In re Jacob M.
This opinion is subject to revisions and editorial changes, not of a substantive nature, and corrections of a technical nature prior to publication in the Connecticut Law Journal. ****************************************************************
The respondent parents filed separate appeals to this court from the judgments of the trial court terminating their parental rights with respect to the minor children, N and J. N and J are the biological children of the respondent mother and J is the biological child of the respondent father. The petitions were consolidated for trial. Held:
1. The respondents could not prevail on their claim that the trial court, relying on an executive order issued by the governor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, improperly denied their joint motion for a mistrial on the basis of the court’s failure to render its judgments within 120 days of the completion of the trial as required by statute (
2. The trial court properly concluded that the Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with the minor children, the evidence in the record having supported the court’s determination; the department offered the mother many services over a number of years, including mental health treatment, parent mentoring services, visitation services, domestic violence counseling and transportation, as well as substance abuse treatment, and the mother attended a partial hospitalization program and an intensive outpatient program; moreover, although the department suspended visitation on the recommendation of a therapist, on the basis that the visits to the mother, who was at that time incarcerated, caused the children much emotional distress, the department continued its reunification efforts by regularly communicating with the children’s therapist to inquire about the children’s ability to resume visitation and provided updates to the mother on the children.
3. The trial court properly concluded that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the father with J, the evidence in the record having supported the court’s determination: the department referred the father for substance abuse services to address his admitted opioid dependence, but he did not complete those programs successfully, and the court properly determined that it was not unreasonable for the department not to have referred the father for mental health services when he denied having any mental health concerns; moreover, the department’s efforts regarding visitation were reasonable under the circumstances wherein J had negative reactions following visitation, and, although the court suspended visitation, the department communicated with the father
4. The trial court’s determination that the termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of J was not clearly erroneous, as it was supported by the court’s findings and conclusions with respect to the applicable statutory (
5. This court declined to review the mother’s claim that the trial court improperly denied her motion to intervene, filed after the trial court rendered judgments terminating her parental rights, in which she sought posttermination visitation with the minor children, as the record was inadequate to review this claim because the trial court did not file a memorandum of decision explaining its ruling and the mother did not file a notice pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 64-1 (b)) or a motion for articulation of the court’s factual and legal basis for its ruling.
Argued February 18—officially released May 20, 2021**
Procedural History
Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, Juvenile Matters at Middletown, and tried to the court, Woods, J.; judgments terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from which the respondent father of Jacob M. and the respondent mother of Natasha T. et al. filed separate appeals to this court. Affirmed.
Karen Oliver Damboise, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 44233 (respondent father).
Albert J. Oneto IV, assigned counsel, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 44237 (respondent mother).
Evan O’Roark, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Clare Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellee in both cases (petitioner).
Chris Oakley, attorney for the minor children in both cases.
DiPENTIMA, J. In these related appeals, the respondents, mother and father, appeal from the judgments of the trial court terminating their parental rights with respect to their minor children and child, respectively. The respondents both claim that the court improperly (1) denied their joint motion for a mistrial, (2) concluded that the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify them with their children or child and (3) concluded that they were unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. In Docket No. AC 44233, the father additionally claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) the termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of his son, Jacob, and (2) it lacked the authority to grant posttermination contact. In Docket No. AC 44237, the mother additionally claims that the court improperly denied her postjudgment motion to intervene. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of the respondents’ claims on appeal. At the time of the court’s July 21, 2020 judgments, Natasha, the biological daughter of the mother,1 was seven years old, and Jacob, the biological son of both respondents, was four years old. In its memorandum of decision, the court found the following. ‘‘On November 22, 2016, [the department] received a report alleging physical and emotional neglect of Natasha . . . and Jacob . . . by [the respondents]. Pursuant to the report, [the father] was in a car accident at work and appeared to be under the influence. [The father’s] boss then sent a friend to the family residence. . . . The children were found to be naked and soiled. They were brought to the maternal grandparents’ home. Police went to the home where the parents admitted to opioid overdoses while caring for the children. At that time the department invoked a ninety-six hour hold on behalf of both children.
‘‘On November 25, 2016, petitions of neglect and motions for orders of temporary custody were filed by [the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families]. The [orders of temporary custody were] . . . granted on November 25, 2016, and sustained on December 2, 2016. The children were adjudicated neglected and committed to [the petitioner] on December 22, 2016. On February 8, 2017, they were sent to live with their mother at the Amethyst House women and children’s program. On March 30, 2017, they returned to their apartment. . . . A motion to revoke commitment was filed on May 8, 2017, and commitment was revoked in a hearing on May 11, 2017 . . . . The children were then placed under an order of protective supervision for six months . . . which was extended until December 7, 2017.
‘‘On September 25, 2018, [the petitioner] filed a permanency plan of [termination of parental rights] and adoption and a termination of parental rights petition [for each child]. Said permanency plan was approved on November 15, 2018. A [termination of parental rights] trial was held in this matter on September 17, 18, 25, and 30, and October 2 and 28, 2019.’’
In a memorandum of decision filed on July 21, 2020, the court, Woods, J., terminated the parental rights of the mother with respect to Natasha and Jacob, and terminated the parental rights of the father with respect to Jacob. On May 8, 2020, prior to the date of the filing of the memorandum of decision, the respondents filed a joint motion for a mistrial. In that motion, the respondents argued that a mistrial was warranted due to the court’s failure to render its judgments within 120 days of the completion of trial in violation of
These appeals followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Both respondents claim that the court, relying on an executive order issued by the governor, improperly denied their joint motion for a mistrial because the court had failed to render its judgments within 120 days of the completion of trial as required by
To provide context for the respondents’ claim, we discuss the relevant statutes and executive order.
On March 10, 2020, prior to the conclusion of the 120 day time limit, the governor issued a declaration of a
On March 19, 2020, the governor issued Executive Order No. 7G, which referenced the declaration of a state of emergency and the confirmed spread of COVID-19 in the United States and in Connecticut and which suspended ‘‘[n]on-[c]ritical [c]ourt [o]perations and [a]ssociated [r]equirements’’ in paragraph 2. Specifically, paragraph 2 (c) of Executive Order No. 7G suspended ‘‘[a]ll time limitations for rendering judgments in civil actions provided in [§] 51-183b . . . .’’
The respondents claim that
Generally, the decision of a trial court to deny a motion for a mistrial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371, 392, 3 A.3d 892 (2010). In the present case, however, the court’s ruling on the motion for a mistrial implicates a constitutional question over which our review is plenary. Persels & Associates, LLC v. Banking Commissioner, 318 Conn. 652, 668, 122 A.3d 592 (2015). Article second of the constitution of Connecticut, as amended by article eighteen of the amendments, provides in relevant part: ‘‘The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another . . . .’’
‘‘The separation of powers doctrine serves a dual function: it limits the exercise of power within each branch, yet ensures the independent exercise of that power. Nevertheless, it cannot be rigidly applied always to render mutually exclusive the roles of each branch of government. . . . [T]he great functions of government are not divided in any such way that all acts of the nature of the function of one department can never be exercised by another department; such a division is impracticable, and if carried out would result in the paralysis of government. Executive, legislative and judicial powers, of necessity overlap each other, and cover many acts which are in their nature common to more than one department.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 234 Conn. 539, 551-52, 663 A.2d 317 (1995); see also Casey v. Lamont, 338 Conn. 479, 258 A.3d 647 (2021).
Article third, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution provides in relevant part that: ‘‘The legislative power of the state shall be vested in . . . the general assembly. . . .’’ ‘‘The [lawmaking] power is in the legislative branch of our government and cannot constitutionally be delegated . . . but the General Assembly may carry out its legislative policies within the police power of the state by delegating to an administrative agency the power to fill in the details.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Milford v. SCA Services of Connecticut, Inc., 174 Conn. 146, 149, 384 A.2d 337 (1977).
‘‘A Legislature, in creating a law complete in itself and designed to accomplish a particular purpose, may expressly authorize an administrative agency to fill up the details by prescribing rules and regulations for the operation and enforcement of the law. In order to render admissible such delegation of legislative power, however, it is necessary that the statute declare a legislative policy, establish primary standards for carrying it out, or lay down an intelligible principle to which the administrative officer or body must conform, with a proper regard for the protection of the public interests and with such degree of certainty as the nature of the case permits, and enjoin a procedure under which, by appeal or otherwise, both public interests and private rights shall have due consideration. . . . If the Legisla-
Pursuant to the authority given to the governor by the legislature in
In Casey, our Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs, who were the owners of a Connecticut pub that had closed in response to executive orders that were issued due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which pertained to on premise consumption of alcoholic liquor, could not satisfy their heavy burden of establishing that
As stated by our Supreme Court in Casey, the General Assembly set forth in
In paragraph 2 (c) of Executive Order No. 7G, the governor suspended the 120 day time limitation for rendering judgments in civil actions provided in
The mother argues, citing Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc., 215 Conn. 688, 577 A.2d 1047 (1990), that the time limitation in
This argument is misplaced because
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court properly denied the respondents’ joint motion for a mistrial. Although the court rendered its judgments outside the 120 day time limit in
II
ADJUDICATORY PHASE
The respondents each challenge independently the court’s conclusions regarding the adjudicatory phase of the termination proceeding made pursuant to
In June, 2018, the petitioner filed a motion for order, seeking to have visitation suspended between the children and the respondents, both of whom were incarcerated at that time. In the motion, the petitioner stated that Davis recommended that visitation be suspended at that time ‘‘due to the negative impact these visits are having on the children.’’ On August 22, 2018, following an evidentiary hearing, the court, Sanchez-Figueroa, J., granted the motion and determined that it was in the children’s best interests to suspend the visits.
The department conferred regularly with Davis to assess the children’s fitness to resume contact with the respondents. A phone call between the respondents and the children took place on July 19, 2019, during which time Natasha became upset and left the room. After further work with Davis, Natasha sent photographs of
The following principles guide our analysis. ‘‘A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition. . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights [under . . .
‘‘[T]he statutory requirement of
‘‘Our Supreme Court clarified the applicable standard of review of an appeal from a judgment of the trial court pursuant to
A
In AC 44237, the mother claims that the court improp-
The following additional facts, as found by the court, are relevant. The court found that the department referred the mother ‘‘to many services over a number of years to assist her in an effort to reunify her with Natasha and Jacob. [The department] has offered her substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, parent mentoring services, visitation services, domestic violence counseling, and transportation.’’ The court noted that, in 2016, the mother had admitted to using heroin daily and to having overdosed on heroin on November 22, 2016. She accepted services at the Recovery Specialist Voluntary Program, where it was recommended that she attend a partial hospitalization program at the Rushford Center on December 5, 2016. In November, 2016, the department referred the mother to the Amethyst House, a residential substance abuse program, which she entered in January, 2017. The children were reunited with the mother at the Amethyst House on March 30, 2017, and returned to their apartment. She was discharged to the Rushford Center to attend a partial hospitalization program and an intensive outpatient program, both of which she completed successfully, and she was discharged from the Rushford Center in September, 2017. The court further found that ‘‘[s]ubsequent to [the] mother’s incarceration on December 1, 2017, the department continued to make reasonable reunification efforts by maintaining monthly phone contact with [the mother] to address the status of the case.’’
The mother’s argument on appeal focuses on the time frame following the court’s August 22, 2018 order suspending visitation, and she contends that the department did not make any effort to reunify her with her children during that time frame. She argues that, ‘‘[i]n view of the dearth of evidence surrounding the petitioner’s efforts to investigate whether family therapy of the kind recommended by . . . Cheyne would have ameliorated the children’s fears about visiting the respondent within a prison setting, it was not clear from the record that there was nothing more the department could have done [to reunite the family].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
The mother mischaracterizes the recommendations of Cheyne, who did not recommend that the children and the respondents engage in some type of family therapy while the mother was incarcerated.4 Rather, Cheyne discussed an eventual progression toward in person contact ‘‘in a perceived safe place,’’ but stressed that she did not recommend reunification in her evaluation ‘‘because, even while [the respondents] seem to have made some strides in terms of their personal growth and in their substance abuse, I also know that
There was evidence that the process described by Cheyne was underway. During the mother’s incarceration, there initially were visits between the mother and the children, but Davis noted the adverse reactions of the children to such visits and recommended that the visits be suspended until the children were better able to regulate their emotions through therapy. A phone call between the respondents and the children took place in July, 2019, but Natasha became upset and left the room. Eventually in August, 2019, at Natasha’s request, and with the assistance of a social worker, photographs of herself were sent to the mother. After visitation was suspended, a social worker requested monthly updates from Davis regarding the children’s therapy, specifically as to whether the children were ready to resume visitation. In addition, a social worker called the mother monthly to provide updates on the children and to receive updates from the mother on her participation in programs while incarcerated.
These facts are much different than those in In re Oreoluwa O., 321 Conn. 523, 139 A.3d 674 (2016) (Oreoluwa), on which the mother principally relies. In Oreoluwa, our Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court terminating the parental rights of the father, who lived in Nigeria and who had difficulty traveling to the United States to visit his biological son who had a medically complex heart condition. Id., 526–43. The court determined that the trial court based its review of the efforts made by the department to reunify on a presumption that the father needed to be present in this country in order to engage in reunification efforts because Oreoluwa could not travel to Nigeria due to medical issues. Id., 542–43. The court noted that no evidence was presented ‘‘regarding any additional steps taken to obtain more specific information about when Oreoluwa may be cleared to travel or at least when the medical authorities would have some clarity regarding
The mother argues that her situation is similar to that of the respondent father in Oreoluwa, who was ‘‘confined’’ to the country of Nigeria and whose child had a complex medical condition because she ‘‘could not visit with the children due to their medical complexity without the assistance of the petitioner, as an agent of the state, to investigate services that would be logically calculated to overcome the physical and medical barriers preventing the visits with the children.’’
The present case and Oreoluwa are inapposite. In Oreoluwa, the department failed to make any effort to determine whether the child was medically able to travel to Nigeria. Unlike the minor child in Oreoluwa, who never visited his father in Nigeria, the children in the present case actually visited the mother in prison until visits were suspended. Further, the department made reasonable efforts by regularly communicating with Davis to inquire about the children’s ability to resume visitation. Additionally, in the present case, unlike in Oreoluwa, the reunification efforts made by the department following the court’s suspension of visitation comprised only one segment in a series of reunification services provided to the mother. In Oreoluwa, the entirety of the reunification efforts took place under circumstances wherein the department never investigated whether the child could travel to Nigeria to visit the biological father. In re Oreoluwa O., supra, 321 Conn. 545.
Although the mother’s argument focuses on only one time frame, we note that throughout the entire process the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with the children. The department offered the mother mental health treatment, parent mentoring services, visitation services, domestic violence counseling and transportation. The mother, who had admitted to having overdosed on heroin and to using heroin daily, was provided with substance abuse treatment by the department. The children were placed at the Amethyst House with the mother and she was provided with fur-
B
In AC 44233, the father claims that the court improperly concluded that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify him with Jacob. We disagree.
The following additional facts, as found by the trial court, are relevant. The court found that the department made ‘‘extensive efforts to find and engage [the father] in services for the purposes of reunification. [The father] was referred to Fostering Family Services in December, 2016, for supervised visiting and parenting education. He attended only a few sessions and did not successfully complete the program. On December 7, 2016, [the father] submitted to a substance abuse evaluation and urine screen at Rushford Center. [The father] reported that he had a history of opioid dependence covering several years. Nevertheless, [the father] was recommended for detox but declined and reported that he had already undergone primary withdrawal. He also declined the partial hospitalization program . . . due to work concerns on December 9, 2016. In March of 2017, [the father] stopped working with Rushford Center and [Recovery Specialist Voluntary Program] case management services. He did not successfully complete these programs. In January, 2017, [the father] was referred to 24/7 Dads Program. He never followed through with the program. [The father] never engaged in any mental health treatment and denied he had any mental health issues. . . . The department continued to make reasonable efforts to reunify [the father] with Jacob . . . while incarcerated by maintaining monthly communication with him to inform him of Jacob’s status and to receive updates on his participate in services while incarcerated.’’
The father does not contest any of these factual findings. Instead, he argues that the department offered only ‘‘minimal services’’ to him. He contends that the court identified his ‘‘presenting problems’’ as unaddressed mental health concerns, but that ‘‘there was no evidence that the department ever referred [him] to mental health services.’’ We are not persuaded.
The court found that the father reported, at a December, 2016 substance abuse evaluation and urine screen at the Rushford Center, that he had a history of opioid dependence covering several years. The department provided the father with referrals for multiple services relating to his substance abuse. The father, however, denied any mental health concerns. In a social study
The father further argues that the department did not make reasonable efforts regarding visitation.6 He contends that the ‘‘department’s efforts to reunify are dictated by the particular deficiencies in the parent child relationship. . . . The deficiencies in this particular parent-child relationship was that they were not visiting at all.’’ He further contends that the department did not provide guidance, through changing the specific steps following the order suspending visitation, as to what he could have done to resume visitation. We are not persuaded.
The department referred the father for services relating to any ‘‘deficiencies in the parent-child relationship’’ caused by his opioid dependence. With respect to visitation, it was suspended due to the negative reaction of the children. Contrary to the father’s contention that the social worker ceased contacting him in the six months following the order suspending visitation, the court found that the department communicated with the father monthly to provide updates on Jacob’s status and to receive updates from him regarding his participation in services while incarcerated, and that the department conferred regularly with Davis to assess the children’s fitness to resume contact with the respondents. These findings are not clearly erroneous. There was evidence that a social worker contacted the father monthly and sought monthly updates from Davis regarding the children’s progress in therapy and regarding whether the children were ready to resume visitation. As we have noted previously, ‘‘[r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan C., supra, 86 Conn. App. 179. The department’s efforts regarding visitation were reasonable under the circumstances wherein Jacob had negative reactions following visitation, the court suspended visitation, the department checked in with the father regularly and the department continually contacted Davis to assess whether resumption of visitation was advisable. On the basis of this record, we conclude that the court’s conclusion that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the father with Jacob was supported by sufficient evidence.
In their respective appeals, both respondents claim that the court improperly determined that they were unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. We need not review these claims because we have determined that the court’s conclusion that the department made reasonable reunification efforts regarding both respondents was adequately supported by the evidence.
‘‘ ‘Because the two clauses [of
III
DISPOSITIONAL PHASE
In AC 44233, the father additionally claims that the court improperly concluded that the termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of Jacob. We disagree.
We first set forth the following applicable legal standards. ‘‘In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child. . . . It is well settled that we will overturn the trial court’s decision that the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the [child] only if the court’s findings are clearly erroneous. . . . In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [respondent’s] parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven statutory factors delineated in [
‘‘[T]he fact that the legislature [had interpolated] objective guidelines into the open-ended fact-oriented statutes which govern [parental termination] disputes . . . should not be construed as a predetermined weighing of evidence . . . by the legislature. [If] . . . the record reveals that the trial court’s ultimate conclusions [regarding termination of parental rights] are supported by clear and convincing evidence, we will not reach an opposite conclusion on the basis of any one segment of the many factors considered in a termination proceeding . . . . Indeed . . . [t]he balancing of interests in a case involving termination of parental rights is a delicate task and, when supporting evidence is not lacking, the trial court’s ultimate determination as to a child’s best interest is entitled to the utmost deference. . . . [A] trial court’s determination of the best interests of a child will not be overturned on the basis of one factor if that determination is otherwise factually supported and legally sound.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Nevaeh W., 317 Conn. 723, 739–40, 120 A.3d 1177 (2015).
The court considered and made written findings as to all seven statutory factors. The father challenges the court’s findings and conclusions with respect to four of those factors. For our analysis regarding some of these challenged factors, the court’s findings regarding visitation, which are detailed in part II of this opinion, are relevant.
