In re L.R.
Appeal from Defiance County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division Trial Court No. 32817-4
Judgment Affirmed
APPEARANCES:
Abigail Christopher for Appellant
Joy S. O‘Donnell for Appellee
{1} Adjudicated delinquent child-appellant, L.R., appeals the October 2, 2019 judgment entry of disposition of the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{2} On April 12, 2019, a complaint was filed against L.R. charging him with gross sexual imposition in violation of
{3} On August 23, 2019, L.R. withdrew his denial of the charge in the complaint and admitted the charge. (Doc. No. 24). The juvenile court accepted L.R.‘s admission and adjudicated him a delinquent child as alleged in the complaint. (Id.).
{4} At a dispositional hearing on October 2, 2019, the juvenile court committed L.R. to the legal care and custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“DYS“) for a minimum of six months (not to exceed L.R.‘s 21st birthday). (Doc. No. 31). In addition to committing L.R. to the legal care and custody of DYS, the juvenile court placed L.R. on “probation” until November 26, 2025. (Id.).
{5} On November 1, 2019, L.R. filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 40). He raises three assignments of error for our review. For ease of our discussion, we will
Assignment of Error No. I
The Juvenile Court exceeded its statutory authority and undermined the executive branch when it committed L.R. to DYS and placed him on a five-year term of court probation for the same charge.
Assignment of Error No. II
A conflict exists between the dispositional options in
{6} In his first and second assignments of error, L.R. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to the legal care and custody of DYS and placing him on probation for the same offense. Specifically, L.R. argues that
Standard of Review
{7} We review a juvenile court‘s disposition for a child adjudicated delinquent under an abuse-of-discretion standard. In re D.S., 111 Ohio St.3d 361, 2006-Ohio-5851, ¶ 6; In re T.H., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2006-02-021, 2007-Ohio-352, ¶ 10; In re D.W., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-221, 2019-Ohio-5259, ¶ 7. An abuse of discretion suggests that a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980).
Analysis
{8} Ohio‘s juvenile courts—deriving power solely by statute—are courts of limited jurisdiction. In re Williams, 4th Dist. Washington No. 05CA56, 2006-Ohio-4657, ¶ 5, citing Carnes v. Kemp, 104 Ohio St.3d 629, 2004-Ohio-7107, ¶ 25 and In re R.K., Cuyahoga No. 84948, 2004-Ohio-6918, ¶ 22. To that end,
The purposes underlying all juvenile dispositions are set forth in
R.C. 2152.01(A) : “to provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children subject to this chapter [R.C. Chapter 2152 ], protect the public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender‘s actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender.”
In re H.V., 138 Ohio St.3d 408, 2014-Ohio-812, ¶ 32 (O‘Connor, C.J., dissenting), quoting
{9} “The various traditional juvenile dispositions available to a trial court are delineated in
{10} On appeal, L.R. contends that “[t]he juvenile court‘s order imposing a term of five-year court probation under
{11} Under the adult-felony-sentencing scheme, trial courts are required to impose either a prison term or community-control sanctions as to each count. State v. Duncan, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-05-086, 2016-Ohio-5559, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173, 2015-Ohio-2089, ¶ 23, quoting State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 14-12-04, 2012-Ohio-4660, ¶ 21. Addressing the adult-felony-sentencing scheme, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the
{12} Unlike the sweeping amendments to the adult-felony-sentencing scheme, which established the imposition of a prison term or community-control sanctions as alternative sanctions, the same limiting language is not present in the statutes governing juvenile dispositions. See, e.g., In re J.A., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2017CA00187, 2018-Ohio-1609, ¶ 26 (noting that the legislature did not include “the same
{13}
(A) If a child is adjudicated a delinquent child, the court may make any of the following orders of disposition, in addition to any other disposition authorized or required by this chapter:
* * *
(4) Place the child on community control under any sanctions, services, and conditions that the court prescribes.
(Emphasis added.) In re T.M. at ¶ 18;
{14} As a felony of the third degree if committed by an adult, gross sexual imposition carries the possibility of a commitment to the legal care and custody of DYS “for an indefinite term consisting of a minimum period of six months and a maximum period not to exceed the child‘s attainment of twenty-one years of age.”
{15} Before we address the juvenile court‘s authority to impose community-control sanctions in conjunction with an order of commitment, we must first address the juvenile court‘s imposition of “probation” in this case. “‘In January 2002, the General Assembly replaced the rubric “probation” in juvenile dispositions and adopted new dispositional options under the heading “community control.“‘” In re J.A., 2018-Ohio-1609, at ¶ 25, quoting In re J.F., 121 Ohio St.3d 76, 2009-Ohio-318, ¶ 9. That is, “““[c]ommunity control,” as described in
{16} Here, because the juvenile court utilized a “check-the-box” dispositional form, which lists “probation” as a category of available sanctions with a number of conditions listed under the probation category, our logical assumption is that the juvenile court‘s intention was to impose community control within the meaning of
{17} Addressing whether a juvenile court may impose a no-contact order in conjunction with an order of commitment, our sister appellate district concluded
{18} Importantly, beyond the prescriptions of
{19} Accordingly, “the extent of a juvenile court‘s sentencing authority in a delinquency case is manifestly broader than in an adult criminal case. To this extent, the minimal limitation upon a juvenile court‘s authority under the catchall provision is that disposition cannot directly conflict with another statute governing juveniles.” Id. at ¶ 25, citing In re Williams, 2006-Ohio-4657, at ¶ 11, fn. 4. See also In re K.H., 4th Dist. Washington No. 09CA35, 2009-Ohio-7070, ¶ 27. For these reasons, we conclude that the statutes governing juvenile dispositions authorize a juvenile court to impose community-control sanctions in conjunction with an order of commitment and that those conjunctive dispositions are not in conflict. See In re T.M. at ¶ 23. See also In re H.V., 138 Ohio St.3d 408, 2014-
{20} Therefore, because we conclude that the juvenile court had the authority to impose community-control sanctions in conjunction with an order of commitment, the juvenile court‘s order of disposition in this case is not void. See In re T.M. at ¶ 26. Accordingly, L.R.‘s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
Assignment of Error No. III
L.R. was denied effective assistance of counsel.
{21} In his third assignment of error, L.R. argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the juvenile court‘s dispositional order committing him to the legal care and custody of DYS and placing him on probation for the same offense.
Standard of Review
{22} A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must establish: (1) the counsel‘s performance was deficient or unreasonable under the circumstances; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. State v. Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303, 306 (2001), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). In order to show counsel‘s conduct was deficient or
{23} “Prejudice results when ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.‘” State v. Liles, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-13-04, 2014-Ohio-259, ¶ 48, quoting Bradley at 142, citing Strickland at 691. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id., quoting Bradley at 142 and citing Strickland at 694.
Analysis
{24} Based on our conclusion in L.R.‘s first and second assignments of error, L.R.‘s argument in his third assignment that his trial counsel was ineffective
{25} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
/jlr