In re Sequoia G.
The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgments of the trial court terminating her parental rights as to her minor children, S, B and A. She claimed that the court improperly found that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate her parental rights. Held that there was ample evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the minor children as the court’s findings as to the children’s best interests, made pursuant to statute (
DiPENTIMA, J. The respondent mother, Michelle L., appeals from the judgments of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor children, Sequoia, Benjamin and Anice.1 On appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly found that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate her parental rights. We disagree with the respondent and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The following facts, which the court found by clear and convincing evidence, and procedural history, are relevant. ‘‘The family has an extensive history with [the Department of Children and Families (department)]. . . . On July 31, 2008, neglect petitions were filed with the Superior Court for juvenile matters with regard to Sequoia, Tevvon and Benjamin. The children were adjudicated neglected and a disposition of protective supervision was entered on April 29, 2009, and expired on June 17, 2009. On March 30, 2012, a ninety-six hour hold was invoked with regard to Sequoia, Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice. The hold was vacated on April 3, 2012. On April 8, 2012, neglect petitions were filed with the Superior Court for juvenile matters . . . regarding Sequoia, Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice. The children were adjudicated neglected and a disposition of protective supervision was entered on November 14, 2012, and expired on May 14, 2013. . . . Following a team meeting . . . the department was concerned about Sequoia returning to the care of either parent. She was placed in a therapeutic foster home.
‘‘On November 21, 2016, Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice were removed from the father’s care through an [order of temporary custody] . . . . Protective supervision of those three children was vested in the respondent. On January 26, 2017, and January 27, 2017, [the department] received referrals regarding the children’s safety in [the respondent’s] home. When [the department] responded to those referrals, [the respondent] reportedly yelled, screamed and used profanity. Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice were removed from her custody pursuant to a ninety-six hour hold on January 27, 2017. On January 30, 2017, an order of temporary custody was filed and granted. On March 30, 2018, the court granted a motion to modify the protective supervision to commitment regarding Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice. All three children were committed to [the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families]. On April 23, 2018, [the petitioner] filed with the court four petitions for termination of parental rights regarding Sequoia, Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice.’’ On September 24, 2019, prior to the start of evidence, the petitioner moved to withdraw [her] termination of parental rights petition as to Tevvon and, instead, filed a motion for permanent transfer of guardianship seeking to vest guardianship of Tevvon in his foster father, Gary R.
The court found in the adjudicatory phase, by clear and convincing evidence, that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification; see General Statutes
On appeal, the respondent does not challenge either the conclusions the court made during the adjudicatory phase or the court’s decision to transfer permanent guardianship as to Tevvon.3 Her sole claim on appeal concerns the findings and conclusions made by the court during the dispositional phase, with respect to Sequoia, Benjamin and Anice. We do not agree with the respondent.
The following legal principles and standard of review guide our analysis. ‘‘This court will overturn a determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child only if the court’s findings are clearly erroneous.’’ In re Kiara Liz V., 203 Conn. App. 613, 626, 248 A.3d 813 (2021).4 ‘‘In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child. . . . The best interests of the child include the child’s interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of [the child’s] environment. . . . In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent’s parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [
The court made findings pursuant to each of the seven statutory factors in
The respondent argues regarding the emotional ties factor,
The court found as to the emotional ties factor that Benjamin has a positive relationship with his foster parents and Sequoia has a positive relationship with her foster mother, whom she approaches readily for affection and care. The court found that Anice would like to be adopted by Gary R. if she cannot return to her biological parents.
It was not inappropriate for the court to have considered the bond between the children and their foster parents. The plain language of
Although the court did not specifically discuss the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the respondent when stating its findings regarding
In the present case, reading the court’s decision as a whole reveals that the court considered the feelings and emotional ties the children had with the respondent. The court found that the respondent relocated to Indiana and visited one time in one year. The court also found that the respondent had difficulties ‘‘managing the children’s behaviors during visits, as they were frequently arguing and fighting. She struggles with basic conversation and affection with the children, and needs to demonstrate active engagement in their lives and show interest in their well-being. . . . [The respondent] participated in the updated court-ordered psychological evaluations with [Jessica] Biren Caverly, [a psychologist], in August, 2017. . . . It was reported that [the respondent] consistently demonstrates emotional coldness, detachment and flattened affect, especially in interactions with the children. . . . It was reported that the parents cannot appreciate the traumatic environment they created for their children and how it can impact children long after removal from their home. It [was] reported that neither [the respondent] nor the father demonstrated any significant engagement or bond with the children.’’ The court further determined that Anice’s desire to live with the respondent or her father is ‘‘not realistic or possible.’’ The court also found that ‘‘Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice look to their older sisters Azelia and Sequoia more readily as parental and attachment figures tha[n] they do to either of their parents.’’ It is clear from these findings that the court determined that the children did not have a strong bond with the respondent. Even if, however, such a bond were present, ‘‘the existence of a bond between a parent and a child, while relevant, is not dispositive of a best interest determination.’’ In re Kiara Liz V., supra, 203 Conn. App. 626.
