In re L.G.
Autumn D. Adams, for appellant.
SULEK, P.J.
{¶ 1} In these consolidated appeals, the appellant, L.B. (“mother“) appeals the April 25, 2024 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division terminating her parental rights and granting permanent custody of four of her children to Lucas County Children Services (“LCCS“), the appellee herein. We affirm.
{¶ 2} Mother is parent to five children, all boys: Tr.B (Child No. 1), L.G. (Child No. 2), Bry.B. (Child No. 3), Bra.B. (Child No. 4), and O.B. (Child No. 5). Initially, LCCS sought permanent custody of all five children, but Child No. 1 was removed from the agency‘s motion, after the juvenile court ordered him into the agency‘s legal custody and placed him into a planned permanent living arrangement (“PPLA“). The instant case pertains to Child Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 only (referred to collectively as “the children“). At the time of filing, Child No. 2 was 12 years-old; Child No. 3 was ten years-old; Child No. 4 was six years-old; and Child No. 5 was five years-old.
{¶ 3} The children have different fathers. The father of Child No. 4 is deceased. The fathers of Child Nos. 2, 3, and 5 were properly served and summoned in this case but did not participate, and each was described as “uninvolved.” Accordingly, we limit our discussion herein to mother‘s parental rights.
A. The family‘s involvement with LCCS
{¶ 4} LCCS became involved with this family in May of 2021 after receiving multiple referrals, including two from medical professionals, alleging concerns for Child No. 3‘s “untreated mental health,” mother‘s mental health, domestic violence, a lack of parental supervision and failing to follow treatment recommendations for Child No. 3.
{¶ 5} Six months later, on November 3, 2021, LCCS filed a complaint in dependency and neglect, and the agency was awarded protective supervision of the children, within mother‘s home. At that time, the court ordered mother to undergo a
{¶ 6} A week after the complaint was filed, LCCS caseworker Nykell Flowers completed a home visit where Child No. 3 was present and not attending school due to an alleged eye infection. Mother disclosed that she had withdrawn Child No. 3 from school because “the teachers were not understanding of his medical condition.” Mother told the caseworker that she intended to homeschool Child No. 3 but lacked any school materials. Subsequently, mother failed to enroll Child No. 3 into a different school.
{¶ 7} As background, Child No. 3 was diagnosed with “conversion disorder” (a.k.a. functional neurological symptom disorder) in 2020, before the agency was involved in this case. Medical evidence admitted at trial established that conversion disorder is a condition that produces a physical response in a person that cannot be medically explained. For example, a person with conversion disorder might “appear” to be having a seizure, “yet there is no seizure activity happening in the brain, which means [that] there is no medical reason for the seizures.” Conversion disorder symptoms can be induced by stress, environment and other mental health disorders. Typically, a diagnosis can be confirmed when “those stressors are removed [and a person] improves.” Following Child No. 3‘s diagnosis in 2020 at The University of Toledo Medical College,
B. LCCS files an amended complaint, and a case plan is developed.
{¶ 8} Following the caseworker‘s home visit, the agency filed an amended complaint. LCCS alleged that mother had violated the juvenile court‘s order by withdrawing Child No. 3 from school and that mother was “continuing to minimize the concerns with the children missing school.” Following an emergency shelter care hearing, LCCS was awarded interim temporary custody of the children. The children were removed from mother‘s home and placed into foster care on November 16, 2021. Following a hearing on December 16, 2021, the children were adjudicated as dependent and neglected.
{¶ 9} The original case plan was filed and became an order of the court on December 14, 2021. Mother‘s case plan called for her to complete a dual assessment and a psychological assessment, and for the children to be linked to medical services and to be enrolled in school. The goal of the plan was for mother and the children to be reunited.
