STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. DESMOND R. LILES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 1-13-04
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY
January 27, 2014
[Cite as State v. Liles, 2014-Ohio-259.]
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR2012 0269 Judgment Affirmed
Sarah M. Schregardus for Appellant
Jana E. Emerick for Appellee
{1} Defendant-appellant, Desmond R. Liles, appeals the Allen County Court of Common Pleas’ judgment entry of conviction. We affirm.
{2} On September 13, 2012, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Liles on one count of felonious assault with a deadly weapon in violation of
{3} On October 11, 2012, an amended indictment was filed charging Liles with Count One of felonious assault with a deadly weapon in violation of
{4} On October 22, 2012, Liles appeared before the trial court and entered not guilty pleas to the amended indictment. (Doc. No. 21).
{5} On January 22-23, 2013, a jury trial was held resulting in guilty verdicts on all three counts. (Doc. Nos. 70-71).
{7} On February 1, 2013, Liles filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 81). Liles raises two assignments of error, which we elect to address out of the order presented in his brief.
Assignment of Error No. II
The trial court violated Desmond Liles’ rights to due process and a fair trial when it entered a judgment of conviction for Felonious Assault and Having a Weapon While Under Disability, when the judgments were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
{8} In his second assignment of error, Liles argues that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence consisted entirely of biased witnesses who could not keep their stories straight. He further argues that no physical evidence was presented demonstrative of his guilt.
{10} The State presented testimony from seven witnesses during the trial. The victim, Anthony S. Brown, testified that, on July 15, 2012, Byron Holten and he went to Meat City to buy snacks to take to Stu‘s house where they all planned to hang out. (Jan. 22-23, 2013 Tr. at 36-38). Brown testified that Holten saw that he had money on him when he was purchasing the snacks at Meat City. (Id. at 39). Brown testified that he left Stu‘s house at some point during the day, but Holten remained at the house. (Id.).
{11} According to Brown, when he returned to Stu‘s house, he sat in the back room, smoked marijuana, and watched TV, when Holten received a phone call on his cell phone. (Id. at 40). Brown testified that, after receiving the phone
{12} Brown testified that, as he was walking out the front door, he noticed Stu and his girlfriend sitting in the house, and the masked men walked right by them and never ordered them to lie on the ground. (Id. at 41). Brown testified that the masked men stole $1,000—money he had received from the recent sale of his tow truck, which he sold to pay taxes he owed on his home. (Id.). Brown testified that he immediately suspected that “the same guys that [he] sees every day” might have been involved in the robbery, and Brown testified that Holten might have been involved since the masked men also walked right by him. (Id. at 42).
{13} Brown testified that, after the robbery, he jumped on a bike and road around the corner to get some clothes. (Id.). When he returned to the house, Brown observed “a little dude like he was casing the scene” who he suspected
{14} Brown testified that the next day he told his sister, Kierrea Brown, that he had been robbed the day before. (Id. at 43-44). Brown testified that Kierrea and he went to his brother‘s house, where his brothers, Jordan Brown and Martyce McLaurin, were located, and Kierra told them that Brown had been robbed. (Id. at 44-45). Brown testified that Martyce then called their cousin, DeAngelo Harper, and began questioning Harper about the incident because Harper was known to frequent Stu‘s house. (Id. at 45). Harper told Martyce to “come over on [his] block,” so Brown and his brothers drove over to Orena Street, and Harper walked down the street to Liles’ grandmother‘s house and stated to Brown‘s brother‘s “they got guns.” (Id. at 47). Brown testified that Harper went to Liles’ grandmother‘s house, and Liles and another guy exited the house and took off in a Jeep. (Id. at 47-48). According to Brown, Harper then walked back toward him and his brothers, and, by this time, Liles and the other man returned to Liles’ grandmother‘s house, so Brown suspected they may have retrieved a weapon. (Id. at 49).
{16} Brown testified that Liles then sat on a “stoop” at the house and, now armed, began saying nasty words, at which point Brown‘s younger brother punched Liles. (Id.). Brown testified that Liles’ cousin then tackled his younger brother, so he began trying to pull Liles’ cousin off of his brother. (Id. at 51-52). Meanwhile, someone grabbed Brown from behind, when Brown heard “pow” and turned around to see Liles with a gun in his hand looking confused as if he wanted to pass the gun off to someone else. (Id. at 53). Brown testified that, once he
{17} Brown testified that he knew Liles before the shooting but was not friends with him. (Id. at 55). Brown testified that he was hospitalized for about a week for the gunshot wound, the main artery in his leg was severed, and he has “a big, nasty scar.” (Id. at 56). Brown testified that the bullet hit him in the buttocks and passed through his groin area when it exited his body, and he still has pain in his hip from the wound. (Id. at 57-58). Brown testified that, prior to the fight erupting, he observed Liles tuck a gun into his gym shorts. (Id. at 53). Brown testified that he did not see anyone else with a weapon, except Liles, and Liles was about four or five feet behind him when Liles shot him. (Id. at 59).
{18} On cross-examination, Brown testified that he could not identify Liles as one of the robbers. (Id. at 61). Brown testified that part of the stolen money was from the sale of his tow truck and another part was from roofing. (Id. at 62). Brown testified that he suspected that Harper was running his mouth saying something false when Harper was up on Liles’ grandmother‘s porch, which
{19} Kierra Brown testified that, on July 16, 2012, her four brothers, Anthony, Martyce, Trayvon, and Jordan, and she received a phone call to meet “some dudes over on Orena,” so they went over there to Liles’ grandmother‘s house. (Id. at 69-70). Kierra testified that, when they exited their vehicle, she saw Liles, Montray, and some “other dudes,” and that she observed three guys leave in a truck. (Id. at 71-72). Kierra testified that when her brothers arrived at the house, a fight broke out, so they all ran up to the fight, and Brown was trying to break up the fight. (Id. at 73). Kierra testified that the fight started in the sidewalk area but spilled into the street. (Id.). Kierra testified that everyone was fighting and Brown was trying to break up the fight when she observed Liles pull a gun out from his jogging pants, so she and her oldest brother started yelling “He got a gun; he got a gun,” but no one could hear them due to the commotion. (Id.). Kierra testified that Liles pulled the gun up to Brown‘s head, so her brother and her started screaming, “No, no,” which caught Liles’ attention, so he stepped back and shot
{20} On cross-examination, Kierra testified that Liles was wearing jogging pants with basketball shorts “or something” underneath, and maybe a t-shirt. (Id. at 76). Kierra testified that Liles’ handgun was gray and “maybe” eight inches long. (Id. at 78). Kierra testified that, in exchange for her truthful testimony, one of the detectives agreed to drop her warrants, and, without that promise, she probably would not be testifying. (Id. at 80). On redirect, Kierra testified that her mom told her that a detective promised to drop warrants on Kierra if she testified, but no detective told Kierra that directly. (Id. at 81).
{21} Lima Police Patrolman Gregory Todd Jennings testified that he was dispatched to the five hundred block of Orena Street, a public roadway on the east side of Lima, Allen County, Ohio, around 5:30 p.m. on July 16, 2012 in reference to a shooting. (Id. at 82-83). Jennings testified that law enforcement did not find
{22} Lima Police ID Officer Michael Carman testified that, on July 16, 2012, he reported to the five hundred block of Orena Street, Lima, Allen County, Ohio to process the scene of a shooting. (Id. at 89-90). Carman testified that the scene was secured by police tape when he arrived, and he began identifying, collecting, and marking evidence. (Id. at 90-91). Carman testified that he identified a fresh blood trail that led from the five hundred block of Orena Street into the six hundred block of Harrison Street through the east/west alley. (Id. at 92). Carman identified State‘s exhibits two through thirty-two as photographs he took of the crime scene. (Id.). Of particular importance, Carman identified State‘s exhibit four as a photograph of a spent shell casing he found on Orena Street. (Id. at 93). Carman identified State‘s exhibit 33 as the spent shell casing he found on Orena Street—a .45 caliber (ACP). (Id. at 95). Carman identified State‘s exhibit nine as a photograph of evidence tents two, three, four, and five, marking the fresh
{23} Charlene Marie Dority, Brown and Kierra Brown‘s grandmother, testified that she received a phone call on July 16, 2012 indicating that Brown had been shot. (Id. at 108). Dority testified that the phone number that called her belonged to Liles’ father‘s car washing business, and she has caller ID on her cellphone. (Id. at 110, 112, 117-118). Dority testified that she accompanied Brown to the hospital, and Brown lost five pints of blood and had to be resuscitated on the operating table. (Id. at 108-109). Dority testified that, around the second or third day that Brown was in the hospital (July 18th), she received a phone call from Liles. (Id. at 110-111). Dority testified about the phone conversation as follows:
Q: So you received a phone call on or about July 18th. How did you know that that was [Liles]?
