IN RE A.M.
No. 2019-0923
Supreme Court of Ohio
Decided November 3, 2020
2020-Ohio-5102
FRENCH, J.
[Until this оpinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In re A.M., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5102.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-5102
IN RE A.M.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In re A.M., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5102.]
(No. 2019-0923—Submitted June 2, 2020—Decided November 3, 2020.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-190027, 2019-Ohio-2028.
{1} This appeal asks us to consider the contours of the statutory requirement that juvenile courts consider the factors set out in
{2} The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which granted permanent custody of A.M. to appellee, the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services. Appellant—A.M.‘s mother, Brianna D.—contends that the juvenile court did not comply with the requirement in
{3} Because we conclude that the juvenile court complied with
Facts and procedural background
{4} Brianna was 16 years old and living in a foster home, in the department‘s custody, when A.M. was born, in November 2015.
{5} The department first sought temporary custody of A.M. in December 2016, shortly after A.M.‘s first birthday, because Brianna was having trouble attending school, was having outbursts in her foster home, and had tested positive for marijuana. Based on stipulations between Brianna and the department, the magistrate modified the department‘s motion to a motion for interim protective orders, whiсh the magistrate granted.
{6} The magistrate adjudicated A.M. dependent on February 10, 2017, and granted the department protective supervision of A.M. The magistrate incorporated into her decision a report from A.M.‘s guardian ad litem that indicated that A.M. appeared to be emotionally attached to Brianna. But the magistrate also found clear and convincing evidence of Brianna‘s “out of control behaviors,” which had led to police involvement, property damage, and Brianna‘s suspension and expulsion from school. She also found that in October 2016, Brianna left her foster home with A.M. without permission and met with A.M.‘s father, who allegedly assaulted Brianna.
{7} Under the department‘s protective supеrvision, A.M. remained with Brianna in her foster home. The magistrate ordered Brianna to undergo mental-health, chemical-dependency, and domestic-violence
{8} In June 2017, the department filed a complaint, affidavit, and motion for interim temporary custody of A.M. and for an order authorizing removal of A.M. from the foster home. The deрartment alleged that since February 2017, Brianna had repeatedly failed to attend school or had been turned away from school due to tardiness, had occasionally failed to make her whereabouts known to her foster family while leaving A.M. in the foster mother‘s care, and had continued to test positive for marijuana. The agency also alleged one instance in which Brianna had become upset and stated that she wanted to sign away her parental rights to A.M. Based on stipulations by the parties, the magistrate granted the department‘s motion for interim temporary custody on June 15, concluding that it would be contrary to A.M.‘s best interest and welfare to remain in the foster home with Brianna.
{9} In a decisiоn issued September 20, 2017, the magistrate terminated the June 2017 interim orders and granted the department temporary custody of A.M. The magistrate‘s findings repeat, nearly verbatim, the allegations from the department‘s June 2017 complaint. The magistrate again ordered Brianna to participate in the services offered under her case plan. In addition to repeating its previous orders regarding mental-health, chemical-dependency, and domestic-violence assessments, parenting classes, and toxicology screens, the magistrate ordered Brianna to obtain and maintain sobriety, to not test positive for opiates, alcohol, or other illegal or nonprescribed substances, and to сomplete high school or obtain a GED. The magistrate ordered Brianna to obtain and maintain a stable income and housing if she were to become emancipated.
{10} Brianna was emancipated in October 2017, shortly after her 18th birthday, upon her request. As a result of her emancipation, Brianna‘s medical insurance lapsed. At that point, she was unable to reengage with Ohio Mentor, which had previously supervised her visitations with A.M., or to continue her therapy sessions.
{11} On March 22, 2018, the department filed a motion to modify its temporary custody of A.M. to permanent custody. The department alleged that Brianna had not engaged in mental-health services since November 2017, had not participated in a substаnce-abuse program, and had admitted to continued marijuana use. A.M.‘s guardian ad litem supported the department‘s motion and stated that a grant of permanent custody was in A.M‘s best interest due to Brianna‘s lack of participation in case-plan services, continued use of marijuana, inconsistent visitation with A.M., and general lack of progress with respect to the case plan.
{12} The magistrate conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing in September 2018. Chris Graham, the caseworker assigned to Brianna and A.M., testified to the “really good relationship,” the bond, and the love between Brianna and A.M. But she also testified that Brianna had not completed any of her court-ordered case-plan sеrvices. Brianna admitted that despite consistent court orders, she had not fully completed any of her case-plan services. She testified, however, that she had matured and that given more time, she would follow through with those services.
