*1 CONCLUSION that section 115— reasons, we hold foregoing For the Procedure is constitutional of the Code of Criminal 7.4 admission of the trial court to allow permits and that of other crimes of domestic violence to establish evidence crime of of a defendant to commit a propensity if the of the statute and requirements domestic violence The judg- of other rules of are met. applicable evidence appellate ment of the court is affirmed.
Affirmed. (No. 108403. (The R.,
In re a Minor Il- People LUIS State of linois, R., v. Luis Appellant, Appellee).
Opinion December 2010. filed *2 General, and Madigan, Attorney Springfield, Lisa (Michael Courier, Attorney, of Belvidere Michelle Scodro, General, A. Solicitor and Michael M. Glick General, Soltanzadeh, Attorneys Assistant Stephen M. Chicago, Delfino, M. Bauer and and Patrick Lawrence Cynthia Schneider, At- N. of the Office of the State’s counsel), Elgin, torneys Appellate Prosecutor, of for People. appellee. Raridon, Rockford, Michael W. for judgment THOMAS delivered the JUSTICE opinion. court, with Garman,
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Karmeier, and Theis concurred in the opinion. opinion, joined by dissented,
Justice Freeman with Justice Burke. opinion, joined by dissented,
Justice Burke with Justice Freeman.
OPINION The State filed a in the circuit court of Boone County alleging respondent, R., Luis was a delin- quent *3 minor. The trial court dismissed that for a jurisdiction. lack of The issue before us is whether that follow, dismissal warranted. was For the reasons that we hold that was not.
BACKGROUND August 8, 2007, On the State filed a in the County alleging respondent circuit court of Boone delinquent seeking was a minor and him to make a ward 520(2) (West 2008). of the court. 705 ILCS The 405/5— petition charged aggravated two counts of criminal sexual arising assault, from conduct that occurred “on about or through August Respondent immediately June of 2000.” petition, arguing that, moved to dismiss the because he years old, was now 21 the trial court was “without person.” [his] State, turn, over moved (see to prosecute respondent under the criminal laws 805(3) (West 2008)) and, ILCS in a mo- separate 405/5 — tion, asked the trial court to designate proceedings as (see an extended juvenile prosecution (West 2008)). ILCS ruling Without on either 405/5 —810 motions, of the State’s granted respon- the trial court dent’s motion to dismiss.
The State and the appealed, appellate affirmed. 388 Ill. 3d 730. In App. doing, began by so the court examining Act, section 5 — 120 of the Juvenile Court which states relevant part: jurisdiction. Proceedings may “Exclusive be instituted provisions concerning any under the of this Article minor prior birthday who to the minor’s 17th has violated or at- *** tempted any municipal to violate federal or State law or *** county Except provided or ordinance ***. as in [certain Act], other sections of the no minor who was under 17 years age alleged may at the time of the offense be prosecuted under the criminal of this laws State.” 705 (West 2008). ILCS 405/5 —120 105(10) that, The court then noted under section 5— Act, a “minor” is defined as “a under the person age 105(10) years subject of 21 to this Act.” 705 ILCS 405/5 — (West 2008). Thus, according plain language to the Act, the under proceedings State institute Act (1) only against persons age who are under the (2) turning 17, to violate prior attempted violated Here, although petition alleged law. he committed the younger than 17 when crimes, longer age was no “under alleged Accordingly, of 21” at the time that was filed. that, literally,” court held “read section appellate proceed- 5—120 “does not authorize the State to institute Act, ings [against respondent] though under even allegedly he years age under 17 when respondent was omitted.) App. (Emphasis committed the crime.” there, on appellate From court went at 732-33. *4 for any grounds depart- there are “to consider whether
299 ing interpretation” of the Ill. from literal Act.1388 Concluding ap- App. not, 733. were 3d at there pellate dismissing order court affirmed the trial court’s jurisdiction. App. lack Ill. for of 388 3d at 738-39. appeal. for
We allowed the State’s leave to 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.
ANALYSIS properly is trial The issue before us whether the court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the State’s delinquency petition jurisdiction. lack for The absence presence jurisdiction purely legal question, ais our therefore de review novo. In re Detention Har- (2010). din, 33, Ill. 2d 39 outset,
At the we note that there is some confusion in the record as to the exact for the basis trial court’s grant respondent’s decision to motion to dismiss. More precisely,it is not clear whether the trial court’s decision upon perceived jurisdiction, personal was based lack of perceived or a lack of over matter. hand, On the one the motion that filed the circuit court asserts that dismissal is warranted because [respondent’s the trial person].” Similarly, “is court without over grant- the trial court’s written order ing explicitly that motion states that the basis for the ruling trial court’s it “lacks over [respondent].” phrasing clearly This indicates both portion appellate analysis
1This an includes age alleged examination whether at time of the prosecution offenses him insulates from criminal for those crimes. App. Although ultimately appellate Ill. at 737-38. opinion did express question, an on this the entire discussion advisory have should not been included in the court’s disposition. Schwartz, See Golden Rule Insurance v. Ill. 2d Co. (“[t]he (2003) advisory do courts Illinois not issue opinions guide litigation”). future
300 requesting and that trial court was personal the lack
granting a dismissal based on subject matter jurisdiction. on the lack jurisdiction, not hand, hearing On the other the trial court concluded the following on motion dismiss with respondent’s pronouncement: oral just jurisdiction
“I’m
ruling that
there is no
under the
proceeding,
Juvenile Court Act for
and the motion is
this
added.)
heard
granted.” (Emphasis
and
context,
In this
the trial
of the
“proceed-
court’s use
word
more
ing” suggests
the trial court was concerned
than
subject
jurisdiction
jurisdic-
with its
matter
with its
court,
Likewise,
person.
tion over
in this
respondent’s
in
strictly
briefed and
this case
parties
argued
have
jurisdiction
matter
subject
terms of the trial court’s
any arguments
contesting
either
or
have
raised
defending
jurisdiction
over respondent’s
the court’s
So
this
to be a
standpoints,
appears
from those
person.
confusion,
subject matter
case. Given this
jurisdiction
ultimately makes no
to our
and because it
difference
is,
questions
will address both
disposition, we
—that
jurisdiction
whether
the trial court had
over
court had
over
person, and whether
trial
subject
matter.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
jurisdiction.
begin
subject
We
with the court’s
matter
as a
“subject
jurisdiction”
matter
This court defines
“
hear
power
‘to
and determine
cases
proceeding
question
to which the
general
class
”
M.W.,
408,
(2009),
In re
quot-
232
2d
belongs.’
Ill.
415
U.S.A.,
Sales,
Inc.
Motor
Toyota,
Toyota
Belleville
v.
ing
(2002).
Inc.,
325,
only
exception
334
With
one
“
here,
mat-
is not
‘a circuit court’s
relevant
entirely by our state constitu-
jurisdiction is conferred
ter
”
Toyota,
M.W.,
Belleville
424,
Ill. 2d at
quoting
tion.’
232
provision
constitutional
Ill. 2d
334. The relevant
at
VI,
article
which states:
is section
original
all
“Circuit Courts shall have
justiciable
except
Supreme
has
matters
when
Court
jurisdiction relating
redistricting
original and exclusive
Assembly
ability
General
to the
of the Governor
office.
shall have such
serve
resume
Circuit Courts
power
provided by
action
law.”
review administrative
as
VI, §9.
art.
Ill. Const.
except
Thus,
review,
an
the context of administrative
possesses subject
circuit
Illinois
“justiciable
brought
as
over
a matter of law
all
matters”
M.W.,
before it.
Ill. 2d
424.
at
Generally speaking,
“justiciable
matter”
“a
controversy appropriate
court,
for
in that
review
*6
opposed
hypothetical
it
concrete,
is definite and
as
to
or
touching upon
legal
parties having
moot,
the
relations of
legal
Toyota,
adverse
interests.” Belleville
2d at
Ill.
subject
jurisdic-
335. To invoke a circuit court’s
matter
complaint
only “alleg[e]
tion, a
need
the exis-
justiciable
M.W.,
tence of
matter.”