A: Because he said who he was and apologized.
Q: Okay. So, what else did he say?
A: He said he didn‘t mean to shoot him, he apologized, and he had been in trouble before for almost the same situation.
Q: Okay. He apologized. Did he describe anything that happened?
A: He said he apologized for shooting him. I said, “But, you shot him anyway?” He said, “Yes.”
Q: And did he say anything else to you?
A: Yes. He was talking to me about he ain‘t been too long out of prison for the same situation, or, for similar to the same situation.
Q: Okay. Did he describe anything about -- I mean, he said obviously there was a shooting. But, did he say anything specific about that shooting?
A: Well, I said, “You know he didn‘t have no gun. They can‘t find no gun.” He said, “Yea, I know he didn‘t have a gun.”
(Id. at 111). Dority testified that Liles called her again on July 20th about the shooting to apologize again and wanted to talk to her, Brown‘s mother, and Brown
{24} On cross-examination, Dority testified that the person‘s voice during the second and third phone calls was the same voice as the person who called the first time. (Id. at 118). However, Dority testified that she was not sure if the voice was Liles’ voice, but the person stated he was “Desmond” when she talked to him. (Id. at 118-119). On redirect, Dority testified that the caller identified himself as Desmond Liles during each of the three phone conversations. (Id. at 119).
{25} Lima Police Patrolman Aaron Montgomery testified that he arrested Liles on July 28, 2012, and while transporting Liles to the police department, Liles indicated that he had a prior felonious assault as a juvenile. (Id. at 120-122).
{26} Lima Police Detective Kent Miller testified that Kierra Brown does not have any warrants through the Lima Police Department, and he never promised to withdraw any of her warrants in exchange for her testimony at trial. (Id. at 122-125). Miller testified that the morning of the trial when Kierra was not present to testify, Kierra‘s mother expressed that Kierra thought she was going to be arrested, so he had a detective look into the issue. (Id. at 125). Miller testified that the detective discovered that Kierra had some outstanding traffic tickets but
{27} Miller testified, as the lead detective on this case, he reported to Orena Street in Lima, Allen County, Ohio in response to a shooting, and Orena Street is a public roadway, not a private drive. (Id. at 125-127). Miller testified that neither the beer bottle found at the scene and depicted in State‘s exhibit 22 nor the shoe print found at the scene and depicted in State‘s exhibit 27 turned out to be relevant in the investigation of the shooting. (Id. at 128). Miller testified that law enforcement was unable to locate a bullet or a gun during their investigation. (Id. at 128). He further testified that he talked to several potential eye witnesses though none were cooperative. (Id.). He testified that, on July 17, 2012, Detective Stechschulte and he visited the victim at Lima Memorial Hospital‘s ICU, but they left after the victim‘s heart rate and blood pressure elevated when they brought up the shooting. (Id. at 129). Miller testified that he gave his business card to Brown‘s grandmother, Dority, and asked her to call him when Brown was able to talk. (Id. at 130). Miller testified that Dority called him around July 19th and after that conversation, law enforcement began to suspect Liles was the shooter. (Id.).
