IN RE CALDWELL.
Nos. 95-574 and 95-718
Supreme Court of Ohio
Decided July 31, 1996
76 Ohio St.3d 156 | 1996-Ohio-410
Submitted March 19, 1996
A juvenile court is authorized to impose consecutive terms of commitment upon a delinquent minor for separate delinquent acts whether or not they arise from the same set of operative facts.
(Nos. 95-574 and 95-718—Submitted March 19, 1996—Decided July 31, 1996.)
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Nos. 94APF07-996 and 94APF07-997.
{¶ 1} On December 1, 1993, fifteen-year-old appellee, William Caldwell, was driving a stolen car. Thinking he was being pursued by the owner or the police, he drove through a residential area in the dark and ran several stop signs at speeds in excess of seventy miles per hour. Caldwell crashed the stolen car into another car and fled the scene. As a result of his late night escapade, four persons, including a passenger in Caldwell’s car, suffered serious physical injury.
{¶ 2} Caldwell was charged in two separate cases, the first with two counts of aggravated vehicular assault against William Manns, the driver of the other car, and Wade Reed, his passenger, the two who suffered the most serious permanent physical injuries, and the second with one count of receiving stolen property. The juvenile court found Caldwell delinquent on all counts. At the dispositional hearing, the court learned that Caldwell had been on probation for an auto theft at the time of this incident on December 1, 1993, and had twice been suspended from
{¶ 3} After finding that Caldwell was not amenable to rehabilitation within six months, and citing the need for the protection and safety of the community, the juvenile court committed Caldwell to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“ODYS”) for an indefinite term consisting of a minimum period of six months and a maximum period not to exceed beyond his twenty-first birthday. The court imposed the indefinite term on each of the three counts and ordered Caldwell to serve the three terms consecutively, thereby requiring that Caldwell serve at least eighteen months in ODYS.
{¶ 4} Caldwell appealed and the cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. Caldwell maintained that the juvenile court was without jurisdiction under the Revised Code to order consecutive commitments. The Court of Appeals for Franklin County concluded that the juvenile court did not have authority to order Caldwell to serve consecutive commitments. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the cases to the juvenile court for further proceedings.
{¶ 5} The court of appeals also entered an order certifying that its judgment was in conflict with decisions from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County in In re Samkas (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 240, 608 N.E.2d 1172, and In re Bremmer (Apr. 1, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 62088, unreported, on the following question: “Whether or not juvenile courts have jurisdiction to impose consecutive commitment orders to the Ohio Department of Youth Services.”
{¶ 6} This cause is now before this court upon determination that a conflict exists and pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
Michael Miller, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Kevin Durkin, for appellee.
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Pamela A. Conger and Scott Lorenzo, Assistant Public Defenders, Judith Stevenson, Franklin County Public Defender, Paul Skendelas and David L. Strait, Assistant Public Defenders, urging affirmance for amici curiae, Ohio Public Defender and Franklin County Public Defender.
STRATTON, J.
{¶ 7} The issue before the court is whether juvenile courts may impose consecutive terms of commitment upon a delinquent minor. To reach the proper conclusion in this matter, the court must look at the legislative intent behind juvenile commitment orders.
{¶ 8} Juvenile delinquency is a serious issue in our society. The question has been and continues to be - What does one do with a child who commits serious offenses? The legislative purpose regarding such errant children has been laid out in
{¶ 9} We as a society believe that our goal should be to rehabilitate, wherever possible, a child who may be young enough that the behavior can be molded and the child directed away from delinquent and criminal acts and toward a productive and responsible future. Therefore, our inquiry must begin with the
{¶ 10} We also recognize that juvenile delinquency is a serious and increasing problem in our society. There is an increasing level of violence in the delinquent acts committed by juveniles. The more common acts of vandalism and truancy seem to be replaced by more violent acts of assault, robbery, and even murder. Juvenile courts struggle constantly with the need to protect society, the goal of rehabilitation, and this rising tide of violent juvenile delinquency.
{¶ 11}
“(4) If the child was adjudicated delinquent by reason of having committed an act that would be * * * a felony of the third or fourth degree if committed by an adult, commit the child to the legal custody of the department of youth services for institutionalization for an indefinite term consisting of a minimum period of six months and a maximum period not to exceed the child’s attainment of the age of twenty-one years.” Am.Sub.H.B. No. 725, 144 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6371.
{¶ 12} After a careful review of the legislative intent, this court disagrees with the court of appeals’ conclusion and finds that the juvenile court did have authority to order consecutive terms of commitment under the provisions of
“(11) Make any further disposition that the court finds proper, except that the child shall not be placed in any state penal or reformatory institution, county, multicounty or municipal jail or workhouse, or any other place where any adult convicted of crime, under arrest, or charged with crime is held.” (Emphasis added.) Am.Sub.H.B. No. 725, 144 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6372.