In Belleville for the was issue compliance statutory period whether with the limitations jurisdictional prerequisite asserting is a a claim under (815 seq. the Motor Vehicle Act Franchise ILCS et 710/1 (West 2000)). Toyota, Belleville 199 Ill. 2d at The 333. argued plain- defendants in that, that case because the purely statutory origin, tiffs cause of action was the subject jurisdiction circuit court’s exercise of matter was upon plaintiff’s compli- conditioned the demonstrated conditions, statutory including with all the limita- anee that period. rejected argument, explaining tions We this circuit matter is defined not subject jurisdiction court’s constitution, the authorizing by the statute but state only the to the court’s exercise prerequisite therefore jurisdiction “justi- the asserted claim is Toyota, ciable.” Belleville Moreover, Ill. 2d at 334-35. long if it as the explained, defectively, we even does so so alleges justiciable the existence of a plaintiffs complaint matter, possesses trial court adjudicate complaint, “[sjubject jurisdic- matter as legal sufficiency of the upon tion does not depend Toyota, 199 Ill. Therefore, pleadings.” Belleville at 340. in actual concluded, plaintiff whether or not the was we compliance statutory period, with limitations “to hear and circuit had matter among plaintiff’s determine claim because cases —those a claim under general presenting class of Act, a justiciable mat- [Motor Franchise] Vehicle granted constitutionally the court’s ter — to which Toyota, extends.” Belleville original 2d at 340. case, then, question in this is whether alleges justiciable existence
delinquency constitutionally which circuit Clearly, extends. it does. The granted original jurisdiction *7 5 — 520 a under section petition State’s asserts claim (705 Act of 1987 ILCS the Juvenile Court 405/5 — 520 (West 2008)). authorizes specifically That section alleging that petitions to file in the circuit court State that minor and praying is a respondent delinquent The State’s minor a ward of court. adjudged be definitely concretely, and it so does this does petition detail offenses with alleged forth setting adjudged respondent that be requesting and specifically then, face, petition its State’s On ward court. alleges justiciable matter, of a which is the the existence subject only prerequisite exercise to the trial court’s jurisdiction Accordingly, in case. to matter this the extent upon subject perceived lack matter that was based jurisdiction, dismissing the trial court’s order petition inwas error. reaching recognize
Now, result, in this we that there potentially pleading delinquency is a fatal defect in the in if that the State filed this case. Even pos- however, case, turns out to be the the trial court subject requisite sessed the matter adjudicate petition. because, This is wish and we very subject clear, make this ing matter has noth- legal sufficiency to do with the of the asserted claim. only Rather, the consideration is whether the asserted legally proper claim, not, sufficient or was filed subject present, it was, tribunal. If matter is legally present whether or the claim is defective. The provides perfect principle. case illustration of this Respondent’s motion to did dismiss not assert that Il- authority linois circuit courts lack the inherent adjudicate delinquency petitions, peti- or that the State’s tion should tribunal, have been filed a different such Rights as the Illinois Human Commission the Court of patently Claims. Such a motion would have been frivo- authority adjudicate lous, as the circuit court’s delinquency petitions beyond dispute. respon- Rather, is particular delinquency dent’s motion asserted that this legally is defective in that falls persons against petitions outside class such whom may lawfully very be filed. While well be correct, the fact remains that someone has to decide that question in the first instance. And tribunal with the authority to make that decision the tribunal with jurisdiction. Here, tribunal circuit court. *8 statutory the is not
Admittedly, language relevant phrase jurisdic “exclusive as the inclusion helpful, impression title the that tion” section 5—120’s creates grants authority to the circuit section 5—120 somehow juvenile and adjudicate delinquency petitions, to that section are that the limitations contained within jurisdiction. the court’s therefore limitations on circuit seen, the creates already legislature But as we have once matter, justiciable authority the circuit exclusively matter derives from the state adjudicate that by cannot be limited the and therefore constitution Toyota, statute. Belleville at 334- authorizing said, misleading, is as that 35. That section 5 — 120’s title section is authority in fact to the circuit grant authority Rather, grant section 5 — 120 is a court. State, specifically defining persons against the class of lawfully delin may juvenile initiate whom the State quency petitions: may provisions of
“Proceedings instituted under the be any prior to the minor’s concerning minor who this Article *** any birthday attempted or to violate 17th has violated federal, State, ***.” ILCS municipal law county (West 2008). 405/5 —120 course, restricts class legislature
Of that juvenile the State initiate persons against whom State is no guarantee delinquency proceedings is restrictions. This where always will abide those adjudicate court, authority and its inherent circuit juvenile matters,” By initiating “all comes in. justiciable al- is, by filing delinquency proceedings —that delinquent minor and is a leging made a ward of the be praying justiciable is existence of alleging the court —the State subject circuit court’s point, At this matter. authority it all possesses triggered, claim, including merits of the State’s adjudicate authority grant of outside the that claim falls whether effectively That what the conferred section 5—120. undeniably pos- here, trial court was asked to do authority to do so. sessed *9 reasons,
For these we hold that the circuit court possessed subject jurisdiction below matter over the petition. delinquency petition State’s dismissal Its subject jurisdiction lack for matter was er- therefore roneous.