{29} Miller testified that, on July 25th and 26th, respectively, he interviewed Brown and Kierra Brown, and their statements were consistent with the evidence he had gathered leading to Liles as the shooter. (Id. at 132-133). Miller testified that, around July 31st, he contacted a female, Johnnie Mae Qualls, who lives approximately five houses north of the scene of the shooting, as a possible eye witness. (Id. at 134). Miller testified that Qualls’ statements demonstrated that she observed the shooting, and her statements were consistent with those offered by Brown and Kierra Brown. (Id. at 136). Miller testified that, after speaking with Qualls, he was more certain that Liles was the shooter; however, Qualls subsequently made it clear that she did not want to cooperate in the investigation. (Id. at 136-137). Miller testified that, based on his investigation, he is certain that Liles is the person who shot Brown. (Id. at 140).
{32} The State then moved to admit exhibits 1 through 35, which were admitted without objection, and rested. (Id. at 161-164). The defense made a Crim.R. 29(A) motion, which was denied. (Id. at 164-165).
{33} The next day the defense presented the testimony of two witnesses. Johnnie Mae Qualls testified that she lives on Orena Street, and, on July 16, 2012, she witnessed a bunch of boys stop in the middle of the street and begin arguing.
{34} On cross-examination, Qualls testified that Liles’ grandmother lives about a block and a half from where she lives. (Id. at 173). Qualls testified that, when the shooting occurred, she was sitting in a chair in her front yard. (Id. at 174). Qualls denied telling Detective Miller, on the day of the incident, that she saw a man who was taller than the rest of the other boys pull out a large handgun and shoot. (Id.). When asked if she told Detective Miller that she witnessed the taller man try to hand the gun to someone who would not take it, Qualls testified, “[m]aybe I did” and then, “okay.” (Id. at 175-176). Qualls also denied telling Detective Miller that, after the crowd dispersed, she realized that Liles was the
{35} Qualls testified that Harper was living with her at the time of the shooting, and Harper was taking a shower in her home when the shooting occurred. (Id. at 177). Qualls also denied telling Detective Miller that Harper was trying to mediate the situation between Brown and Liles, and Brown simply wanted his money returned. (Id.). Qualls admitted that Detective Miller called her a week or two prior to trial, and she refused to testify against Liles, because she lives in a bad neighborhood and is 77 years old and cannot run and hide. (Id. at 178-179). She admitted that she told Detective Miller that she could not testify “‘cause he was going to get [her] burned out,” though she testified that she really did not want to testify due to her poor physical health. (Id. at 180). On redirect, Qualls testified that no one from Liles’ family threatened her to not testify at trial, and she does not fear his family because “[t]hey‘re like my family.” (Id. at 181-182).
{36} Patrolman Aaron Rode testified that he spoke with Kierra Brown at the scene of the shooting, and Kierra did not identify the shooter at that time. (Id. at 186). On cross-examination, Rode testified that the scene was very chaotic and, when he arrived, Kierra was talking to her parents on her cell phone, indicating that her brother had just been shot. (Id. at 187-188). Rode testified that it was
difficult to get even basic information from Kierra on the scene because she was several feet from her brother who was lying on the ground bleeding and in severe pain. (Id.). Rode testified that, in his experience, people are “almost never” forthcoming about what happened when they are still at the scene of the crime. (Id. at 188).{¶37} Thereafter, the defense rested, and the State did not present any witnesses on rebuttal. (Id. at 189). The matter was submitted to the jury who returned with guilty verdicts on all three counts. (Id. at 230-231).
{¶38} Liles—in a total of one paragraph—argues that his felonious assault and having a weapon under disability convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence, because “the State‘s evidence consisted solely of the testimony of biased witnesses who could not keep their story straight,” no weapon was recovered, and no physical evidence demonstrated he was the shooter. (Appellant‘s Brief at 13). Upon review of the record, we cannot find that the jury clearly lost its way by convicting Liles, creating a manifest injustice.
{¶39} The criminal offense of felonious assault is codified in
[n]o person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if * * * the person * * * has been adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an offense that, if committed by an adult, would have been a felony offense of violence.
