IN RE: STEVEN R. DRUMMOND, MARY A. DRUMMOND, Debtors.
No. CV-23-0009-CQ
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
February 23, 2024
QUESTION ANSWERED
COUNSEL:
Keith S. Knochel, Nicholas R. Darus (argued), Knochel Knochel & Darus, Bullhead City, Attorneys for Steven R. Drummond and Mary A. Drummond
Terry A. Dake (argued), Terry A. Dake, Ltd., Phoenix, Attorney for Lawrence J. Warfield
Brett W. Johnson, Benjamin W. Reeves, Tracy A. Olson, Ryan P. Hogan, Charlene A. Warner, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix, attorneys for Amici Curiae Arizona Creditors Bar Association, et al.
JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, and JUSTICES BOLICK, LOPEZ, MONTGOMERY, and KING joined. VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER dissented.
JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:
¶1 The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona certified the following question to this Court: “Whether a motor home in which a person over 18 years of age resides qualifies as a mobile home for the purpose of claiming an Arizona homestead exemption pursuant to
BACKGROUND
¶2 Steven and Mary Drummond (the “Drummonds“) filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in March 2022. The question here centers around the Drummonds’ self-propelled motor home, a 2017 Tiffin Allegro recreational vehicle, which they use as a full-time residence. During the bankruptcy proceedings, the Drummonds claimed that their motor home is subject to the homestead exemption as a “mobile home” under
¶3 Because no Arizona precedent exists determining whether a motor home qualifies as a mobile home under Arizona‘s homestead exemption statute, we agreed to resolve the certified question pursuant to
¶4
A. Any person eighteen years of age or over, married or single, who resides within this state may hold as a homestead exempt from execution and forced sale, not exceeding $250,000 in value, any one of the following:
1. The person‘s interest in real property in one compact body on which exists a dwelling house in which the person resides.
2. The person‘s interest in one condominium or cooperative in which the person resides.
3. A mobile home in which the person resides.
4. A mobile home in which the person resides plus the land on which that mobile home is located.
¶5 We “determine the plain meaning of the words the legislature chose to use, viewed in their broader statutory context.” See Columbus Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Tr., N.A., 255 Ariz. 382, 385 ¶ 11 (2023). “Our task in statutory construction is to effectuate the text if it is clear and unambiguous.” BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep‘t of Transp., 244 Ariz. 17, 19 ¶ 9 (2018). Absent ambiguity, we interpret statutes according to their plain language. Premier Physicians Grp., PLLC v. Navarro., 240 Ariz. 193, 195 ¶ 9 (2016). When a statute‘s plain language is unambiguous in context, it is dispositive. See Shea v. Maricopa County, 255 Ariz. 116, 120–21 ¶ 19 (2023); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012) (explaining that courts must interpret a statute‘s plain language in context, because “[c]ontext is a primary determinant of meaning“). Additionally, “[i]n construing a specific provision, we look to the statute as a whole and we may also consider statutes that are in pari materia — of the same subject or general purpose — for guidance and to give effect to all of the provisions involved.” Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509 ¶ 7 (2017). However, if more than one reasonable interpretation exists, we will examine secondary interpretation methods, including the statute‘s subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, as well as its spirit and purpose to aid with interpretation. See Romero-Millan v. Barr, 253 Ariz. 24, 27–28 ¶ 13 (2022).
I.
¶6 The Drummonds argue that their motor home qualifies for the homestead exemption under
¶7
¶8 Here, dictionary definitions of “mobile home” are too varied to categorically establish any plain meaning. See, e.g., Mobile Home, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mobile%20home (last visited Feb. 20, 2024) (defined since 1934 as “a dwelling structure built on a steel chassis and fitted with wheels that is intended to be hauled to a usually permanent
¶9 But inconclusive dictionary definitions do not render the term ambiguous. Rather, as previously noted, “[w]e do not view statutory words in isolation, but rather draw their meaning from the context in which they are used.” See DBT Yuma, 238 Ariz. at 396 ¶ 10. And considering the term “mobile home” in the context of
¶10 Sections 33-1101(A)(1), (2), and (4) each describe a permanent residence in which a person seeking a homestead exemption resides. Each subsection describes a home that is permanently attached to land — often anchored to a foundation or at least with its wheels and axles removed, hard-wired to electrical services, and hard-plumbed to both water and sewer. Examined in this context, the Drummonds’ argument that the subsection (A)(3) definition of “mobile home” includes a readily movable “motor home” fails.