{¶ 10} On June 6, 2023, LCCS filed a motion for permanent custody. As to mother, the agency alleged that, despite case planning services, mother had failed to remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed and that mother‘s mental illness was so severe as to render her unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the children. Specifically, LCCS alleged that mother “continues to deny or has difficulty
{¶ 11} Since their removal, Child Nos. 2 and 3 have remained with the same foster parents, who reside in Putnam County. For a time, from October of 2022 until October of 2023, Child Nos. 4 and 5 left foster parents’ care and were placed with M.J.K and L.K.Jr. M.J.K. is the mother to half-siblings of Child No. 4. After one year in their care, M.J.K. and L.K.Jr. “voluntarily disrupted” the placement, allegedly because of financial concerns, although the record indicates that they were offered multiple forms of financial assistance. Child No. 4 and Child No. 5 were then returned to the foster parents in Putnam County. On October 11, 2023, M.J.K. and L.K.Jr. filed a third-party complaint for legal custody of Child No. 4 only.
C. A trial is held.
{¶ 12} A trial was held over two days, on February 26 and March 21, 2024. At issue before the court were two matters: LCCS‘s motion for permanent custody (case No. JC21286827) and M.J.K and L.K. Jr.‘s third-party complaint for legal custody (case No. JC23296622).
{¶ 13} A number of witnesses testified at trial, including two caseworkers (Nykell Flowers and Kaitlin Rudebock), the state‘s expert witness (Aimee Drescher, Ph.D.), mother‘s therapist (Kelli Gunn) and the CASA (Melanie Schell). Mother also testified,
The caseworkers
{¶ 14} Nykell Flowers worked with the family for about 18 months, until February of 2023. According to Flowers, mother struggled to have “congruent conversation[s]” and would “often disassociate” while they were talking, seeming to be “very confused” or unable to remember things they had just discussed. Flowers also described mother as paranoid. As examples, Flowers said that mother claimed that “an ex was trying to run her off the road,” but never filed police reports. Mother also claimed that “the school and her apartment complex [were] conspiring against her and that the kids’ identity [had been] stolen,” preventing mother from filing tax returns. Mother also “fixat[ed]” on allergies that she claimed the children had but, inexplicably, “would [then] send them to school with those same [food items] that they were allergic to.”
{¶ 15} During one visit with the children—when mother had been asked to bring her children dinner—mother asked another family for their leftovers. The caseworker cautioned mother about being “so trustworthy of strangers’ food,” especially given mother‘s allergy concerns. In the fall of 2022, after mother fell asleep during a visit, she was drug tested. Mother tested positive for cocaine, twice. Although the positive test results were “alarming,” the bigger worry remained mother‘s mental health, particularly her “lack of insight, awareness, and accountability about why the kids were removed in
{¶ 16} Flowers also observed the children, particularly Child No. 3. Before the children‘s removal, when the caseworker visited mother‘s home, Child No. 3 was in a wheelchair and “could not speak.” He appeared “not to be conscious or just very lethargic.” After he was placed in foster care, the caseworker “never” saw those symptoms again, or any others. He also resumed going to school daily and became involved in sports, playing an instrument and going to camp. Child No. 3 and his older brother, Child No. 2, “successfully completed” their case-planning services at Zepf while in foster care.
{¶ 17} Kaitlin Rudebock was the second case-manager, beginning in February of 2023. Rudebock testified that she learned that mother had begun receiving treatment from Harbor Behavioral Healthcare, another mental health provider, without LCCS‘s knowledge. Records from Harbor indicate that mother was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. They also indicate that mother had “disorganized thoughts” and could not identify the reasons for her children‘s removal. Rudbock testified that it was “concerning” to LCCS that mother was “moving from provider to provider and not remaining consistent [with her] services.” She added that it was “similar” to what mother “has done with [Child No. 3] and his medical needs.”
{¶ 18} Initially, visits between mother and the children were “important” to the children but “as time went on . . . they did express [to Caseworker Flowers] that they
{¶ 19} Every month, mother was given a list of upcoming appointments between her children and their medical providers. Both caseworkers testified that mother frequently missed appointments, citing a lack of transportation, “oversleeping” or “forgetting.”
{¶ 20} According to Rudebock, the children are “doing well” with foster parents and the children are bonded to them and with each other. Under cross-examination, Rudebock confirmed that, about a month before the hearing, a referral was made against foster parents, which was investigated by Putnam County Children‘s Services and found to be unsubstantiated.
Aimee Drescher, Ph.D.
{¶ 21} Aimee Drescher, Ph.D. is a clinical psychologist who evaluated mother on behalf of LCCS in 2022 for the purpose of determining mother‘s “parental capacity” and whether she met the criteria for any mental health diagnoses. Dr. Drescher testified as an expert witness, by agreement of the parties, and her report and progress notes were admitted into evidence.
{¶ 23} Dr. Drescher also evaluated mother to determine if she suffered from “factitious disorder imposed on another” (a.k.a Munchausen disorder by proxy). The reason for this evaluation was due to Child No. 3‘s conversion disorder diagnosis. Dr. Drescher could not confirm whether mother met the criteria for factitious disorder because mother‘s “personality characteristic impact[ed] her ability to interact” and because Child No. 3 had other caretakers at the time he “fell ill.” However, as noted in Dr. Dresher‘s report, mother‘s “report of symptoms in her children and their flourishing out of her care [was] worrisome and indicative of a serious psychotherapy.” (Emphasis added.) Dr. Drescher testified that it was “very concerning” that mother “didn‘t
Kelli Gunn
{¶ 24} Kelli Gunn is a licensed professional clinical counselor with Unison who treated mother. Gunn provided both individual therapy to mother and also led the “DBT skills group” that mother participated in. The goal of DBT therapy is to establish “life skills,” such as distress tolerance, emotion regulation, and interpersonal effective skills.
{¶ 25} Mother began receiving treatment at Unison in 2022, but her DBT treatment was delayed for a year, until June of 2023. At trial, Gunn testified that she did know the reason for the delay. However, the record indicates that Gunn delayed DBT treatments because mother had “not ma[de] enough progress in her individual therapy, specifically because she did not recognize the reason for her children‘s removal or [Child No. 3‘s] conversion disorder.” The records also indicate that mother “displayed resistance” and struggled to “actively listen.”
{¶ 26} As of the March 21, 2024 hearing, mother had completed about 20 weeks of the DBT program and had “about” four weeks left. Gunn agreed that mother missed
Mother
{¶ 27} Mother testified that she sought a new mental health provider (at Harbor) because she and her then-therapist at Unison were not “a good match,” and records confirm that mother reported feeling “disrespected” there. Likewise, mother testified that she and her first caseworker “did not see eye to eye” because the caseworker “wasn‘t understanding the case” and “seemed very confused.” As an example, mother cited Flower‘s failure to appreciate the importance of obtaining medical records from a Columbus neurologist who had treated Child No. 3 (before LCCS became involved). Mother testified, “I still don‘t know if [LCCS] even received those records.” She also complained that “they haven‘t said anything about [Child No. 2‘s] allergies and asthma.” Her relationship with the second caseworker, Rudebock, was no better. Mother testified that she felt “ignored” by Rudebock, prompting mother to contact Rudebock‘s supervisor “numerous” times. Eventually, mother demanded that all communications with LCCS include her attorney because she felt Rudebock would “purposely [mis]construe” what she said. Mother also testified extensively about frustrations she felt toward foster mother, especially with regard to visitation.
{¶ 29} Currently, mother takes only vitamins and “medicine that is prescribed for pain” in her back and neck. She denied that she used cocaine, claiming that the two positive test results were “false positive[s].”
{¶ 30} Mother started receiving DBT treatments in June of 2023, after LCCS filed for permanent custody. Mother complained that “no one ever told [her]” that LCCS would file for permanent custody if DBT was “not occurring.” When asked, mother said that DBT has helped her because it “gets [her] out of the house [and] gives her something to do,” but she added that she has “learn[ed] new skills” because of DBT.
The CASA
{¶ 31} Melanie Schell served as the CASA. She observed that visits between mother and children involved “minimal interaction” and that mother made “minimal attempt[s]” to engage with them. She added that visitation “has become a problem lately because [the older two children] don‘t want to go to visits” and “have essentially refused to participate.”