{¶40} Turning first to Liles’ weapon-under-disability conviction, the parties stipulated that Liles had been previously adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of attempted felonious assault—a felony offense of violence if committed by an adult—and further agreed to the admission of a judgment entry reflecting that prior adjudication. (Jan. 22-23, 2013 Tr. at 3-7); (State‘s Ex. 35). The testimony at trial also demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Liles, at a minimum, had or carried a firearm on July 16, 2012. Brown testified that, prior to the shooting, Draper told him that Liles’ group had guns, and Brown saw Liles tuck a weapon in his pants. (Jan. 22-23, 2013 Tr. at 47, 50). Brown and Kierra testified that Liles was the only person with a gun in his hands after the shot was fired. (Id. at 53, 73-74). Qualls initially told Detective Miller that Liles had a handgun. (Id. at 175-176). Qualls also told Detective Miller that she did not want to testify against Liles because she was afraid she would get “burned out.” (Id. at 180).
{¶41} The fact that Brown was initially uncooperative was explained by the fact that Brown was not physically or mentally able to answer questions while hospitalized in the ICU. Given the fact that he was already shot and Qualls’ testimony concerning her fear of testifying against Liles, the jury may have also reasonably concluded that Brown initially failed to cooperate because identifying Liles as the shooter may have resulted in retaliation against his family or himself. This is also true of Kierra, who failed to identify Liles as the shooter at the scene but identified Liles as the shooter in court. The jury could have also concluded that Kierra‘s failure to identify Liles at the scene was due to her troubled emotional state having just witnessed the shooting of her brother and watching him bleeding while lying on the ground waiting for paramedics. The fact that Qualls declined to testify against Liles is understandable and could, to the jury, have rendered her initial statements to Detective Miller more credible than her subsequent testimony.
{¶42} Liles’ felonious assault conviction was also not against the manifest weight of the evidence. As stated above, there was ample evidence demonstrating that Liles had a handgun, which is a firearm and deadly weapon.
{¶43} We are not persuaded that the lack of physical evidence is damning to the State‘s case for either conviction. To begin with, the lack of any gun powder residue on Liles’ person is not unexpected, because Liles was arrested twelve days after the shooting. (Id. at 158); (Doc. No. 2). Furthermore, Detective Miller testified that he did not test Liles for gun powder residue because with the
{¶44} Because the jury did not clearly lose its way by convicting Liles of felonious assault and having a weapon while under disability, we overrule his second assignment of error.
Assignment of Error No. I
Desmond Liles was deprived of his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Sections 10 and 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution when trial counsel failed to object to improper testimony.
{¶45} In his first assignment of error, Liles argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony concerning his prior imprisonment for a similar situation. He also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Miller‘s improper testimony regarding Brown and Kierra‘s inconsistent statements immediately following the shooting and Dority‘s supposedly truthful statements concerning the phone calls.
{¶46} A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must establish: (1) the counsel‘s performance was deficient or unreasonable under the circumstances; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. State v. Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303, 306 (2001), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).
{¶47} In order to show counsel‘s conduct was deficient or unreasonable, the defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel provided competent representation and must show that counsel‘s actions were not trial strategies prompted by reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675 (1998). Tactical or strategic trial decisions, even if unsuccessful, do not generally constitute ineffective assistance. State v. Frazier, 61 Ohio St.3d 247, 255 (1991). Rather, the errors complained of must amount to a substantial violation of counsel‘s essential duties to his client. See State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St. 3d 136, 141-142 (1989), citing State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396 (1976).
{¶48} Prejudice results when “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 142, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. “A
{¶49} The “failure to object to error, alone, is not enough to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 210, 2006-Ohio-6404, ¶ 139, citing State v. Holloway, 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244 (1988). As explained by the Ohio Supreme Court:
[E]xperienced trial counsel learn that objections to each potentially objectionable event could actually act to their party‘s detriment. * * * In light of this, any single failure to object usually cannot be said to have been error unless the evidence sought is so prejudicial * * * that failure to object essentially defaults the case to the state. Otherwise, defense counsel must so consistently fail to use objections, despite numerous and clear reasons for doing so, that counsel‘s failure cannot reasonably have been said to have been part of a trial strategy or tactical choice.