{14} Brianna filed a timely objection, in which she stated only that the magistrate‘s decision was against the weight of the evidence and contrary to lаw. Although Brianna‘s filing noted that she reserved the right to amend her objection upon receipt of a hearing transcript, she did not do so. The juvenile court heard oral argument on Brianna‘s objection, during which Brianna‘s counsel challenged only the magistrate‘s finding under
{15} The juvenile court overruled Brianna‘s objection and adopted the magistrate‘s decision. The judgment entry states that the court reviewed the transcript, heard oral arguments, and conducted an independent review of the objected-to matters and that the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the magistrate had properly granted the department‘s motion for permanent custody. The court independently found that “considering all relevant factors, including but not limited to those found in
{16} On appeal to the First District, Brianna shifted her argument. There, with new counsel, she argued that the juvenile court‘s determination that a grant of permanent custody was in A.M.‘s best interest was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the juvenile court‘s judgment in a split decision. It subsequently denied Brianna‘s requests for en banc consideration and to certify a conflict.
{17} We initially denied Brianna‘s discretionary appeal, 157 Ohio St.3d 1406, 2019-Ohio-3731, 131 N.E.3d 77, but on reconsideration, we accepted jurisdiction to address a single proposition of law concerning a juvenile court‘s consideration of the factors listed in
Analysis
The statutory framework
{18}
{19} An agency that seeks permanent custody of a child bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing
In determining the best interest of a child * * *, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child‘s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child‘s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
(c) The custodial history of the child * * *;
(d) The child‘s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
The factors in
{20} The parties here essentially dispute what a juvenile court must do to comply with, or to demonstrate its compliance with,
The parties’ positions
{21} Brianna asks this court to hold that a juvenile court must show how it considered each of the best-interest factors in
{22} The department, on the other hand, argues that a juvenile court need only consider the statutory factors and that it need not specifically discuss each factor to comply with
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require written discussion or factual findings with respect to each best-interest factor
{23} As we do with any issue of statutory interpretation, we begin by
{24} As we mentioned above, before granting an agency‘s motion for permanent custody under
{25}
{26} In other contexts, this court has held that a requirement to consider enumerated factors does not constitute a requirement that a court explicitly address those factors or that it make specific factual findings. See, e.g., State v. Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 485 N.E.2d 711 (1985). Douglas addressed the interplay between former
{27} We employed similar reasoning with respect to former
{28} We have not previously addressed this question with respect to
{29} Most other Ohio appellate districts have likewise held that
{30} Other appellate districts, however, have held the opposite. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals, for example, has held that a “trial court must discuss, in its judgment entry, each of the
{31} Based on the plain and unambiguous statutory language, and consistently with our treatment of the word “consider” in other contexts, we hold that
The magistrate‘s decision and juvenile court‘s judgment entry indicate consideration of the statutory best-interest factors
{33} Having determined that
{34} We first look to the magistrate‘s decision. The magistrate expressly concluded that it was in A.M.‘s best interest to award permanent custody to the department. She also individually cited each of the factors set out in
{35} The magistrate‘s consideration of certain of the factors in
{36} The magistrate‘s consideration of the remaining
{37} That leaves
{38} The magistrate specifically indicated that she considered
{39} We now turn to the juvenile court‘s judgment entry overruling Brianna‘s objection and adopting the magistrate‘s decision. Pursuant to Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d), if timely objections to a magistrate‘s decision are filed, the juvenile court must “undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” The fact that a court does not cite any specific portion of a transcript or record does not demonstrate that the court failed to conduct an independent review of the matters objected to. Giovanni v. Bailey, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 28631 and 28676, 2018-Ohio-369, ¶ 21 (applying the analogous Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d)).
{40} Here, the juvenile court noted its obligation to independently review the matters objected to. The court stated that it had independently reviewed the record, including the trial transcripts, heard oral argument on Brianna‘s objection, and considered all relevant factors, including those
{41} In short, the magistrate‘s decision and juvenile court‘s judgment entry demonstrate that the court satisfied its statutory duty to consider the best-interest factors set out in
Conclusion
{42}
Judgment affirmed.
KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, and STEWART, JJ., concur.
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O‘CONNOR, C.J.
DONNELLY, J., dissenting.