Personal Jurisdiction
possessed
We now
the circuit
consider whether
jurisdiction
respondent’s person.
over
Unlike
jurisdiction,
by
filing
which is invoked
of a
complaint alleging
justiciable
or
the existence of a
“
personal jurisdiction
matter,
‘derived from the ac
”
sought
person
tions of the
M.W.,
to be bound.’
232 Ill.
quoting
Properties
426,
2d at
Prezell,
v.
Meldoc
158 Ill.
(1987).
App.
petitioner
plaintiff
212,
3d
Thus,
216
a
or
jurisdiction
by filing peti
submits to the
of the court
“
complaint,
‘thereby seeking
tion or
to be bound to the
”
M.W.,
426,
resolution’
thereof.
2d
Ill.
at
(2004).
quoting
Snyder,
App.
35,
Owens v.
respondent
by
A
defendant,
or
contrast, either has
personal jurisdiction imposed upon
by
him the effective
jurisdiction
personal
summons,
service of
or consents to
appearance. M.W.,
his
426;
232 Ill. 2d at
see also 705
525(4) (West 2008) (“[t]he appearance
ILCS
405/5 —
*** person
respondent
petition,
any
named
aas
in a
proceeding under this Act shall
constitute waiver of
court”).
jurisdiction
service and submission to the
question
Here,
there
no
that the circuit court had
respondent’s person. Although
over
initial summons issued to
returned
was
unserved,
nevertheless consented
person August
circuit court’s
17,
over his
on
general appearance
his
when
counsel filed a
in this
cause on his
M.W.,
427-28;
behalf. See
ILCS extent 405/5 — delinquency trial dismissing court’s order premised on lack over it respondent’s person, likewise was error. Remaining Issues them in the context of Although attempts to frame jurisdiction, the circuit court’s the State raises two ad- beyond jurisdictional the pure ditional issues that extend (1) are whether discussed above. These issues questions motion to granted trial court have the State’s should criminal proceedings to the division for transfer (2) criminal whether State prosecution; law for respondent under the criminal offenses prosecute allegedly committed as a minor. We decline to address he these issues. “ pass It Illinois courts ‘cannot is well settled law, render propositions on mere abstract future advisory opinion, give legal advice as to an *10 ” Hospital, v. Gottlieb Memorial 237 Ill. Lebron events.’ (2010) 217, (Karmeier, J., concurring in part 2d and Stokes Garman, J.), quoting part, joined by dissenting (1998). Co., Pekin Insurance v. App. us do here. asking this the State is to exactly Yet is what dismiss, to granted it motion respondent’s Because transfer mo upon circuit never ruled court pending, remains and tion. That motion therefore remand. up circuit court take it on presumably the will stands, this court simply nothing it there is for As authority As the State’s this for question. review on law, criminal the State respondent under prosecute criminal charges against respondent, any filed yet has do may never so. Conse for all this court knows ruling question for a on this request the State’s quently, on how legal advice more than solicitation nothing does not something emphatically this court proceed, reasons, address ad we decline to For these dispense. the State. issues raised ditional
CONCLUSION question pos- There is no that the circuit court below subject sessed over the matter and over respondent’s person, and the erred circuit court therefore granting Accordingly, motion to dismiss. judgment appellate court, we reverse the of the reverse judgment court, circuit and remand the cause proceedings to the circuit court for further consistent with this decision.
Judgments reversed; cause remanded. dissenting: FREEMAN, JUSTICE relatively May simple The issue in this case is a one. petition juvenile delinquency a circuit court entertain years age? when the of the is 21 simple: answer is reason, the court For not. correctly delinquency petition circuit court dismissed the appellate case, filed in this and the recognizing should be affirmed. Instead of that the circuit powerless grant requested court is the relief in the petition, adjudication i.e., the as a delinquent court, and a ward of the the court instead sending insists on the case back to the circuit “for proceedings further consistent with this decision.” 239 proceedings given Ill. 2d at 307. occur, What further can anybody’sguess. separately facts, I, therefore, write my why longer to set forth views on the State can no obtain relief from on circuit court its for delinquency.
Article V the Act, Juvenile Court which addresses delinquent special procedural minors, creates substantive enclave for minors accused of criminal acts. *11 “ only purpose Not is the of this article to with ‘dealt 1 ” (In problem juvenile delinquency’ of P., re Jaime (2006), quoting 223 Ill. 2d 534 705 ILCS 405/5— 101(1) (West 1998)), “overriding purpose” but its is to
308 ” those ‘under in of delinquency age
“deal with 21.’ added.) P., Jaime 534, quoting Ill. 2d at (Emphasis 223 (West 1998). 101(10) 705 ILCS 405/5 — V, According delinquent article a minor “means birthday minor who to his or her 17th has any prior violate, attempted regardless of where violated law, occurred, county or any municipal act federal or State 105(3) (West 2008). A 705 ILCS ordinance.” 405/5 — age years.” as a under the of “person minor defined (West 2008). 105(10) In furtherance 705 ILCS 405/5 — Y, under article a minor be accorded purpose, its not and treatment available to preferential protective special crimes. For committing example, adults accused of in proceedings not adult criminal obligations applicable (705 arresting ILCS imposed are on the officer 405/5— (705 (West 2008)), ILCS pretrial judge 405/5 —501 (West (705 2008)), Attorney ILCS 405/5— (West (705 415(2) 2008)), trial ILCS judge 405/5— (West 2008)). special result of these ultimate differs, ways, from that of an procedures substantial Indeed, prosecu- a successful adult criminal proceeding. crime, in a conviction of tion under article V results not adjudication delinquency. Although in an but rather detention, placed be juvenile adjudged delinquent of the beyond the attainment go the detention cannot 750(3) (West 2008). Finally, 705 ILCS age 21. 405/5 — “automatically statute, under the Act by proceedings all age [respondent’s] attaining upon terminate 2008). (West 755(1) years.” 705 ILCS 405/5 — definition, of 21 age over the Accordingly, by persons Act. There is no protections are not entitled to over 21 here was in this case that defendant dispute The Act its instituted. proceedings were when importantly, him. More apply language own does enter a longer court could no the circuit delay, By of the State’s against him. virtue delinquency as juvenile his status outgrown has defendant
309 The circuit does purposes and benefits Act. court the to the authority adjudicate not have matter of such, As the circuit cor- delinquency. rectly petition. dismissed the State’s statutory than apply provisions,
Rather the the court gets by arguments distracted regarding have personal jurisdiction, concepts nothing that to with do the real issue: whether the circuit court has the of authority under article V the Juvenile Court Act to
adjudicate a petition
delinquency
against
filed
a 21-
year-old.
legislature
There
no question
the
made
adjudication
the
of a minor’s
delinquency
“justiciable
matter”
in
as
term is used
section 9 of article VI of
re A.H.,
408,
Illinois Constitution. In
415-17
(2009)
(2001);
M.W.,
408,
re
In
232 Ill. 2d
444
(Freeman,
J., specially concurring,
by
joined
Burke,
Thomas and
JJ.).
problem
that,
The
though remains
because the
old,
21
years
Act
longer
no
applies
him, which renders
grant
the circuit court unable to
A.H.,
relief under the Act.
In
416;
See
re
Ill. 2d at
195
see
People
also
ex rel.
v. Village
Bluff,
Lake
206
Graf
(Freeman,
(2003)
541,
J.,
Ill. 2d
564
dissenting, joined by
McMorrow, C.J.), citing
M.M.,
53,
In re
156 Ill. 2d
(1993)
J.).
(Miller, C.J.,
Bilandic,
concurring, joined by
A
court cannot
judgment
enter a
by
unauthorized
law.
People ex rel. Ryan Roe,
(2002);
v.
JUSTICE majority assigns I because it join cannot about that does circuit court “confusion” in this case is created only not exist. confusion interpret which chooses the circuit majority, way, term one while “jurisdiction” court’s use of the “jurisdic- the term interpretation a different adopting by respondent is used tion” when term interpret consistently. Do- *13 I would term legislature. that the circuit court was ing so leads to the conclusion filed delinquency petition the correct when dismissed I affirm the Accordingly, in would this case.