The father argues, with respect to the reasonable efforts factor,
The court determined that the father neither adjusted nor corrected his circumstances to make it in Jacob’s best interest to be returned to him. See
Regarding the feelings and emotional ties factor,
Regarding
Regarding the father’s argument as to the foster mother, we note that the issue of whether her actions contributed to the children’s negative feelings toward the respondents was a contested issue at trial. The father highlights the testimony of the guardian ad litem in support of his argument. There was ample testimony from the foster mother, Davis and Cheyne that the foster mother acted appropriately. The court found that the foster mother facilitated visitation between Jacob and the father. We cannot second-guess credibility determinations of the trial court on appeal. See In re Jason M., 140 Conn. App. 708, 736, 59 A.3d 902, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 931, 64 A.3d 330 (2013), cert. denied sub nom. Charline P. v. Connecticut Dept. of Children & Families, 571 U.S. 1079, 134 S. Ct. 701, 187 L. Ed. 2d 564 (2013).
The father further argues that termination of his parental rights is not in Jacob’s best interest because Jacob deserved the opportunity to form positive memories of him. The father contends that Cheyne recommended that the children establish positive memories of their biological parents. Termination of the father’s parental rights to Jacob does not necessarily nullify Cheyne’s recommendation. Cheyne’s focus was on the well-being of the children when she described a process by which the children could form positive memories of their biological parents for their own well-being. Cheyne testified that she was not recommending that the department or the court pursue reunification, and stated in her evaluation that an open adoption would be best.
Additionally, the court’s determination that termination of the father’s parental rights was in Jacob’s best interest is also supported by the remaining statutory factors, as well as the court’s conclusion regarding the need for permanency and stability. See, e.g., In re Elijah G.-R., supra, 167 Conn. App. 34.
IV
POSTTERMINATION CONTACT
In AC 44233, the father additionally claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked authority to grant posttermination contact. The father directs our attention to a discussion during trial in which the court stated: ‘‘I don’t believe, and of course counsel can inform the court in their posttrial briefs, that there’s any authority that the court can require [posttermination] communication to continue.’’ The court did not make a ruling regarding posttermination contact but, rather, invited counsel to include such authority in the posttrial briefs, if so inclined. Moreover, the father did not request during trial or in his joint posttrial brief that the court order posttermination contact, and, therefore, the claim is unreviewable. ‘‘Our appellate courts, as a general practice, will not review claims made for the first time on appeal. . . . [B]ecause our review is limited to matters in the record, we [also] will not address issues not decided by the trial court. . . . The purpose of our preservation requirements is to ensure fair notice of a party’s claims to both the trial court and opposing parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Guddo v. Guddo, supra, 185 Conn. App. 286–87.
V
MOTION TO INTERVENE
In AC 44237, the mother additionally challenges the court’s denial of her posttermination motion to intervene in which she sought posttermination visitation with the children. In the unusual procedural posture of this case, the mother, who was a party to the termination proceedings, filed a motion to intervene in September, 2020, after the trial court had rendered its July, 2020 judgments terminating her parental rights to the children. In her motion, the mother argued that the court should grant her motion to intervene pursuant to
The mother argues that the court improperly denied her motion to intervene in which she sought posttermination visitation with the children.9 Because the record is inadequate, we decline to review this claim. ‘‘[P]ursuant to Practice Book § 64-1 (a), the court [is] required to state, either orally or in writing, a decision that encompassed its conclusion as to each claim of law raised by the parties and the factual basis therefor. . . . If an oral decision is rendered, a signed transcript of
The court did not file a written memorandum of decision explaining its ruling. The mother did not file a notice pursuant to Practice Book § 64-1 (b) with the Office of the Appellate Clerk, nor did she file a motion asking the court to articulate the factual and legal basis for its ruling. See Practice Book § 66-5. On the record before us, we are left to speculate as to the court’s reasons for denying the motion to intervene. The court could have, inter alia, concluded that a biological parent has no right to seek visitation after judgments terminating parental rights to her children have been rendered or it could have determined on the merits that posttermination visitation was not appropriate under the circumstances.10 Because we do not know the trial court’s factual or legal bases for denying the motion, the record is inadequate for us to review this claim.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.