In re Z.C.
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we resolve a conflict between the Eleventh District Court of Appeals and other appellate districts over the proper appellate standards of review to apply in cases involving a juvenile court‘s decision under
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Appellant, D.C., is the father of Z.C., a minor child. Appellee, the Ashtabula County Children Services Board (“ACCSB“), became involved with Z.C. in early 2019 when the Juvenile Division of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas granted the agency emergency temporary custody of Z.C. based on the agency‘s concerns about Z.C.‘s mother‘s home, where the child was living with other siblings. D.C. did not reside at that home, and Z.C. had never been in D.C.‘s home. Ultimately, Z.C. was placed in foster care with his half-brother, L.T., with whom he shares the same mother. ACCSB has been granted permanent custody of L.T., and the foster family wishes to adopt both children.
{¶ 3} In May 2020, D.C. moved for custody of Z.C. in the juvenile court. In August 2020, ACCSB moved to modify its temporary custody of Z.C. to permanent custody. The juvenile-court magistrate held an evidentiary hearing, and in April 2021, the magistrate issued a decision granting ACCSB‘s motion. The magistrate determined that committing Z.C. to the permanent custody of the agency and terminating the parental rights of D.C. and Z.C.‘s mother would serve Z.C.‘s best interest. D.C. objected to the magistrate‘s best-interest analysis, arguing that the evidence had not demonstrated that a legally secure placement of Z.C. could not be achieved without granting permanent custody to ACCSB and that he was
{¶ 4} D.C. appealed the judgment to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, arguing (1) that the juvenile court had abused its discretion in finding that clear and convincing evidence supported granting permanent custody of Z.C. to ACCSB and (2) that the juvenile court had erred to the prejudice of D.C. and against the best interest of Z.C. by granting permanent custody to ACCSB.
{¶ 5} The Eleventh District affirmed the trial court‘s judgment, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in terminating parental rights and granting the agency‘s motion for permanent custody. The appellate court also recognized that its decision to apply an abuse-of-discretion appellate standard of review was in conflict with decisions of other appellate districts that had applied a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard and/or a manifest-weight standard. The Eleventh District sua sponte certified that its decision was in conflict with the following cases: In re S.V., 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-13-060, 2014-Ohio-422; In re Y.M., 5th Dist. Tuscarawas Nos. 2021 AP 09 0020 through 0023, 2022-Ohio-677; In re Ca.S., 4th Dist. Pickaway Nos. 21CA9 and 21CA10, 2021-Ohio-3874; In re W.W., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-110363 and C-110402, 2011-Ohio-4912; and In re R.B., 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2022-01-003 and CA2022-01-004, 2022-Ohio-1705.
{¶ 6} We accepted the certified conflict on the following question: “When reviewing a trial court‘s decision to terminate parental rights, is the appellate standard of review abuse of discretion, manifest weight of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or sufficiency of the evidence?” 169 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2023-Ohio-482, 203 N.E.3d 730.
{¶ 7} Under
{¶ 8} We have described an appellate court‘s task when reviewing a trial court‘s application of the clear-and-convincing burden of proof as follows: “Where the proof required must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990), citing Ford v. Osborne, 45 Ohio St. 1, 12 N.E. 526 (1887), paragraph two of the syllabus; accord Cross at 477.
{¶ 9} Here, the court of appeals stated that it would not substitute its judgment for that of a trial court “where there is ample competent and credible evidence supporting the trial court‘s determination.” 2022-Ohio-3199, 195 N.E.3d 590, ¶ 10. But it also described its task of appellate review as follows:
[A]n appellate court reviews a trial court‘s determination of permanent custody and the termination of parental rights for an abuse of discretion. In re Snow, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2003-P-0080, 2004-Ohio-1519, ¶ 28. See also In re D.F., 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 29350 and 2016-CA028, 2022-Ohio-1781, ¶ 23;
In re L.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109995, 2021-Ohio-510, ¶ 51; Matter of T.L., 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 19 JE 0013, 2019-Ohio-4919, ¶ 18; and Matter of W.G., 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 22 JE 0002, 2022-Ohio-2342, ¶ 23. “Further, we review a judgment of the trial court adopting the decision of its magistrate for an abuse of discretion.” Molzon v. Molzon, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2021-A-0024, 2022-Ohio-1634, ¶ 51. An abuse of discretion is the trial court‘s “failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.” State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 11 (8[th] Ed.2004). “The highly deferential abuse of discretion standard is particularly appropriate in allocation of parental rights and responsibilities cases since the trial judge is in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and there ’ “may be much that is evident in the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does not translate well to the record.” ’ ” Molzon, supra, at ¶ 53[,] quoting In re K.R., 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2010-T-0050, 2011-Ohio-1454, ¶ 30, quoting Wyatt v. Wyatt, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2004-P-0045, 2005-Ohio-2365, ¶ 13.