the court. appellate 8, 2007, peti- delinquency
On the State filed a August R., him with two against respondent charging Luis tion allegedly criminal sexual assault aggravated counts Because of August June and of 2000. committed between of the in time the commission crimes gap the between who had been petition, respondent, the of the filing occurred, had reached the charged minor the acts when R. dismissal the Accordingly, sought of 21. Luis age “jurisdic- the court did not have petition, arguing that him. tion” over motion to granted
The respondent’s circuit court delinquency dismissing the State’s dismiss. In its order agreed respondent, circuit court with petition, the jurisdiction [respon- the over indicating that court “lacks hearing on the at the pronouncements In its oral dent].” there no motion, said, ruling “I’m that just the court Act for this the Court under Juvenile statements, From majority the these two proceeding.” “confused” on the court was the circuit concludes then launches into majority of jurisdiction. constitutionally nature of derived on discussion reiterating jurisdiction, subject-matter circuit court’s U.S.A., Sales, Motor Toyota, Toyota Inc. v. Belleville what Inc., (2002), amend- Ill. 2d 325 made clear —that constitution, judicial ments to the article of the VI, in current enacted in and retained our article 9, with a integrated system section created a single “ ‘original jurisdiction enjoys unified circuit court which ” Belleville, 337, of all 199 Ill. 2d at justiciable matters.’ 1964). (amended VI, §9 Const. art. After quoting Ill. discussion, reaches rather majority this then pos- determination circuit court unremarkable I subject-matter sessed in this case.2 What find puzzling why majority necessary finds it engage this discussion. above, filed delinquency
As noted after the State its petition against court, respon- the circuit dent petition dismissed, moved to have arguing the circuit court had Interpret- no over him. ing “jurisdiction,” use term majority not does conclude that contend- ing that the circuit jurisdiction. court lacked article VI Rather, majority states:
“Respondent’s did motion dismiss that Il- assert adjudi- linois circuit authority courts lack inherent delinquency petitions, cate or that *14 tribunal, should have been filed in a different such as the Human Rights Illinois or the Commission Court of Claims. frivolous, Such a motion would have patently been as the authority adjudicate circuit court’s delinquency peti- to beyond Rather, dispute. tions is motion as- particular serted that this delinquency petition legally in defective that falls outside the class of against persons petitions may lawfully whom such be 239 Ill. filed.” 2d at 303. majority statute, also section discusses the
5—120 the Juvenile Court Act of which the majority possessed 2The also the circuit determines that court personal jurisdiction respondent, parties over issue that the do an dispute. not in applied reaching grant
circuit court its decision to (West 2008). The major dismissal. 705 ILCS 405/5 —120 ity notes that section 5 — 120 of the Act is entitled “exclusive and finds this use of the term jurisdiction,” However, Ill. 2d at helpful.” “not 304. term again rejects the the notion that the majority section, in “jurisdiction,” as used this was intended authority the the in article VI scope limit court’s the Rather, harkening to its earlier discussion of sense. back Belleville VI, that Toyota majority and article finds as section is simply “misleading, section 5 — 120 is that not authority in fact to the circuit court. grant State, Rather, is a grant authority section 5—120 whom specifically defining persons against class of lawfully peti juvenile delinquency the State initiate original.) at 304. (Emphases tions.” If the term majority interpret “jurisdiction” can legislature in such a by respondent as used our constitution, why that not offend should way does our be to the assigned different circuit interpretation court, likely presumed that which is ruling? Isn’t it law, “that asserting Illinois circuit to know the was authority adjudicate inherent delin- courts lack the should have quency petitions, or that the State’s And it more been filed in a different tribunal”? isn’t did not the circuit court ruled that it likely when meant, like the “jurisdiction” respondent, have it “legally defective persons against peti- whom such falls outside the class be may lawfully tions filed”? different to the
By selectively assigning meanings blinds itself “jurisdiction,” majority term When behind circuit court’s order. actual rationale to dismiss granted respondent’s circuit motion that, as it did not mean “jurisdiction,” and said it lacked ruling. to enter a court, authority lacked a circuit *15 just Rather, like and section 5—120 of the legally Act, the circuit court meant that the was ruling defective. The correctness is the issue that majority Instead, should be addressed. concludes that the circuit court has article VI —a actually disputes that no one remands this matter —and unspecified proceedings,” to the circuit court for “further wasting money pre- the time and State, as well as judicial purpose cious I resources. can see no to such a course of action. my appellate view,
In should be affirmed. As Chief Justice Miller stated in his concur- (1993) (Miller, M.M., rence in In re 156 Ill. 2d C.J., concurring, joined by J.), Bilandic,
“That a circuit court’s over a certain matter by conferred the constitution by rather than legislature mean, however, does not that a court is free to ways act in inconsistent controlling with statutory law ***. Clearly, the constitutional source of a circuit court’s carry does not with it a disregard license to language of a statute.” properly
The circuit court dismissed the State’s juvenile delinquency petition against respondent. To have done otherwise would have been “inconsistent with controlling statutory law.” The fact that the circuit court “jurisdiction” used the term same term used —the legislature ruling and the its should not —in reality distract us from the that dismissal of the proper. joins JUSTICE FREEMAN in this dissent.