Johnson at ¶ 140, quoting Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 774 (6th Cir. 2006); State v. Campbell, 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 52-53 (1994).
{¶50} Dority testified that a man who identified himself as Liles called her to apologize for shooting her grandson, Brown, and stated “he ain‘t been too long got out of prison for the same situation, or, for similar to the same situation.” (Jan.
{¶51} This argument lacks merit. While
{¶52} Next, Liles argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Miller‘s testimony on redirect that Brown‘s statement while he was recovering in the ICU—that he was hit by a stray bullet—was inaccurate and of “no value.” (Jan. 22-23, 2013 Tr. at 153-154). We disagree. To begin with, defense counsel opened the door to this testimony through cross-examination when he asked Detective Miller whether Brown‘s testimony was consistent with
{¶53} Liles also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Miller‘s testimony concerning Dority‘s credibility. On redirect examination, Miller testified that he was confident that Liles called Dority as she testified in light of: (1) the temporal proximity of the calls to the shooting; (2) the content of the conversation, including that the caller stated he had recently been released from prison—a fact Miller confirmed about Liles; (3) the caller identifying himself as “Liles“; and, (4) the phone number from which the phone calls were made being owned by Liles’ father‘s business. (Jan. 22-23, 2013 Tr. at 154). Contrary to Liles’ characterization, we are not persuaded that this testimony was offered to bolster Dority‘s credibility; rather, it was offered to show why Detective Miller, himself, was confident the caller—and thereby the shooter—was Liles. This testimony was not based on Detective Miller‘s personal opinion or
{¶54} Finally, Liles contends that trial counsel should have objected to Detective Miller‘s testimony that “I find statements typically given somewhat after the fact are more accurate” offered to explain Kierra‘s “inconsistent” statements. (Id. at 157). The alleged “inconsistency” between Kierra‘s statement at the scene and her subsequent testimony is that Kierra did not provide the shooter‘s identity at the scene, but identified Liles as the shooter at trial. (Id. at 73-76, 186).1 On cross-examination, Detective Miller testified that he was aware of the “inconsistent” versions of the events that Kierra had provided, but Miller testified that, based upon his review of the cruiser audio, he believed the reporting officer made an error in his report. (Id. at 149-150). On redirect, Detective Miller explained that Kierra made the statements that appeared in the police report “within a couple minutes of realizing her brother was shot” when Kierra was standing by her brother as he was bleeding out in the street. (Id. at 155). Miller testified that Kierra was “very emotionally upset” when she made the statements; thereafter, Miller testified that, in his experience, generally statements made
{¶55} Upon review, we are not convinced that Detective Miller‘s testimony concerned Kierra‘s credibility, but rather, the accuracy of the police report and Kierra‘s initial statement—or lack thereof—in light of her state of mind when she made the initial statement. The reporting officer, Rode, explained that Kierra was talking with her parents on her cell phone and standing feet from her brother who was still bleeding when Rode was asking her for the shooter‘s identity. (Id. at 187-188). Rode testified that Kierra was “emotional,” and it took him a long time to get even basic information from her because of her mental state. (Id. at 188). From Kierra‘s testimony, the jury could have even concluded that she was so emotionally upset that she did not even recall talking to Rode at the scene. (Id. at 78-79). Detective Miller‘s testimony on redirect must be viewed in light of all the previous testimony on this issue—it was offered to explain why Kierra might not have identified Liles at the scene but later identified him at trial.
{¶56} Finally, even assuming that any of the aforementioned testimony was inadmissible, we are not persuaded that Liles suffered prejudice. The trial court instructed the jury that it alone was the final arbiter of credibility. (Id. at 215-216). The evidence presented at trial established beyond a reasonable doubt that Liles shot Brown. It is clear from the testimony presented that many of the witnesses,
{¶57} Liles’ first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶58} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ROGERS, J., concurs in Judgment Only.
SHAW, J., concurs.
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