{¶ 10} In contrast to the abuse-of-discretion appellate standard of review that the Eleventh District applied here, the appellate courts in the certified-conflict cases applied a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard and/or a manifest-weight standard. See S.V., 2014-Ohio-422, at ¶ 25 (concluding that the trial court‘s decision to grant the state‘s motion for permanent custody was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, because the trial court‘s best-interest findings were supported by competent, credible evidence); Y.M., 2022-Ohio-677, at ¶ 75 (finding that the trial court‘s finding that the permanent-custody award was in the children‘s
{¶ 11} Given that
{¶ 12} We recognize the confusion that may have arisen from our case law. For example, in Masters v. Masters, 69 Ohio St.3d 83, 85, 630 N.E.2d 665 (1994), this court stated, “It has long been a recognized rule of law that for a reviewing court to overturn a trial court‘s determination of custody, the appellate court must find that the trial court abused its discretion.” The Masters decision cited Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 523 N.E.2d 846 (1988), which stated that “the trial court‘s determination in a custody proceeding is, of course, subject to reversal upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.” But both Masters and Miller involved
{¶ 13} Sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence are distinct concepts and are ” ‘both quantitatively and qualitatively different.’ ” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), paragraph two of the syllabus. We have stated that “sufficiency is a test of adequacy,” Thompkins at 386, while weight of the evidence ” ‘is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief’ ” (emphasis sic), id. at 387, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990). “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law.” Id. at 386. “When applying a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, a court of appeals should affirm a trial court when ” ‘the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” ’ ” Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 115 Ohio St.3d 291, 2007-Ohio-4918, 874 N.E.2d 1198, ¶ 3, quoting Thompkins at 386, quoting Black‘s at 1433.
{¶ 14} But “even if a trial court judgment is sustained by sufficient evidence, an appellate court may nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Eastley at ¶ 12. When reviewing for manifest weight, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving
{¶ 15} We recognize that the Eleventh District here described its abuse-of-discretion review similarly to how other courts have described sufficiency or manifest-weight review when it stated, “We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court applying a clear-and-convincing standard where there is ample competent and credible evidence supporting the trial court‘s determination.” 2022-Ohio-3199, 195 N.E.3d 590, at ¶ 10, citing In re A.J.O. & M.N.O., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180680, 2019-Ohio-975, ¶ 6. This reference to “competent and credible evidence” and its relationship to manifest-weight review has been described as follows:
The interplay between the presumption of correctness and the ability of an appellate court to reverse a trial court decision based on the manifest weight of the evidence was succinctly set forth in the holding of this court in C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co.[, 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978)]: “Judgments supported
by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
Seasons Coal Co. at 80. In Eastley, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, we explained that some courts have relied on the phrase “some competent, credible evidence” in C.E. Morris Co. to blur the concepts of sufficiency and manifest weight, leading to some confusion. Eastley at ¶ 14-15. But in Eastley, we made clear that the concepts of sufficiency and manifest weight in civil cases are distinct and that “the sufficiency of the evidence is quantitatively and qualitatively different from the weight of the evidence.” Id. at ¶ 23. Thus, although the phrase “some competent, credible evidence” can be helpful in describing the reviewing court‘s deferential role in the manifest-weight analysis, it should not be used as a substitute for the separate sufficiency and manifest-weight analyses appropriate for permanent-custody determinations.
{¶ 16} If a court of appeals determines that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the proper remedy is a remand for a new trial. See id. at ¶ 22. However, “[r]eversal on the manifest weight of the evidence and remand for a new trial are not to be taken lightly.” Id. at ¶ 31. Additionally, the role of this court to conduct manifest-weight review in civil cases is limited. Under
{¶ 17} We recognize that D.C.‘s assignment of error on appeal to the Eleventh District stated that the juvenile court had abused its discretion in finding that clear and convincing evidence supported its permanent-custody decision. But the appellate court‘s role is to apply the appropriate appellate standard of review depending on the nature of the arguments that are presented by the parties, not for the appellant to dictate the standard of review in his or her assignment of error. And it may be that despite how the Eleventh District characterized its review, the Eleventh District essentially found that the juvenile court‘s determination was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. But we are asked only to resolve the certified-conflict question to determine the proper appellate standards of review. Having resolved that question—and because it is not for this court to conduct a manifest-weight review—we must remand this matter to the court of appeals for that court to apply the proper standards.
Conclusion
{¶ 18} For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified-conflict question by holding that the proper appellate standards of review to apply in cases involving a juvenile court‘s decision under
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.