{¶ 13} In this case, the court of appeals found that because
{¶ 14} The Eighth District Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion in In re Samkas (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 240, 608 N.E.2d 1172. In Samkas, the court found that the phrase “[m]ake any further disposition that the court finds proper” grants authority to the juvenile court to impose consecutive commitment terms. In rejecting the contention that consecutive terms were punitive rather than rehabilitative, that court summed up its rationale:
“It is beyond cavil that each individual learns at his own pace through different means and methods. Some individuals learn quickly and others take longer to learn that one does not take property of another without permission either by violence or otherwise. Some children learn this lesson early in life; appellant obviously had not learned this lesson at age seventeen years. Some juveniles learn only through detention which is itself a means and method of education and rehabilitation. Therefore, the General Assembly passed
R.C. 2151.355(A)(10) [now (A)(11)], which reads as follows:“‘(10) Make any further disposition that the court finds proper.’ (Emphasis added.)
“Obviously the General Assembly by adding the word any, which it was not required to do, gave the trial judge discretion to further implement the rehabilitative disposition of a juvenile under
R.C. 2151.355 .” Id. at 244, 608 N.E.2d at 1174.
{¶ 15} In In re Bremmer (Apr. 1, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 62088, unreported, relying on Samkas, the court further examined the legislative intent of the statute and concluded that by using the word “any” in paragraph (A)(11), which the General Assembly was not required to do, it gave the trial judge discretion to take “any” steps the judge believes necessary to fully and completely implement the rehabilitative disposition of a juvenile under
{¶ 16} By including this catchall provision in
{¶ 17} As the Bremmer court realized, the requirement of consecutive terms for escape actually buttresses this statutory interpretation. As in
{¶ 18} The Caldwell court of appeals attempted to distinguish Samkas and Bremmer on the basis that they involved unrelated acts rather than separate delinquent acts arising out of one course of conduct such as those committed by Caldwell. This type of analysis ignores the purposes of rehabilitation, as well as
{¶ 19} In addition,
{¶ 20} As a safety valve, the juvenile court maintains supervisory powers over early release of the delinquent child. If the court, after ordering consecutive terms of commitment, determines that the child has been rehabilitated before the minimum commitment period ends and could be safely returned to the custody of his or her parents or the community,
{¶ 21} Our decision is consistent with the underlying purposes and goals of the juvenile court system, i.e., supervision, care and rehabilitation of the delinquent
{¶ 22} This interpretation does not tend to promote punishment rather than rehabilitation. Some juveniles exhibit more serious criminal tendencies and behavior than do other juveniles. It would be unfair to require that a child who has committed numerous delinquent acts be committed for the same period of time as a child who was determined to be delinquent for only one act. The first child should not be rewarded for a crime spree by an interpretation that limits the discretion of a juvenile court. The juvenile court is in the best position to evaluate the facts of each case to determine whether a longer period of rehabilitation may be needed under each separate fact pattern. The juvenile court’s discretion is balanced by the provisions of
{¶ 23} We are instructed by
{¶ 24} In light of the serious nature of appellee’s actions on December 1, 1993, his obvious lack of remorse for his conduct, his disregard for school, and his prior probation for auto theft, the juvenile court acted well within its discretion to order consecutive terms of commitment. The court deemed it to be in the interest of public safety and necessary for the appellee’s rehabilitation to require him to spend more than one period of commitment with the ODYS.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur separately.
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., concurring.
{¶ 26} I concur in the syllabus and the judgment, but write separately in order to further underscore the fact that
{¶ 27}
“(A) To provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children subject to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code;
“(B) To protect the public interest in removing the consequences of criminal behavior and the taint of criminality from children committing delinquent acts and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care, and rehabilitation;
“(C) To achieve the foregoing purposes, whenever possible, in a family environment, separating the child from its parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the interests of public safety[.]”
{¶ 28} By authorizing courts to liberally construe the juvenile court statutes, the General Assembly recognized the multitude of situations which come before courts requiring them to employ various sanctions when disposing of juvenile delinquency cases. Therefore, the General Assembly provided the courts with broad discretion in
{¶ 29} As noted in a footnote in the majority opinion, the General Assembly revised
{¶ 30} The juvenile involved in this case makes clear that the court in In re Samkas (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 240, 608 N.E.2d 1172, was correct when it found that the needs of rehabilitation vary from juvenile to juvenile. One type of commitment does not fit all juveniles. Juvenile courts need broad discretion to fashion the appropriate time for complete and lasting rehabilitation. The trial court
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion.