In re KELAN W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Kelan W., Respondent-Appellee).
No. 5-21-0029
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District
December 1, 2021
2021 IL App (5th) 210029
PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Moore and Vaughan concurred in the judgment and opinion.
NOTICE: Decision filed 12/01/21. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same. Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, No. 20-JD-192, Honorable William G. Clay IV, Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Moore and Vaughan concurred
OPINION
¶ 1 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 2 Respondent, Kelan W., a minor, was charged with aggravated vehicular hijacking, unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, aggravated unlawful use of weapon, and misdemeanor theft in an amended petition for adjudication of wardship (petition) filed on September 28, 2020. The petition alleged that the respondent committed aggravated vehicular hijacking in the State of Missouri and committed the other offenses in Illinois. The charge of aggravated vehicular hijacking referenced section 570.023.1 of the Missouri Revised Criminal Code (
¶ 3 The statute the respondent allegedly violated was section 570.023 of the Missouri Revised Criminal Code, which reads as follows: “Robbery in the first degree—penalty. 1. A person commits the offense of robbery in the first degree if he or she forcibly steals property and in the course thereof he or she, or another participant in the offense: *** (2) Is armed with a deadly weapon ***.”
¶ 4 The State filed a response on October 6, 2020. It asserted that juvenile and
¶ 5 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 6 Before we turn to the merits of this appeal, we first address Illinois Supreme Court Rule 660A (eff. July 1, 2018), which requires accelerated disposition in appeals involving delinquent minors. Under Rule 660A, we are directed to issue our decision within 150 days after the filing of the notice of appeal, except for good cause shown. Ill. S. Ct. R. 660A(f) (eff. July 1, 2018). In order to give this case the attention it deserves, this court finds it necessary to file this disposition past the due date, and we find good cause to issue our decision after the 150-day deadline.
¶ 7 This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) and Rule 660A. This case involves a question of statutory interpretation, a purely legal question, and as such the standard of review is de novo. People v. Begay, 2018 IL App (1st) 150446, ¶ 40.
¶ 8 Turning to the merits, the State argues on appeal that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the charge of aggravated vehicular hijacking contained in the State‘s petition on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction over a juvenile who committed an offense in another state. The State further argued that the circuit court erred in finding that it lacked authority to preside over a proceeding enforcing a law of another state. According to the State‘s argument, the circuit court accepted the respondent‘s argument that only violations of Illinois law may be pursued under the Juvenile Court Act. Because that ruling is directly contrary to the plain language of the Juvenile Court Act (
¶ 9 The respondent argues that this court should affirm the circuit court‘s ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to preside over a juvenile who committed an offense in any other state nor authority to preside over a violation of Missouri law. In support of that argument, respondent offers arguments targeted at practicality, policy, and fairness. For example, the respondent argues that prosecution in Illinois for an offense occurring in another state may be impractical where counsel would be required to interview witnesses in another state, issue subpoenas through another state, and familiarize themselves with the laws of another state.
¶ 10 We recognize that attorneys in this state regularly must interview witnesses in other states and our courts must expend resources to coordinate those witnesses’ testimony before our tribunals. Further, attorneys in the State of Illinois must often familiarize themselves with statutes of other jurisdictions. The legislature is the body vested with the responsibility of codifying public policy into law. People ex rel. Madigan v. Bertrand, 2012 IL App (1st) 111419, ¶ 35. The narrow issue in this
¶ 11 The juvenile court system is a creature of legislative design. People v. M.A., 124 Ill. 2d 135, 141 (1988). The legislature has the prerogative of establishing procedural rules for access to the juvenile courts in Illinois. People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 104. As such, the legislature has specifically described the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as follows:
“Exclusive jurisdiction. Proceedings may be instituted under the provisions of this Article concerning any minor who prior to his or her 18th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance. Except as provided in Sections 5-125, 5-130, 5-805, and 5-810 of this Article, no minor who was under 18 years of age at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.”
705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2020).
