In rе KELAN W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Kelan W., Appellant)
Docket No. 128031
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
October 6, 2022
2022 IL 128031
OPINION
¶ 1 At issue in this appeal is whether, under section 5-120 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 On August 27, 2020, respondent, while in Missouri with an adult accomplice, allegedly took Joshua Luterman‘s 2019 Volkswagen Jetta by force or the threat of force. The two then drove the car across the river into Illinois, where they were both apprehended. Respondent was 16 years old at the time of the offense. He resides in Illinois with his mother.
¶ 3 On September 28, 2020, the State filed an amended four-count petition to adjudicate respondеnt a delinquent minor. Count I alleged that, on August 27, 2020, while in Missouri, respondent took a motor vehicle by force or threat of force, while armed with a firearm, in violation of section 18-4(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (
¶ 4 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss count I on the ground that the circuit court did not have the authority to consider a prosecution for acts committed by a juvenile entirely outside of Illinois. In response, the State asserted that juvenile
¶ 5 On January 6, 2021, the circuit court entered an order holding that it did not have the authority, or the required jurisdiction, to rule on violations of Missouri law. Consequently, the circuit court dismissed count I and allowed the remaining three counts to proceed.
¶ 6 The appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on all four counts. 2021 IL App (5th) 210029, ¶ 24. The appellate court found that the plain language of section 5-120 of the Act is clear and unambiguous and that it authorizes delinquency procеedings against a minor in Illinois who violates another state‘s law. Id. ¶ 22. The appellate court therefore found that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the charge contained in count I. Id.
¶ 7 This court granted respondent‘s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
ANALYSIS
¶ 8 The sole issue before us is whether, under section 5-120 of the Act, the State may bring a juvenile delinquency petition against respondent for alleged unlawful conduct committed outside of Illinois.
¶ 9 The parties agree that this question is a narrow one, concerning the proper construction of the Act, subject to de novo review. People v. Giraud, 2012 IL 113116, ¶ 6. The principles guiding our analysis are well established. Our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent, the surest and most reliable indicator of which is the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. In determining the plain meaning of statutory terms, we consider the statute in its entirеty, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it. Id. Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must apply it as written, without resort to extrinsic aids to statutory construction. Id.
¶ 10 This appeal turns on the proper construction of section 5-120 of the Act, which states:
Exclusive jurisdiction. Proceedings may be instituted under the provisions of this Article concerning any minor who prior to his or her 18th birthday has violated or аttempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance. Except as provided in Sections 5-125, 5-130, 5-805, and 5-810 of this Article, no minor who was under 18 years of age at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State. (Emphasis added.)
705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2020) .
¶ 11 As this court has previously explained,
¶ 12 We find the language of section 5-120 unambiguously authorizes delinquency proceedings in Illinois when a minor engages in unlawful conduct in this or any other state. Our legislature chose to use the word any in this provision before federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance. The word any is defined to indicate one that is selected without restriction or limitation of choice. Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 97
¶ 13 Furthermore, section 5-120 specifically authorizes prosecution in juvenile court in Illinois for a violation of any federal law, regardless of where the act occurred. That a minor may be adjudicated delinquent for violating any federal law, whether in Illinois оr elsewhere, further supports our conclusion that any *** State *** law was similarly intended by the legislature not to be limited to violations that occur in Illinois.
¶ 14 Respondent attempts to circumvent the plain language of section 5-120 by arguing that it does not allow prosecution for his alleged conduct in Missouri because the legislature chose to capitalize State to refer to the State of Illinois. As the appellate court recognized, respоndent points to no grammar, style, or principle of bill drafting to show that capitalization of the word State always indicates the State of Illinois. We similarly find no evidence that capitalization of the word State with no qualifying language such as this or State of Illinois, means only State of Illinois. Respondent‘s suggested construction would also require this court to improperly construe the word State in section 5-120 in isolation, rather than in light of the other words and phrases in the provision. It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous it must be applied as written, and we cannot depart from the plain language by reading into it exceptions or limitations not expressed by our legislature. In re Jarquan B., 2017 IL 121483, ¶ 22.
¶ 15 Similarly, respondent‘s reliance upon section 5-101(3) of the Act‘s purpose and policy provision, in conjunction with the adult criminal jurisdiction provision contained in section 1-5(a) of the Code (
¶ 16 Respondent also asserts that, if this delinquency proceeding may proceed fоr conduct that occurred in Missouri, it may be difficult for counsel to interview witnesses in another state and to issue subpoenas and request witnesses from another state to testify and it may require counsel to familiarize himself with the laws of another state. As the appellate court recognized, these arguments are simply based on practical and policy objections to juvenile delinquency proceedings based on out-of-state conduct. Thе only issue we are addressing in this appeal is whether the State has the authority to initiate delinquency proceedings for an offense that was not committed in Illinois. That question requires us only to interpret the plain language of section 5-120, without consideration of any potential inconveniences to the court, witnesses, or counsel.
¶ 17 Finally, we note that the purpose of the Act is to promote a juvenile justice system capable of deаling with the problem of juvenile delinquency, a system that will protect the community, impose accountability for violations of the law, and equip juvenile offenders with competencies to live responsibly and productively.
¶ 18 The Act also instructs that juvenile justice polices should, inter alia, [i]nclude the minor‘s family in the case management plan, [a]llow minors to reside within their homes whenever possible and appropriate and provide support necessary to make this possible, and [p]rovide programs and services that are community-based and that are in close proximity to the minor‘s home.
¶ 19 Because we hold that the plain language of the Act allows for a delinquency proceeding for out-of-state conduct, the circuit cоurt erred in dismissing count I of the petition against respondent.
CONCLUSION
¶ 20 Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court‘s judgment and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 21 Appellate court judgment affirmed.
¶ 23 Cause remanded.
¶ 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ANNE M. BURKE, specially concurring:
¶ 25 Although I agree with the result reached by the majority in affirming the judgment of the appellate court, I disagree with portions of the majority‘s reasoning. I therefore specially concur.
¶ 26 At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of section 5-120 of the Juvenilе Court Act of 1987 (
Exclusive jurisdiction. Proceedings may be instituted under the provisions of this Article concerning any minor who prior to his or her 18th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance. Except as provided in Sections 5-125, 5-130, 5-805, and 5-810 of this Article, no minor who was under 18 years of age at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State. (Emphasis added.)
Id.
¶ 27 The appellate court interpreted the language emphasized above to mean that proceedings may be instituted in juvenile court in Illinois for a violation, or attempted violation, of any Illinois criminal law or any criminal law of the other 49 states. To hold that section 5-120 refers only to Illinois criminal law, the appellate court explained, would be contrary to the statute‘s plain language and would require this court to disregard the statute‘s reference to any violations of the law, wherever they may occur, including those laws of other states, counties, municipalities, or federal law. (Emphasis in original.) 2021 IL App (5th) 210029, ¶ 13.
¶ 28 The appellate court thus concluded that section 5-120 incorporates by reference the criminal laws of both Illinois and all 49 other states. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 5 Ill. 2d 117, 122 (1955) (when a statute incorporates the law of another jurisdiction it is the same as though the statutе or the provisions adopted had been incorporated bodily into the adopting statute (quoting Evans v. Illinois Surety Co., 298 Ill. 101, 106 (1921), quoting People ex rel. Cant v. Crossley, 261 Ill. 78, 85 (1913))); In re Jose C., 198 P.3d 1087, 1095 (Cal. 2009) (explaining that the incorporation of federal criminal law into the state delinquency act created an independent state action). In this way, the criminal laws of the other states may serve as the basis for a juvenile adjudication in an Illinois circuit court, just as the criminal laws of Illinois do.
¶ 29 Affirming the appellate court, the majority similarly concludеs that section 5-120 incorporates by reference, and without qualification, the penal codes of the other 49 states. The majority holds that the legislature‘s use of the word ‘any’ in this regard demonstrates its intent to authorize the State to initiate delinquency proceedings for unlawful conduct by a minor, including for a violation of another state‘s laws. Supra ¶ 13. I disagree.
¶ 30 The majority‘s reading of section 5-120 is unpersuasive because it fails to account for the fact that the criminal laws of Illinois will often conflict with the laws of our sister states, particularly in controversial areas such as gun possession,
¶ 31 Moreover, the conduct need not occur in another state. As the majority stresses, section 5-120 excludes any geographic restriction on the conduct of a minor that may result in a delinquency proceeding by including language authorizing such a proceeding for conduct ‘regardless of where the act occurred.’ Supra ¶ 13 (quoting
¶ 32 The majority maintains, however, that it is simply adhering to the plain language of the statute. The majority rejects respondent‘s argument that, because the word State is capitalized in section 5-120, the legislature intended the word to mean Illinois and the statute therefore references only violations of Illinois law. According to the majority, there is no principle of grammar, style, or bill drafting that supports this argument. Supra ¶ 15. Here, too, I disagree.
¶ 33 This court‘s own style manual adopts the usage principle urged by respondent, instructing that the word State should be capitalized when used in lieu of the word Illinois. Style Manual for the Supreme and Appellate Courts of Illinois 37 (5th ed. 2017) (Capitalization). Indeed, thе majority itself uses the very principle which it says does not exist. Announcing its holding, the majority states that the legislature‘s use of the word any in section 2-150 demonstrates its intent to authorize the State [(here capitalized to mean ‘Illinois‘)] to initiate delinquency proceedings for unlawful conduct by a minor, including for a violation of another state‘s [(here in lower case)] laws. Supra ¶ 13.
¶ 34 The word State in section 2-150 is clearly being used in lieu of the word Illinois. Thus, the rule set forth in section 2-150 is that delinquency proceedings may be initiated in Illinois for a violation or attempted violation of any Illinois law but not the laws of all other 49 states.1 The majority‘s contrary reading of the statute is at odds with the ordinary usage of the capitalized word State and leads to results that simply cannot have been contemplated by the legislature.
¶ 35 This is not, however, the end of the analysis. Section 2-150 states that delinquency proceedings may be initiated for a violation of Illinois law, regardless of where the act occurred. So, by its plain terms, section 2-150 authorizes the State
¶ 36 Respondent maintains, however, that Illinois lacks the рower, or legislative jurisdiction, to authorize delinquency proceedings for conduct that occurs entirely within another state. In support, respondent points to section 1-5(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (
¶ 37 Respondent also contends that conducting delinquency proceedings in Illinois for conduct that took place in Missouri raises due process concerns, arguing in essence that it is unfair and illogical to apply section 2-150 here. I disagree.
¶ 38 The Juvenile Court Act is a codification and exercise of the powers of the State as parens patriae (People ex rel. Houghland v. Leonard, 415 Ill. 135, 138 (1953)), to which respondent, as a juvenile resident of Illinois, is subject. It is well settled that the State, acting as parens patriae, is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children‘s vulnerability and may exercise broad authority over their activities to afford them protection. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634-35 (1979). Given this legal framework, it would be wholly inconsistent to say that the State has an obligation to protect and rehabilitate respondent but that it may not initiate delinquency proceedings in Illinois. And this is particularly true here, where Missouri has no power as parens patriae and has not requested respondent‘s return under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles Act (
¶ 39 Further, as the State points out, in many respects respondent benefits from having the delinquency proceedings initiated in Illinois rather than Missouri. While both the Illinois and Missоuri juvenile justice systems emphasize rehabilitation through family and community-based interventions, as the place of his residence, Illinois is better positioned than Missouri to ensure that the respondent‘s family and community are involved in the rehabilitative process and that there is no more disruption in respondent‘s life than is necessary
¶ 40 Finally, respondent contends that practical difficulties in conducting a defense, such as interviewing witnesses or obtaining evidencе, may arise when delinquency proceedings are held in Illinois for conduct that occurred in another state. However, to the extent that respondent is asserting that practical concerns have risen to the level of a due process violation in this case, the allegations are premature, as there is no evidence of record that any practical difficulties do, in fact, exist. See, e.g., Vasquez Gonzalez v. Union Health Servicе, Inc., 2018 IL 123025, ¶ 24 (findings of fact are required to determine whether a statute is unconstitutional as applied). Should serious impediments to conducting a defense actually arise on remand, respondent is free to raise those concerns in the circuit court, as would any juvenile subject to delinquency proceedings for conduct that occurred in another state.
¶ 41 For these reasons, I specially concur.
¶ 42 JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.