The respondent contends that, because she has resided out of state, ‘‘it is unlikely that the [department] or the children’s attorney and/or guardian[s] ad litem would conduct home visits. Regarding visitation with the children, the [respondent] did visit with the children when she was living in [Connecticut] and when she is able to make trips now back to [Connecticut], she arranges for visits with the children and, more importantly, she has weekly phone contact with the children.’’ We are not persuaded by this argument.
When reading the court’s decision as a whole, the court’s factual findings support its conclusion that the respondent had not complied with the court orders at issue. The court found that, although the department had offered supervised visitation, the respondent did not continue visitation with Sequoia, Benjamin or Anice, but ‘‘left her children behind’’ and moved to Indiana. Evidence presented at trial supports this finding. A social worker with the department testified that after the respondent moved to Indiana in June, 2018, she had supervised visits with some or all three of the children in January, 2019, and June, 2019. A ‘‘Social Study in Support of Petition for Termination of Parental Rights,’’7 dated April 16, 2018, which was admitted as a full exhibit at trial, indicates that the respondent has not been consistent in keeping appointments with the department and has refused to permit the department to conduct home visits since November, 2017. In that social study, it was noted that the respondent has visited with the children, but struggled with appropriately parenting the children during visits. A subsequent ‘‘Social Study in Support of Permanency Plan,’’ dated July 1, 2019, which was admitted as a full exhibit at trial, stated that the respondent had visited the children twice since she moved to Indiana in June, 2018. The court also had before it evidence of the children’s varying degrees of phone contact with the respondent. The July 1, 2019 social study noted that Benjamin communicates with the respondent ‘‘a few times a month’’ on the phone, that Anice ‘‘does not communicate often on the phone’’
Particularly in light of the evidence that the respondent refused to allow the department to conduct home visits since November, 2017, and that she has visited with the children only twice in person since moving to Indiana in June, 2018, it was not clearly erroneous for the court to find that she had not fulfilled her obligations in connection with the court orders regarding visitation with the children.
Although the respondent did not file a motion for transfer of guardianship as to Anice, she additionally argues that the court erred in finding that it was in Anice’s best interest to terminate the respondent’s parental rights with respect to her because Anice, who resides in the same household as Tevvon, ‘‘would probably be happy’’ with a permanency plan similar to that of Tevvon, wherein guardianship would be transferred to Gary R. She contends that Gary R. testified that he would be willing to be a permanent resource for Anice and that terminating her parental rights with respect to Anice would subject her to further disruption wherein she would be removed from the home she lives in with Tevvon.
The respondent has not directed us to any case law indicating that a court has an obligation, sua sponte, to consider a ‘‘less onerous means of achieving permanency planning’’ in the absence of a motion specifically seeking an alternative permanency plan. Rather, our statutory scheme provides as follows: ‘‘A permanency plan is the proposal for what the long-term, permanent solution for the placement of the child should be. General Statutes
The respondent filed a motion in opposition to the proposed permanency plan in which she stated that it was in the best interests of the children that they be reunited with her, and she did not request a permanent transfer of guardianship as to Anice. Because the issue of whether a transfer of guardianship was appropriate for Anice was never raised in the trial court, it made no findings regarding whether a transfer of guardianship was in Anice’s best interests and a more appropriate disposition for Anice than the one approved by the court. See, e.g., In re Azareon Y., 309 Conn. 626, 633–39, 72 A.3d 1074 (2013) (when respondent did not request trial court to consider alternatives to petitioner’s permanency plan, record on appeal was inadequate to review substantive due process claim). We cannot review this aspect of the respondent’s best interest claim because it was not raised in the trial court and no exceptional circumstances exist. ‘‘It is well settled that [o]ur case law and rules of practice generally limit [an appellate] court’s review to issues that are distinctly raised at trial. . . . [O]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court. . . . The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 142, 84 A.3d 840 (2014); see also In re Skylar B., 204 Conn. App. 729, 745, A.3d (2021) (only properly filed motion provides requisite notice to all interested parties and court of alternative disposition as well as evidence relevant for court to evaluate merits of transfer of guardianship versus termination of parental rights and adoption).
In the present case, there was ample evidence to support the court’s conclusion that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of Sequoia, Benjamin and Anice. The respondent challenged the court’s findings only as to two of the statutory factors; both challenges we have rejected. Moreover, even if the respondent were able to demonstrate
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of
** June 8, 2021, the date that this opinion was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.