{43} The majority may be correct in holding that a juvenile court‘s statutory obligation to “consider” the best-interest factors of
{44} As the majority has thoroughly explained, the record contains many details regarding A.M.‘s history and the relationship between A.M. and her mother, appellant, Brianna D., for the magistrate to consider and carefully weigh in determining whether granting permanent custody of A.M. to appellee, the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services, would be in A.M.‘s best interest. But you would not know that from reading the magistrate‘s decision.
{45} In contrast to the majority‘s generous description of the magistrate‘s decisiоn, I would describe the decision as a patchwork quilt of language taken from the September 20, 2017 adjudication-and-dispositional entry and from a generic template for permanent-custody decisions. In some places, A.M.‘s name is inserted in the template in all capital letters, and in many places, the decision merely refers to the “child/ren.” Some of the boilerplate language is completely irrelevant, some of it is relevant but not accompanied by any case-specific information, and some of it is accompanied by case-specific information that is not relevant to the boilerplate language. For example, in the portion of the decision addressing the wishes of the child pursuant to
Ohio revised code section
2151.414(D)(1)(b) considers the wishes of the child/ren as expressed directly by the child/ren or through the child/ren‘s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child/ren in determining whether a termination of parental rights is in the child/ren‘s best interest.O.R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) . The Guardian ad Litem agrees that PermanentCustody is in the best interest of the child so that the child may be adopted.
{46} One cannot reasonably read the foregoing language as a description of the magistrate‘s personal interaction with A.M. and assessment of A.M.‘s wishes. Even assuming that the final sentence is not boilerplate language from a template, repeating a guardian ad litem‘s (“GAL‘s“) best-interest recommendation does not tell us anything about the personal wishes of A.M.; it reflects the professional opiniоn of the GAL. In a custody proceeding, the determination by a GAL of what is in the child‘s best interest and what the child wants are two distinct facts, and sometimes, the two are in direct opposition to one another. See In re Baby Girl Baxter, 17 Ohio St.3d 229, 232, 479 N.E.2d 257 (1985). The majority opinion weaves in the observation that the magistrate at one point “stated that she had consulted A.M. in an age-appropriate manner,” majority opinion at ¶ 35, but the statement the majority is referring to does not indicate whether A.M. expressed any wishes; at the end of the magistrate‘s decision, after terminating the mother‘s parental rights and granting permanent custody to the agency, and after describing the agency‘s efforts to finalize permanent placement of A.M. with a new family, the magistrate included what appears to be a boilerplate sentence—with A.M.‘s name inserted in all capital letters—that states: “The Court consulted [A.M.], in an age-appropriate manner, regarding the proposed permanency plan.”
{47} My objective here is not to quibble over what the magistrate did or did not state at every point in her decision but to point out how much effort the majority of this court had to expend in extracting and assembling enough information to justify upholding the magistrate‘s decision. As another example, in the portion of the decision purportedly addressing the relationship between Brianna and A.M. pursuant to
The interaction and interrelationship of the child/ren with their parent(s), sibling(s), relative(s), foster parent(s) and out-of-home provider(s) causes the child/ren‘s best interest to be served by the termination of parental rights.
Again, one cannot reasonably consider the foregoing boilerplate language to be evidence of the magistrate‘s individualized consideration of the relationship between A.M. and her mother. But the majority portrays the sentence as the magistrate‘s “concluding that the interaction and interrelationship between A.M. and Brianna ‘cause[d]’ A.M.‘s best interest to be served by an award of permanent custody.” Majority opinion at ¶ 38. The majority points to certain observations about Brianna‘s negative behaviors elsewhere in the magistrate‘s decision, but how are we to know that those negative behaviors are what led the magistrate to the ever-so-personalized conclusion about the relationship between the “parent(s)” and “child/ren?” We do not know whether the magistrate weighed these negative factors against positive ones, such as the unquestionable loving bond between Brianna and A.M., because such positive factors are nowhere to be found in the magistrate‘s decision. Did the magistrate ignore them altogether? Did she find that they carried less weight because of a credibility problem? Or did the magistrate carefully consider the positive factors and decide that they were outweighed by the teenage mother‘s failure to get her young, traumatized life together quickly enough?
{49} Even if the magistrate was not required to provide a thorough explanation of the facts and analysis that applied to each separate best-interest factor under
{50} Accordingly, I dissent and would reverse the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Cynthia S. Daugherty, for appellant.
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas C. Varney, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Treleven and Klingensmith Law, L.L.C., and Celia Klug Weingartner, attorney/guardian ad litem, for A.M.