¶11 First,
¶12 Second,
¶13 Lastly,
¶14 Residences that come under (A)(1), (2) and (4) are permanently situated and physically connected to land. Houses, condominiums, and cooperatives are physically connected to the property on which they are built. These physical connections include permanent integration with utilities, like electricity, water, and sewer. It is difficult and time-consuming to sever these connections and re-establish them elsewhere. Though it is theoretically possible to move, for example, a stick-built home to another piece of land, moving such a residence requires the effort of severing the permanent, physical connections to the residence‘s foundation and utilities, as well as attaching wheels or using another mode of transportation. Similarly, mobile homes under (A)(4) are physically connected to land owned by the debtor and would also be difficult to sever and move.
¶15 This interpretation of subsection (A)(4) might suggest that
¶16 Residential structures that are not readily movable and are tied to a permanent location is the context establishing subsection (A)(3)‘s meaning because these characteristics are common among
¶17 Moreover, considering the term “mobile home” in a broader statutory context also suggests that the term describes a permanent dwelling attached to land. Although not an exemption statute like
¶18 Accordingly, a motor home cannot be a “mobile home” under the homestead statute because it is intended to be readily movable and is not tied to the land upon which it sits in any significant way. See
¶20 Though not disagreeing that (A)(1) and (A)(2) describe difficult-to-move dwellings that are physically attached to property, the dissent focuses on the word “located” in (A)(4) to argue that an easy-to-move dwelling could qualify for (A)(4)‘s exemption. Infra ¶ 40. But if “located” in this context does not mean physically connected, then a bankruptcy debtor would be able to drive their motor home to a parcel of land to protect additional assets. And as the dissent acknowledges, the homestead exemption protects the home, see infra ¶ 46, not the most valuable plot of land you can drive a vehicle to for purposes of claiming an exemption.
¶21 Ultimately, the dissent elevates the policy interests purportedly served by the statute over what we view as the best reading of subsection (A)(3) in its proper context. See infra ¶ 46. That we cannot do. We defer to the legislature to exercise its prerogative to modify the statute to better align with its policy objectives if it disagrees with our interpretation of the statute. For all these reasons, subsection (A)(4) requires a permanent connection with the land, and, together with (A)(1) and (A)(2), informs us that (A)(3) also requires a permanent connection.
II.
¶22 Because
¶23 The associated-words canon, noscitur a sociis, is the interpretive method used to “avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words,” thus avoiding giving legislative acts “unintended breadth.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995)). This interpretive canon is applicable when terms are “conjoined in such a way as to indicate that they have some quality in common.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 196 (2012). “The common quality suggested by a listing should be its most general quality — the least common denominator, so to speak — relevant to the context.” Id.; see also Third Nat‘l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977) (“It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.“).
¶24 As noted above, the common characteristics among
¶25 Considering the statute‘s title and subject matter also confirms this conclusion. See State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 188, 190 ¶ 7 (2000) (noting that where an ambiguity exists, the title of a
¶26 A mobile home is customarily tied to real property because of its characteristic of permanency, see Part I ¶ 8, and such integration renders it practically unmovable, see Part I ¶ 14. In contrast, a motor home is self-propelled, and thus readily movable, and has no permanent connection with real property. Accordingly,
¶27 Whether interpreting
III.
¶28 We conclude by addressing In re Irwin, 293 B.R. 28 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003), where the United States Bankruptcy Court for The District of Arizona concluded that a “motor home . . . can qualify for the homestead exemption under
¶29 First, the bankruptcy court did not engage in an interpretive analysis of
¶30 The Irwin court‘s use of secondary methods of interpretation to define
¶31 In Matcha, the court of appeals stated that “the fundamental purpose of the homestead law is to protect the family against the forced sale of home property from certain creditors, and, to further this purpose, the homestead laws should be interpreted liberally to advance the objectives of the statutes.” 131 Ariz. at 117. The court‘s directive to liberally interpret the homestead law, however, was announced for a circumstance distinctly different from the
¶32 This Court has previously found that the equitable doctrine of substantial compliance is appropriate when deciding whether statutory obligations have been met. See, e.g., In re Pima Cnty. Mental Health No. 20200860221, 255 Ariz. 519, 524 ¶ 11 (2023) (explaining that substantial compliance “tolerates errors if the purpose of the relevant statutory requirements was nevertheless fulfilled“); Feldmeier v. Watson, 211 Ariz. 444, 447 ¶ 14 (2005) (allowing substantial compliance with initiative petition statutes if the petition “fulfills the purpose of the relevant statutory or constitutional requirements“); Pima County v. Cyprus-Pima Mining Co., 119 Ariz. 111, 114 (1978) (allowing substantial compliance with statute requiring payment of disputed taxes because “spirit of the law” was satisfied). This doctrine, however, is not applicable when interpreting the text of a statute to determine its meaning. Our statutory interpretation jurisprudence is circumscribed, and it requires us to use established principles of interpretation to ascertain a statute‘s meaning. See DBT Yuma, 238 Ariz. at 396 ¶ 10; Fann, 251 Ariz. at 434–35 ¶¶ 27, 29. And while applying an equitable doctrine like substantial compliance may be appropriate in determining whether a statute‘s requirements have been satisfied, we have never used the doctrine as a method of statutory interpretation. We see no compelling reason to do so now. Cf. Molera v. Reagan, 245 Ariz. 291, 297 ¶ 26 (2018) (“[W]e cannot rewrite statutes to smooth their rough edges.“).
¶33 Finally, the Irwin court‘s analysis of the relationship between subsections (A)(3) and (A)(4) also misses the mark. In support of its conclusion that a motor home is exempt property, the court stated “the homestead statute indicates there is no necessity that the mobile home be affixed or even customarily used in connection with any particular real estate, because the distinction between paragraphs (A)(3) and (A)(4) clearly implies there need be no particular relationship to any real property.” Irwin, 293 B.R. at 31–32. A contextual analysis of
¶34 Accordingly, Irwin‘s reliance on Matcha for the proposition that the homestead law should be “interpreted liberally” is misplaced and its conclusion that a motor home is exempt under
CONCLUSION
¶35 We answer the certified question by holding that a motor home in which a person over 18 years of age resides does not qualify for the Arizona homestead exemption under
VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting
TIMMER, VCJ., dissenting,
¶36 Since statehood, Arizona has provided homeowners with a homestead exemption to prevent families from being rendered homeless by the debt collection process. See McLauchlan, 252 Ariz. at 325 ¶ 8; Ferguson v. Roberts, 64 Ariz. 357, 361 (1946); see also First Nat‘l Bank v. Reeves, 27 Ariz. 508, 514–15 (1925) (discussing the pre-statehood
¶37 Federal courts have maintained for decades that the term “mobile home” can include a motor home used as a permanent residence, and I agree. See Warfield v. Froemming, 663 F.Supp.3d 1079, 1083–84 (D. Ariz. 2023); In re Irwin, 293 B.R. 28, 31 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003). I interpret “mobile home” as used in
¶38 The homestead statutes do not define “mobile home.” We therefore interpret
¶39 The majority finds that “mobile home” in
¶40 First, no language in
¶41 Second,
¶43 Third, even if the legislature used “mobile home” as a term of art in 1971, the year the legislature included “mobile homes” within the homestead exemption, see 1971 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 94, § 2 (1st Reg. Sess.), the term was used broadly and could include motor homes. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 78 (2012) (“Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was adopted.“). For example, some dictionaries defined “mobile home” as a “trailer,” Mobile Home, Webster‘s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 543 (1967), and then defined “trailer,” in part, as “a highway vehicle designed to serve wherever parked as a dwelling,” Trailer, Webster‘s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 938 (1967). See also Matthews v. Indus. Comm‘n, 254 Ariz. 157, 163 ¶ 33 (2022) (turning to dictionary definitions from the time a provision was adopted to determine original public meaning of terms). Nothing confined that definition to non-self-propelled or difficult-to-move homes. Similarly, nothing in
¶44 Fourth, the legislature explicitly defined “mobile home” in another chapter of Title 33 as excluding “motor homes.” See
¶45 For these reasons, I agree with federal court decisions that “mobile home,” as used in
¶46 The purpose of the homestead exemption supports an interpretation of “mobile home” as any lodging that can be moved and is actually used as the owner‘s permanent residence. This Court has consistently found that the purpose of the homestead exemption is to ensure that “individuals whose property is subject to foreclosure are not rendered homeless.” See McLauchlan, 252 Ariz. at 325 ¶ 8; see also Ferguson, 64 Ariz. at 361 (“The chief object of these laws is to shelter the family . . . .“). Consequently, we “liberally constru[e] our exemption laws so as to preserve the homestead.” Reeves, 27 Ariz. at 513; see also Wilson v. Lowry, 5 Ariz. 335, 341–42 (1898) (“It is the well-settled policy of the courts to liberally construe those humane and beneficial provisions of the law exempting certain property from execution for the payment of debts.“), overruled in part on other grounds by Hoff v. City of Mesa, 86 Ariz. 259 (1959); Matcha v. Winn, 131 Ariz. 115, 117 (App. 1981) (“[T]he homestead laws should
¶47 Relatedly, interpreting “mobile home” in
¶48 The operative provisions of
¶49 Finally, the legislature‘s decision not to exclude motor homes from the term “mobile home” as it did in the Arizona Mobile Home Parks Residential Landlord and Tenant Act “supports the conclusion that the term ‘mobile home’ encompasses a motor home for the purposes of the exemption.” Warfield, 663 F.Supp.3d at 1082.
¶50 The fundamental difference between a permanently attached manufactured home and a motor home is the latter‘s ability to propel itself.