative tool, the new scheme implicitly places less weight on punishment by prioritizing treatment and restricting commitment avenues.
California’s shifting landscape on juvenile justice is in keeping with
broader trends. Landmark juvenile criminal cases in recent decades have
increasingly recognized that all juvenile offenders are presumptively capable
of rehabilitation even those who have committed terrible crimes. As the
United States Supreme Court observed in
Roper v. Simmons
(2005) 543 U.S.
551, 570, “ the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an
adult [,]” and consequently, “[t] he personality traits of juveniles are more
transitory, less fixed. ” Although this reality is perhaps self-evident to anyone
who remembers their own adolescence or has guided a child through that
tumultuous time (
J.D.B. v. North Carolina
(2011)
Given these developments and the significant rehabilitative focus of our
state’s juvenile court law even pre-realignment, the prospect that a particular
sentencing decision might place a minor in a setting that is likely to entrench
nascent criminal tendencies rather than encourage reform is particularly
concerning. As such, cases like this one where a child with no prior record is
committed to the DJJ after a first offense albeit a serious one — merit
particular scrutiny. Miguel was committed to DJJ in August 2020, before
juvenile justice realignment took effect. Even so, his commitment to DJJ in
the first instance may be upheld only upon a showing of probable benefit to
Miguel and ineffectiveness or inappropriateness of less restrictive
alternatives. (
Carl N., supra,
B . Substantial Evidence Review
We review a juvenile court’s placement decision for abuse of discretion.
(
Carl N., supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 431−432.) “ ‘ “[ A] trial court abuses
its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support
in the evidence. ” ’ ” (
In re Nicole H.
(2016)
Miguel questions whether this threshold was met in his case, and we
find considerable guidance for evaluating his argument in the relatively
recent
Carlos J.
opinion from the First Appellate District. (
Carlos J., supra,
A psychologist who evaluated Carlos explained that he had a “ ‘ history
of trauma and active PTSD, ’ ” but noted he was amenable to treatment, and
identified “ ‘ individual psycho-therapy ’ ” as his primary need. (
Carlos J.
,
supra
,
In reversing, the appellate court explained that there was “no evidence
before the juvenile court regarding any ‘intensive treatment’ appellant might
receive at [DJJ],” information that would have been
necessary
for the court to
conclude that a DJJ commitment would probably benefit Carlos by meeting
his most pressing needs. (
Carlos J., supra
,
In coming to this conclusion, the
Carlos J.
court explained that there
are two evidentiary thresholds the People must meet to support a DJJ
commitment. As an initial, preliminary showing, the probation department
is required to (1) identify programs at DJJ that would likely benefit the
particular minor, and (2) “ include
brief
descriptions of the relevant
programs. ” (
Carlos J.
,
supra
,
But the opinion went on to discuss what was required once the People
clear the first evidentiary hurdle. Of particular relevance here, the appellate
*14
court commented that after the People make a minimal showing to support a
DJJ commitment for a particular minor, the minor might then “dispute the
availability or efficacy of particular programs, or . . . suggest that other
conditions at the [DJJ] undermine the programs [by presenting] sufficient
evidence to reasonably bring into question the benefit he or she will receive
. . . . ” (
Carlos J., supra
,
Our case appears to pick up where Carlos J . left off, at this second step. The probation study in this case provided a list of DJJ programs, with brief descriptions, that it thought Miguel could benefit from one of which addressed substance abuse, identified by Dr. Rogers as Miguel’s primary treatment need. The inclusion of this information in the study appears to meet the initial minimal showing described in Carlos J . (22 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.) But Miguel then countered with evidence that a DJJ commitment would actually be adverse to his rehabilitation given his particular needs, identifying “other conditions at the DJJ,” namely the re ady availability of drugs and the entrenched gang atmosphere, that would probably undermine the efficacy of DJJ’s programming for him. (See id. at p. 13.) Because this evidence came from Dr. Rogers’ s clinical assessment of how Miguel would respond to the DJJ environment, it was “of ‘reasonable, credible and . . . solid value’ ” and called into question the probation study’s conclusion that a DJJ commitment would benefit Miguel. ( Id . at pp. 10, 13.)
Consistent with the sequential process outlined in
Carlos J.
, we
conclude that in response to Dr. Rogers’ s report and opinions the People were
obligated to provide the court with some additional information that would
*15
enable it to make a comparative analysis of the benefit to Miguel of the
different placement options prior to deciding whether Miguel would likely
benefit from DJJ, and whether other options would be ineffective or
inappropriate. By way of example,
Carlos J
. explained that the People might
counter evidence that the gang environment in DJJ would be detrimental to
the minor’s particular needs “with tes timony showing improvements in the
gang intervention programs or showing flaws in the analysis in the minor’s
evidence. Such information would enable the juvenile court to balance the
benefits of the gang intervention services against the risk that confinement
at the [ DJJ] would harden the minor’s gang affiliation and criminality.”
(
Carlos J
.,
supra
,
Here, the People relied solely on the probation study, which failed to address the substance of Dr. Rogers’ s analysis or provide a contrary expert opinion.5 Moreover, given Miguel’s lack of history in the juvenile system, the court had less evidence than it often does to assess whether less restrictive placement options would fail. (Compare In re A.R. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1081 [upholding a DJJ commitment where “Minor had a long history with the juvenile system and the juvenile court had already tried various less restrictive placements”] with Michael R., supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at pp. 338 – 339 [“We cannot as sume without some evidence on the record that minor will not respond” to the rehabilitative programs available at less restrictive 5 The probation study essentially dismissed Dr. Rogers’s findings by summarizing them, and then moving on to its DJJ recommendation without offering further information or discussion.
placements]; see also
In re Calvin S.
(2016)
In reaching this conclusion, we are sensitive to the traditional
deference shown to the juvenile court in these matters. We reverse only for
an abuse of discretion. (
George M., supra
,
C . Proceedings on Remand
Ordinarily, proceedings on remand would follow a predictable course. The People would have the opportunity at a new disposition hearing to provide additional information supporting their view that commitment carries a probable benefit to Miguel notwithstanding his articulated concerns. Nothing in our opinion would be construed to undermine the juvenile court’s consideration of permissible factors in its placement decision. Public safety, which appears to have animated the court’s decision both here and in Carlos J. , remains a consideration explicitly permitted by the law (§ 202), and the trial court would be entrusted with determining the level of security and *17 length of time necessary for the minor’s commitment on a more developed record.
Before making such an inquiry, however, the sweeping juvenile justice
realignment reforms effected by Senate Bill No. 823 require the juvenile
court to consider as a threshold matter whether commitment to DJJ remains
permissible. (See, e.g.,
Dix v. Superior Court
(1991)
DISPOSITION
The order committing Miguel to DJJ is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for a new disposition hearing consistent with this opinion.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
AARON, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.