{¶ 32} The CASA expressed doubt that the children could be returned to mother‘s care, because mother “hasn‘t been able to move past the fact that the children were removed.” In her opinion, mother is not capable of providing the children with “a safe and stable environment.”
D. The trial court grants LCCS‘s motion.
{¶ 34} On April 25, 2024, the juvenile court issued a decision and judgment entry granting LCCS‘s motion for permanent custody. As to mother, the court found, pursuant to
{¶ 36} Through appellate counsel, mother appealed the juvenile court‘s permanent custody decision.1 She raises two assignments of error for our review:
I. LCCS never worked towards reunification.
II. The findings Mother failed to remedy the reasons which caused removal of the children, and thus permanent custody to LCCS was in their best interest, was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at trial. [Sic].
II. The permanent custody statute
{¶ 37} Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children. In re K.H., 2008-Ohio-4825, ¶ 39. However, the right to parent one‘s children is not absolute; it does not give a parent a right to abuse or neglect a child. Id. at ¶ 40. And, the state has broad authority to intervene to protect children from abuse and
{¶ 38}
{¶ 39} All of the court‘s findings under
{¶ 40} The Ohio Supreme Court recently clarified the standard of review in permanent custody cases. In In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, the court held that, “[g]iven that
III. The evidence supports the trial court‘s findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) .
{¶ 41} In the instant case, the trial court found, with respect to the first requirement, that
{¶ 42} On appeal, mother‘s only challenge—under the first prong—is the juvenile court‘s finding under Section (B)(1)(a), that the children could not and should not be placed with mother within a reasonable time. Specifically, mother claims that she did not have “a shot” in this case because “reunification was never a consideration.” Mother‘s argument is premised upon testimony offered by the CASA who said that reunification “was not” considered. However, the CASA later clarified that she “was never told by the caseworkers that [reunification] was an option.” (Emphasis added.). Indeed, it was LCCS—not the CASA—that was charged with developing the case plan and assessing whether the goals of the plan were being met. The case plan in this case clearly indicates that reunification was the goal. Moreover, the case managers testified that while mother was “compliant” in some aspects of her case plan, she ultimately failed to complete it.
{¶ 43} Importantly, mother does not dispute the juvenile court‘s other finding under Section (B)(1), that the children have been in LCCS‘s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period.
{¶ 44} Because “the first prong of the permanent custody test is satisfied where ‘one or more’ of the conditions set forth in
IV. The evidence supports the juvenile court‘s best interest findings.
{¶ 45} In determining the best interest of a child, the juvenile court “shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:”
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child‘s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child‘s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;
(d) The child‘s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶ 46} Under
{¶ 47} Regarding the best interest factor set forth in
{¶ 49} In consideration of
{¶ 50} On appeal, mother trivializes Child No. 2‘s “wish[] to remain in a job” or Child No. 3‘s “wish to remain in soccer” and the children‘s collective “wish[] to remain with a foster parent‘s pet.” She insists that such factors “cannot take precedence over [her] right to parent.” We agree with LCCS that mother “misses the point.” A legally secure permanent home “is more than a house with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for the [children‘s] needs.” In re M.B., 2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 56 (4th Dist.). The activities cited by the juvenile court reflect not only that the children‘s basic needs are being met but also that they have achieved a sufficient amount of stability that they feel the “ability to do the things they want” and “[t]hey want to remain [with foster parents] so they can essentially be kids.”
{¶ 51} After carefully reviewing the record in this case, we find that the juvenile court‘s findings are supported by sufficient, credible evidence and are otherwise not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we find no error in the juvenile court‘s decision finding it was in the children‘s best interest to be placed in the permanent custody of LCCS. Accordingly, mother‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 52} For the reasons expressed above, we find that the juvenile court‘s decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence and was not against the manifest weight
Therefore, the April 25, 2024 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Pursuant to App.R. 24, costs of this appeal are assessed to mother.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________ JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J. ____________________________ JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, P.J. CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.