¶ 12 Our primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc., 238 Ill. 2d 455, 461 (2010). The plain language of a statute is the most reliable indication of legislative intent. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006). When the language of the statute is clear, it must be applied as written without resort to aids or tools of interpretation. Id. This court cannot read into the plain statutory language exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. People v. Youngblood, 365 Ill. App. 3d 210, 211 (2006). Moreover, this court should give independent meaning to all words in the statute. People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 505 (2002). Where, as here, the circuit court‘s power to act is controlled by statute, the circuit court must proceed within the strictures of the statute and may not take any action that exceeds its statutory authority. People ex rel. Devine v. Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d 445, 453-54 (2007). Further, a court exercising jurisdiction over a juvenile pursuant to the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act is not at liberty to reject or embellish its statutory authority, even if there is a perceived need or desirability for such action. Id. at 454.
¶ 13 We are not authorized to construe a statute other than by its plain language where its plain language is clear and unambiguous. Bertrand, 2012 IL App (1st) 111419, ¶ 35. The jurisdictional statute allowing for proceedings to be initiated under the Juvenile Court Act is not ambiguous. The statute permits proceedings to be instituted in the juvenile court for any violation or attempted violation, “regardless of where the act occurred, [of] any federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance.”
¶ 14 The respondent‘s argument that the statute was intended to limit juvenile court jurisdiction to only offenses committed in Illinois is belied by the statute‘s inclusion of federal offenses. Generally, the State of Illinois could not prosecute a criminal defendant for a federal crime. See People v. Archie, 1 Ill. App. 3d 981, 984 (1971);
¶ 15 The State correctly notes that the Juvenile Court Act defines a delinquent minor with language that mirrors the exclusive jurisdiction law in the Juvenile Court Act, as “any minor who prior to his or her 18th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance.”
¶ 16 The respondent argues, and we agree, that the Juvenile Court Act states that “minors shall have all the procedural rights of adults in criminal proceedings, unless specifically precluded by laws that enhance the protection of such minors.”
¶ 17 Juvenile proceedings are “distinct and different from a criminal prosecution” because juveniles are not adjudicated criminals, nor do they suffer the same consequences as convicted adults. People v. Woodruff, 88 Ill. 2d 10, 18-19 (1981). The Juvenile Court Act provides that its purpose is to promote a juvenile justice system capable of dealing with the problem of juvenile delinquency, a system that will protect the community, impose accountability for violations of the law, and equip juvenile offenders with competencies to live responsibly and productively. See
¶ 18 The respondent further argues that the capitalized word “State” in the statute refers to the State of Illinois, not all 50 states of the United States of America. We find that the language of the statute is unambiguous, regardless of the capitalization of the word “State” in the statute. Additionally, we agree with the State that the respondent presents no explanation regarding why the legislature would concurrently limit juvenile jurisdiction to only violations of Illinois law yet permit jurisdiction for any and all violations of federal, county, or municipal law.
¶ 19 While we agree with the respondent that capitalization can change the meaning in some contexts, the respondent argues that it is clear in the usage of the capitalized “State” in both the Criminal Code of 2012 and the Juvenile Court Act that “State” means the State of Illinois. As an example, the respondent points to section 1-5(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012, which reads, “A person is subject to prosecution in this State for an offense which he commits, while either within or outside the State ***.”
¶ 20 The Juvenile Court Act broadens juvenile court jurisdiction to include a violation or attempted violation, “regardless of where the act occurred, [of] any federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance.”
¶ 21 A statute should not be read to include words or language not otherwise expressed. Manago v. County of Cook, 2017 IL 121078, ¶ 10. That the word “State” is capitalized has no significance here except as a scrivener‘s device unless the statute‘s plainly expansive reach and inclusion of any federal law is to be ignored.
¶ 22 We find the plain language of section 5-120 of the Juvenile Court Act, when given its plain and ordinary meaning, is clear and unambiguous. When the language of the statute is clear, it must be applied as written without resort to aids or tools of interpretation. Id. This court cannot read into the plain statutory language exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. Youngblood, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 211. In sum, the plain language of section 5-120 must apply here, and the court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the charge of aggravated vehicular hijacking.
¶ 23 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the St. Clair County circuit court and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 25 Reversed and remanded.
No. 5-21-0029
Cite as: In re Kelan W., 2021 IL App (5th) 210029
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, No. 20-JD-192; the Hon. William G. Clay IV, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys for Appellant: James A. Gomric, State‘s Attorney, of Belleville (Patrick Delfino and Patrick D. Daly, of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Attorneys for Appellee: James E. Chadd, Ellen J. Curry, and Eun Sun Nam, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee.